area handbook series 

Cuba 

a country study 



I 



Cuba 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Rex A. Hudson 
Research Completed 
April 2001 



On the cover: La Iglesia de San Francisco de Asis (Church of 
San Francisco) and the plaza fountain in La Habana Vieja 
(Old Havana), 1997 

Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 



Fourth Edition, First Printing, 2002. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Cuba: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress ; edited by Rex A. Hudson — 4th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA pam ; 
550-152) 

"Research completed April 2001." 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

ISBN 0-8444-1045-4 (he : alk. paper) 

1. Cuba. I. Hudson, Rex A, 1947- . II. Library of Congress. Fed- 
eral Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-152 

F1758.C94875 2002 
972.91— dc21 

2002018893 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-152 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written 
by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors 
seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, 
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular 
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, 
their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common inter- 
ests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and 
extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Robert L. Worden 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-4840 
E-mail: frds@loc.gov 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study supersedes the 
1987 edition edited by James D. Rudolph. The authors 
acknowledge any general background information that the 
1987 edition may have provided for the present volume, which 
is a completely new edition. 

Enrique J. Lopez is gratefully acknowledged for providing 
the section on telecommunications in chapter three. The book 
editor would also like to thank the chapter authors for review- 
ing and commenting on various chapters of this volume. Their 
shared expertise contributed greatly to its overall quality. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of 
the United States government and international organizations, 
including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , as well as 
scholars affiliated with universities or other institutions, who 
offered their time, special knowledge, or research facilities and 
materials to provide information and perspective. None of 
these individuals is, however, in any way responsible for the 
work or points of view of the authors. 

The book editor would also like to thank members of the 
Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. Med- 
itz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials, served as 
liaison with the sponsoring agency, provided numerous sub- 
stantive and technical contributions, and prepared the index; 
Marilyn L. Majeska, who provided substantive editing and man- 
aged editing and production; Janie L. Gilchrist, who did the 
word processing and prepared the camera-ready copy; and 
Stephen C. Cranton, who provided automation and typesetting 
support. 

The firm of Maryland Mapping and Graphics prepared the 
book's maps and charts based on the book editor's drafts, as 
well as the photographs and illustrations for the cover and 
chapter title pages. 

Finally, the book editor acknowledges the generosity of the 
individuals and the United States Government, diplomatic, 
and international agencies and organizations who allowed 
their photographs to be used in this study. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations xv 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxi 

Country Profile xxxi 

Introduction xlvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Jaime Suchlicki 

THE EARLYYEARS, 1492-1520 6 

The Indigenous Peoples 6 

Spanish Conquest and Colonization 9 

THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1520-1898 10 

Administration and Economy 10 

Life and Society 14 

The British Occupation, 1762-63 17 

Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth 

Century 18 

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, 1868-1902 23 

The Ten Years' War, 1 868-78 23 

Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 

1895-1902 29 

United States Involvement 30 

THE REPUBLIC, 1902-59 34 

The Piatt Amendment Years, 1902-34 34 

An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 44 

The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52 49 

Background to Revolution, 1952-59 55 

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1959- 64 

Fidel Castro Takes Charge 64 

vii 



Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionali- 
zation 74 

The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89 79 

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE POST-SOVIET 

ERA 85 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 89 

Sergio Diaz-Briquets 

PHYSICAL AND NATURAL SETTING 93 

Principal Geographic Features 93 

Topography and Drainage 94 

Climate and Precipitation 98 

ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 100 

Economic Policy and Regulatory Environment .... 101 

Land Use 102 

Agriculture 103 

Water Policies 105 

Forestry 107 

Mining 108 

Urban and Industrial Pollution 108 

Environmental Consequences of the Special 

Period, 1990-2000 109 

DEMOGRAPHY 110 

Population 110 

Demographic Transition 113 

Migration 117 

RACIAL COMPOSITION 117 

PRE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 120 

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 122 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION 1 24 

Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 125 

Women's and Youth Organizations 126 

Other Mass Organizations 127 

The Military 128 

The Family Institution 129 

RELIGION 131 

The Roman Catholic Church 132 

Afro-Christian Rites 134 

Other Religions 135 

Religion in the Special Period 136 



viii 



Social Consequences of the Papal Visit of 

January 1998 137 

HEALTH 138 

EDUCATION 144 

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPECIAL PERIOD .... 149 

Health and Education 149 

The Social Safety Net 151 

Employment Policies 151 

Remittances and Closer Bonds with the Emigre 

Community 152 

Tourism 152 

OUTLOOK 154 

Chapter 3. The Economy 157 

Jorge Perez-Lopez 

PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY 161 

Background 161 

The Economic Crisis of the 1990s 163 

Economic Reforms 166 

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 179 

Background 179 

Key Economic Sectors 180 

Labor 200 

The Second Economy 205 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 207 

Background, 1960-90 207 

Foreign Trade and Finance 211 

Investment 218 

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 221 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 225 

Jorge L Dominguez 

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 229 

The Constitution 230 

National Assembly of People's Power 231 

Council of State 235 

Council of Ministers 237 

Courts 238 

Provincial and Local Government 240 

National and Local Elections 243 

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA 245 

ix 



Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses 245 

Political Bureau and Central Committee 249 

Party Organization, Membership, and Role 254 

MASS ORGANIZATIONS 256 

CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS 259 

Religion and the State 259 

Nongovernmental Organizations . . 263 

Human Rights and Opposition Groups 265 

MASS MEDIA 267 

POLITICAL PROCESSES 268 

Emerging Political Leaders 268 

Political Aspects of the Security and Military 

Forces 270 

The Widening of Public Space 271 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 274 

OUTLOOK 279 

Chapter 5. National Security 283 

Phyllis Greene Walker 

BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED 

FORCES, 1959-91 287 

Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s 287 

The Era of "Internationalism," 1970-91 291 

MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES . . 295 

Organizational Changes of 1989 295 

Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s . . . 298 

THE MILITARY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY. .... 301 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND TREATY 

OBLIGATIONS 304 

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION AT GUAN- 

TANAMOBAY 308 

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES 310 

Doctrine of the War of All the People 312 

Territorial Troops Militia 312 

Civil Defense 314 

Revolutionary Army 315 

Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force . . 319 

Revolutionary Navy 320 

Conscription and Personnel Resources 322 

Professional Training and Education 325 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 328 



x 



Relations with Russia 333 

Relations with Other Armed Forces 334 

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 335 

Leadership and Organization 335 

Special Troops 337 

Border Guard Troops 338 

National Revolutionary Police 340 

Intelligence Directorate 341 

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 344 

General Crime Trends 344 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems . . 346 
The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee 

Smuggling 350 

Human Rights and Political Prisoners 353 

Penal System 356 

OUTLOOK 362 

Appendix. Tables 365 

Bibliography 391 

Glossary 425 

Index 439 

Contributors 451 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Units, 1999 xlvi 

2 Topography and Drainage 96 

3 Population Distribution by Age-Group and Sex 116 

4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1995 166 

5 Minerals, Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Thermal 

Resources, 1996 188 

6 Transportation System, 1999 194 

7 Central Administrative Structure, 2001 232 

8 Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba 

(Partido Comunista de Cuba— PCC) ,2001 250 

9 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1999 330 

10 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1999 331 



xi 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, published in 1987, this study is an 
attempt to examine objectively and concisely the dominant his- 
torical, social, environmental, economic, governmental, politi- 
cal, and national security aspects of contemporary Cuba. The 
views expressed are those of the authors and should not be 
construed as representing the views of the United States Gov- 
ernment. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book and 
list sources thought by the chapter authors to be particularly 
helpful to the reader. Brief comments on sources recom- 
mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. 
To the extent possible, place-names follow the system adopted 
by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) . Mea- 
surements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is 
provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements 
(see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

The body of the text generally reflects information available 
as of April 2001. The introduction, in addition to providing his- 
torical perspective on Cuba's hemispheric relations, discusses 
significant events that occurred between the completion of 
research and mid-2002. The Country Profile generally reflects 
information contained in the chapters. Statistics contained in 
the tables or figures reflect the most current data available at 
the time. 

Although there are many variations, Spanish surnames most 
often consist of two parts: a patrilineal name followed by a 
matrilineal name. In the instance of President Fidel Castro 
Ruz, Castro is his father's name, and Ruz is his mother's 
maiden name. In nonformal use, Cubans very often drop the 
matrilineal name. Thus, after the first mention the president is 
referred to simply as Castro. (His brother is referred to as Raul 
Castro on second mention in order to avoid confusion.) 

Some literature on Cuba refers to the Cuban Revolution as 
the guerrilla struggle that culminated in the fall of Fulgencio 
Batista y Zaldivar during the last days of 1958 and the first days 
of 1959. In this book, the Cuban Revolution refers to a histori- 
cal process that began on January 1, 1959, and continues into 
the present. This definition, as well as the practice of uppercas- 



xiii 



ing "Revolution" in this context, conforms with official Cuban 
government practice and with much scholarly literature. 

Whenever possible, names, abbreviations, and acronyms of 
organizations or terms conform to official Cuban government 
use, as indicated in sources such as the Havana telephone 
directory, and official United States Government use, as com- 
piled by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). 
For example, although the plural form of Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) generally refers to the thou- 
sands of block CDRs, the national committee that heads these 
CDRs is listed officially in Cuban and United States Govern- 
ment reference sources as the Committee for the Defense of 
the Revolution (Comite de Defensa la la Revolucion — CDR). 
Thus, the singular of the abbreviation is used to distinguish the 
national committee from the block CDRs. 



xiv 



Table A. Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 



Acronym or Abbreviation 



Organization or Term 



AIC Agrupacion Independiente de Color (Independent Colored 

Association) 

AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

AIE Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student Left Wing) 

ALADI Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion (Latin American 

Integration Association) 

ANAP Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (National 

Association of Small Farmers) 

ANPP Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (National Assembly of 

People's Power) 

AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph Company 

BCC Banco Central de Cuba (Cuban Central Bank) 

BFI Banco Financiero Internacional (International Financial 

Bank) 

BNC Banco Nacional de Cuba (Cuban National Bank) 

BRR Brigadas de Respuesta Rapida (Rapid Response Brigades) 

Cadeca Casas de Cambio (Exchange Houses) 

Caricom Caribbean Community and Common Market 

Caritas Catholic Relief Services 

CCDRN Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacion 

Nacional (Cuban Committee for Human Rights and 
National Reconciliation) 

CCPDH Comite Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos (Cuban Committee 

for Human Rights) 

CDA Cuban Democracy Act 

CDR Comite de Defensa de la Revolution (Committee for the 

Defense of the Revolution) 

CEA Centro de Estudios sobre America (Center for American 

Studies) 

CEATM Comite Estatal de Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material (State 

Committee for Technical and Material Supply) 

CEB Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base (Ecclesiastical Base Com- 

munities) 

CEPAL Comision Economica para America Latina 

CETSS Comite Estatal de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (State Commit- 

tee on Labor and Social Security) 

CIEM Centro de Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial (Center 

for the Study of the World Economy) 

CIGB Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia (Center for 

Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology) 

Cimex Companfa Importadora-Exportadora (Import-Export Com- 

pany) 

CIPS Centro de Investigaciones Psicologicas y Sociologicas (Center 

for Psychological and Sociological Research) 

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 

CMEA (see Comecon) 

CNN Cable News Network 



XV 



Table A. ( Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 



Acronym or Abbreviation 



Organization or Term 



Comarna 

Comecon 
CPA 

CTC 

Cubalse 

Cabana 

Cabanacan 

DA 

DAAFA.R 

DCI 

DCI 

DCPI 

DEP 

DEU 

DGG 

DGI 

DGSP 

DGTE 

DI 
DI 

DPEI 

DPNR 

DRI 

DSE 

DT 

ECAM 
ECLAC 



Comision Nacional para la Proteccion del Medio Ambiente y 
la Conservacion de los Recarsos Natarales (National Com- 
mission for Environmental Protection and Conservation of 
Natural Resoarces) 

Coancil for Mutual Economic Assistance 

Cooperatives de Prodaccion Agropecnaria (Agricultural-Live- 
stock Cooperatives) 

Central de Trabajadores de Caba (Caban Workers Federa- 
tion) 

Empresa para Prestacion de Servicios al Caerpo Diplomatico 
(Diplomatic Corps Serv ice Company) 

Empresa Consolidada Cabana de Aviacion (Consolidated 
Caban Aviation Company) 

Corporacion de Tarismo y Comercio Internacional (Interna- 
tional Tourism and Trade Corporation) 

Departamento America (America Department) 

Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolacionaria (Antiair- 
craft Defense and Rev olutionary Air Force) 

Direction de Cedala de Identidad (Directorate for Identity 
Cards) 

Direction de Contra Inteligencia (Directorate of Counterin- 
telligence) 

Direccion de Caadros, Personal y Instruction (Directorate of 
Cadres, Personnel, and Instraction) 

Direccion de Establecimientos Penales (Directorate of Peni- 
tential)' Establishments) 

Directorio Estadiantil Universitario (University Stadents 
Directorate) 

Direccion General de Gaardafronteras (General Directorate 
of Border Guards) 

Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Intelligence 
Directorate) 

Direccion General de Segaiidad Personal (General Director- 
ate of Personal Security) 

Direccion General de Tropas Especiales (General Directorate 
of Special Troops) 

Direccion de Information (Information Directorate) 

Direccion de Inteligencia (Directorate of Intelligence) 

Departamento de Prevention y Extincion de Incendios 
(Directorate for the Prevention and Extinction of Fires) 

Direccion de la Policia Nacional Revolacionaria (National 
Revolationary Police) 

Direccion de Relaciones Internacionales (International Rela- 
tions Directorate) 

Departamento de Segaridad del Estado (Department of State 
Secarity) 

Direccion Tecnica (Technical Directorate) 

Escuela de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo (Gen- 
eral Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School) 

E< onomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 



Acronym or Abbreviation 



Organization or Term 



EEC 
EJT 
ELN 
EMCC 

EMPA 

ETA 
ETECSA 

EU 
FAR 

FARC 

FEEM 

FEU 

FY 
FMC 

FNLA 

FSB 
FSLN 

FTAA 

GATT 

GDP 

GNB 

GNP 

GONGO 

GSP 

GTP 

HIV 

IAEA 

IDI 

IISS 
ITM 

Juceplan 
KGB 

LAFTA 
LCC 



European Economic Community 

Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo (Youth Labor Army) 

Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army) 

Escuelas Militares Camilo Cienfuegos (Camilo Cienfuegos 
Military Schools) 

Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviacion (Aviation Pilots Military 
School) 

Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) 

Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. (Telecommu- 
nications Company of Cuba) 

European Union 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces) 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolution- 
ary Armed Forces of Colombia) 

Federacion de Estudiantes de la Ensehanza Media (Federa- 
tion of Secondary School Students) 

Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (Federation of University 
Students) 

fiscal year 

Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation of Cuban 
Women) 

Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola) 

Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) 

Frente Sandinista de Liberacion National (Sandinista 
National Liberation Front) 

Free Trade Area of the Americas 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

gross domestic product 

Grupo Nueva Banca (New Banking Group) 

gross national product 

government-operated nongovernmental organization 
global social product 

Guerra de Todo el Pueblo (War of All the People) 

human immunodeficiency virus 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Instituto de la Demanda Interna (Domestic Consumer 
Demand Institute) 

International Institute for Strategic Studies 

Instituto Tecnico Militar (Military Technical Institute) 

Junta Central de Planificacion (Central Planning Board) 

Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee for State 
Security) 

Latin American Free Trade Association 

Laboratorio Central de Criminologi'a (Central Laboratory of 
Criminology) 



Table A. ( Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 



Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term 



MCR Movimiento Civico Revolucionario (Civic Resistance Move- 

ment) 

MGR Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Navy) 

MINFAR Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry 

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces) 

MNR Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias (National Revolutionary 

Militias) 

MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Move- 

ment for the Liberation of Angola) 

MPS Material Product System 

MTT Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (Territorial Troops Militia) 

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

OAS Organization of American States 

OCES Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States 

ONE Oficina Nacional de Estadi'sticas (National Statistical Office) 

OPJM Organization de Pioneros Jose Marti (Organization of Jose 

Marti Pioneers) 

PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba) 

PLA Chinese Popular Liberation Army 

PNR Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary 

Police) 

PPC Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Cuban People's Party) 

PPC Orthodox Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) (Cuban People's 

Party) (Orthodox) 

PRC People's Republic of China 

PRC Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party) 

PRC Authentic Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autentico) (Cuban Revolu- 

tionary Party (Authentic) 

PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolu- 

tionary Party) 

PSP Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist Party) 

PUND Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico (Democratic 

National Unity Party) 

SA. sociedades anonimas (quasi-private companies) 

SELA Sistema Economica Latino Americana (Latin American Eco- 

nomic System) 

SIGINT signals intelligence 

SMA Servicio Militar Activo (Active Military Service) 

SMO Servicio Militar Obligatorio (Obligatory Military Service) 

SNA System of National Accounts 

SNTAF Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y Forestales 

(National Trade Union of Agricultural and Forestry Work- 
ers) 

SPE Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial (System for Mana- 

gerial Improvement) 



Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 



Acronym or Abbreviation 


Organization or Term 


SUPV 


Sistema Unificado de Prevention y Vigilancia (Unified Pre- 




vention and Vigilance System) 


TGF 


Iropas Guardaironteras (Border Guard Iroops) 


TCD 

1 or 


Tribunal Supremo Popular (Supreme Court of Cuba) 


UBPC 


Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa (Basic Units of 




Cooperative Production) 


UJC 


Union de Jovenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists) 


UMAP 


Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion (Military Units 




in Support of Production) 


UNCHR 


United Nations Commission on Human Rights 


UNDP 


United Nations Development Programme 


Uneca 


Union de Empresas de Construccion del Caribe (Union of 




Caribbean Construction Enterprises) 


UNITA 


Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola 




(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) 


URC 


Union Revolucionaria Comunista (Communist Revolutionary 




Union) 


USTEC 


United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council 



Table B. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Descripti 



PREHISTORY 

c. 1000 B.C.-c. 1000 A.D. 

c. 800-c. 1450 

FIFTEENTH CENTURY 
October 27, 1492 



Ciboney Indians migrate to central-western Cuba. 

Successive migrations of Arawak Indians (sub-Taino and 
Taino) largely displace Ciboney. 

Christopher Columbus discovers and explores Cuba. 



SIXTEENTH CENTURY 

1508 

1511-24 



1515 
1519 

1522- 33 

1523- 24 
1538 



Sebastian de Ocampo circumnavigates and explores the island. 

Diego Velazquez de Cuellar conquers the Indians and estab- 
lishes various settlements, including Baracoa, the first settle- 
ment, established in 1512. 

Santiago de Cuba is established as the Cuban capital. 

San Cristobal de Habana is relocated from its original site on 
the Gulf of Batabano on the south coast to its present loca- 
tion on the north coast. 

The last major indigenous peoples' uprising is suppressed. 

Blacks are brought from Africa to work the mines and fields. 

La Habana (hereafter Havana) becomes the seat of govern- 



1553 
1555 



1592 
1595 



SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
1607 



1628 
1662 



Santiago de Cuba is selected formally as the capital of the 
island. 

The governor's seat moves from Santiago de Cuba to Havana. 

French pirate Jacques de Sores captures and burns part of 
Havana. 

Philip II declares Havana to be a city. 

Cattle raisers install sugar mills on their lands and begin sugar 
production. 



Havana is formally established as the capital of Cuba, and the 
island is organized into two governing regions. 

Dutch pirate Piet Heyn captures the Spanish fleet off the 
northern coast of Cuba. 

The English capture and ransack Santiago de Cuba. 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
1715 



August 17, 1917 



1723 
1728 



1733 
1748 



Political administration is centralized following the Bourbons' 
assumption of power in Spain. 

Bourbon reforms begin to be introduced into Cuba. 

More than 500 armed vegueros (tobacco farmers) march into 
Havana to protest the Spanish tobacco monopoly. 

The first Cuban printing press is established. 

The University of Havana (Real y Pontificia Universidad de 
San Jeronimo de La Habana) is founded. 

Havana assumes jurisdiction over all Cuban administrative 
units. 

Havana is established as a bishopric. 



XXI 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1762 
1763 
1789 

1790 
1791 
1792 

1793 



The English capture and occupy Havana and the western half 
of the island. Havana becomes an open port. 

Havana is traded back to Spain for Florida under the Treaty of 
Paris, which ends the Seven Years' War. 

Cuba is divided into two ecclesiastical jurisdictions, one in San- 
tiago and the other in Havana. Free slave trade is autho- 
rized by royal decree. 

Cuba's first newspaper is established. 

Haitian sugar and coffee planters flee to Cuba. 

The Economic Society of Friends of Cuba (La Sociedad 
Economica de Amigos del Pais) is founded. 

Cuba's first public library is established. 



NINETEENTH CENTURY 

1808 

1809 

1812 

1814 
1817 

1818 

December 2, 1823 

1828-30 

1830s 

1837 

1844 

1848 
1854 

1865 

October 10, 1868 
April 10, 1869 

February 11, 1878 



March 15, 1878 
May 1878 



Thomas Jefferson attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain. 

Joaquin Infante organizes the first independence conspiracy. 

Jose Antonio Aponte organizes a conspiracy of slaves and free 
blacks. 

Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish throne. 

England and Spain sign a treaty proclaiming the end of legal 
slave trade effective 1820. 

A Spanish royal decree opens Cuban ports to free interna- 
tional trade. 

The United States issues the Monroe Doctrine. 

The Agmla Negra (Black Eagle) Conspiracy is organized. 

Spain imposes harsher authoritarian controls. 

The first railroad in Latin America commences operation in 
Cuba, linking Havana with Bejucal and Giiines. 

A slave conspiracy, called La Escalera (the ladder) because sus- 
pects are tied to ladders and whipped, is suppressed. 

President James Polk attempts to purchase Cuba. 

The United States issues the Ostend Manifesto, calling for the 
purchase of Cuba. 

The Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), Cuba's first political 
party, is organized. 

The Grito de Yara begins the Ten Years' War between Cuba 
and Spain. 

Rebels fighting Spain hold a Constituent Assembly in Guai- 
maro, where they adopt Cuba's first constitution and elect 
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as their president. 

The Pact of Zanjon, signed with Spain, ends the Ten Years' War 
but does not win independence for Cuba. The country is 
organized into six provinces: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, 
Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de 
Cuba. 

The Protest of Baragua: General Antonio Maceo rejects the 
Pact of Zanjon and calls for the abolition of slavery. 

The Ten Years' War officially ends, after the remaining Cuban 
forces surrender. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1879-80 

October 7, 1886 
1892 

May 19, 1895 
December 7, 1896 
February 15, 1898 
April 25, 1898 
December 10, 1898 

January 1, 1899 

TWENTIETH CENTURY 
June 21, 1901 

Republican Period 
May 20, 1902 

May 22, 1903 
July 2, 1903 

1904 

August 1906 

1906-09 

1908 

1912 

1912 

April 7, 1917 
1917 

1920 
1920 



La Guerra Chiquita (The Little War) , a short-lived rebellion 
against Spain, takes place. 

Spain abolishes slavery in Cuba. 

Jose Marti forms the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revo- 
lucionario Cubano — PRC) in Tampa, Florida. 

Cuba's foremost hero, poet, and visionary, Jose Marti, is killed 
on the battlefield at Dos Rios in eastern Cuba. 

Antonio Maceo, one of the most successful guerrilla leaders, is 
killed at the Battle of Punta Brava in western Cuba. 

The battleship U.S.S. Maine, anchored in Havana Harbor, 
blows up and sinks, killing 260 officers and crew. 

The United States declares war on Spain, beginning the Span- 
ish-American War (1898). 

The United States and Spain sign the Treaty of Paris, ending 
the Spanish-American War and granting Cuba its indepen- 
dence. 

The United States occupies Cuba militarily, installing General 
John R. Brooke as the first United States military governor. 



The Cuban constitution is drafted, incorporating the United 
States-imposed Piatt Amendment, which gives the United 
States the right to intervene in Cuba. 

The United States military occupation ends when the republic 
is proclaimed and Tomas Estrada Palma (president, 1902- 
06) is sworn in as Cuba's first elected president. 

Cuba and the United States sign the Permanent Treaty, which 
incorporates the Piatt Amendment. 

The follow-up United States-Cuban Treaty is signed, whereby 
Cuba agrees to lease the United States military bases in the 
port cities of Guantanamo and Bahia Honda for an indefi- 
nite period. 

Cuba holds its first elections for national Congress. 

The August War (Guerrita de Agosto) , a Liberal Party (Partido 
Liberal) uprising set off by Estrada Palma's fraudulent elec- 
tion, hastens United States intervention. 

The second United States intervention takes place, with 
Charles Magoon serving as governor of the island. 

Liberal Party candidate Jose Miguel Gomez (president, 1909- 
13) wins election to a four-year term. 

A short-lived racial uprising, led by the Independent Colored 
Association (Agrupacion Independiente de Color) , 
prompts the dispatch of United States Marines to Cuba. 

Conservative Mario Garcia Menocal (president, 1913-21) is 
elected to a four-year term. 

Cuba declares war on Germany. 

The Liberal Party leads a short-lived uprising in Oriente and 
Camaguey. 

The sugar boom collapses. 

Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso (president, 1921-25) wins elec- 
tion to a four-year term as president. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



February 1923 
1924 

August 16, 1925 

1927 

1930 
1931 

1933 

August 12, 1933 
September 4, 1933 

January 1934 
May 29, 1934 
1934 

December 11, 1935 

May 1936 

December 1936 

1939 

1938 
1939 

1940 

December 9, 1941 
1943 



United States representative General Enoch Crowder is sent to 
Cuba to "reform" the political process. 

Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-33) is elected to 
his first four-year presidential term. 

The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — 
PCC) is founded in Havana. 

The anti-Machado University Students Directorate (Directorio 
Estudiantil Universitario) is founded. 

The clandestine ABC organization is established. 

Carlos Mendieta and former President Garcia Menocal orga- 
nize a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio. 

Machado's army crushes the expedition from the United States 
led by Carlos Hevia and Sergio Carbo. 

The United States becomes involved in mediating between 
Machado and various groups seeking to overthrow his gov- 
ernment. 

The army ousts Machado; Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Que- 
sada (president, 1933) becomes provisional president. 

The Revolt of the Sergeants, led by Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar 
(president, 1940-44, 1952-59), hastens the fall of Cespedes. 

Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48) 
becomes president of a revolutionary government. 

Colonel Batista overthrows Grau's regime and appoints Colo- 
nel Carlos Mendieta (president, 1934—35) as provisional 
president. 

The United States abrogates the Piatt Amendment by signing 
the Treaty of Relations between Cuba and the United 
States. 

The Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic) (Partido Revolu- 
cionario Cubano — PRC) (Autentico) is organized. 

A general strike forces the resignation of President Mendieta, 
who is replaced by Jose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 
1935-36). 

Miguel Mariano Gomez y Arias (president, 1936) is "elected" 
president. 

Federico Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40) becomes president 
for a four-year term. 

Grau San Martin is elected president of the Constitutional 
Assembly. 

The PCC is recognized as a legal political party. 

The Workers' National Federation (Confederacion Nacional 
Obrera), created in 1925, is reorganized into the Cuban 
Workers Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de 
Cuba— CTC). 

A progressive constitution is drafted. General Batista is elected 
president for a four-year term. 

Cuba declares war on the Axis powers. 

General Batista legalizes the PCC and established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union, which is allied to the 
United States. 



xxiv 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1944 

1947 

1948 
1951 

March 10, 1952 
April 1952 
1953 

July 26, 1953 

November 1, 1954 
May 15, 1955 

December 2, 1956 

March 13, 1957 

1957 



The PCC changes its party name to Popular Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Popular— PSP). 

Grau San Martin is elected president. 

Eduardo Chibas forms the Orthodox branch of the Cuban 
People's Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano— PPC) Ortho- 
dox (Ortodoxo). 

Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52) is elected president. 

Chibas commits suicide. 

Batista seizes power through a military coup. 

Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union are broken. 

Resistance is organized and led primarily by Autenticos and 
university students. 

Fidel Castro Ruz launches the ill-fated Moncada Barracks 
attack. 

Batista is "reelected" president for a four-year term. 

Fidel Castro is released from prison and departs for the United 
States. 

Castro's eighty-three-member Granma expedition lands in Ori- 
ente Province. 

Members of the Directorate (Directorio) and the Autenticos 
attack the Presidential Palace unsuccessfully. 

Police kill Directorio leader Jose Antonio Echeverria. 

Castro consolidates his guerrilla operations in the Sierra Maes- 



1958 



Revolutionary Period 
January 1, 1959 

January 7, 1959 
January 1959 
May 17, 1959 

1959 

February 1960 
May 7, 1960 



The Castro-organized general strike collapses. 

A military offensive against the guerrillas fails. 

The United States gradually withdraws support for the Batista 
regime, suspending arms shipments to it on March 14. 

A rigged election produces the victory of Batista's candidate, 
Andres Rivero Agiiero. 

Increased demoralization and corruption lead to the gradual 
collapse of Cuba's armed forces. 

Batista and his close associates escape to the Dominican 
Republic. 

Fidel Castro assumes command and begins consolidation of 
power. 

The United States recognizes the Castro government. 

Trials and executions of former Batista regime officials begin. 

The first Agrarian Reform Law is promulgated, expropriating 
farmlands of more than 404 hectares and forbidding for- 
eign land ownership. 

Castro becomes prime minister and replaces Manuel Urrutia 
Lleo with his hand-picked candidate, Oswaldo Dorticos 
Torrado. 

The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificacion — 
Juceplan) is created to plan and direct the economy. 

Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations resume. 



XXV 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



October 19, 1960 

January 3, 1961 
April 17-19, 1961 

December 2, 1961 
January 31, 1962 

October 14, 1962 

October 22-November 20, 
1962 

November 21, 1962 

November 6, 1965 

November 2, 1966 

August 1967 

October 9, 1967 
1975 

October 1975 
February 24, 1976 



April 1977 

April 27, 1977 

September 1977 

January 1978 
August 30, 1979 

April 1980 
April 19, 1982 



The United States declares an embargo on trade with Cuba, 
except for medical supplies and most foodstuffs. 

The United States breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

Cuban forces defeat the United States-sponsored Bay of Pigs 
invasion. 

Castro declares himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. 

Cuba is expelled from the Organization of American States 
(OAS — see Glossary). 

The Cuban Missile Crisis begins when United States reconnais- 
sance aircraft photograph Soviet construction of intermedi- 
ate-range missile sites in Cuba. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis brings the United States and the 
Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear conflict. 

President John F. Kennedy ends the quarantine measures 
against Cuba. 

The Freedom Flights Program begins, allowing 250,000 
Cubans to come to the United States by 1971. 

The Cuban Adjustment Act allows 123,000 Cubans to apply for 
permanent residence in the United States. 

After a one-year suspension, flights resume to take United 
States citizens out of Cuba 

Ernesto "Che" Guevara is executed in Bolivia. 

The United States reports the presence of Cuban soldiers and 
advisers in Angola to support the Marxist group, the Popu- 
lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento 
Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) . 

Cuba begins deployment of 35,000 combat troops to support 
the Marxist regime in Angola. 

Cuba's new socialist constitution is promulgated, making Cas- 
tro head of government as president of the Council of Min- 
isters, commander of the armed forces, and first secretary 
of the PCC. The PCC is institutionalized within the formal 
governmental structure. 

Cuba undertakes internationalist military assistance to several 
African countries. 

Cuba and the United States sign agreements on fishing rights 
and maritime borders. 

Cuba and the United States open interests sections in each 
other's capitals. 

Cuba begins deployment of 20,000 troops to Ethiopia. 

The United States Senate announces discovery of a Soviet 
"combat brigade" of 3,000 troops in Cuba. 

About 10,000 Cuban refugees seeking asylum enter the Peru- 
vian Embassy in Havana, starting a mass exodus of Cubans 
to Peru and the United States. Castro allows 125,000 
Cubans to leave for the United States in the Mariel Boatlift. 

The United States bans travel to Cuba by United States citizens 
and allows the 1977 fishing accord to lapse. 



xxvi 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



1983 



July 31, 1984 

December 14, 1984 
May 20, 1985 
1985 



October 4, 1985 



1986 



May 18, 1986 
July 1, 1986 

1987 



November 19, 1987 



United States Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders 
meets with the head of the Cuban Interests Section in Wash- 
ington, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, to request that Cuba take 
back thousands of Cubans (who came to the United States 
via the 1980 Mariel Boatlift) because of their criminal con- 
duct in Cuba. 

Cuba informs the United States it is willing to discuss the 
return of some Cubans who came to the United States ille- 
gally in 1980, but only as part of overall negotiations on 
"normalizing of migration" between the two countries. 

Cuban and United States officials start discussions in New York 
about immigration issues, including the possible return of 
1,000 Cuban refugees (Marielitos) from the 1980 Mariel 
Boatlift. 

Cuba and the United States conclude a migration pact under 
which Cuba agrees to accept the return of Marielitos. 

Radio Marti begins broadcast news and information from the 
United States to Cuba. 

Twenty-three Cuban Marielitos are returned to Havana. These 
are the first of more than 2,700 unwanted Cubans the 
United States wishes to return as part of an agreement with 
Fidel Castro's government. 

Havana suspends all immigration proceedings between Cuba 
and the United States in response to the start-up of Voice of 
America's Radio Marti. Cuban-Americans are prohibited 
from visiting Cuba. 

President Reagan bans travel to the United States by Cuban 
government or PCC officials or their representatives, as well 
as most students, scholars, and artists. 

The United States and Cuba agree to negotiate the revival of 
the 1984 immigration agreement that enabled the United 
States to deport several thousand Cubans with histories of 
crime or mental illness who had arrived in the United States 
as part of the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Talks collapse when 
the United States refuses to recognize Cuba's right to broad- 
cast over an AM frequency in the United States to match 
Radio Marti transmissions. 

Cuba allows seventy political prisoners, many of whom had 
been in prison for more than twenty years, to leave the 
country and fly to Miami. 

Farmers' markets (legal since 1980) are banned. 

Cuba suspends service on its convertible currency (see Glos- 
sary) debt. 

Private home ownership is banned. 

Cuba agrees to release 348 political prisoners at request of 
Roman Catholic Church in the United States. 

The Cuban government, in a policy reversal, agrees to restore 
an immigration pact with the United States by which 2,600 
Cubans, whose criminal records make them ineligible for 
United States residence, are to be deported from the 
United States and up to 27,000 Cubans are to be allowed to 
emigrate to the United States each year. 



xxvii 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



March 1988 



April 21, 1988 



1989 



1990 



March 23, 1990 



1991 



September 1, 1991 



1992 



United Nations Commission on Human Rights (see Glossary) 
unanimously agrees to accept an unexpected invitation 
from Havana to investigate human rights in Cuba. Even 
though UN specialists encounter harsh penal systems in 
Cuban prisons, they find no evidence to support United 
States charges of torture and executions. The official UN 
investigation concludes that abuses have declined. 

John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New York, meets with 
Fidel Castro in Havana. It is the first visit by a Roman Catho- 
lic cardinal to Cuba since 1959. 

The UN issues a report on the human rights situation in Cuba, 
suggesting that although there have been big improvements 
in church-state relations and treatment of political prison- 
ers, basic political liberties are still widely denied. 

Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a highly decorated 
war hero, is arrested on corruption charges; American offi- 
cials say the action suggests dissension at the highest levels 
of the Cuban military; Cuba's Transportation Minister, Dio- 
des Torralba Gonzalez, a friend of Ochoa's, is also relieved 
of his duties; Ochoa is accused of being involved in illicit 
sales in Angola. 

Minister of Interior General Jose Abrantes Fernandez is 

replaced as the top security officer following official charges 
that high military officers in Cuba are involved in drug traf- 
ficking. The Ministry of Interior is reorganized. 

Cuba announces that a firing squad has executed four Cuban 
Army officers convicted by court martial of conspiring to 
ship tons of cocaine and marijuana to the United States. 
The four include Ochoa Sanchez, 

The Castro regime announces a series of austerity measures, 
the "special period in peacetime" (hereafter Special 
Period — see Glossary) . 

TV Marti, an anti-Castro, United States-taxpayer-funded sta- 
tion, is launched, but the signal is jammed by the Cuban 
government. 

Switzerland, which sponsors United States diplomats in 
Havana, offers to sponsor the Cuban Interests Section in 
Washington to ensure that both countries have diplomatic 
representation in each other's capital. 

The deteriorating economic situation in Cuba prompts a large 
increase in the number of Cubans seeking to leave their 
country. 

Cuba announces the lifting of restrictions on travel abroad; 
anyone aged twenty or over is to be allowed to leave and visit 
other countries, provided that the host nation gives them a 
visa. 

The Fourth Party Congress is held and resolves to allow mem- 
bers of religious groups to join the party. 

In order to remove a major obstacle to increased United States 
economic aid to the Soviet Union, President Mikhail S. Gor- 
bachev declares that he will withdraw Soviet troops from 
Cuba and end the US$2-billion-a-year trade subsidy that 
Moscow gives Havana. 

The government of President Castro steps up efforts to crush 
internal opposition. 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



August 14, 1993 
1994 



August 1994 



September 9, 1994 



late September 1994 
1994 



December 1994 
May 2, 1995 



February 24, 1996 

November 19, 1996 
February 12, 1997 

January 11, 1998 
January 21-25, 1998 



In a rare exception to the economic blockade of Cuba, the 
Bush administration grants permission to the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) to expand 
telephone services between Cuba and the United States; 
Cuba rejects AT&T's proposal. 

Russia and Cuba agree to the withdrawal of a former Soviet 
infantry brigade that has been on the island since the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 

Cuba and Russia sign trade accords for new ties based on 
mutual benefits; Cuba is to trade sugar for Russian oil at 
world market prices. 

Cuba ends the ban on the use of dollars. 

The Clinton administration ends the United States' open-door 
policy toward Cuban refugees, who will be detained for an 
indefinite period after they arrive in the United States. 

Following Castro's declaration of an open migration policy, a 
new boat-lift begins. The United States stops refugees 
aboard rafts and boats off the Florida coast and begins 
detaining them at its Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. 

Cuba and the United States reach agreement under which 
Cuba pledges to stop citizens from fleeing in small boats 
and the United States promises to accept at least 20,000 
Cuban immigrants a year. 

Farmers' markets are reinstated. 

The flood of Cuban refugees ends as the Cuban government 
implements terms of agreement reached with the United 
States aimed at halting the exodus. 

The Clinton administration gives United States telecommuni- 
cations companies permission to establish direct telephone 
links with Cuba. 

Cuba establishes a new currency, the convertible peso (see 
Glossary) . 

Cuba and the United States issue a joint communique reaf- 
firming their commitment to promote safe, legal, and 
orderly migration. Under this accord, Cubans interdicted at 
sea or who enter the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station ille- 
gally are returned to Cuba provided that they do not have 
any concerns about possible official Cuban retaliation. 

Cuban Air Force MiG jet fighters shoot down two small 
unarmed aircraft belonging to Brothers to the Rescue, a 
Miami-based Cuban exile group, in international waters, 
killing four persons. 

Pope John Paul II receives Fidel Castro at the Vatican and 
accepts an invitation to visit Cuba. 

The White House approves licenses for ten press organizations 
interested in establishing bureaus in Havana; Cuba 
approves only the Cable News Network (CNN). 

National and provincial parliamentary elections are held. 

Pope John Paul II visits Cuba. 



xxix 



Table B. ( Continued) Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



February 25, 1999 



November 25, 1999 

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
March 2000 



June 28, 2000 



March 21-24, 2001 



April 12-15, 2001 
June 12, 2001 

July 14, 2001 



Cuba suspends about 80 percent of its telephone links to the 
United States in retaliation for the withholding by five 
United States telecommunication firms of US$19 million ii 
payments owed to the Telecommunications Company of 
Cuba (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, S.A. — 
ETECSA). 

A five-year-old Cuban boy, Elian Gonzalez, is rescued in the 
Straits of Florida. 



Tough new legislation aimed at combating political dissent and 
protecting the Cuban economy becomes effective. Decree- 
Law 88, the Law for the Protection of the National Indepen- 
dence and Economy of Cuba, provides a penalty of up to 
twenty years' imprisonment for a series of offenses, includ- 
ing providing information to the United States government; 
owning, distributing, or reproducing material produced by 
the United States government or any other foreign entity; 
and collaborating, by any means, with foreign radio, televi- 
sion, press, or other foreign media, for the purpose of desta- 
bilizing the country and destroying the socialist state. 

Elian Gonzalez, accompanied by his father, returns to Cuba 
after an intense seven-month legal and political battle over 
the child's custody. 

A conference of American and Cuban scholars, entitled "Bay 
of Pigs: Forty Years After," is held in Havana, and many 
declassified United States and Cuban documents on the 
invasion are released. 

Chinese President Jiang Zemin pays a state visit to Cuba. 

United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell says that China 
had delivered arms to Cuba. 

United States President George W. Bush confirms support for 
tougher economic and travel sanctions against Cuba. 



XXX 



Country Profile 




Country 

Official Name: Republic of Cuba (Republica de Cuba). 

Short Name: Cuba. 

Term for Citizen(s): Cuban (s) 

Capital: La Habana (hereafter, Havana). 

j w av on 1902 (from Spain on December 10 s 
Independence: May l^uz p ™i«qq to 19021 

1898 but administered by United States from 1898 to 1902). 



XXXI 



Geography 



Location: Caribbean island south of Florida between Carib- 
bean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean at geographic coordinates 
21°30*N, 80°00'W. 

Size: Slightly smaller than Pennsylvania. Square kilometers: 
110,860, including Isla de Cuba (104,945 square kilometers), 
Isla de la Juventud (2,200 square kilometers), and adjacent 
keys (3,715 square kilometers). 

Length of Coastline: 5,746 kilometers. 

Maritime Claims: As signatory to Law of the Sea Treaty, Cuba 
claims twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea and 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zone. 

Topography: Plains cover about two-thirds of land surface, 
three principal mountain ranges the rest. Tallest peak, Pico 
Real del Turquino, at 1,974 meters, is in Sierra Maestra 
mountain chain. About 60 percent of total land area (11 
million hectares) used for agriculture. About 12 percent 
(800,000 hectares) of agricultural land highly productive deep 
and permeable soils; 22 percent marginal for agriculture. Of 
remaining noncultivated land, 21 percent (or 2,311,000 
hectares) pasture or fallow, and 25.7 percent (or 2,831,600 
hectares) forested. Human settlements account for 6.3 percent 
(or 694,000 hectares). 

Principal Rivers: Most important hydrographic basins: Cauto, 
Zaza, and Sagua la Grande. Average length of major rivers: 
ninety-three kilometers. Cuba's longest river: 370-kilometer 
Cauto, flowing from eastern mountains to southern coast. 

Climate: Tropical, warm, and humid. Annual mean tempera- 
tures average 25° Celsius (C). Havana's average annual rainfall: 
1,146.1 millimeters; days with rain: ninety-six. Average monthly 
temperatures in Havana range from 27° C in July and August to 
22° C in January and February; average temperature: 24.5° C. 
Relative humidity: 79 percent. Island averages 1,400 milli- 
meters of rainfall a year, although annual amount varies greatly 
from year to year. Two well-established dry and rainy seasons: 



xxxii 



monthly rainfall averages between thirty-two and ninety-nine 
millimeters during dry season, from December to April; 
between 200 and 260 millimeters during rainy season, from 
May through November. Hurricane season: July to November; 
months of most frequent storms: September and October. 

Society 

Population: Total population (1999): 11,106,000 people. July 
2001 estimate: 11,184,023. Net estimated migration rate 
(2000): -1.52 migrant(s) per 1,000 population. Illicit emi- 
gration continuing problem. Estimated 3,800 Cubans took to 
Florida Straits in 1999, 40 percent of whom (1,520) were 
interdicted by United States Coast Guard. Population density 
(1998): 100.3 inhabitants per square kilometer. Annual 
population growth rates in late 1990s less than 0.5 percent a 
year, down from 0.67 in 1995. Estimated population growth 
rate (2000): 0.39 percent. Population projection (2010): 
11,516,000. Relatively high current median age (30.2 years) 
projected to increase further (to 38.7 years) by 2010. Country 
primarily urban, with 78 percent of population residing in 
cities and towns; 22 percent rural. Largest city: Havana, with 
2.2 million inhabitants (1996). Estimated birth rate (2000): 
12.68 births per 1,000 population. Estimated life expectancy at 
birth (for both sexes combined, 2000): 76.21 years (73.84 for 
males and 78.73 for females). 

Ethnic Groups: According to 1981 Cuban census, 66 percent of 
population is "white" and 34.0 percent "nonwhite," latter 
including black (12.0 percent), mulatto or mestizo (21.9 
percent), and Asian (0.1 percent). Since 1959 Revolution, 
nonwhite share of population has increased significantly. 
Percent of population classified as white declined from 73 
percent in 1953 to 66 percent in 1981, whereas share of 
mulattos rose from 14 percent to 22 percent (black percentage 
remained almost same). 

Official Language: Spanish (Espanol) . 

Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate (people age fifteen 
and older who can read and write) in 1995: 95.7 percent 



xxxiii 



(males: 96.2 percent; females, 95.3 percent). In late 1990s, 
Cuba had eighteen teachers per 1,000 population; and 12,223 
schools, including 9,481 primary schools, 1,891 secondary 
schools, and thirty-two higher education institutions. In 1995- 
96 academic year, student enrollment in primary, secondary, 
and higher education was, respectively, 933,000, 639,000, and 
111,000. 

Health: Estimated infant mortality rate (2000): 7.51. Total 
fertility rate (1996): 1.54 children born per woman. Estimated 
total fertility rate (2000): 1.6. Major causes of death per 
100,000 population (1996): heart disease, 206; malignant 
neoplasms (cancers), 37; cerebrovascular disease, 72; infec- 
tious and parasitic diseases, 53; accidents, 51; influenza and 
pneumonia, 40. Health personnel total 339,943, including 
62,624 physicians and dentists, of whom 28,855, or 46 percent, 
are family doctors (1997). Total also includes 81,333 nurses 
and more than 56,342 mid-level technicians. Ratio of popu- 
lation to physicians (1997): 214, one of world's lowest, down 
from 1,393 in 1970. Physicians train in twenty-three medical 
schools, ten of which are located in Havana, and four dentistry 
schools. Health infrastructure includes 283 hospitals, 440 
Polyclinics, 161 medical posts, 220 maternity homes, 168 dental 
clinics, and other facilities (1997). Forty-eight hospitals in 
Havana, and sixty-four in rural areas. Other facilities: 196 
nursing homes for elderly (sixty-three of which provide only 
day services) and twenty-seven homes for disabled. Total 
number of hospital beds, including military hospitals (1997): 
66,195; social assistance beds: at least 14,201. Only 2,155 cases 
diagnosed as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive, 
811 of which were known to have developed into full-blown 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) (1999). 

Religion: No official religion. Nearly 90 percent of population 
nominally Roman Catholic in prerevolutionary Cuba, but 
number of practicing Roman Catholics probably less than 10 
percent. Estimated half of all Cubans agnostic, slightly more 
than 40 percent Christian; less than 2 percent practiced Afro- 
Cuban religions. Limited membership in other religions, 
including Judaism. Religiosity estimates may be considerably 
higher, however, if due credit is given to the cultural relevance 



xxxiv 



of informal religions, particularly of syncretic Afro-Cuban rites, 
which historically were minimized. 

Economy 

Overview: State-controlled economy. Some reforms imple- 
mented in 1990s. Central control complicated by existence of 
informal, mostly dollar economy. Compared with 1990, living 
standards for average Cuban without dollars remain at 
depressed level. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): During 1989-93, GDP 
declined by 35 percent because of lost Soviet aid and domestic 
inefficiencies. GDP grew by 0.7 percent in 1994, 2.5 percent in 
1995, 7.8 percent in 1996, 2.5 percent in 1997, and 1.2 percent 
in 1998. Cumulative GDP growth rate over 1993-98 period was 
about 16 percent, compared with contraction of 35 percent 
between 1989 and 1993. GDP growth rate in 2000: 5.6 percent. 

Per Capita GDP and Minimum Wage: Average monthly 
earnings of Cuban workers in main economic sectors, in pesos 
per month (for value of peso, see Glossary), from highest to 
lowest (1989): culture and arts, 223; science and technology, 
217; transportation, 211; administration, 201; construction, 
201; public health, social security, and tourism, 195; education, 
191; finance and insurance, 190; agriculture, 186; industry, 
186; forestry, 184; communications, 176; community and 
personal services, 164; and commerce, 163. Within industrial 
sector, average monthly earnings ranged from 237 pesos per 
month for workers in electricity production and distribution to 
141 pesos per month for workers in apparel industry. 

Inflation: In early 1990s, Cuba had very high levels of 
suppressed inflation (expressed through physical shortages 
and rampant black markets) . 

Employment and Unemployment: Self-employment in more 
than 100 occupations, primarily those related to transpor- 
tation, home repair, and personal services, became legal in 
September 1993, and number of authorized occupations 
expanded to 140 in July 1995. Making such employment legal 
allowed approximately 208,000 workers to engage in self- 



xxxv 



employment, fewer than 5 percent of economically active 
population of 4.5 million workers. By March 1996, number had 
fallen to 160,000, as result of new taxes introduced that year. 
Restrictions on self-employment remain quite severe. State- 
sector employment in 1989 was roughly 4.1 million workers, of 
whom 3.5 million were civilian employees and 600,000 were 
classified as other state employees. During 1990s state-sector 
employment fell sharply, reflecting severe dislocations suffered 
by state enterprises and sharp reductions in size of armed 
forces. By 1996 overall state employment was roughly 3.2 
million workers, 22 percent lower than in 1989. State civilian 
employment was 24 percent lower in 1997 than in 1990. From 
1989 to 1996, nonstate-sector employment, particularly in 
agricultural sector, increased more than four-fold, from about 
230,000 in 1989 to more than 1 million in 1996, absorbing 
large portion of workers shed by state sector. 

Agriculture: Liberalized agricultural markets introduced in 
October 1994. In 1997 Cuba had 6,686,700 hectares of 
agricultural land, of which 3,701,400 hectares were cultivated. 
In 1997 state directly controlled 24.4 percent of agricultural 
land; nonstate sector controlled 75.6 percent. Besides sugar- 
cane, which accounted for 48 percent of cultivated land in 
1997, state enterprises specialize in production of rice, citrus, 
coffee, and tobacco, as well as livestock, and market their 
output. Sugar production fell from 8.1 million tons in 1989 to 
3.2 million tons in 1998. 

Mining: Metal commodities produced in Cuba include 
chromite, cobalt, copper, crude steel, and nickel. Other 
nonfuel industrial mineral products include cement, gypsum, 
lime, ammonia, salt, silica sand, and sulfur. World's eighth 
leading producer of nickel in 1998, but produces only about 4 
percent of world's total nickel mine production. Nickel most 
important metal to Cuban economy and export sector. Min- 
istry of Basic Industry responsible for mineral and petroleum 
sectors. 

Industry: In 1986 Cuba's manufacturing sector consisted of 827 
enterprises of widely varying sizes, employing 726,000 workers. 
Industries with largest number of enterprises were non- 



xxxvi 



electrical machinery (150 enterprises), sugar (148), and 
foodstuffs (145). Majority of largest manufacturing plants 
(those employing more than 4,000 workers) were part of sugar 
industry; other industries having plants with more than 4,000 
workers were textiles (three), mining and nonferrous metal- 
lurgy (one), apparel (one), fishing (one), and beverages and 
tobacco (one). In addition to sugar and nickel mining 
industries, significant contributors to national product in 1989 
included beverages and tobacco, foodstuffs, nonelectrical 
machinery, chemical products, electricity generation, and 
construction materials. 

Energy: Poorly endowed with energy resources, Cuba relies on 
imports to meet energy requirements. Coal not found in 
commercial quantities; hydroelectric resources limited by low- 
volume rivers; and oil and natural gas deposits inadequate to 
meet demand. Biomass (in form of bagasse) an important 
energy source for sugar industry. In 1988 Cuba met 70 percent 
of energy requirements with liquid fuels (crude oil, light oil 
products, and heavy oil products), about 29 percent with 
biomass, and remaining 1 percent with other energy sources 
such as coal, coke, and hydroelectricity. Domestically produced 
oil amounted to nearly 1.7 million tons in 1998. Combined 
electric-generation capacity in 1997: 4.33 gigawatt hours. Real 
generating capacity may be only 1,200 megawatts. Electricity 
production in 1998: 15.274 billion kilowatt hours. Electricity 
consumption in 1998: 14.205 billion kilowatt hours. 

Services: In 1995 services included trade (hotels and restau- 
rants); electricity, gas, and water; community, personal, and 
social services; finance (including business and real estate); 
and transport (including communications and warehousing) . 

Trade Balance: Cuba ran deficit in services trade in 1989-91 
but has recorded surpluses in every year beginning in 1992. 
During 1993-95, surpluses were quite sizable, averaging 
around US$250 million. Income generated by tourism rose by 
535 percent between 1990 and 1997; it first exceeded US$1 
billion mark in 1995, reached nearly US$1.4 billion in 1996, 
and exceeded US$1.5 billion in 1997. Tourism surpassed nickel 
to become second largest source of revenue in 1991 and 



xxxvii 



overtook sugar exports in 1994. 

Imports: Over 1989-93 period, merchandise imports fell from 
8.1 billion pesos to slightly more than 2.0 billion pesos, or by 75 
percent. By 1998 they had risen to 4.2 billion pesos. 

Exports: Exports, like imports, began to recover in 1994, rising 
to about 1.3 billion pesos that year and 1.9 billion pesos in 
1996, falling to 1.8 billion pesos in 1997 and 1.4 billion pesos in 
1998. Principal export destinations in 1999: Russia, accounting 
for about 25 percent of exports; Netherlands, 23 percent; 
Canada, 16 percent. 

Balance of Payments: Unpaid debt and accrued service pay- 
ments resulting from Cuba's suspension of payment on con- 
vertible currency effective July 1, 1986, amounted to nearly 
US$6.1 billion in 1987, US$6.5 billion in 1988, and US$6.2 
billion in 1989. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 
billion in 1993 to more than US$11.2 billion at the end of 
1998. 

Budget Deficit: Budget deficit fell to pre-crisis level of -1.6 
billion pesos in 1994, -766 million pesos in 1995, -569 million 
pesos in 1996, -459 million pesos in 1997, and -560 million 
pesos in 1998. Budget deficit as share of GDP was 39.5 percent 
in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994, 5.8 percent in 1995, 4.0 percent 
in 1996, 3.1 percent in 1997, and 3.8 percent in 1998. 

External Debt: Cuba's overall debt to Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in 1989 estimated at nearly US$27 billion (using 
official exchange rate of 1 ruble=US$1.58) and at US$30.2 
billion in 1990 (using official exchange rate of 1 ruble= 
US$1.78). Because value of ruble vis-a-vis United States dollar 
fell sharply in 1990s, so did value of Cuban debt in United 
States dollar terms. Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 
billion in 1993 to about US$9.1 billion in 1994, US$10.5 billion 
in 1995, and US$11.2 billion in 1998. 

Official Exchange Rate: Value of peso dropped precipitously in 
1990s as Cuban citizens expressed very strong preference for 
holding United States dollars to obtain goods and services not 
available through centrally planned first economy. In mid-1994 



xxxviii 



peso reached probably its lowest point when it was exchanged 
at about 150 pesos for one United States dollar. In second half 
of 1990s, unofficial exchange rate fluctuated in range of twenty 
to twenty-two pesos for one United States dollar. By January 
2001, peso valued at twenty-two to dollar. 

Foreign Investment: By end of 1998, 345 joint ventures had 
been created. Foreign investment for 1985-95 period totaled 
about US$2.1 billion. 

Fiscal Year (FY): Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Air and maritime transportation services provide access to 
almost every location in Cuba. Infrastructure of ports, airports, 
and warehouses supports extensive foreign trade. 

Roads: Estimated 60,858 kilometers of highways, including 
29,4820 kilometers of paved roads and 31,038 kilometers of 
unpaved roads. Main highway: Central Highway, mostly two- 
lane highway running for 1,200 kilometers from Pinar del Rio 
in west to Santiago de Cuba in east. Multilane National 
Expressway being constructed, with 650 kilometers, from Pinar 
del Rio in west to near Sancti Spiritus in east, completed. 

Railroads: Standard-gauge railroads, 4,807 kilometers. Railroad 
transportation neglected since 1959 in favor of truck transport. 
Poorly maintained railroad system consists of one main axis 
running length of island, connecting all of major urban 
centers, economic zones, and ports, either directly or through 
branches. About one-third of railroads carry both passengers 
and freight, with rest dedicated to transport of sugarcane. 
Central railroad line under major reconstruction since late 
1970s; equipment last updated with diesel locomotives 
manufactured in former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 
Service has been reduced since early 1990s, and fuel shortages 
and frequent equipment breakdowns have made system largely 
unreliable. 

Ports: Most important of eleven main ports capable of 
handling general export and import cargoes: Antilla, Cien- 



xxxix 



fuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 
Cuba. Only major deep-water ports: bays of Cienfuegos, 
Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 
Cuba. Havana by far most important port. In addition, eight 
bulk sugar loading terminals, one supertanker terminal at 
Matanzas, and several other smaller import facilities, as well as 
specialized port facilities for fishing fleet. Number one in sugar 
export, port of Cienfuegos capable of handling one-third of 
Cuba's sugar production through its bulk sugar terminal. Its 
pier for handling oil and oil byproducts allows berthing of 
ships up to 50,000 tons. Guantanamo Bay, leased by United 
States for naval base, separated from rest of Cuba by twenty- 
nine-kilometer boundary. 

Pipelines: In late 1980s, Cuba completed an oil import facility 
at port of Matanzas and a pipeline linking it with new refinery 
built in Cienfuegos. 

Air Transport and Airports: Ten of seventeen civilian airports 
handle international flights, with nine linked to nine largest 
tourist resorts. Main international airports include Camaguey, 
Ciego de Avila, Cienfuegos, Havana, Matanzas, Santiago de 
Cuba, and Varadero. Main national airports that handle 
primarily domestic flights: Baracoa, Bayamo, Cayo Largo, 
Guantanamo, Holgmn, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, Nueva 
Gerona, and Santa Clara. Cuba's flag carrier: Consolidated 
Cuban Aviation Company (Empresa Consolidada Cubana de 
Aviacion — Cubana). Of estimated 170 airports in 1999, seventy- 
seven paved and ninety-three unpaved. 

Telecommunications: Domestic telephone countrywide trunk 
system coaxial cable; Havana and Isla de la Juventud have fiber- 
optic distribution. Country has two microwave radio relay 
installations (United States-built installation is old, with 
capacity of 960 channels; Soviet-built installation is newer, with 
capacity of 1,920 channels). Both analog and digital mobile 
cellular service established. Telephone density very low: 4.5 to 
5.5 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Number of main 
telephone lines in use in 1995: 353,000. Existing lines and 
systems not suitable for speed, bandwidth, and applications of 
modern telecommunications. Number of mobile cellular 



xl 



telephones in use in 1995: 1,939. About 70,000 new telephone 
lines being installed per year, with emphasis on public tele- 
phones throughout Cuba. International telephone system uses 
satellite earth station Intelsat. Telecommunications Company 
of Cuba, S.A. (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, 
S.A. — ETECSA) is the state-owned telecommunications com- 
pany. Principal foreign investor: STET, Italy's largest telecom- 
munications concern. 

Government and Politics 

Administrative Subdivisions: Fourteen provinces (provincias) 
listed from west to east: Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Ciudad de 
La Habana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, Sancti Spfritus, 
Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguin, 
Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo. Special Municipality 
(municipio especial): Isla de lajuventud (Isle of Youth). Number 
of municipalities in national territory: 169. 

Government: Communist state with one party, Communist 
Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC). Current 
government of Fidel Castro Ruz in power since January 1, 
1959. Castro president (chief of state and head of government) 
since December 2, 1976. As chief of state, Castro president of 
thirty-one-member Council of State and thirty-nine-member 
Council of Ministers. Cuba's most important executive 
institution: seven-member Executive Committee of Council of 
Ministers. Six vice presidents of Council of State among Cuba's 
most important politicians. Fidel Castro's formally designated 
successor: General of Army Raul Castro Ruz, first vice president 
of Council of State and Council of Ministers and minister of 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona- 
rias — FAR) . Provincial government consists of fourteen provin- 
cial assemblies, each headed by an Executive Committee, each 
with president and at least seventy-five members. Municipal 
government consists of 169 municipal assemblies, each headed 
by a president, who heads one of 169 executive committees. 

Legislature: Under 1992 constitution, all formal legislative 
powers (including powers of amending constitution) vested in 
601-member unicameral National Assembly of People's Power 



xli 



(Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, 
National Assembly) . National Assembly meets only two or three 
times annually for two or three days. National Assembly elects 
Council of State to make all decisions on behalf of National 
Assembly when latter not in session (most of time) . 

Judiciary: Minister of Justice administers all courts, which are 
all subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State and 
lack independence. Office of State Prosecutor (Fiscalia 
General de la Republica) , overseeing all law enforcement, also 
subordinate to National Assembly and Council of State. 
Members of five-chamber Supreme Court of Cuba (Tribunal 
Supremo Popular — TSP) nominated for terms by minister of 
justice and confirmed by National Assembly, except for TSP's 
president and vice president (nominated by president of 
Council of State) and military chamber members (nominated 
jointly by ministers of justice and FAR) . Each province has four- 
chamber provincial courts exercising jurisdiction over most 
types of crimes. Each municipality has municipal courts 
handling minor crimes. 

Electoral System: National Assembly seats elected directly from 
slates approved by special candidacy commissions; members 
serve five-year terms. National elections last held January 11, 
1998, when single official slate received 89.7 percent of vote 
and 601 seats; only 5 percent of voters voided their ballots or 
voted blank. In 1998 National Assembly elections, overall 
results slightly more favorable to government than in 1993, 
reflecting trend toward economic stabilization and recovery 
during intervening years. Results also more favorable to 
government in La Habana Province, where single slate 
received 88.4 percent of votes cast and percentage of null or 
blank ballots fell to 7 percent. Next elections to be held in 
2003. 

Politics: Under 1992 Electoral Law, Cuba has multi-candidate 
single-party elections with no effective campaigning at munic- 
ipal level and entirely uncompetitive rules but some cam- 
paigning at provincial and national levels. At all levels, political 
regime sharply constrains freedom of political association. 
Cubans not free to associate in political party other than Com- 



xlii 



munist Party of Cuba (PCC) to contest elections. Candidates 
running for office in different provinces and municipalities on 
official slate cannot associate into formally constituted 
"factions." Public authorities and PCC retain right to shape 
associational patterns at all levels. To be elected, candidate 
must receive more than half of valid votes cast. No candidate 
failed to be elected in 1993 and 1998 national elections. 

Political Party: PCC remains only party, still Marxist-Leninist, 
but now also follower of Jose Marti. Political Bureau party's 
leading decision-making institution and Cuba's most important 
decision-making entity. Party congresses govern PCC by 
adopting party's statutes and its programs, and choosing 
membership of Central Committee and Political Bureau. Party 
congresses meet approximately every five years, Central Com- 
mittee Plenum at least once a year, and Political Bureau once a 
week. Party membership 800,000 members by time of Fifth 
Party 7 Congress in 1997. 

Mass Media: Principal daily newspaper: Granma, official organ 
of PCC. Official organ of Union of Young Communists (Union 
de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC) : Juventud Rebelde, weekly. Long- 
standing newsmagazine: Bohemia. Television remains principal 
source of communication for entertainment and news, 
although costs of production for television led government to 
reduce number of channels and of hours of transmission in 
1990s. Number of television broadcast stations in 1997: fifty- 
eight. Number of televisions in 1997: 2.64 million. Radio 
became one of Cuba's more dynamic mass mediums in 1990s. 
Number of radio broadcast stations in 1998: AM 169, FM fifty- 
five, shortwave, one. Number of radios in 1997: 3.9 million. 

Foreign Relations: Collapse of Soviet Union and communist 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 left 
Cuba with no international allies. During 1990s, Cuban 
economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe 
plummeted. Cuban economic relations with Russia focused 
principally on barter trade, at market prices, exchanging sugar 
for petroleum. Consistent with its general policy on non- 
servicing of any debts, Cuba refused to service its large accu- 
mulated international debt to Russian Federation. Russian 



xliii 



ground troops, stationed in Cuba since 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, departed in 1992. Cuban relations with China recovered 
only gradually from the sharp bilateral split that had become 
manifest in 1966. With collapse of European communism, 
however, political relations warmed more quickly between 
these two remaining communist governments. Between 1989 
and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops from all 
countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it 
announced that it had stopped providing military support to 
revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in 
other countries. Traditional tension in United States relations 
with Castro regime continued through 1990s, aggravated by 
Cuba's encouragement of unauthorized emigration to United 
States in 1994, unilateral United States efforts to tighten 
economic embargo against Cuba, Cuba's human rights viola- 
tions, and, in 1999-2000, dispute over custody of Cuban boy 
rescued off coast of Florida. Cuban policy has been most 
effective within Anglophone Caribbean. Admitted to Carib- 
bean Tourism Organisation in 1992, Cuba in 1994 became 
founding member of Association of Caribbean States. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Total active armed forces members in 2000: 
58,000. Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) includes ground 
forces, Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucio- 
naria — MGR) , and Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 
Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — 
DAAFAR). Army, including conscripts and ready reserves, 
totals 45,000; MGR, 3,000; DAAFAR, 10,000. Army reserves: 
39,000. Ready reserves serve forty-five days per year to fill out 
active and reserve units. 

Military Service: Two years compulsory military service for 
young men beginning at age seventeen (registration at age 
sixteen); women volunteers serve three years. 

Paramilitary Forces: Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de 
Trabajo— EJT): 65,000. Civil Defense (Defensa Civil): 50,000. 
Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales — 
MTT) : 1 million. State Security: 20,000, including Ministry of 



xliv 



Interior's Special Troops (Tropas Especiales). Border Guard 
Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — TGF): 6,500. 

Defense Relations: Has long maintained contacts with armed 
forces of many developing world nations, including those in 
Latin America, as well as with Canada and Western Europe. 
International contacts broadened in 1990s. Ties with Chinese 
Popular Liberation Army (PLA) most important relationship 
with foreign military service to develop since Soviet Union's 
demise. 

Defense Budget: Figures vary. According to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1999-2000, 
defense expenditures amounted to estimated US$720 million 
in 1997 and estimated US$750 million in 1999, and defense 
budget in 1999 amounted to only P650 million, or US$31 
million. Military expenditures approximately 4 percent of GDP 
(1995), according to the World Factbook 2000, or 1.6 percent, 
according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Military expenditures 
2.2 percent of Gross National Product (GNP — see Glossary) 
(1995), or 2.3 percent (1997), according to World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1 998. 

Military Units: Army divided into three Regional Commands: 
Western (most important), Central, and Eastern, each with 
three army corps. Army units include four or five armed 
brigades, nine mechanized infantry brigades (three mecha- 
nized infantry, one armored, one artillery, and one air defense 
artillery regiment), one airborne brigade, fourteen reserve 
brigades, and one border brigade. Navy has four operational 
flotillas. Cubahas headquarters of Western Naval District, 
Holguin of Eastern Naval District. Naval bases at Cienfuegos, 
Cabanas, Havana, Mariel, Punta Movida, and Nicaro. 

Foreign Forces: As of 1999, United States: 1,080 personnel 
stationed in Guantanamo (United States Navy: 590; United 
States Marines: 490). Russia: 810 personnel (signals intelli- 
gence); military advisers: an estimated ten military personnel. 



xlv 




xlvi 



Introduction 



THE WORLD'S SEVENTH LARGEST island, with a total land 
surface of 110,860 square kilometers (about the size of Pennsyl- 
vania), the independent republic of Cuba is the largest and 
westernmost island in the West Indies, lying less than 150 kilo- 
meters south of Key West, Florida. Despite being an island 
country, it is, in terms of population (more than 11.1 million in 
2001) , the ninth largest country in Latin America and the sixty- 
seventh largest in the world, according to the United States 
Bureau of the Census. 

Cuba's strategic location at the entrance to the Gulf of Mex- 
ico between North America, the Caribbean, and Central Amer- 
ica has played an important part in its history since 
Christopher Columbus discovered the island in 1492. The 
Spaniards first used Cuba as an operational base for the con- 
quest of Mexico; Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula lies only about 
150 kilometers to the west of the island. During almost four 
centuries of Spanish rule, the Spaniards also used the island's 
natural harbors as ports for treasure-laden ships sailing 
between the New World and Spain. Spain imposed oppressive 
trade restrictions on its Cuban colony, however, until forced to 
reevaluate its policy after Britain occupied Havana in 1 762-63 
and lifted the restraints on commerce. 

Cuba has been of strategic interest to the United States at 
least since 1808, when President Thomas Jefferson called it 
"the key to the Gulf of Mexico." It was suddenly transformed in 
that century from an unimportant "ever-faithful isle" of Spain 
into the world's major sugar producer, attracting United States 
economic interests. Liberated from Spain by the United States 
in the Spanish-American War (1898), Cuba came under the 
tutelage of a new power. The United States granted the island 
independence and a degree of self-rule in 1902 but kept it 
dependent as a result of economic involvement and successive 
military interventions, as authorized by the Piatt Amendment 
(see Glossary) of 1901. The corrupt and brutal dictatorship of 
Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar (president, 1940-44, 1952-59), 
during which there were 20,000 political killings, ended with its 
overthrow on January 1, 1959, by a popularly supported guer- 
rilla force led by Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ), who has 



xlvii 



presided over his own brand of communist dictatorship ever 
since. 

In addition to being separated from its northern neighbor 
by the Florida Straits, Cuba has been isolated socially, economi- 
cally, politically, and diplomatically from the world's leading 
democracy for more than four decades by an embargo origi- 
nally imposed by the United States in 1960 for Cold War rea- 
sons. Only one other country has been under embargo longer 
than Cuba, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(more commonly known as North Korea) , which the United 
States began embargoing in 1950. 

This fourth edition of Cuba: A Country Study would be incom- 
plete without a discussion of the embargo, which the Cubans 
have always called the blockade (el bloqueo), and of Cuba's dip- 
lomatic strategy to counter it. The embargo has had a signifi- 
cant impact on numerous aspects of the island country, 
including the history of the Castro regime, the health of the 
population, the economy, foreign policy and relations, and the 
armed forces. Moreover, Cuba in the new millennium cannot 
be adequately understood without taking into account the 
embargo and the reality that the island nation is no longer iso- 
lated in the world, that it has become gradually integrated into 
the world system, and that it has been undergoing significant 
social and economic changes since the end of the Cold War. 
For these reasons, and also because American public opinion 
has become increasingly critical of the embargo, this introduc- 
tion assesses the overall effectiveness of the sanctions during 
the 1960-2001 period; summarizes Cuba's efforts to use diplo- 
macy, "internationalism" (see Glossary), and trade relations in 
the Western Hemisphere to counter it; and shows how the evo- 
lution of international opinion toward Cuba has evolved in 
response to the embargo. 

Since the end of the Cold War, Cuba's diplomatic efforts to 
counter the embargo have resulted in very significant progress 
toward the reintegration of the once-pariah island nation into 
the Caribbean and Latin American communities and the world 
in general, with the main exception of the United States. As a 
result of this development, the United States' embargo of Cuba 
has become paradoxical. According to embargo critics, it 
would be in the United States' national interest to have Cuba 
fully integrated into the world community rather than isolated 
and unconcerned with international opinion regarding the 
issue. The record shows that when Cuba was relatively isolated 



xlviii 



during the Cold War it lashed out by engaging in foreign 
adventurism and overt domestic repression. As Cuba has 
become more a part of the world community since the end of 
the Cold War, diplomatic concerns have increasingly con- 
strained the Castro regime from engaging in foreign subversive 
activities and domestic repression. Although the regime lacks 
the funding to engage in foreign adventurism in any case, it no 
longer can risk jeopardizing its hard-won diplomatic relations 
by exporting revolution on even a small scale. Nor can it risk 
jeopardizing its economically vital tourism industry by repress- 
ing Cuban citizens in full view of thousands of foreign tourists. 

Because the objective of the embargo is to keep Cuba iso- 
lated, the existing situation limits the enormous potential 
American social, economic, and political influences that schol- 
ars seem to agree could accelerate the process of change in 
Cuba. Scholars also seem to agree that change in Cuba comes 
only from outside the country. For this reason, the issue of how 
the United States can best promote change in Cuba is likely to 
need further consideration. By keeping United States influ- 
ence out of Cuba and thereby allowing the Cuban regime to 
maintain itself in power, the embargo has, according to this 
argument, served as a sort of reverse Berlin Wall. 

Less than a year before the real Berlin Wall began to be 
erected on August 13 (coincidentally Fidel Castro's birthday), 
1961, Washington began to build its invisible barrier around 
the island nation in retaliation against the Castro regime's 
nationalization of all United States businesses and property. 
On January 22, 1962, the Organization of American States 
(OAS — see Glossary), meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
reluctantly voted by a two-thirds majority to expel Cuba from 
the OAS because the island nation had "voluntarily" placed 
itself outside the inter-American system. Only fourteen of the 
twenty-one members voted for the resolution, with Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico abstaining. 

Cuba's foreign policy subsequently became more radical. 
The embargo, the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 set the confronta- 
tional tone for Cuba-United States relations for the rest of the 
twentieth century. Historian Jaime Suchlicki is critical of Presi- 
dent John F. Kennedy for allegedly being confused and indeci- 
sive about the Bay of Pigs invasion and for being apologetic 
about the outcome. Had Kennedy lived, however, Cuba-United 
States relations might well have taken a turn for the better, a 



xlix 



development that would have been anathema to the Cuban- 
American community at that time. Kennedy reportedly had 
second thoughts about the embargo, just as he had regrets 
about the Bay of Pigs fiasco. On November 17, 1963, he met 
with French journalist Jean Daniel and asked him to tell Castro 
that the United States was now ready to negotiate normal rela- 
tions and to drop the embargo. According to Kennedy's press 
secretary, Pierre Salinger, "If Kennedy had lived, I am confi- 
dent that he would have negotiated that agreement and 
dropped the embargo because he was very concerned with the 
role the Soviet Union was playing in Cuba and Latin Amer- 
ica...." 

The OAS adopted the United States-imposed embargo on 
July 26, 1964, as a result of Castro's policy of supporting "armed 
struggle" (the old Cuban euphemism for terrorism and insur- 
gency) in selective Latin American countries. Within two 
months, every Latin American country except Mexico had bro- 
ken diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the island nation 
became a pariah state. In 1967, at the time of Ernesto "Che" 
Guevara's fatal guerrilla foray in Bolivia, Cuba had diplomatic 
relations with only one country in Latin America — Mexico. 

In the early 1970s, Cuba's rapprochement with Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean in the form of "internationalist" assis- 
tance, especially medical aid, began to improve the 
revolutionary nation's regional image, with diplomatic results 
that began to erode the embargo. Increasingly, Cuba gave pre- 
cedence to bilateral relations, such as those between Cuba and 
Mexico, that enhanced the island's diplomatic and trade secu- 
rity over support for revolutionary movements. Diplomatic 
relations were revived with various Caribbean and South Amer- 
ican nations. 

By 1975 Havana had restored diplomatic relations with ten 
of Latin America's twenty-two nations. The OAS, impressed by 
Cuba's overt goodwill efforts and Castro's diplomatic and trade 
overtures but apparently downplaying his continuing covert 
support for revolution, lifted its twelve-year-old diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on the island nation on July 29, 1975, with 
the approval of sixteen countries, including the United States. 
On August 21, 1975, the administration of President Jimmy 
Carter eased the trade embargo in order to allow United States 
subsidiaries in third countries to trade with Cuba. 

With hopes of a rapprochement, Cuba and the United States 
agreed on May 30, 1977, to establish interests sections in each 



1 



other's countries, beginning September 1. During 1978, how- 
ever, Cuba's military involvement in Angola's civil conflict 
dashed any hope that the United States gesture to liberalize the 
embargo would lead to normalization of bilateral relations. 
Prospects for improved relations between Havana and Wash- 
ington further dimmed during 1978-79, as Cuba expanded its 
military involvement in Africa and increased its support for rev- 
olutionary movements in Central America and the Caribbean. 

At the start of the 1980s, several events disrupted Cuba's nor- 
malization campaign and contributed to the downturn in 
Cuba's relations with Latin America. The downturn began with 
Castro's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Second, Cuba's handling of refugee incidents involving the 
Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies in Havana was inept and 
led to the 1980 Mariel Boat-Lift and the flight of more than 
100,000 refugees. Castro's attempt to use the Mariel Boat-Lift 
to force the United States to discuss normalization of relations 
further exacerbated the situation. In addition, Castro reverted 
to virulent revolutionary rhetoric and continued support for 
armed struggle, particularly in Central America, Colombia, 
and Chile. These actions led the administration of President 
Ronald Reagan to make new efforts to isolate Cuba. 

In 1980-81 Cuba suffered major diplomatic setbacks. Its 
relations were suspended, downgraded, or otherwise damaged 
with Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela because of Cuban subver- 
sive activities or breaches of diplomatic protocol, and Colom- 
bia and Costa Rica broke relations with Havana over Cuba's 
renewed emphasis on armed struggle. Cuba's involvement in 
Grenada in 1981 created considerable tension in the Eastern 
Caribbean and led two other countries — Jamaica and St. 
Lucia — to break relations. Upon taking office as prime minis- 
ter of Jamaica that January, Edward Seaga expelled the 500 
Cubans working on the island and declared the Cuban ambas- 
sador persona non grata. By late 1981, Cuba had become so 
ostracized that even longtime friend Mexico failed to invite 
Castro to the North-South Conference held in Mexico that 
October, despite his position as leader of the Nonaligned 
Movement (see Glossary). 

The Malvinas/Falkland Islands War between Argentina and 
Britain in 1982 provided Cuba the opportunity that it needed 
to break out of its self-created diplomatic isolation and proved 
to be a watershed in Cuba's relations with Latin America. Cuba 
improved its standing in South America and specifically its rela- 



li 



tions with Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela by joining 
them in siding with the right-wing military regime in Argen- 
tina. The Cuban government overlooked its ideological differ- 
ences with the Argentine junta in large part because trade 
relations with Argentina gave Cuba another conduit for cir- 
cumventing the embargo; Argentina soon surpassed Mexico as 
Cuba's largest regional trading partner. 

Cuba's relations with the Eastern Caribbean, however, 
reached a nadir in 1983. The joint United States/Eastern 
Caribbean intervention in Grenada on October 25 put an 
abrupt end to Cuban activities in Grenada. The only members 
of the thirteen-member Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (Caricom — see Glossary) to retain relations with Cuba 
were Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, neither of which sup- 
ported the joint United States/Eastern Caribbean military 
action against Grenada. 

By the mid-1980s, as a result of Havana's new overtures to 
Latin America, Cuba was again enjoying a rapprochement of 
sorts with the region. Fortunately for Castro, the demise of 
right-wing authoritarian regimes and the transition to demo- 
cratic government in several South American nations in the 
1980s improved his prospects for courting the region in the 
wake of the Falklands/Malvinas War and for normalizing rela- 
tions with more countries. 

Cuba also had become more integrated into Latin American 
multilateral organizations, such as the Latin American Parlia- 
ment and the Latin American Integration Association (see 
Glossary), the successor to the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (see Glossary). Havana finally bowed to Latin 
American pressure to support the Central American peace pro- 
cess in 1985 by belatedly endorsing the proposals initiated by 
the Contadora Support Group (see Glossary), which called for 
the removal of all foreign forces from Central America. 

At the same time that Cuba began emerging from its diplo- 
matic isolation in the mid-1980s, Castro overestimated his self- 
appointed role in Latin America as revolutionary statesman. 
His attempt to fill a regional leadership vacuum by rallying 
Latin American and other developing world nations around his 
proposals for a debtors' cartel, a repudiation of Latin America's 
US$360-billion foreign debt, and a "new world economic 
order" was a failure. Although he succeeded in persuading 
Peru's President Alan Garcia Perez to suspend his country's 
debt payments, Castro's grandstanding elicited mainly skepti- 



lii 



cism in Latin America and the broader arenas of the develop- 
ing world. 

In 1986 the Reagan administration renewed attempts to iso- 
late Cuba in the Americas by further tightening the embargo. 
Cuba was able to continue reducing its diplomatic isolation, 
however, by using its "internationalist" workers to provide med- 
ical, educational, construction, and other assistance to numer- 
ous countries. Although, until the early 1990s, Cuba's 
"internationalist" support to a number of politically unstable 
countries in the developing world also included military, guer- 
rilla, and security support, the small-scale Cuban aid to nations 
where Havana sought to cultivate relations created goodwill 
that led to the resumption of relations with numerous coun- 
tries. Contrary to assertions that Cuba provided "international- 
ist" assistance only to "ideologically compatible" countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba aided several right-wing regimes, 
such as Peru in June 1970, Nicaragua in December 1972, Hon- 
duras in September 1974, and the Dominican Republic in 
1987. 

In November 1987, as a result of the goodwill created by 
Cuba's "internationalist" aid and its diplomatic overtures in the 
Latin American region, the presidents of eight Latin American 
countries — Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (the so-called Group of Eight — 
see Glossary) — agreed at a meeting in Acapulco that Cuba 
should be invited to rejoin regional organizations, including 
the OAS. The Group of Eight's proposal was the first direct 
regional challenge to United States policy toward Cuba. 

Despite the calls for reintegration of Cuba into the Latin 
American community, most countries in the region remained 
wary of the communist island state, and antagonism between 
Cuba and the United States was greater in 1987-88 than at any 
time in the previous ten years. The Castro regime voiced sup- 
port for Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez's Esquipu- 
las II accord for peace in Central America in 1987, but the 
sincerity of Havana's support of the peace process came under 
question when the plan began to stagnate in late 1988. 

Tension between Cuba and the Soviet Union increased in 
1989, and Cuba's economic slide began. Castro formally wel- 
comed Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev during his offi- 
cial visit to Cuba in March, but Cuba's special relationship with 
the collapsing Soviet Union was already all but over. Castro 



liii 



reportedly had defied Gorbachev's advice that Cuba should get 
on track to political pluralism and a free market. 

During the Cold War, the international community and news 
media bestowed on Cuba and Castro greatly exaggerated glo- 
bal significance as minor global actors. But as Havana's once- 
close ideological allies in the former Soviet bloc distanced 
themselves from the Castro government in 1989-90, this 
inflated aura of importance declined markedly. 

In 1989 skepticism about the Castro regime began increas- 
ing in the Americas as a result of the televised Havana trials of 
several Ministry of Interior officials and Division General 
Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez, hitherto a national hero, on 
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking. The summary execu- 
tions of Ochoa and three other pro-reform officers in July 1989 
shocked democratic leaders in Latin America, Spain, and else- 
where. By lauding the installation in September 1989 of the de 
facto, short-term president of Panama, Castro also earned bad 
publicity for flouting Latin American and world criticism of the 
lack of a democratic system in Panama. 

In an attempt to counter the fallout from the Ochoa affair 
and to improve his country's regional standing, Castro again 
made overtures suggesting his willingness for closer relations 
with Latin America, which he described publicly as Cuba's 
"common fatherland" and "common future." In October 1989, 
the Group of Eight, absent Panama, added its voice to those 
calling for Cuba's reincorporation into the OAS. Castro, who 
throughout the 1960s had referred to the OAS contemptuously 
as the "ministry of colonies," announced Cuba's willingness to 
rejoin the organization, if formally invited. 

Reaching out diplomatically became more urgent for the 
island nation as its estrangement from its one-time allies in the 
former Soviet bloc became increasingly apparent during 1990. 
In that pivotal year, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
whose Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — 
see Glossary) trade bloc accounted for as much as 85 percent 
of Cuba's trade during the 1980s, significantly reduced their 
ties to Cuba. The Soviet Union also substantially reduced its 
financial support, and Cuba found itself no longer an indis- 
pensable Soviet ally. The Soviet Union now regarded it as a 
drain on its diminishing resources and of questionable value as 
a Soviet proxy in conflicts in the developing world that were no 
longer of interest to Moscow. 



liv 



As a result of Nicaragua's presidential election in December 
1989, Cuba lost a key regional ally. Subsequently, the Castro 
government, as the only Marxist-Leninist regime in a region of 
democratically elected governments, increasingly stood out in 
1990 as an anachronism. Although the OAS nevertheless voted 
that year to admit Cuba as a member, the United States vetoed 
the OAS vote. 

In order to survive the loss of its longtime Soviet benefactor 
and to improve its standing in the world, Cuba put a higher pri- 
ority in the 1990s on continuing to reintegrate itself into the 
Latin American community of nations (including the Carib- 
bean region) , on expanding its relations globally, and on devel- 
oping its tourist industry. Cuba also began actively seeking to 
cultivate alternative relationships, not only with major develop- 
ing world nations, particularly China, but also with wealthy cap- 
italist countries, such as Japan. 

Regionally, Cuba focused its efforts on the Eastern Carib- 
bean. By 1990 Cuba had begun new diplomatic initiatives to 
improve its relations with Caricom and to obtain observer sta- 
tus on a number of Caricom standing committees, including 
health and education. Caricom's decision in 1990 to promote 
cooperative projects with Cuba facilitated Cuba's rapproche- 
ment with the English-speaking Caribbean. 

By 1990 Latin America and Cuba's status in the region had 
also changed significantly. The democratically elected govern- 
ments that had replaced military regimes in the region had 
opened diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba (often simply 
to demonstrate their independence of United States policy) 
and had admitted it into more inter-American organizations. 
In addition, Cuba appeared to have sharply curbed its support 
for armed struggle in South America and the Caribbean, 
although it continued to support the insurgency in El Salvador. 

As Cuba pursued its foreign policy of expanding diplomatic 
relations, it continued its traditional domestic policy of repres- 
sion. In defiance of the March 5, 1990, vote by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva calling for 
continued scrutiny of human rights in Cuba, the Castro regime 
began to crack down on the nascent human rights movement 
that had flowered since 1989. By April 1990, while communist 
rule was collapsing in Eastern Europe, the regime had crushed 
the Cuban human rights movement led by dissident Gustavo 
Arcos Bergnes, president of the Havana-based Cuban Commit- 



lv 



tee for Human Rights (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos 
Humanos— CCPDH). 

A short time later, beginning on July 9, 1990, the Castro gov- 
ernment damaged relations with Italy and Switzerland, as well 
as with traditional friends and important trading partners, such 
as Czechoslovakia, Mexico, and Spain (Cuba's principal West- 
ern creditor), by interfering with attempts by a few dozen 
Cuban asylum seekers to obtain sanctuary in the embassies or 
diplomatic residences of these nations in Havana. But despite 
these setbacks, Cuba was elected on October 18, 1990, for the 
first time since 1956, to a seat on the United Nations Security 
Council as one of the ten nonpermanent members. Cuba won 
the votes of all Latin American and Caribbean nations, as well 
as the largest number of votes cast for any of the aspirants to 
vacant seats (146 votes out of a possible 156). 

In the wake of the democratic tidal wave that swept away 
Cuba's allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989- 
91, Castro defiantly maintained that Cuba's "socialist" system 
was unique and would remain unaffected by the sudden 
demise of East European socialism and the rise of democratic 
reformism. While the Castro government pursued a policy of 
fostering foreign relations with most countries, it simulta- 
neously sought to keep the Cuban population from being con- 
taminated ideologically, not only by the democratic revolution 
that had overpowered his former communist allies but also by 
other outside influences, such as democracy in the Americas, 
globalization, and capitalism. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost 
(openness) was anathema to Castro, who openly sided with 
hard-line conservative Soviet leaders. In the early 1990s, Castro 
continued to insulate Cuba to a considerable extent from the 
political and ideological repercussions of the events in the 
communist bloc, aided by the nation's geographical distance 
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the 
embargo-imposed isolation from the United States, and the 
government's highly effective repressive apparatus. 

In 1991, as the full weight of the embargo finally began to be 
felt in Cuba, Castro faced one of the most critical years of his 
rule since the Bay of Pigs invasion thirty years earlier. Cuba's 
severe economic crisis and mounting international pressure on 
the Castro regime to democratize generated some overly opti- 
mistic predictions that 1991 would likely be Castro's last year in 
power. 



Ivi 



On May 24, 1991, in the wake of the Cold War's end, the Cas- 
tro regime completed withdrawing its military troops from 
Africa and began focusing on implementing the policy, 
adopted in 1989, of opening its economy and attracting for- 
eign investment. To that end, Havana sharply shifted its efforts 
from building its Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Arma- 
das Revolucionarias — FAR) to developing an international 
tourism industry and expanding international relations. The 
new emphasis on tourism was in response to the country's pre- 
cipitous economic deterioration resulting not only from the 
cutoff of Soviet aid and the breakup of economic and trade 
relations with East European countries and the Soviet Union, 
but also from Castro's unwillingness to radically restructure the 
economy to introduce free markets and private ownership. The 
continuation of the embargo, for its part, exacerbated the 
country's economic collapse. 

Cuba's participation in the First Ibero-American Summit of 
civilian heads of state of nineteen Latin American nations and 
of Spain and Portugal held on July 18-19, 1991, in Guadalajara, 
Mexico, prompted Havana's rapprochement with Chile, 
Colombia, and other countries. Leaders in the region urged 
Castro to quicken the pace of reform in Cuba in return for 
closer relations and possible reincorporation into the OAS. On 
August 2, 1991, the Latin American Parliament voted 154 to 
twenty-seven, with thirty abstentions, for a resolution asking for 
an end to the embargo of Cuba. Cuba continued to make dip- 
lomatic advances in Latin America and the Eastern Caribbean 
during 1992. 

Spurning the worldwide appeal to lift the embargo, the 
United States, in the apparent belief that the collapse of the 
post-Soviet Castro regime was imminent, intensified its 
embargo on October 15, 1992, with the passage of Representa- 
tive Robert G. Torricelli's Cuban Democracy Act (see Glos- 
sary). This legislation, which President George Bush signed 
into law on October 23, tightens restrictions on humanitarian 
aid, specifically food, medicine, and medical supplies. In addi- 
tion to prohibiting American subsidiaries in third countries 
from trading with Cuba, the Act prohibits any vessel that had 
engaged in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days from 
entering into the United States to load or unload freight. 

The Cuban Democracy Act outraged the international com- 
munity. Many countries claimed that the Act violated both 
international law and United Nations resolutions that food and 



lvii 



medicine cannot be used as weapons in international conflicts. 
Britain and Canada immediately barred United States subsid- 
iaries located in their countries from complying with its provi- 
sions. On November 24, fifty-nine members of the United 
Nations General Assembly voted against the United States in 
favor of a resolution proposed by Cuba demanding that the law 
and the trade embargo be terminated. Only Israel and, by mis- 
take, Romania, voted with the United States in opposing the 
measure. The European Union (EU — see Glossary) , Canada, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Japan were particularly incensed over 
the Cuban Democracy Act. 

Cuba again did well on the diplomatic front in 1993-94. At 
the Third Ibero-American Summit, held in Salvador, Brazil, on 
July 15-16, 1993, the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Por- 
tugal called for an end to the United States trade embargo of 
Cuba. On November 3, the United Nations General Assembly 
voted by eighty-eight to four (Albania, Israel, Paraguay, and the 
United States), with fifty-seven abstentions, to condemn the 
embargo. In 1994 the leaders of Latin America, Spain, and Por- 
tugal became increasingly critical of the embargo and called 
for the United States to ease its stance. At the twenty-fourth 
General Assembly of the OAS in Brazil in early June, the for- 
eign ministers of most OAS members called for the end of the 
embargo and the readmission of Cuba to the OAS. At the 
Ibero-American Summit meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia, 
on June 14, the leaders of nineteen Latin American nations 
and of Spain and Portugal approved a communique calling for 
the elimination of the unilateral United States economic and 
trade boycotts of Cuba and readmission of Cuba to the OAS. 

Three months later, on September 10, 1994, the fourteen- 
member Rio Group (see Glossary) also called for incorporat- 
ing Cuba fully into regional bodies and lifting the embargo of 
Cuba. In addition, the Rio Group urged "peaceful transition 
toward a democratic and pluralist system in Cuba." On October 
26, the United Nations General Assembly again voted over- 
whelmingly to demand an end to the embargo against Cuba, 
with 101 in favor, two opposed (the United States and Israel), 
and forty-eight abstaining. In contrast to international opinion, 
in 1994 only 35 percent of Americans favored ending the 
embargo, while 51 percent opposed ending it, according to a 
September 1994 Time/Cable News Network (CNN) poll. 

Throughout his regime, Castro has invoked the threat of 
United States military invasion of Cuba as justification for mili- 



lviii 



tarizing the island, and he has blamed the embargo for the 
hardships and privations caused by his own social, economic, 
and political policies. An independent countrywide survey con- 
ducted in Cuba in late 1994 and designed by the Miami Herald 
and CID/Gallup, the Costa Rican affiliate of the Princeton, 
New Jersey-based Gallup, found that the great majority (62 per- 
cent) of Cubans blamed the United States economic sanctions, 
rather than Cuba's political system, for economic difficulties. 

On March 22, 1995, conservative members of the United 
States Congress, seeing no reason to change the status quo, 
proposed to tighten the embargo even more through passage 
of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (see Glos- 
sary; more commonly known as the Helms-Burton legislation) . 
This legislation proposed augmenting the embargo extraterri- 
torially by punishing foreign companies that do business with 
Cuba. Meeting in Quito, Ecuador, on May 22-23, the foreign 
ministers of the Rio Group unanimously condemned the bill. 
The bill's adoption by the Congress in October 1995 prompted 
the leaders of Latin American countries, Spain, and Portugal, 
all attending the Ibero-American Summit in Bariloche, Argen- 
tina, at the time, to issue a strong condemnation of United 
States policy toward Cuba. Shortly thereafter, on November 2, 
one hundred and seventeen members of the United Nations 
General Assembly voted to condemn the embargo; only the 
United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan voted in favor of it. 

In retaliation for the shooting down by two Cuban MiG-29 
fighter jets of two civilian planes piloted by four members of a 
Cuban exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, over international 
waters, within sight of Key West, on February 24, 1996, the 
United States Senate approved the conference report to the 
Helms-Burton legislation by a vote of seventy-four to twenty-two 
on March 5. Canada, Russia, the EU, and the four teen-member 
Caricom strongly condemned the bill. Despite the interna- 
tional furor aroused by the bill, President William Jefferson 
Clinton signed the Helms-Burton legislation into law on March 
12, thereby halting a series of liberalizing measures toward 
Cuba. The new law did not deter foreign companies from 
entering into joint ventures with Cuban state companies. More- 
over, every six months for the remainder of his administration, 
President Clinton waived Title III, which would have allowed 
United States citizens to sue foreign companies for conducting 
business on confiscated American property in Cuba. 



lix 



The Helms-Burton Act intensified international outrage 
over the embargo. On August 26, 1996, thirty-four members of 
the OAS passed a resolution declaring that the Helms-Burton 
Act "does not conform to international law." That October 28, 
the EU approved legislation forbidding compliance with the 
Helms-Burton Act. On November 12, the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly voted by 138 to three (United States, Israel, and 
Uzbekistan) to condemn the embargo. (For the first time, all 
fifteen EU countries voted yes.) On November 28, Canada's 
Parliament passed legislation penalizing companies for obey- 
ing the Helms-Burton Act. 

The Castro regime's repressive policies, however, continued 
to limit international solidarity with the island nation. For 
example, in May 1996 Cuba's failure to enact political reforms 
and economic liberalization led the EU to suspend discussions 
with Havana on an economic cooperation agreement. At the 
annual Ibero-American Summit, held in Santiago, Chile, on 
November 10-11, 1996, Latin American leaders pressed Castro 
to make democratic changes on the island, while they 
denounced moves by the United States to isolate Cuba. On 
December 2, the EU further conditioned improvement in 
political and economic relations with Cuba and developmental 
assistance on progress in human rights and fundamental dem- 
ocratic reforms in Cuba. 

Cuba responded to the Helms-Burton Act by adopting a law 
in January 1997 that penalizes United States citizens who seek 
restitution of their expropriated properties under the Helms- 
Burton law. More significantly, the United States was also sub- 
jected to retaliatory legislation from its trade partners, and in 
1997 the United Nations General Assembly voted 143 to three 
against the embargo of Cuba. Individual countries flouted the 
embargo. For example, in August 1997 France announced a 
trade agreement with Cuba. 

During his visit to Cuba on January 21-25, 1998, Pope John 
Paul II criticized the embargo several times. The papal visit had 
a beneficial effect on Cuba's international image. Responding 
to the pope's call for the world to open up to Cuba and Cuba to 
open up to the world, numerous celebrities and senior officials 
and leaders of foreign governments visited Havana during the 
year. Several countries, including Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, and Spain, restored diplomatic relations with Cuba 
as a result of the papal visit. 



lx 



Moreover, in the aftermath of the papal visit, the Castro gov- 
ernment released many of its 1,320 political prisoners, leaving 
between 350 and 400 in prison. In April 1998, the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, for the first time in sev- 
eral years, voted down a United States-backed resolution con- 
demning Cuba. 

Acknowledging the impact of the pope's visit to Cuba, Presi- 
dent Clinton, on March 20, 1998, eased controls on licensing 
procedures of direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba, on 
resuming cash remittances up to US$300 per quarter for the 
support of close relatives in Cuba, and on developing proce- 
dures for streamlining and expediting licenses for the commer- 
cial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to 
Cuba. President Clinton also agreed to work on a bipartisan 
basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban peo- 
ple. Havana, however, subsequently announced that it would 
refuse all direct American humanitarian aid as long as the 
United States maintained the embargo on Cuba. 

Underscoring the mounting isolation of the United States 
on the Cuba embargo issue, the United Nations General 
Assembly on October 14, 1998, again passed a resolution call- 
ing for an end to the embargo. An overwhelming majority (157 
votes, with twelve abstentions) pitted the United States and, 
symbolically at least, Israel against most of the world. 

Despite the worldwide criticism of the embargo, on January 
5, 1999, President Clinton declined the recommendation of 
twenty-four United States senators requesting that he establish 
a National Bipartisan Commission to review United States pol- 
icy toward Cuba. At the same time, the president announced 
five minor changes in the embargo: broadening cash remit- 
tances, expanding direct passenger charter flights from New 
York and Los Angeles to Cuba, reestablishing direct mail ser- 
vice to Cuba, authorizing the sale of food and agricultural 
inputs to independent entities in Cuba, and expanding 
exchanges among academics, athletes, and scientists. 

American public support for the embargo began to show 
signs of cracking. A Gallup poll released on May 24, 1999, 
showed that, in contrast to the 1994 Time/ CNN poll, only 42 
percent of those polled supported the embargo, while 51 per- 
cent favored ending it. The poll also found that 71 percent of 
Americans supported reestablishing diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. 



Ixi 



On November 9, 1999, the United Nations General Assem- 
bly, by a vote of 155 in favor to two against (the United States 
and Israel), again adopted a resolution on the need to end the 
embargo of Cuba. Nevertheless, the island nation's poor 
human rights record continued to keep many countries at 
arm's length. Staunch traditional allies such as Canada and 
Mexico had tended to overlook the Castro government's 
human rights record, but that attitude began to change in the 
late 1990s, especially after Havana put a harsh new law on dis- 
sent into effect in February 1999. The legislation, which pro- 
vides a maximum prison sentence of twenty years, includes 
penalties against unauthorized contacts with the United States 
and the import or supply of "subversive" materials, including 
texts on democracy, by news agencies and journalists. That 
March a court used the new antisedition law in sentencing four 
dissidents to prison terms of up to five years, despite Canadian 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien's personal request to Castro in a 
meeting in Havana in April 1998 for their freedom. Beginning 
in April 1999, relations between Cuba and Canada — the largest 
foreign investor in Cuba and Cuba's second-largest trade part- 
ner, behind Spain — cooled over the Castro regime's continued 
crackdowns on dissident journalists and human rights activists. 
Canada had already halted its unsuccessful campaign to restore 
Cuba's membership in the OAS. 

In general, human rights issues seemed not to interfere 
greatly with Cuba's relations with Latin America and the Carib- 
bean. At the Ibero-American Summit held in Havana in 
November 1999, Mexico's President Ernesto Zedillo did what 
no Mexican leader had done before, when he made an implicit 
call for greater democracy in Cuba, but Cuban-Mexican rela- 
tions remained unchanged. Nor were human rights a factor in 
Cuba's strong relations with Venezuela. These relations greatly 
strengthened after Hugo Chavez Frias, a leftist military officer 
and populist, was inaugurated as president in February 1999, 
an event attended by Castro. Nor did human rights issues pre- 
vent Paraguay, South America's only hold-out, from reestablish- 
ing full diplomatic relations with the island nation on 
November 8, 1999. 

By providing small-scale "internationalist" aid, Cuba has con- 
tinued to reap diplomatic dividends. In 1998 Cuba reportedly 
had 2,759 "internationalist" technical workers, professionals, 
and specialists in eighty-six countries. In late December 1998, 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central 



lxii 



America during the October 27 to November 1 period, Cuba 
dispatched about 600 medical doctors to aid the affected popu- 
lations of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the 
immediate aftermath of the flooding and mud slides that dev- 
astated a large area of Venezuela in December 1999, Cuba sent 
more than 400 health-care personnel to assist in the recovery 
efforts. In August 2000, Cuba aided El Salvador in combating 
an outbreak of dengue fever. 

Despite Cuba's continuing condition as an embargoed 
nation, the only major country that Cuba was isolated from in 
2001-01 was the United States, and the only Latin American 
countries still without diplomatic relations with Havana were El 
Salvador and Honduras. Relations between Cuba and the 
United States were still limited to Interests Sections in each 
other's capitals. 

As a result of Havana's diplomatic and "internationalist" ini- 
tiatives and the global propaganda value to Cuba of the United 
States embargo, the island nation today no longer stands alone 
in the court of world opinion. Growing international resent- 
ment of the embargo appears to have spurred many countries 
to open relations with Cuba. By 2000 Cuba's public renuncia- 
tion of its longtime support for armed struggle and revolution- 
ary military "internationalism" in the early 1990s and its 
diplomatic initiatives during the decade had allowed the island 
nation to upgrade its international standing, in the form of 
diplomatic relations with 172 members of the 187-member 
United Nations. With the important exception of the United 
States, Cuba was no longer seen as a rogue state but as a diplo- 
matically accepted member of the world community. 

In Latin America and the Caribbean, Havana had succeeded 
in reestablishing relations with twenty-nine countries and in 
improving relations with others, such as El Salvador and Hon- 
duras. Havana has twenty-three accredited missions in the 
region, and twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean coun- 
tries have diplomatic posts in Havana. The Castro regime's dip- 
lomatic comeback in Latin America may be a far more 
significant Cuban achievement in the region than Cuba's short- 
lived revolutionary victories in Grenada and Nicaragua. 

Viewed as a David against Goliath, Cuba is now seen interna- 
tionally as a victim of a United States isolation strategy widely 
regarded as punitive and counterproductive, and, because it 
supposedly ignores the Cuban reality, as irrational. With 
increasingly large majorities, the United Nations General 



lxiii 



Assembly has voted overwhelmingly every year since 1992 for 
resolutions condemning the unilateral economic sanctions. 
Only Israel has regularly stood with the United States in oppos- 
ing United Nations resolutions condemning the embargo since 
1992. Israel, however, is an active trading partner of Cuba, as 
well as a major investor, even though it lacks diplomatic rela- 
tions with Havana. 

The embargo is widely seen as having helped to keep the 
Castro regime in power by preventing Cubans from being 
influenced by new ideas about human rights, economics, and 
democracy, and by giving Castro a scapegoat on which to blame 
Cuba's economic problems. Many Cubans reportedly believe 
that his regime would not last a year if the embargo were lifted. 
Just as President Reagan's decision to let American students 
travel to Eastern Europe helped to bring down the Berlin Wall 
on November 7, 1989, the Castro regime, according to 
embargo critics, would be unlikely to withstand the ideological 
and socioeconomic impact of millions of United States visitors. 
Cuban-American visitors alone have had a profound impact on 
Cuban society. As sociologist Sergio Diaz-Briquets points out 
herein, "Many observers feel that the 1980 Mariel outflow was a 
direct result of family visits as many disaffected Cubans were 
deeply influenced by contacts with Cuban-American visitors 
and the perceptions of their experience abroad." 

Despite Cuba's geographical proximity, United States citi- 
zens, unlike those of most other countries, have not been free 
to visit their island neighbor. United States law restricts travel 
to Cuba to all but a few American and foreign government offi- 
cials traveling on official business (including representatives of 
international organizations of which the United States is a 
member) , journalists regularly employed by a news-reporting 
organization, and Cuban-Americans, who are accorded the spe- 
cial right to make a once-a-year visit to family relatives. The 
United States ban on travel to Cuba was lifted on March 18, 
1977, but it was reimposed on April 19, 1982, and has remained 
in effect since then. 

The legal restrictions notwithstanding, as many as 154,000 
United States residents, including about 124,000 Cuban-Ameri- 
cans and 30,000 others, such as journalists, humanitarian work- 
ers, and academics, reportedly visited Cuba legally during 
2000. Estimates of United States citizens, including Cuban- 
Americans, who visited the island nation illegally in 2000 range 
from 22,000 to 80,000. Despite these numbers, Cuba remains 



lxiv 



largely terra incognita for its northern neighbor as a result of 
the embargo. It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to a 
February 1-4, 2001, poll by Gallup, 68 percent of Americans 
had an unfavorable opinion of Cuba, while only 27 percent had 
a favorable opinion. 

The Castro government, however, has not helped its case 
with its poor human rights record, which has included sharp 
restrictions on basic rights, such as freedom of expression, asso- 
ciation, assembly, and movement. Indeed, there has been a pat- 
tern of crackdowns following United States initiatives to ease 
the embargo, as if Castro were signaling that his government 
would prefer not to have the embargo lifted just yet. 

Human rights issues relating to Cuba also continued to be of 
concern to several democratic governments in the Americas in 
2000 and 2001. In late April 2000, Argentina and Chile voted 
"yes" in favor of a United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights vote censuring Cuba for its human rights record, while 
Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador abstained. The final vote was 
twenty-one in favor, eighteen against, and fourteen abstaining. 

In 2000-01, once-close relations between Cuba and Mexico 
and Spain appeared to be on a somewhat more formal footing 
because of the Castro government's continued hard line 
regarding human rights issues. At the Ibero-American Summit 
held in Panama on November 17-18, 2000, Castro criticized 
Mexico and Spain for supporting an El Salvador-proposed reso- 
lution against terrorism because it did not mention Cuba's 
complaints of Cuban-American-sponsored terrorism perpe- 
trated in Cuba. (Throughout the 1990s, Cuban-American 
exiles boasted of paramilitary raids into Cuba, including a 
series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997.) Cuba's refusal to 
sign the resolution strained ties with Spain. 

Two weeks later, on December 1, 2000, Castro attended the 
presidential inauguration of Mexico's President-elect Vicente 
Fox. With Fox's inauguration, relations between Cuba and 
Mexico began on a new footing as the Institutional Revolution- 
ary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional — PRI), which 
had ruled Mexico for seven decades and which historically was 
friendly to Cuba, relinquished the presidency to the opposi- 
tion. Nevertheless, in 2001 Mexico's economic and commercial 
relations with Cuba continued, and bilateral relations 
remained friendly and cooperative. 

Cuba's human rights record notwithstanding, international 
disapproval of the embargo has continued to increase. The 



lxv 



continuation of the embargo has remained a significant irri- 
tant in the relations of Latin America and United States allies 
with Washington. The embargo has remained widely criticized 
internationally as a relic of the Cold War that lost its justifica- 
tion when Cuba ceased being a satellite of the former Soviet 
Union. It is also widely viewed as having been highly ineffective 
in achieving its main foreign policy goals, and as having failed 
to oust the Castro government and to keep Cuba from gradu- 
ally reestablishing cultural, diplomatic, economic, and other 
ties with Latin America and the rest of the world. 

In 2000 and 2001, there was no lack of support in Washing- 
ton for continuing the embargo of Cuba. The embargo lobby 
continued to argue that economic sanctions should not be 
lifted until Castro allows free elections and open markets, 
releases all political prisoners, and restores civil liberties — con- 
ditions that were not made when the embargo was first 
imposed. Embargo proponents continued to argue that United 
States economic ties to Cuba would only boost the Castro 
regime politically and economically and not benefit the Cuban 
people. They continued to argue that sustained sanctions can 
work. Despite the annual Cuban-American visits to Cuba that 
are a major source of financial support for the Cuban economy 
in the form of remittances, Cuban-American activists in South 
Florida have continued to express outrage that American tour- 
ists have been visiting Cuba illegally and spending money 
there. 

The forty years of embargo have been costly for Cuba. 
According to a Cuban complaint lodged with the United 
Nations General Assembly in October 1998, the United States' 
trade embargo on Cuba had cost the Caribbean island US$60 
billion in lost revenues, severely undermining the country's 
economy. In April 2000, Cuba's public health minister told the 
Group of Seventy-Seven (see Glossary) Summit in Havana that 
the embargo had cost Cuba's health sector more than US$2 bil- 
lion. Cuba also announced in April that the embargo had cost 
the country's world-renowned cigar industry US$1.1 billion in 
lost revenues. 

Despite its economic losses from the embargo, Cuba has 
been able to circumvent it since 1991 by finding trading part- 
ners among the former socialist nations and among market- 
economy countries. Cuba's top four trading partners in 1999 
were Spain, Canada, China, and Venezuela, in that order. In 
2000 Venezuela, as a result mainly of crude oil and refined 



lxvi 



product exports to Cuba, jumped to the top spot, with Spain 
following at a close second, according to Cuba's Central Bank. 

The pro-embargo lobby has found its stance under increas- 
ing scrutiny in the new millennium. The story of six-year-old 
Elian Gonzalez, the ship-wreck survivor who lost his mother at 
sea and was cared for by relatives in Miami's Little Havana, put 
Cuba back in the news in early 2000 and created a widespread 
perception that Cuban-Americans in Miami were extremist. 
The backlash prompted lawmakers to reexamine United States 
policy toward Cuba. 

After four decades of status quo in relations between Havana 
and Washington, the embargo was widely regarded in the 
United States as an archaic policy. Increasingly, the American 
public and lawmakers questioned whether a United States pol- 
icy that was initially formulated and adopted at the height of 
the Cold War could still be relevant in the post-Cold War era. 
United States public opinion favored a reassessment by Wash- 
ington of the 1960s-era policy framework of the embargo. A 
May 2000 Gallup poll showed that 48 percent of Americans 
favored ending the embargo, as opposed to 42 percent in favor 
of maintaining it. The same poll, perhaps influenced by the 
Elian controversy, found that 57 percent of Americans favored 
renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba (a 14 percent decline, 
however, since the May 1999 poll), while only 36 percent 
opposed resuming ties. 

Embargo critics include those advocating an approach that 
calls for engaging Cuba in dialogue while lifting some United 
States sanctions that they believe hurt the Cuban people. Oth- 
ers call for lifting the embargo completely and restoring all 
relations. They argue that the embargo continues to provide 
Castro with a pretext not only for keeping Cuban society milita- 
rized (through mass militias) and under the tight control of 
the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — 
PCC), but also for exploiting United States-Cuban hostilities. 
Like the long-standing Piatt Amendment authorizing United 
States military intervention in Cuba from 1901 until its abroga- 
tion in 1934 and the leasing "in perpetuity" of the Guantanamo 
naval base in 1903 and, since 1934, for less than US$4,000 in 
annual rent, the embargo has long turned public sentiment in 
Cuba as well as international opinion against the United States. 

Lifting the embargo and restoring relations, critics argue, 
would be more likely to lead to a peaceful transition to democ- 
racy rather than violent civil conflict. Advocates of a policy 



lxvii 



change toward Cuba also point to the international consensus 
against the embargo, the suffering that it has caused the Cuban 
people, and lost opportunities to United States businesses 
interested in competing with Canadian and European compa- 
nies operating in Cuba. Moreover, it is argued that lifting the 
embargo would not necessarily help the regime but instead 
would deprive Castro of one of his most important propaganda 
weapons. 

On May 25, 2000, a proposed measure to permit the export 
of food, medicine, and medical products to Cuba marked a sig- 
nificant shift in Congress and reflected a growing impatience 
with the embargo's failure. In particular, business interests, 
including American farmers, alarmed that international com- 
petitors had been making major sales to countries under uni- 
lateral United States sanctions, were joining traditional 
opponents of the embargo. As a result of a growing desire by 
American farmers and business people to trade with Cuba, by 
2000 the once-powerful but still influential embargo lobby had 
been reduced to the vocal right wing of the Cuban-American 
community in Florida, its allies in Congress, and other conser- 
vatives. Nevertheless, a Florida International University poll 
released in October 2000 found that, although only 25.8 per- 
cent of Cuban-Americans felt that the embargo had worked 
well, 64.2 percent of the Cuban-American population 
expressed strong support for its continuation. 

The new congressional proposal of May 25, 2000, seemed to 
herald a gradual easing of the embargo, but its actual helpful- 
ness to Cuba appeared to be minimal at best because of the 
conditions attached to it. For example, the proposal disallowed 
bartering, purchase of any Cuban goods by United States com- 
panies, or extension of any public or private credit to cash- 
strapped Cuba from the United States to finance purchases. In 
addition, under the Cuban Democracy Act, ships visiting Cuba 
would still be banned from docking at a United States port dur- 
ing the following six months. 

Despite the prospects raised by the proposed exemption, a 
Cuban-American congressional representative from Florida 
forced removal of the trade provision from the agricultural 
spending bill on grounds that it was an unacceptable attach- 
ment to a spending bill. Furthermore, a House-approved mea- 
sure that would have dropped enforcement of United States 
restrictions on travel to Cuba by Americans was replaced by a 
provision that codified the ban on American tourism to the 



lxviii 



island. Moreover, on June 20, 2000, the Senate voted, by fifty- 
nine to forty-one, to again defeat the proposed creation of a 
National Bipartisan Commission to study the effectiveness of 
the economic embargo of Cuba. 

On November 9, 2000, the international community reiter- 
ated its contrary stance when the United Nations General 
Assembly passed, with 167 votes in favor, a nonbinding, Cuba- 
drafted resolution urging Washington to lift the embargo as 
soon as possible and all countries to refuse to comply with it. 
Only the United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands voted 
against it, while four other countries abstained. 

On March 10, 2001, Caricom went on record against Cuba's 
isolation from the integrational process linked with the cre- 
ation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) zone. In an 
official statement, Caricom said that any policy of isolation and 
expulsion is counterproductive in the post-Cold War era. 

The United States' tattered diplomatic prestige became evi- 
dent with its ouster from the fifty-four-nation Commission on 
Human Rights on May 3, 2001. The unprecedented action 
reportedly reflected a growing frustration with America's alleg- 
edly noncooperative actions and attitudes toward international 
organizations and treaties, as well as its votes involving the Pal- 
estinians and countries like China, Cuba, and Iran. On May 19, 
President Bush specifically linked the Commission's vote on 
Cuba with the subsequent loss of the United States' seat. 

Despite the favorable votes in the United Nations and other 
multinational fora over the embargo issue, Cuba's pariah status 
in organizations or pacts involving the United States contin- 
ued. Cuba was the only country in the Americas to be excluded 
from the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, on 
April 20-22, 2001, when the agreement was approved, because 
only democratic countries are eligible to participate in the pro- 
posed FTAA. 

Although its economic system survived the 1990s, the island 
nation underwent significant social and economic changes 
during the decade as the economy geared toward dollar-based 
tourism, dollar remittances, and foreign investment. Political 
scientist Jorge I. Dominguez observes herein that since the 
1990s Cuba has been undergoing a gradual social and political 
transition of a still undetermined nature. He explains that a 
proto-civil society has grown as a consequence of government 
reforms (such as greater religious freedom) , as many Cubans 
become largely independent of the state for their livelihood, 



lxix 



and as younger, more dynamic, well-educated, and pragmatic 
leaders emerge in key institutions. Sergio Diaz-Briquets 
explains that the greater religious freedom "will inevitably con- 
tribute to the undermining of the ideological, social, political, 
and economic power of the Cuban totalitarian state." He adds 
that tourism and the dollarization of the domestic economy 
"will further accelerate a process of social change." And he 
points out that the presence of so many foreign visitors limits 
the regime's ability to suppress civil and political dissent. 

In the first quarter of 2001, the Castro regime, apparently 
more confident from having surmounted the country's eco- 
nomic depression of the 1990s and angry over international 
criticism of its human rights practices, returned to the mass 
protests, hard-line rhetoric, and confrontational diplomacy 
that had characterized the island nation during the decades of 
the Cold War. Instead of consumer ads, billboards displayed 
the old "Socialism or Death" signs. The resurgence of the hard 
line has been attributed to the divisive effect of the regime's 
1993 decision to allow the circulation of dollars and the 
regime's concern that discontent could get out of control 
unless redirected away from regime policies and toward the 
United States. 

Legalization of dollars made it possible for taxi drivers, hotel 
workers, and other Cubans, including prostitutes, associated 
with the tourism industry and getting tipped or paid in dollars 
to earn far more than professionals, such as government offi- 
cials, military officers, doctors, scientists, and university profes- 
sors. Since dollars became legal, resentment has grown 
between those with access to dollars and those without. Cubans 
receiving remittances from relatives in the United States have 
also contributed to the growing inequalities. 

Many Cubans reportedly also greatly resent the system of 
tourism apartheid that prevents Cubans from getting near 
tourist resorts for foreigners or entering hotels for foreign 
tourists (unless they are employees), that reserves first-class 
medical facilities for foreigners and high Cuban officials, and 
that compels many young Cuban women to prostitute them- 
selves for dollars. 

If its frequent, government-sponsored, anti-United States ral- 
lies held in Havana's open-air structure called the protest 
drome (protestodromo) are any indication, the regime appears to 
be fearful that this seething resentment could get out of con- 
trol and, instead of being directed against the United States 



lxx 



embargo and government, develop into mass protests against 
the Castro regime. In this regard, the embargo appears to serve 
the Castro regime well as a scapegoat and as a mechanism for 
bottling up growing resentment, at least for the short term. 
Mounting popular resentment may have the potential for 
unraveling the Castro regime and is reminiscent of the social 
discontent that erupted in the 1959 Revolution. 

On July 14, 2001, President Bush announced plans to 
strengthen the embargo by enforcing limits on cash payments 
that Cuban-Americans may send to their relatives on the island 
and by preventing American tourists from visiting Cuba. On 
July 16, however, in an unexpected setback for the Cuban exile 
lobby and its Congressional allies, President Bush announced 
that he would continue the Clinton administration policy of 
waiving Title III of the Helms-Burton Act for six months at a 
time. On July 25, for the second successive year, the House 
voted, by 240 to 186, to approve a measure that would effec- 
tively lift the ban on most travel to Cuba, but the measure again 
died in the Senate. 

Embargo critics believe that the politically charged embargo 
has long narrowed the perceptual lens through which United 
States policymakers view the prospects for effecting a peaceful 
transition to democracy in Cuba. For example, a related argu- 
ment against the embargo is that, in the absence of relations 
between Cuba and the United States, Washington lacks the 
ability to influence the direction of the generational transition 
of Cuba's social, economic, and political system, or even the 
military, still dominated by aging generals of the generation of 
Fidel and Raul Castro. According to this argument, whether 
post-Castro Cuba remains under a regime headed by the 
uncharismatic General of the Army Raul Castro Ruz, the first 
vice president of the Council of State and Council of Ministers 
and minister of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — MINFAR), or 
instead somehow undergoes a gradual transition to democracy, 
the lifting of the embargo would allow Cuba to accelerate a 
process of change that the United States could influence for 
the better. 

Additional groundwork for Raul Castro's eventual succession 
as chief of state reportedly was made as a result of a reorganiza- 
tion of the FAR High Command in January 2001. Five gener- 
als — two FAR vice ministers and the commanders of the 
eastern, central, and western armies — were promoted to the 



lxxi 



rank of army corps general (general de cuerpo de ejercito). Until 
then, Minister of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra was the sole 
individual holding that rank. 

Few Cubans reportedly believe that the Cuban Revolution 
will outlast Fidel Castro. According to Professor Jorge 
Dominguez, younger, more competent, and more urbane civil- 
ian members of the political elite who are more attuned to eco- 
nomic and political experimentation include Carlos Lage 
Davila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of 
Ministers; and Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, president of the 
National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 
Poder Popular) . Although one of these civilian leaders might 
make a more credible figurehead president in a post-Fidel Cas- 
tro transitional government than Raul Castro, it appears 
unlikely that there will be any transition from communism to 
democracy in Cuba until the Cuban population is allowed to 
elect a president in a free and fair election. 

Moreover, there are two important aspects of civil-military 
relations in Cuba that should be taken into account in any 
assessment of post-Fidel Castro Cuba. First, the military is well 
regarded by the Cuban population and is considered by many 
observers to be the most powerful institutional actor in the 
political system. Second, although it seems unlikely that the 
Cuban elites and the population in general would back a 
regime headed by Raul Castro, a long-time ideological hard- 
line military man who lacks political charisma and any interna- 
tional stature, he will likely succeed his brother, as long as he 
retains the support of the military. 

In assessing the prospects for change in Cuba's relatively 
closed society, the impact of the information revolution is also 
an important consideration. The Cuban government's efforts 
to expand Cuba's ties with the nations of the world and its 
reported plans to create an information technology (IT) busi- 
ness on the island make its long-standing policy of trying to 
control the population's access to information increasingly 
untenable. Cuban authorities have long stifled Cuba's IT devel- 
opment. Because the Internet poses a serious threat to the 
Cuban government's information monopoly, Internet access is 
allowed only to businesses, foreigners, and about 40,000 offi- 
cials of state entities. According to reports by foreign news 
media, Internet access in Cuba is forbidden to the average citi- 
zen. The Castro government denied these reports in early 



lxxii 



March 2000, however, claiming that access to the Internet is 
limited only for technological and financial reasons. 

As the leaks in its information monopoly proliferate, the 
regime is likely to find its policy of keeping the population iso- 
lated from the global revolution in IT to be a hopeless and 
highly counterproductive task. Despite the obstacles, a growing 
number of younger Cubans, ignoring official Internet prohibi- 
tions, have been able to purchase computers on the black mar- 
ket and to find a way to tap into official Internet links without 
permission. Cuba reportedly began to open a dozen cyber-cafes 
around Havana in 2001, but the US$5 per hour Internet access 
charge is likely to limit use of these facilities mainly to tourists 
and the relatively few Cubans who are paid in dollars. 

Although this general review of the embargo issue suggests 
that the arguments in favor of lifting the embargo seem to 
greatly outweigh those against it, the matter is complicated by 
the Castro regime's unceasing hostility toward America and the 
regime's potential or actual military, intelligence, and terrorist 
threats to United States national security interests. In regard to 
the potential military threat, an unclassified United States 
Department of Defense report entitled "The Cuban Threat to 
U.S. National Security" concluded that the Cuban Armed 
Forces posed "a negligible conventional threat" to the United 
States or surrounding countries by the late 1990s. Although the 
greatly downsized and financially strapped Cuban Armed 
Forces may not pose a significant conventional threat, the 
report failed to take into account an Armageddon-type crisis, 
such as a scenario in which the regime were about to be over- 
thrown. In that situation, the Castro brothers could order 
some unanticipated terrorist attack against the United States, 
possibly using MiGs. Furthermore, the Cuban military is highly 
defensive, with much of its equipment hidden in a vast system 
of caves and tunnels. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Cuba in Decem- 
ber 2000 raised the specter of a new alliance between Havana 
and Moscow, but reportedly was mostly symbolic rather than a 
signal of a resumption of once-close relations between Cuba 
and the former Soviet Union. Rather than resume Russia's sub- 
sidizing of Cuba, Putin reportedly was more interested in get- 
ting the Castro government to repay Cuba's multibillion-dollar 
debt to Russia, as well as making an opening for large Russian 
companies that might be interested in investing on the island. 
Putin's visit reportedly failed to achieve a breakthrough in rela- 



lxxiii 



tions, a significant trade deal, or even an agreement by Castro 
to repay the debt. 

President Putin's visit did, however, reportedly result in the 
signing by the Russian and Cuban defense ministers of a mili- 
tary and technical plan that calls for the parties to develop 
cooperation in such spheres as military personnel training, 
modernization of armaments, and military equipment. The 
agreement specifically concerns repair and modernization of 
Cuban planes made in the former Soviet Union. To that end, a 
Cuban military delegation headed by Army Corps General 
Julio Casas Regueiro, deputy minister of the FAR, visited Mos- 
cow in late April 2001. 

Cuba's anti-United States intelligence activities have also 
apparently impeded reestablishment of diplomatic relations 
with the United States. While the Castro regime has overtly 
pursued a diplomatic strategy to win acceptance in the interna- 
tional community, it has a well-publicized record of using its 
diplomatic posts, including the United Nations, for intelli- 
gence activities against the United States and its North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. 

The Cuban intelligence threat was also manifested in 2001 
by cases of proven or alleged espionage by Cuban citizens resid- 
ing in the United States. On June 8, 2001, a federal jury in 
Miami, concluding a six-month trial, convicted five Cuban 
agents of espionage against the United States. Five other 
indicted members of the spy ring, which was revealed in Sep- 
tember 1998, pleaded guilty in exchange for cooperation and 
received lighter sentences. The leader of the ring, Gerardo 
Hernandez, the only one charged and convicted in a murder 
conspiracy in the death of the four Brothers to the Rescue 
members whose planes were shot down on February 24, 1996, 
received a sentence of life imprisonment. Four others were 
able to flee to Cuba and avoid prosecution. Reflecting the anti- 
United States hostility of the Castro regime, Granma Interna- 
tional, the English version of Cuba's official newspaper, on June 
24, 2001, headlined the actions of the Cuban spies as "a heroic 
behavior in the entrails of the monster," a slogan that also 
appeared on a large poster behind Fidel Castro's podium when 
he addressed a crowd of 60,000 in Havana on June 23, along 
with photos of the five indicted Cubans, and on the T-shirts of 
many Cubans at weekly rallies in Havana. In addition, on Sep- 
tember 22, 2001, the Washington Post reported the arrest by 
agents of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 



lxxiv 



(FBI) of a senior intelligence analyst for Cuban affairs, on 
charges of spying for the Castro regime. 

Since 1964 Cuba's intelligence threat to the United States 
and NATO has been symbolized by the Russian-operated Lour- 
des electronic eavesdropping site, which has targeted the 
United States. On October 17, 2001, however, President Putin, 
reversing his earlier stance, announced that Russia will close 
the Lourdes facility in order to save the annual rental fee of 
US$200 million, which Castro had refused to cancel as partial 
payment for Cuban debts to Moscow. The Castro government 
angrily denounced Putin's decision. 

Cuba's potential terrorist threat needs to be put in some 
context. According to Professor Jaime Suchlicki, one of the 
"major themes" of Cuba's international relations by the 1990s 
included continuous support of "movements of national libera- 
tion in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America." By 
the early 1990s, the regime appeared to have largely ceased 
active support of revolutionary groups in the absence of subsi- 
dies and other support that it had received from the former 
Soviet Union. According to Professor Dominguez, Cuba 
announced in 1992 "that it had stopped providing military sup- 
port to revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow govern- 
ments in other countries." By most accounts, Cuba has 
promoted tourism, trade, and diplomacy instead of terrorism 
and revolutionary military internationalism since the early 
1990s. 

Nevertheless, the regime has reportedly continued ties with 
a number of international terrorist groups, and it has 
remained on the United States Department of State's list of 
nations sponsoring terrorism. According to the Department's 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, published in April 2001, the 
island country continued to provide safehaven to members of 
several terrorist groups, as well as to several United States ter- 
rorist fugitives. Active terrorist groups with members taking ref- 
uge in Cuba include the Basque Fatherland and Freedom 
(Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna — ETA) and Colombia's National Lib- 
eration Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional — ELN) and 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC) . 

Cuba also has continued to maintain ties to other state spon- 
sors of international terrorism, according to the report. In 
addition, in May 1998 then Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen testified in Congress that Cuba possesses advanced bio- 



lxxv 



technology and is capable of mass-producing agents for biolog- 
ical warfare. The Castro regime also reportedly poses a 
cyberterrorism threat to the United States infrastructure, 
according to Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. During the public part of a hearing of the 
United States Senate Intelligence Committee on February 7, 
2001, Admiral Wilson was widely reported to have told the 
committee, in response to a question concerning Cuba's capa- 
bility for cyber warfare, that the FAR could start an "informa- 
tion warfare or computer network attack" that could "disrupt 
our military." 

If Cuba is, as alleged by the Department of State report, 
secretly supporting international terrorism, the Castro regime 
could be seen by the United States as posing an unacceptable 
potential threat to vital United States national security interests 
in the post September 11, 2001, world. If Fidel Castro was will- 
ing to risk nuclear war between the former Soviet Union and 
the United States in October 1962, some have argued that he 
could become desperate enough to help Islamic terrorists use 
biological weapons against the United States. In the spring of 
2001, Fidel Castro toured Iran, Libya, and Syria, and was 
quoted as telling Iranian university students that "Iran and 
Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its 
knees." Like other nations on the list of state sponsors of ter- 
rorism, Cuba could find itself coming under increasing United 
States pressure to demonstrate that it deserves to be removed 
from the list by discontinuing to provide safehaven or other 
support to members of active terrorist groups. 

A lack of Cuban cooperation in the antiterrorism war could 
impede progress toward reestablishing diplomatic relations 
with the United States. In his speech of September 22, 2001, 
Fidel Castro was unsparing in attacking the United States and 
its intention to wage a war in Afghanistan, contending that 
United States "fanaticism" was stronger than that of the terror- 
ists who carried out the September 1 1 attacks. Moreover, Cuba 
was the only nation that failed to condemn terrorism at the 
United Nations General Assembly session on November 16, 
2001. Instead, the Cuban foreign minister, Felipe Perez Roque, 
used the forum to launch a propaganda attack against the 
United States. Echoing the propaganda of Osama bin Laden 
and the Taliban, he denounced the United States for waging 
an "ineffective, unjustifiable bombing campaign" in Afghani- 



lxxvi 



stan, which "has targeted children, the civilian population, and 
the International Red Cross hospitals and facilities as enemies." 

Prior to the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001, many observers believed that the Castro 
regime would be able to maintain itself in power and continue 
to blame the island's socioeconomic problems on the embargo 
as long as the status quo, Cold War situation between Cuba and 
America prevailed. Major setbacks to the Cuban economy dur- 
ing the year, however, had, by late 2001, compelled the Cuban 
government to reiterate its readiness for normal relations with 
the United States. Tourism to the island, a critical source of 
dollars, fell sharply following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. Another critical source of dollars, remittances from 
exiles in Miami, also declined sharply because of the post-Sep- 
tember 1 1 economic downturn in the United States. President 
Putin's abrupt decision to close Russia's Lourdes listening post 
constituted another major loss of revenue. And on November 
4, Hurricane Michelle, the island's worst storm in five decades, 
severely damaged crops that Cuba needed for export and 
domestic consumption. Creating a crack in the embargo, the 
aftermath of the storm prompted the first trade accords 
between Cuba and the United States in four decades, allowing 
four American companies to sell Cuba about US$20 million 
worth of wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs. Whether the trade 
deal heralds a thaw in relations remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, post-September 11 world sympathy for Cuba's 
financial plight and condemnation of the blockade remained 
unchanged, despite strong United Nations support for the 
United States-led war against terrorism. This fact was evident 
when the United Nations General Assembly again voted over- 
whelmingly on November 27 for an end to the United States 
trade embargo against Cuba. As in 2000, the vote was 167 to 
three (United States, Israel, and the Marshall Islands). At a 
time when vital national security interests of the United States 
were under threat by international terrorism, maintaining the 
status quo between Cuba and the United States no longer 
seemed feasible to many Americans. Thus, it remained a com- 
pelling argument, that, if Cuba were opened to unchecked 
United States influences through the lifting of the embargo, 
the Castro regime would be unlikely to keep the socioeco- 
nomic impact of American trade and millions of United States 
visitors, the IT revolution, and the forces of economic global- 
ization from sweeping his communist system into the same 



lxxvii 



dustbin of history now occupied by the former Soviet Union 
and its East European allies. 



December 14, 2001 

* * * 

In the first half of 2002, it appeared that Castro himself was 
increasingly becoming a major liability in his own decades-long 
diplomatic offensive in Latin America. With his mind-set stuck 
in the Cold War and in his "untouchable" communist system of 
rule, Castro had succeeded in alienating even his long-time 
allies in the region. Despite having diplomatic relations with 
most countries and worldwide support for the lifting of the 
United States embargo, Cuba remained ostracized from the 
United States, and this ostracism adversely affected Cuba's rela- 
tions with other countries, most notably Mexico. 

As Mexico's relations with the United States and the global 
economy grew closer, President Vicente Fox distanced himself 
from Castro during the first half of the year, and Mexico's four- 
decades-old policy of neutrality toward Cuban human rights 
issues began to unravel. President Fox ended a good-will visit to 
Cuba on February 4 by meeting with several of the Cuban gov- 
ernment's most prominent opponents and calling on the Cas- 
tro government to pursue democratic reforms and increase 
human rights protections. Fox's visit and Castro's subsequent 
brief appearance at the United Nations development summit 
meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, in March set the stage for Cas- 
tro's diplomatic debacle with President Fox a few weeks later. 

At the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting 
on April 19, Castro was especially piqued by Mexico's vote cen- 
suring Cuba. He called it a "despicable betrayal" because it 
allowed the measure to narrowly prevail by twenty-three to 
twenty-one votes. In apparent retaliation, Castro seriously dam- 
aged Cuban-Mexican relations by publicizing a humiliating 
tape recording that he had made of a private telephone conver- 
sation with Fox in which the Mexican president had tried to 
persuade Castro to cancel or cut short his attendance at the 
Monterrey summit the previous month in order not to "compli- 
cate" Mexican-United States relations. The audiotape was 
highly embarrassing to Fox because he had stated publicly that 



lxxviii 



he did not ask Castro to cut short his attendance at the meet- 
ing. 

For Cuba's annual May 1 commemoration, Castro continued 
his bitter campaign against his former Latin American allies by 
ordering several million Cubans to rally in the center of 
Havana to express condemnation of the "treasonous syco- 
phants" — otherwise known as the democratic governments of 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay. These countries had joined in supporting a resolu- 
tion critical of Cuba at the United Nations Human Rights Com- 
mission meeting on April 19. 

Meanwhile, United States policy toward Cuba under the 
administration of President George W. Bush appeared reminis- 
cent of the 1980s. President Bush committed his administra- 
tion to a continuation of the traditional Cold War policy 
toward Cuba. Bush's call for Castro to open his country's politi- 
cal and economic system was part of the "Initiative for a New 
Cuba" launched as a result of a review that began in January. 
Bush said that he would veto further measures on trade with 
Cuba and on lifting the ban that empowers the United States 
Department of the Treasury to fine Americans traveling to 
Cuba. 

In the annual publication entitled Patterns of Global Terror- 
ism — 2001, released by the United States Department of State's 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on May 21, 
2002, Cuba remained on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, 
despite signing all twelve United Nations counterterrorism 
conventions and the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism 
at the 2001 summit. Although the report did not mention any- 
thing about Cuba's biological weapons capabilities, in the 
March-June period of 2002 United States military and Depart- 
ment of State officials made conflicting statements as to 
whether Cuba possessed biological weapons. On March 19, 
Carl W. Ford, Jr., assistant secretary for intelligence and 
research of the Department of State, stated in testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, "Cuba has at least a 
limited developmental offensive biological warfare research 
and development effort." On May 6, a week before former 
President Jimmy Carter's five-day visit to Cuba on May 12-17, 
Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton made a similar state- 
ment to a meeting of the conservative Heritage Foundation, 
indicating that Cuba is developing biological weapons and has 
"at least a limited offensive biological research and develop- 



lxxix 



ment effort" in germ warfare. Later that month, however, in 
response to Bolton's allegation that Cuba is developing biologi- 
cal weapons, Major General Gary Speer, acting commander in 
chief of the United States Southern Command, stated that he 
had seen no evidence that Cuba is producing biological weap- 
ons from its biomedical research program. 

After being effusively welcomed by Castro, Carter began his 
historic visit to Cuba with a promise from Castro that he could 
visit any of the island's biotechnology research centers. Not 
being in Cuba on an arms-inspection mission, however, Carter 
toured only the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotech- 
nology (Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotecnologia — 
CIGB) in Havana, a facility visited by thousands of foreign sci- 
entists, including 400 Americans in 2001. 

Carter was the most prominent American political figure to 
visit Cuba in forty-three years of communist rule. As Cuban 
human rights advocates had hoped, his visit lent support to 
their campaign for greater political and economic freedom. By 
the time that he arrived in Cuba on May 12, dissident activists 
had openly collected 11,020 valid signatures on a petition call- 
ing for a national referendum to institute civil rights, the right 
to own and operate private businesses, electoral reform, and an 
amnesty for all political prisoners. Article 88 of the 1976 consti- 
tution allows any citizen who collects the signatures of at least 
10,000 registered voters to petition the National Assembly for a 
referendum on any subject. The three-year-long petition drive 
was known as the Varela Project, after Felix Varela, a nine- 
teenth-century Roman Catholic priest, philosopher, and 
Cuban independence activist. Although the petition was 
rejected when its creator, Oswaldo Paya, a dissident engineer, 
delivered it to the National Assembly on May 10, the Varela 
Project was the biggest peaceful challenge to date to the Cuban 
government. Despite being unsuccessful in its reform objec- 
tives, the Varela Project united more than 140 of Cuba's dissi- 
dent groups in a single campaign and marked a historic victory 
over opposition divisiveness and apathy, as well as intimidation 
by the authorities. 

As he had done for Pope John Paul IPs visit in 1998, Castro 
accorded Carter the unprecedented privilege of having the 
country's news media broadcast the entire text of the former 
president's address to the Cuban people. In addition, the offi- 
cial newspaper, Granma, published Carter's entire speech in its 
May 16 issue, except for his comments about democracy. "Our 



lxxx 



two nations have been trapped in a destructive state of belliger- 
ence for forty-two years," Carter said in his twenty-minute 
address, which he delivered in Spanish. "And it is time for us to 
change our relationship and the way we think and talk about 
each other." Carter called on Castro to allow a national referen- 
dum to bring about broad reforms in political rights. He also 
praised the Varela Project and castigated Cuba's socialist system 
for denying basic freedoms. 

As Cuban officials had hoped, Carter called in his speech for 
easing sanctions against the island nation. The next day, forty 
members of the United States Congress (half Democrats and 
half Republicans) called for unrestricted American travel and 
increased trade with Cuba. The continuation of the traditional 
policy toward Cuba was becoming increasingly unpopular in 
Congress, where a majority in the House and Senate reportedly 
favored lifting the travel ban. Nevertheless, a few days later 
President Bush announced that he would tighten sanctions. In 
a policy speech at the White House on May 20, Bush condi- 
tioned any easing of this policy on Cuba's adoption of demo- 
cratic reforms, such as holding democratic elections; giving 
opposition parties the freedom to organize and speak, thereby 
allowing non-communist candidates to participate in the 2003 
legislative elections; freeing all political prisoners; and allowing 
the development of independent trade unions. 

President Bush's announced intention to expand a program 
to provide assistance to internal Cuban dissidents through 
American religious and nongovernmental organizations met 
with a cold reception among Cuban dissidents. A number of 
them reiterated their belief that aid offered by the United 
States government would compromise their efforts. Carter 
strongly warned against the proposed aid program and con- 
firmed that the Cuban dissidents he met unanimously oppose 
the United States embargo on food and medicine and favor 
more interchange with Americans. 

Having rejected the reform demands made by opposition 
figures and President Bush, Castro on June 12 launched a peti- 
tion drive for a constitutional amendment to declare Cuba's 
socialist system "irrevocable." He defiantly staged a massive 
march through downtown Havana, while other marches were 
held in cities, towns, and villages throughout the island nation. 
Castro ordered the country's eligible voting population over 
sixteen years of age — totaling between 7 and 8 million of 
Cuba's 11 million population — to show their solidarity by sign- 



lxxxi 



ing a petition in favor of the proposed constitutional amend- 
ment. Castro's claim that 99.7 percent of registered voters 
signed his petition was reflective of the autocratic nature of his 
regime and suggested that the results were most likely rigged. 
Moreover, the fact that Castro felt compelled to go to such an 
extent to ratify his system of government seemed indicative of 
how worrisome the Varela Project and Jimmy Carter's visit must 
have been as a challenge to his rule. Just as the papal visit had 
resulted in a significant opening of religious freedom in Cuba, 
Carter's visit may have had a similarly profound impact on the 
human rights movement in Cuba. 

Although the influx of dollars had created a vibrant under- 
ground economy, the country's economic outlook remained 
bleak in the first half of 2002, as tourism remained down and 
the sugar and nickel industries experienced continuing low 
prices. In June the government was preparing to close about 
half of the country's 156 decrepit sugar mills. The resulting dis- 
missal of thousands of Cuban sugar workers was expected to 
add to the climate of tension on the island. Cuba's overall 
terms of trade were not expected to improve until sugar and 
nickel prices reversed their decline. Cuba also lost a third of its 
daily oil supply when Venezuela stopped shipping its inexpen- 
sive oil to Cuba in April 2002, forcing the island nation to 
spend millions of dollars more than planned on the world mar- 
ket. The negative economic trends could be reversed some- 
what by a recovery in agriculture, remittances, and tourism, but 
the Castro regime's ratification of its "irrevocable" communist 
system of government effectively sentenced the country to con- 
tinual suffering without any real prospect for change. The 
domestic opposition remained weak, but the population 
seemed be waiting for the moment when the maximum leader 
would pass from the scene, and the country could begin a long- 
awaited transition to democracy. 

July 22, 2002 Rex Hudson 



lxxxii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Statue of national hero Carlos Manuel de Cespedes in Arms Plaza (La Plaza 
de Armas), Havana, 1997 
Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 



THE HISTORY OF CUBA began with the arrival of Christo- 
pher Columbus in 1492 and the subsequent invasion of the 
island by the Spaniards. Although aboriginal groups inhabited 
the island, they were soon eliminated or died as a result of dis- 
eases or the shock of conquest. As a result, the impact of indig- 
enous groups on subsequent Cuban society was limited, and 
Spanish culture, institutions, language, and religion prevailed 
in Cuba. Colonial society developed slowly, with pastoral pur- 
suits and agriculture serving as the basis of the economy. For 
the first three centuries after the conquest, the island remained 
only a neglected stopping point for the Spanish fleet that vis- 
ited the New World and returned to Spain with the mineral 
wealth of continental America. 

Cuba awakened dramatically in the nineteenth century. The 
growth of the United States as an independent nation, the col- 
lapse of Haiti as a sugar-producing colony, Spanish protective 
policies, and the ingenuity of Cuba's Creole business class all 
converged to produce a sugar revolution on the island. In a 
scant few years, Cuba was transformed from a sleepy, unimpor- 
tant island into the major sugar producer in the world. Slaves 
arrived in increasing numbers. Large estates squeezed out 
smaller ones. Sugar supplanted tobacco, agriculture, and cattle 
as the main occupation. Prosperity replaced poverty. Spain's 
attention replaced neglect. These factors, mainly prosperity 
and Spain's involvement, delayed a move toward independence 
in the early nineteenth century. While most of Latin America 
was breaking with Spain, Cuba remained "the ever-faithful 
island." 

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, all this began to 
change. Creole rivalry with Spaniards for the governing of the 
island, increased Spanish despotism and taxation, and the 
growth of Cuban nationalism all produced a prolonged and 
bloody war. By 1898 the United States, concerned about its eco- 
nomic interests on the island and its strategic interest in a 
future Panama Canal and aroused by an alarmist "yellow" press, 
focused its attention on Cuba. The emergence of the United 
States as the victorious power in the Spanish-American War 
(1898) ensured the expulsion of Spain, United States suprem- 
acy in the Caribbean, and tutelage over Cuban affairs. 



3 



Cuba: A Country Study 

In 1902 Cuba launched into nationhood with fewer prob- 
lems than most Latin American nations. Prosperity increased 
during the early years. Militarism seemed curtailed. Social ten- 
sions were not profound. Yet corruption, violence, and politi- 
cal irresponsibility grew. Successive United States interventions 
and economic involvement weakened the growth of Cuban 
nationality and made Cuba more dependent on its northern 
neighbor. 

The 1930s saw a major attempt at revolution. Prompted by a 
cruel dictatorship, the economic hardships of the world 
depression, and the growing control of their economy by Span- 
iards and North Americans, a group of Cubans led by students 
and intellectuals sought radical reforms and a profound trans- 
formation of Cuban society. In January 1934, after the over- 
throw of the regime of Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 
1925-33) and the short-lived first presidency of Ramon Grau 
San Martin (president, 1933-34, 1944-48), they were cata- 
pulted into power. Their revolution failed, however. The rise of 
militarism, the opposition of the United States, and divisions 
among Cuban political elites and within the revolutionary 
ranks returned the island to less turbulent times. Fulgencio 
Batista y Zaldivar (president, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) and 
the military emerged as the arbiters of Cuba's politics, first 
through de facto ruling and finally with the election of Batista 
to the presidency in 1940. 

The end of World War II and the end of this early Batista era 
brought to power the inheritors of the 1933 revolution. With 
the election in 1944 of Grau San Martin and, four years later, 
his successor, Carlos Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52), an era 
of democratic government, respect for human rights, and 
accelerated prosperity ensued. Yet political violence and cor- 
ruption increased. Many saw these Autentico administrations, 
that is, administrations belonging to the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano — PRC), more com- 
monly known as the Authentic Party (Partido Autentico) , as 
having failed to live up to the ideals of the revolution. Others 
still supported the Autenticos and hoped for new leadership 
that could correct the vices of the past. A few conspired to take 
power by force. 

Batista's coup d'etat on March 10, 1952, had a profound 
effect. It led to doubts and disillusionment about the ability of 
the Cubans to govern themselves. It began a brutal dictatorship 
that resulted in the polarization of society, civil war, the over- 



4 



Historical Setting 



throw of the dictatorship, the destruction of the military and 
most other Cuban institutions, and the rise of a long totalitar- 
ian system led by a charismatic, anti-United States caudillo (see 
Glossary). Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power 
on January 1, 1959, as the result of his successful guerrilla cam- 
paign against the Batista regime. 

In power for four decades, Fidel Castro converted Cuba into 
a Marxist-Leninist society with no individual freedoms or pri- 
vate property and with a Soviet-style centrally planned econ- 
omy (see Glossary) run by a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy 
that has stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. Despite 
massive Soviet aid, the Cubans sank to unprecedented levels of 
poverty, aggravated further by the collapse of communism in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 

Cuba's alliance with the Soviets provided a protective 
umbrella that propelled Fidel Castro onto the international 
scene. Cuba's support of anti-United States guerrilla and ter- 
rorist groups, military intervention in Africa, and unrestricted 
Soviet weapons delivery to Cuba made Castro an important 
international player. Cuba's role in bringing to power a Marxist 
regime in Angola in 1975 and in supporting the Sandinista 
overthrow of the dictatorship of Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle in July 1979 perhaps stand out as Castro's most signifi- 
cant accomplishments in foreign policy. In the 1980s, the 
United States expulsion of the Cubans from Grenada, the elec- 
toral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the peace 
accords in Central America, including El Salvador, showed the 
limits of Cuba's "internationalism" and influence. 

The collapse of communism in the early 1990s had a pro- 
found effect on Cuba. Without Soviet support, international- 
ism decreased significantly, and Cuba found itself in a major 
economic crisis. Minor adjustments, such as more liberalized 
foreign investment laws and the opening of private, but highly 
regulated small businesses and agricultural stands, were intro- 
duced. Yet the regime continued to cling to an outdated Marx- 
ist and caudillista (see Glossary) system, refusing to open the 
political process or the economy. Castro remained one of the 
last unyielding communist bulwarks bent on remaining in 
power and perpetuating his dynastic vision of a communist 
Cuba, led by his anointed successor, his brother General Raul 
Castro Ruz, first vice president of the Council of State. 



5 



Cuba: A Country Study 



The Early Years, 1492-1520 

The Indigenous Peoples 

Knowledge about the early inhabitants of Cuba is sketchy. 
The people who inhabited the island at the time of Columbus's 
landing, estimated at about 60,000, had no written language. 
Most of them, although peaceful, were annihilated, absorbed, 
or died out as a result of the shock of conquest. Whatever infor- 
mation is available comes primarily from the writings of early 
explorers and from later archaeological discoveries and studies 
of village sites, burial places, and so forth. These sources indi- 
cate that at least three cultures — the Guanahatabey, the 
Ciboney, and the Taino — swept through the island before the 
arrival of the Spaniards. 

The first of these, the Guanahatabey, was the oldest culture 
on the island. It was a shell culture, characterized by its use of 
shell gouge and spoon as its principal artifacts. The Guana- 
hatabey might have come from the south of the United States, 
for their artifacts display certain similarities with those of some 
early inhabitants of Florida. Yet some archaeologists and 
anthropologists are more inclined to accept the theory that the 
Guanahatabey migrated from South America through the 
chain of islands in the West Indies until finally settling in Cuba. 
By the time of the Spanish arrival, they had retreated to the 
most western part of Cuba. 

The Guanahatabey built no houses and lived mostly in caves. 
They were fruit pickers and food gatherers and did little fish- 
ing or hunting. They seem to have relied on mollusks as their 
principal foodstuff. Their civilization apparently was in decline 
by the time the Europeans arrived. 

The second culture, the Ciboney, was part of the larger 
South American Arawak group. The Ciboney inhabited west- 
ern Cuba and the southwestern peninsula of Hispaniola. It is 
generally agreed that the Ciboney, as well as the more 
advanced Taino, the other Arawak group found in Cuba, origi- 
nated in South America and had island-hopped along the West 
Indies. 

The Ciboney were a Stone Age culture and were more 
advanced than the Guanahatabey. They were highly skilled col- 
lectors, hunters, and fishermen and inhabited towns, usually 
near rivers or the sea. Some lived in caves while others had 
begun to inhabit primitive dwellings called bajareques or barba- 
coas. The Ciboney practiced some form of elementary agricul- 



6 



Historical Setting 



ture, and their diet included turtles, fish, birds, and mollusks. 
Two of the more typical artifacts they developed included a 
stone digger (gladiolito) and a ball (esferolito), both symbols of 
authority or high social status; they were also considered magi- 
cal objects. The Ciboney fell prey to the more advanced Taino 
and became their servants, or nabories. Bartolome de Las Casas, 
an early chronicler known as the "protector of the Indians," 
described the Ciboney as "a most simple and gentle kind of 
people who were held like savages." 

The Taino was the second and more advanced Arawak group 
to enter the island. The Taino people occupied the central and 
eastern parts of Cuba, as well as most of Hispaniola, Jamaica, 
and Puerto Rico. The Taino made extensive use of pottery and 
stone artifacts that are reminiscent of Old World neolithic arti- 
facts. The short, olive-skinned Taino people subjected their 
children to artificial cranium changes by binding the frontal or 
occipital regions of their heads during early childhood; hence, 
their faces and particularly foreheads were unusually wide. 
They preferred high and fertile terrain close to sources of fresh 
water and lived in small villages in round houses with conical 
roofs made up of bamboo and thatched palm called caneyes or 
rectangular ones called bohios. 

The Taino developed a rather advanced economic system 
based on agriculture with commonly cultivated fields. The cul- 
tivation and preparation of yuca (manioc), a sturdy tuber, 
played a significant role in their society. After the yuca, which 
has a period of growth longer than a year, had been harvested, 
the Taino grated it, drained it of its poisonous juice, and baked 
it into unleavened bread called cassava, which the Spaniards 
labeled "bread of the earth." This bread was both nutritious 
and tasty and kept for several months, even in humid weather. 

Tobacco, cotton, corn, and white and sweet potato were also 
an important part of the Taino economy. Tobacco was used for 
smoking as well as for religious ceremonies and for curing the 
ill. After the Spanish occupation, tobacco became an impor- 
tant item for export. Cotton was mostly used for hammocks, 
bags, and fishing nets. Both the manufacture of textiles and the 
making of pottery items were tasks performed by women, while 
men engaged in hunting, fishing, or agriculture. The Taino 
also developed a number of wooden artifacts, such as powerful 
canoes, which gave them great mobility by water. 

Society was organized along distinct class lines. At the top 
was the chief, or cacique, who managed all the affairs of the 



7 



Cuba: A Country Study 

community and ruled over a specific territory. The line of 
inheritance to become a cacique was not direct; the eldest son of 
the cacique's eldest sister became chief when the former cacique 
died. If the cacique did not have any sisters, then his eldest son 
would inherit the post. The caciques were aided by the nitainos, 
a group of advisors who supervised communal work and seem 
to have been in charge of various sectors of the population. 
Aware of the nitainos 1 importance in controlling the labor sup- 
ply, the Spaniards used them later on as overseers on their 
plantations. Next to the nitainos was the medicine man, or 
behique. The lower class was composed of the nabories, who did 
most of the work of the village. 

The Taino believed in a supreme invisible being, and their 
religion was dominated by a series of gods represented by idols. 
Ancestor worship was common, and the Taino carved special 
idols resembling their ancestors. The souls of the dead were 
thought to reside in a nearby island and to return at night to 
hunt the living. 

In terms of economic development, social organization, 
technological advances, and art, the native peoples of Cuba 
were far inferior to the more advanced civilizations of the 
mainland, such as the Maya and Aztec of Mexico or the Inca of 
Peru. The Ciboney and Taino left only a mild imprint on 
Cuba's later culture; the Guanahatabey left almost none. There 
was little mingling of races between Spaniards and Indians. A 
new society, first of Spaniards and then of Spaniards and 
blacks, supplanted the indigenous society. New institutions, 
new values, and a new culture replaced the old ones. Some 
Indian words, foods, and habits, as well as agricultural tech- 
niques, however, were retained by later generations. Retained 
also was the bohio, the typical and picturesque dwelling of many 
Cuban farmers, which still can be seen today and remains per- 
haps the most visible legacy of the native society. 

For the most part, however, the Cuban native peoples' con- 
tribution to the development of a Cuban nationality must be 
considered minor. Nevertheless, for generations after the con- 
quest, Native American warriors such as Hatuey, who fought 
the Spanish conquest in eastern Cuba, were glorified in the 
pages of Cuban history books and raised to the status of folk 
heroes. They represented for Cuban children a symbol of 
native resistance against the oppressive Spanish conquistador. 
The Indians' innocence and kindness were contrasted with the 
cruelty of the Spanish invaders. But for those present-day 



8 



Historical Setting 



Cubans in search of the roots of a uniquely Cuban national 
identity, this Indian heritage was not enough of a foundation. 
Unlike for the Mexicans, the glory of the Aztec past was not 
there for the Cubans to turn to. Instead, Cuban writers in 
search of the roots of Cuban nationality would later look to 
Spanish or Negro contributions and try to find in them the 
missing link with the past, but with little luck. The Spanish her- 
itage was dismissed as part of the rejection of colonialism, and 
Negro contributions were never totally recognized, particularly 
by white Cuban society. 

Spanish Conquest and Colonization 

In the early sixteenth century, following Christopher Colum- 
bus's discovery of the island in 1492, the Spanish crown 
became increasingly intrigued with the possibility of finding 
gold in Cuba. Spanish officials, desirous of increasing their 
labor supply as well as exploring possible new sources of 
wealth, also began to look toward Cuba. Columbus's son, Diego 
Columbus, who had been appointed governor of the Indies in 
1508 and lived in Hispaniola, was particularly interested in 
extending the territory under his control. As a preliminary 
step toward colonization, Nicolas de Ovando (governor of His- 
paniola, 1502-9) sent an expedition headed by Sebastian de 
Ocampo that circumnavigated Cuba in 1508; he brought back 
tales of wealth and a more detailed picture of the island's fine 
terrain and harbors. 

Finding a conquistador who combined military skill, admin- 
istrative talent, and loyalty to the crown as well as to Diego 
Columbus himself was no easy task. The choice finally fell on 
Diego Velazquez de Cuellar (governor of Hispaniola, 151 1— 
21), Ovando's lieutenant and one of the wealthiest Spaniards 
in Hispaniola. Although not as heroic or daring as later con- 
quistadors such as Francisco Pizarro, conqueror of Peru, or as 
cunning as Hernan Cortes, conqueror of Mexico, Velazquez 
had achieved a reputation for courage and sagacity because of 
his role in subduing Indian caciques in Hispaniola. 

From the start, Velazquez faced an outraged and hostile 
Indian population. Led by Hatuey, a fugitive Indian chieftain 
from Hispaniola, the natives of eastern Cuba resolved to resist 
the Spanish onslaught. It was a futile gesture, for the peaceful 
Tainos lacked the military skills and weapons to face the better 
armed and trained Spaniards. Spanish horses and hounds, 
both unknown in Cuba, played a decisive role in terrorizing the 



9 



Cuba: A Country Study 

indigenous peoples, who soon surrendered or fled into the 
mountains to escape the wrath of the conquistadors. Hatuey 
himself was captured, tried as a heretic and a rebel, and 
burned at the stake. 

Velazquez set out to pacify the country and end the abuses 
against the Indians. He induced groups of Indians to lay down 
their weapons and work near the several new towns that he 
established throughout the island. Among these were Baracoa, 
Bayamo, Trinidad, Sancti Spiritus, La Habana (hereafter, 
Havana), Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. 

In this task, Velasquez was decisively aided by the work of 
Bartolome de Las Casas. The Dominican friar preceded the 
Spaniards into native villages on many occasions and suc- 
ceeded in convincing the indigenous peoples to cooperate with 
the conquistadors. Las Casas, however, was horrified by the 
massacre of the natives and became an outspoken critic of the 
conquest of Cuba. He wrote extensively condemning the Span- 
iards' cruelty and claiming that the Indians were rational and 
free and therefore entitled to retain their lands. 

To strengthen his own power and gain supporters both in 
Cuba and in Spain, Velazquez began to grant encomiendas (see 
Glossary), or contracts, whereby large landowners (encomen- 
deros — see Glossary) , who were favored conquistadors, suppos- 
edly agreed to provide protection and religious instruction to 
Indians in return for their labor. The crown used the 
encomienda concept as a political instrument to consolidate its 
control over the indigenous population. Many encomenderos, 
however, interested only in exploiting the resources of the 
island, disregarded their moral, religious, and legal obligations 
to the Indians. A conflict soon developed between the crown 
and the Spanish settlers over the control and utilization of the 
labor by the exploitative encomenderos, and also over the crown's 
stated objective to Christianize the natives and the crown's own 
economic motivations. In the reality of the New World, the six- 
teenth-century Christian ideal of converting souls was many 
times sacrificed for a profit. Christianization was reduced to 
mass baptism; and despite the crown's insistence that Indians 
were not slaves, many were bought and sold as chattels. 

The Colonial Period, 1520-1898 

Administration and Economy 

As soon as the conquest was completed and the Indians sub- 



10 



A view of El Castillo del Morro (Morro Castle) and the lighthouse 
from El Castillo de la Punta (Point Castle), 1997 
Courtesy Mark P Sullivan 

jugated, the crown began introducing to the island the institu- 
tional apparatus necessary to govern the colony. The governor, 
the highest representative of the crown on the island, ruled 
Cuba with almost complete authority over administrative, polit- 
ical, and judicial affairs. The governor was technically subject 
to the audiencia (see Glossary) in Santo Domingo and to a vice- 
roy in New Spain, the highest royal official in the New World. 
In practice, however, he exercised great autonomy, particularly 
after the wealth of Mexico was discovered, diverting the 
crown's interests away from Cuba and its lack of resources. 

Nominally responsible for the collection and expenditures 
of revenues and all financial affairs, the governor delegated 
these functions to several royal officials (oficiales reales — see 
Glossary) appointed directly by the crown. At first the seat of 
government remained in Baracoa, the first village founded by 
Velazquez. In 1515 it was transferred to Santiago, and finally in 
1538 to Havana because of Havana's geographic location and 
excellent port. In 1607 Havana was formally established as the 
capital of Cuba, and the island was divided into two provinces 



11 



Cuba: A Country Study 

with capitals at Santiago and Havana. The governor-captain 
general at Havana ruled in military matters over the entire 
island, but the governor at Santiago was able to exercise con- 
siderable political independence. 

Although the governor-captain was nominally subject to the 
viceroy of New Spain, the viceroy exerted little control over the 
affairs of the island. Of more direct influence, and a powerful 
check on the governor, was the audiencia of Santo Domingo. 
This tribunal heard criminal and civil cases appealed over the 
decisions of the governor. But it soon, as in Spain, became 
more than a court of law; it was also an advisory council to the 
governor and always exercised its right to supervise and investi- 
gate his administration. 

At the local level, the most important institution was the 
cabildo (see Glossary) , a town council, usually composed of the 
most prominent citizens. The alcaldes (judges) acted as judges 
of first instance, and, in the absence of the governor or his lieu- 
tenant, presided at meetings of the cabildo. They also visited the 
territories under their jurisdiction and dispensed justice in 
rural areas. 

As royal government became better organized and more 
entrenched in Cuba, the powers and prerogatives of the cabildo 
were progressively curtailed. By the end of the colonial period, 
few responsible citizens wanted to become involved in local 
government. Those who did were more interested in their per- 
sonal well-being than in the affairs of the colony. Peninsular 
Spaniards, or peninsulares (see Glossary; hereafter, Peninsu- 
lars) , who bought their offices sought rewards for their invest- 
ments and enriched themselves at the expense of public funds. 
Creoles (criollos), Spaniards born in the New World, also joined 
the Spanish bureaucracy in order to gain wealth and partici- 
pate in other opportunities controlled by Peninsulars. They 
looked to local government as one of the few potential areas of 
employment in which they could succeed. Very few Creoles 
ever attained a position of importance in the political hierar- 
chy of the island. As the bureaucracy grew in the colonial 
period, a latent hostility developed between Peninsulars and 
Creoles — a hostility that erupted into hatred and violence dur- 
ing the wars for independence in the nineteenth century. 

In the early years, cabildo members were content to eke out 
an existence until such time as new opportunities might arise 
for them to migrate to better lands or until mineral wealth that 
would bring them instant wealth might be discovered in Cuba. 



12 



Historical Setting 



Those who expected to enrich themselves from Cuba's mineral 
resources were greatly disappointed. The island did not enjoy 
the large deposits of gold and other minerals that were later 
found in Mexico and South America. Gold found in the river 
banks did not represent any great wealth, although washing the 
gold did require a large labor supply as well as costly equip- 
ment. A handful of Spanish entrepreneurs controlled the busi- 
ness and used Indians as a labor supply. The crown was also 
involved from the earliest times in controlling mining opera- 
tions. The Spanish monarchs took one-fifth of all production as 
a tax for the right of mining, especially when Indians in an 
encomienda arrangement did the mining. 

Foodstuffs also were an important part of the economy. The 
Indian agricultural practices were taken over by the Spaniards, 
who continued to grow some of the native foodstuffs, particu- 
larly yuca. New crops and new grains from the Old World were 
also brought to the island. Sugarcane, which had been grown 
by the Spaniards in the Canary Islands, was also a part of the 
island's economy. As early as 1523, the crown instructed the 
Contracting House (Casa de Contratacion — see Glossary) to 
lend money to settlers in Cuba to help finance the construction 
of a sugar mill. Other similar loans were made in later years, 
but it was not until the eighteenth century and particularly the 
nineteenth century that sugar assumed any importance. Lack- 
ing large amounts of capital, an adequate labor supply, and 
official encouragement, the sugar industry remained overshad- 
owed in importance by the more lucrative and important busi- 
ness connected with the cattle industry and its derivative 
products. 

Cattle-raising became one of the most prosperous busi- 
nesses, especially in the seventeenth century. Although the 
activity called for daring horsemanship, it required no sus- 
tained effort, for Cuba's abundant pasture lands facilitated 
breeding. The cattle were let loose on Cuba's savannas, where 
they multiplied rapidly. They were used as a means of transpor- 
tation as well as for feeding purposes. Salted meat became an 
important item sold to the Spanish ships that called at Cuba's 
ports. Perhaps the chief value of cattle lay in the hides. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as demand for leather 
grew in Europe, cattle hides became Cuba's chief export, yield- 
ing considerable profit. 

Tobacco also made some modest gains, particularly in the 
seventeenth century. Because it was not too bulky and com- 



13 



Cuba: A Country Study 



manded high prices in Europe, tobacco was a favorite item for 
smuggling. By the eighteenth century, it became an important 
export item to the French. Throughout this period, the 
tobacco business remained in private hands. But under the 
administration of Charles III (1759-88), it was converted into a 
government monopoly. The crown advanced money to the 
growers, who sold their crops to the government at a fixed 
price. In the early nineteenth century, the value of tobacco as 
an export began to decline. By then the price of land had 
increased tremendously, partly as a result of the growth of 
sugar estates. Tobacco growers found themselves either 
squeezed out of their lands or selling them to the sugar capital- 
ists. The crown's emphasis on coffee and sugar growing was 
also detrimental to the tobacco industry. In desperate need of 
capital, the Spanish monarchs encouraged the more lucrative 
sugar business as a source of revenue. 

The economy was oriented toward importing the bare neces- 
sities, with little or no provision for domestic manufacturing. 
Spain followed a thoroughly mercantilist economic policy, 
encouraging Cuba's dependence on outside sources of supply 
for its needs and looking at the island as a producer of raw 
materials to satisfy the needs of the mother country. 

Life and Society 

In the early years, Cuba became the source of support for 
the conquest of nearby lands. It was from the island that 
Hernan Cortes's expedition sailed in 1519 to conquer the 
Aztec Empire. The conquest of Mexico meant temporary pros- 
perity and great euphoria, but it also meant the decline of 
Cuba's importance. The days of boom soon gave way to years of 
bust. Farmers and adventurers all left the island in search of El 
Dorado in Mexico, or joined the ill-fated expedition of Panfilo 
de Narvaez of 1527 and Hernando de Soto in 1539 to conquer 
Florida. Exodus of population, decline of food production, and 
economic misery afflicted the island. Estates were abandoned 
by their owners and bought cheaply by less adventurous Penin- 
sulars, humble folks willing to produce for the passing ships 
and live a modest existence. 

For the next two centuries, Spain focused most of its atten- 
tion on the continental colonies from which it obtained much- 
needed mineral wealth. A complex and at times cumbersome 
political and defense system developed to ensure the uninter- 
rupted flow of this wealth. Cuba was relegated to a mere stop- 



14 



Historical Setting 



ping point for passing ships. It remained valuable only because 
of its strategic location as the gateway to the New World, not 
because of its products. 

Cuba's population diminished continuously throughout this 
period. The indigenous peoples continued to die out and 
there was little new influx of Spanish immigrants. An economy 
of scarcity and a hot, sickness-ridden tropical climate offered 
little incentive for new immigration. Those who did come to 
Cuba were mostly Spanish officials, soldiers, and members of 
the clergy; there were also many transient migrants on their 
way to Mexico or South America. By 1544 Cuba had a popula- 
tion of fewer than 7,000, composed of 660 Spaniards, some 
5,000 native Americans, and 800 black slaves. 

This early society was characterized by little social mobility as 
well as lack of interest in the arts or in education. Creoles were 
less educated and seemed less interested in a formal education 
than were their ancestors. Living in small towns, surrounded by 
an unknown and at times hostile environment, fearful of 
Indian or later of black rebellion, or of foreign attacks, most 
had little time for cultural activities and were mainly concerned 
with the daily problems of existence. Brutality, opportunism, 
corruption, and smuggling characterized this society. Violence 
and lack of observance of the law flourished as the struggle for 
survival became harsher. Whatever education existed was 
offered within the Roman Catholic Church. 

Protected by the power of the state, the church grew in num- 
bers and influence. By the mid-seventeenth century, there were 
about 200 friars and priests and about 100 nuns on the island. 
Churches were built in every new city, and church wealth 
increased through the continuous acquisition of lands donated 
to the church and through the collection of rents, as well as of 
the special tax called diezmo. With wealth came not only pres- 
tige and influence, but also the loss of the church's early mis- 
sionary zeal. The priesthood began identifying with the 
wealthier classes to the neglect of Indians and blacks and 
became a conservative institution interested in preserving the 
status quo. 

The uninterrupted arrival of blacks throughout the colonial 
period decisively influenced this developing society. African sla- 
very existed in Spain, and the first slaves had come to Cuba 
with the early conquistadors. Later they were brought in 
greater numbers to pan for gold; they replaced the weaker 
indigenous groups. The importation of black slaves was costly, 



15 



Cuba: A Country Study 

however. As gold reserves became exhausted, there was little 
need for a large and expensive labor supply, and so their 
importation slowed down. Not until the full-scale development 
of the sugar industry was there again a significant need for 
manpower. Thousands of black slaves entered Cuba in the 
nineteenth century, and by 1825 the black population had sur- 
passed the white one. 

The condition of the slaves, although not unbearable, was 
poor. Blacks were much more valuable than the Indians and 
seemed to have received better treatment. Yet Spanish officials 
complained to the crown that the blacks were given little food 
or clothing and that they were subjected to abusive corporal 
punishment, forcing many to escape into Cuba's mountains. 
These runaway slaves, called cimarrones, were a constant con- 
cern to the Spaniards because by their example they encour- 
aged other slaves to escape captivity and to rebel. As early as 
1538, black slaves rioted and looted Havana, while French pri- 
vateers were attacking the city from the sea. 

Although most blacks worked in rural areas, some per- 
formed a variety of jobs in the cities. A considerable number 
labored in artisan industries, in construction, in the wharves, 
and in domestic service. Some were able to obtain their own 
earnings and thus liberate themselves or pay the price of their 
manumission. Others were freed after they had performed ser- 
vices their master was willing to reward. The number of slaves 
decreased continuously until reaching the low figure of 38,879, 
out of a total population of 171,620 in 1774. 

The opportunities for slaves to become free contributed to 
the development of a uniquely Cuban society. Spanish law, the 
Roman Catholic religion, the economic condition of the 
island, and the Spanish attitude toward blacks all contributed 
to aid their integration into Cuban society. While the black 
population in the British sugar-producing colonies in the 
Caribbean lived under the tight political control of a small, 
exploiting minority of overseers and government officials, 
blacks in Cuba coexisted with the rest of the population and 
lived mainly by farming and cattle grazing. Prior to the eigh- 
teenth century, the island avoided the plantation system with 
its concomitant large-scale capital investment, latifundios 
(large estates), and docile black slave labor force. Instead, soci- 
ety developed with little outside interference. Cuba thus began 
to find its own identity in a society that combined racial bal- 



16 



Historical Setting 



ance, small-scale agriculture, and folk-Catholicism within a 
Spanish framework. 

The British Occupation, 1762-63 

Of all the wars that ravaged the Caribbean, one in particular, 
the Seven Years War (1756-63), had a profound effect on 
Cuba. At first only France and Britain were at war, but soon 
Spain came in on the French side. Motivated by dynastic con- 
nections with France, by grievances against Britain and its colo- 
nies in the New World, especially in Central America, and by an 
awareness that if France lost the war Britain would be supreme 
in the Caribbean, Spain cast its lot with the French. Spain's 
entrance into the war proved disastrous because Spain lacked 
the naval power to confront the British or to prevent them 
from capturing Spanish possessions. In August 1762, the Brit- 
ish destroyed a large Spanish naval force and captured Manila 
and Havana, only to trade the latter back to Spain for Florida 
in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. 

Several factors converged in the late eighteenth century to 
bring Cuba out of its isolation and into the mainstream of 
world affairs and to give the sugar industry the boost it needed. 
These developments included the relaxation of Spanish trade 
restrictions, the emergence of the important and nearby 
United States market for Cuban products, and the devastation 
of Haiti's sugar and coffee estates following the rebellion of 
that country's slaves in the 1790s. But it was the British capture 
and occupation of Havana that really shocked Cuban society 
out of its lethargic sleep. 

During the brief eleven months of British occupation, the 
oppressive Spanish trade restrictions were lifted, and Havana 
was thrown open to trade with Britain and particularly with the 
North American colonies. More than 700 merchant ships vis- 
ited the port during those months, more than the number that 
had visited Havana in the preceding decade. British capital, as 
well as large numbers of low-priced slaves, entered the island, 
boosting sugar production. For the most part, Britain main- 
tained Spanish administrative institutions, although an attempt 
was made to reform the judicial system by ending some of the 
existing privileges and streamlining judicial practices. 

The impact of the occupation was long-range. It made the 
Cubans aware of the benefits of trading with the British and 
particularly with a close and growing market like the United 
States. The large quantities of British goods that entered the 



17 



Cuba: A Country Study 

island gave the Cubans a taste for those products and increased 
their demands for freer trade. Similarly, the occupation 
focused the attention of North American entrepreneurs on 
Cuba's economic potential as an area for investment, a source 
of raw materials, and a market for British and North American 
products. Finally, Spain was forced to reexamine its policies 
toward Cuba. The island was no longer the stopping point of 
the fleets, but a bone of contention among European powers, 
one important enough to have merited a British effort at con- 
quest. Spain had to look at its Caribbean possession and try to 
satisfy, or at least placate, the demands and aspirations of her 
tropical subjects. 

The British occupation had given the island the initial eco- 
nomic boost it needed. When the slave uprisings and the 
destruction of properties took place in Haiti, Cuba was ready to 
become the sugar bowl of the Caribbean and soon replaced 
Haiti as the supplier of European sugar. Cuban planters 
pleaded with the Spanish crown for the easing of trade rela- 
tions and for the free importation of slaves. Spain acceded to 
these pleadings in 1791. 

In the years that followed, the sugar industry grew substan- 
tially. Annual production rose from 14,000 tons in 1790 to 
more than 34,000 tons in 1805, and the number of sugar mills 
grew to 478, more than twice as many as had existed prior to 
the British capture of Havana. Sugar also benefited from the 
close commercial relations that developed between Cuba and 
the United States. The wars of the French Revolution isolated 
Spain from her colonies, thus helping the growth of trade 
between Cuba and the United States. By the turn of the cen- 
tury, Cuba enjoyed substantial trade with the United States, 
and when Cuban ports were thrown open to free trade with all 
nations in 1818, commercial relations between the two grew 
even closer. 

Sugar, Prosperity, and Unrest in the Nineteenth Century 

Throughout the nineteenth century, sugar as well as coffee 
became increasingly important in the Cuban economy. Large 
cattle estates were subdivided and sold to enterprising Span- 
iards for sugar or coffee cultivation. Aware of the profit possi- 
bilities, the Spanish crown encouraged and aided the 
subdivisions of land. Prior to this time, much suitable land was 
often part of large estates, the owners of which could neither 
divide nor sell the land because it had been granted to them 



18 



Historical Setting 



for use, not ownership. The crown agreed in 1819 to consider 
landowners all those who could prove they had been on the 
land for the past forty years. This measure facilitated the break- 
down of large estates, contributed to the growth of the sugar 
industry, and benefited a new class of proprietors. These new 
landowners could sell their land at a profit, become sugar pro- 
ducers themselves, or lease their land to other less fortunate 
and smaller planters, who did not receive title to a piece of real 
estate. In 1827 Cuba had 1,000 sugar mills, 2,067 coffee estates, 
and 5,534 tobacco farms. By 1860 it is estimated that there were 
about 2,000 sugar mills, the greatest number in Cuban history. 
A prosperous and large class of rural proprietors who based 
their prosperity on the cultivation of sugar and tobacco had 
emerged. 

Despite its rapid growth, the sugar industry's development 
was not without serious problems and setbacks. Overproduc- 
tion, fluctuations in price, competition from the British islands 
in the Caribbean, and the appearance of a dreaded competitor, 
beet sugar, in the second decade of the century depressed the 
sugar market and slowed down Cuba's sugar boom. These 
problems were further complicated by the British-imposed 
legal suppression of the slave trade in 1821. This action 
deprived the island of a continuous source of labor. Moreover, 
Cuba lacked an appropriate network of internal transportation 
that could facilitate movement of sugar to the mills and the 
ports of embarkation. 

In the 1840s, however, two events renewed the acceleration 
of the sugar industry. Coffee, which had come to occupy an 
important position in the island's economy, was seriously 
affected by a fall in prices that almost ruined coffee planters. 
Capital and labor fled from coffee into sugar, and much land 
was shifted to the growing of cane. The second event was the 
introduction of the railroad. Cane could now be brought from 
remote areas to the mills and then to the ports for shipment. 
What started out as a relatively small business grew into a pow- 
erful, capitalistic enterprise based on large landholding, slave 
labor, and mass production. 

In the early decades of the century, most Cubans seemed 
content with their status. The new aristocracy of wealth that 
had developed around the sugar industry enjoyed its recently 
acquired wealth and feared that a repetition in Cuba of the 
continental wars would upset the social order upon which its 
prosperity depended. This "plantocracy" was willing to tolerate 



19 



Cuba: A Country Study 



a limited number of political and economic reforms, so long as 
the status quo was not endangered. The status quo meant the 
presence of a foreign power to protect their position against 
the possibility of a black rebellion similar to the one in Haiti. 

By the 1840s, there was real concern about preserving 
Cuba's colonial status. Still fearful of a slave rebellion, or even 
an actual end to slavery forced on a weak Spain by Britain, the 
plantocracy looked toward the United States for a possible per- 
manent relationship. Painfully aware of the problems in the 
British Caribbean since the abolition of slavery and its impact 
on sugar production, the property owners saw in the United 
States, particularly in the southern states, a slave-owning society 
similar to Cuba's own plantation economy. A series of slave 
revolts in Cuba in the early 1840s increased apprehension and 
the desire for a permanent relationship with the United States. 

United States interest in Cuba and in its strategic location 
grew, particularly after the war with Mexico and the acquisition 
of California. In the 1840s and 1850s, Presidents James K. Polk, 
Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan attempted unsuccessfully 
to purchase Cuba from Spain. In 1854 three United States min- 
isters to Europe signed a secret report, later known as the 
Ostend Manifesto (see Glossary), which called for the United 
States purchase of Cuba or, if this failed, the forceful wresting 
of the island from Spain. 

The Ostend Manifesto was the high watermark of United 
States interest in acquiring Cuba peacefully in the 1850s. Other 
efforts, however, proved bolder. During the administrations of 
Zachary Taylor (president, 1849-50) and Millard Fillmore 
(president, 1850-53), pro-slavery elements were discouraged 
by the lack of official support. Some turned to filibustering 
expeditions, hoping that they might lead to the overthrow of 
Spanish power on the island. The principal filibusterer was 
Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan-born Spanish general. He lived in 
Cuba and became involved in a conspiracy and various expedi- 
tions to the island in an attempt to annex Cuba to the United 
States. 

The failure of Lopez's expeditions and his death in 1851 and 
the United States Civil War ended, at least temporarily, the 
clamor for annexation. The abolition of slavery in the United 
States deprived Cuban slaveholders of the reason for wanting 
to tie themselves permanently to their northern neighbor. 
Abraham Lincoln's coming to power also had a significant 
effect on the Cuban policy of the United States, for Lincoln 



20 



Historical Setting 



and his advisers were willing, as long as Spain remained nonag- 
gressive, to allow Cuba to stay under Spanish control. The 
expansionist attempts of the 1840s and 1850s thus gave way to 
the less aggressive era of the 1860s. The proponents of the 
acquisition of Cuba were not defeated, however, only silenced. 
What their brethren were unable to achieve in mid-century, the 
expansionists of the 1890s accomplished at the turn of the cen- 
tury when the United States occupied Cuba during the Span- 
ish-American War and later exerted considerable political and 
economic influence over the affairs of the island. 

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Cuba continued to prosper. The progressive changes known as 
the Bourbon Reforms (see Glossary), initiated throughout 
Latin America by Charles III (King of Spain, 1759-88), quick- 
ened economic and political activities and started a complete 
transformation of Cuban society. Population increased, agricul- 
tural production and profits expanded, and contacts with vari- 
ous Spanish ports as well as with the rest of Europe became 
closer, leading to the introduction of new ideas into the colony. 
The old order began to decay. To the forefront of Cuban soci- 
ety came a new and active class of Creole hacendados (hacienda 
owners) and entrepreneurs, who based their prosperity on 
sugar, coffee, land speculation, and the slave trade. 

It was only natural that members of this group would make 
their point of view felt concerning economic and social mat- 
ters. As the century progressed and their power increased, they 
began questioning Spanish mercantilist policies. Their primary 
focus concerned their immediate economic interests. Yet at a 
time when Europe was undergoing profound intellectual 
changes resulting partly from the Enlightenment (see Glos- 
sary) , their questioning of Spain's economic policies naturally 
led to the growth of a more critical attitude on the part of many 
Creole writers and intellectuals on the island. The desire for 
economic reforms was later translated into a desire for political 
and even social change. Intellectual activity flourished so 
intensely during the century that the period has come to be 
known as Cuba's Golden Century. 

Many of the attitudes of prominent Creoles were influenced 
by ties with the international community and particularly by 
Spain's inability to satisfy the island's economic needs. It finally 
became clear that Spanish policy had little to offer in exchange 
for increased taxation, ineffective administration, and the 
exclusion of Creoles from responsible positions in govern- 



21 



Cuba: A Country Study 



ment. The Cubans turned away from any hopes of reform and 
toward independence. 

With the annexation movement faltering and the possibility 
of independence still remote, some Cubans turned to attempts 
at reform within the Spanish empire. Reformism (reformismo) , a 
movement that had existed in Cuba since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century for the purpose of reforming Spanish insti- 
tutions in Cuba, took new impetus in mid-century, partly as a 
result of the failure of a number of conspiracies aimed at expel- 
ling Spanish power and because of black uprisings against sla- 
very on the island. Spain also seemed at the time to be 
following a more conciliatory policy toward Cuba. 

In 1865 the reform movement was strong enough to orga- 
nize the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista), the first such 
political party to exist on the island. The party was not a cohe- 
sive political organization. Some of its members had been pre- 
viously involved with the annexation movement, and a few still 
flirted with the idea. Others wanted some form of political 
autonomy for Cuba within the Spanish empire. Still others 
called for the island's representation in the Cortes (see Glos- 
sary). A few felt that reformism could be a step that would 
eventually lead to complete independence. In general, the 
party advocated equal rights for Cubans and Peninsulars, limi- 
tation on the powers of the captain-general, and greater politi- 
cal freedom on the island. It also supported freer trade and 
gradual abolition of slavery, and called for an increase of white 
immigrants into Cuba. The slave trade was partially curtailed in 
1865, and the Spanish governor issued a law abolishing slavery 
in Cuba on November 5, 1879. It was not until October 7, 1886, 
however, that a royal decree completely abolished slavery in 
Cuba. 

The activities of the Reformists soon met with strong opposi- 
tion from a group of Peninsulars, who formed the Uncondi- 
tional Spanish Party (Partido Incondicional Espanol). Trying 
to prevent any economic or political change, especially if it 
affected their interests, the Peninsulars used their newspaper, 
the Diario de la Marina, to attack the reformers. They cautioned 
that any concessions from Spain could only strengthen the Cre- 
oles, weakening continuous Spanish control over Cuba. 

The work of the Reformists and their clash with the Peninsu- 
lars had an impact on Spain. Following the successful move- 
ment for independence in Santo Domingo against Spanish 
rule in 1865, and at a time when Spain was experiencing 



22 



Historical Setting 



renewed economic and political difficulties, the Spanish mon- 
archy felt it would be best to moderate its policy toward Cuba. 
It therefore called for the election of a reform commission that 
would discuss changes to be introduced on the island. 

The Information Board (Junta de Information) (1866-67), 
as the Reform Commission came to be known, was composed 
of twelve elected Creole reformers and four Peninsulars, 
reflecting Cubans' desire for reform. To appease the fears of 
the conservative elements within Cuba and to prevent the elec- 
tion of radical reformers, the Spanish government instructed 
the Cuban municipalities to set high property qualifications for 
voting. Yet to everyone's surprise, the reformers won a major 
victory in the elections. Of the sixteen Cuban commissioners, 
twelve were Creole reformers. The results of this election 
clearly indicated the Cubans' desire for reform, rather than a 
widespread Cuban desire for independence. It seems that a sig- 
nificant proportion of the white Creole population of the 
island still hoped, as late as the 1860s, for a modification of 
Spanish policy and the introduction of reforms that would per- 
mit them to continue within the Spanish empire. 

Yet the hope for change was short-lived. The Spanish govern- 
ment, which had come to power as the Reform Commission 
began deliberations several months earlier, had decided to let 
the commission meet, but had no intention of implementing 
its recommendations. In early 1867, the government not only 
disbanded the Information Board and dismissed all of its rec- 
ommendations, but also imposed new and irritating taxes. Fur- 
thermore, Spain sent to Cuba Francisco Lersundi (captain- 
general, 1867-69), a reactionary captain-general who prohib- 
ited public meetings and tightly censured reformist literature. 

The failure of the Information Board in particular and of 
reformism in general gave new impetus to the independence 
movement. Aware that Spain would not permit any significant 
changes and that the island's destiny as well as their own would 
best be served by an independent Cuba, Creoles began prepar- 
ing for complete separation from Spain. 

Toward Independence, 1868-1902 

The Ten Years' War, 1868-78 

Although remaining in the Spanish fold, the "ever-faithful" 
island, as Cuba became known, grew away from the crown. The 
interests and views of the Creoles and Peninsulars increasingly 



23 



Cuba: A Country Study 

clashed. Reconciliation seemed difficult; those who clamored 
for violence became more numerous, and, finally, war broke 
out. The wars for independence that followed lasted more than 
thirty years, from 1868 until the outbreak of the Spanish-Amer- 
ican War, followed by the intervention of the United States in 
1898. The wars were Cuba's belated reaction to the fight for 
independence waged throughout most of Latin America dur- 
ing the first quarter of the century. 

This is not to say that Cubans made no attempts to separate 
from Spain in the first part of the century. As early as 1809, at a 
time of turmoil and rebellion against Spanish power in Latin 
America, several Cubans conspired to gain independence for 
Cuba. Lacking widespread popular support, however, the early 
attempts at independence were weakened by several factors. 
Among these were the growth of the sugar industry and of 
wealth in general, the fear of a black rebellion, and the 
increased sentiment in favor of annexation by the United 
States. Then, too, a number of Spanish royalists and troops set- 
tled in Cuba following their defeat in Latin America. Cuba 
became a heavily fortified garrison, the last significant bastion 
of Spanish power in the New World. 

The international picture also was not favorable to the 
Cuban cause for independence. Fearful of European expan- 
sion into the New World and particularly of British and French 
designs on Cuba, the United States was quick to issue the Mon- 
roe Doctrine (1823), which warned in part that the nation 
would not tolerate the transfer of New World colonies from 
one European power to another. The United States seemed to 
have preferred Cuba under a weak Spain than under a mighty 
Britain. If anyone else were to have Cuba, some United States 
politicians and business interests reasoned, it would be its 
neighbor to the north. 

The reasons for the war that broke out in 1868 in Cuba were 
many and complex. Throughout the nineteenth century, Spain 
had experienced increasing political instability, with liberal and 
reactionary governments alternating in power. Spanish policy 
changes were particularly reflected in the colony under the 
rule of such arbitrary and ruthless captain-generals as Miguel 
Tacon (1834-38) and Francisco Lersundi (1867-69), the latter 
sharing power with more moderate and understanding offi- 
cials, such as Domingo Dulce and General Francisco Serrano. 

The clash between Spanish economic measures and the 
desires of the Creole sugar slavocracy also contributed to the 



24 



Historical Setting 



mounting tension. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
planters had grown into a powerful and vocal group that could 
control or at least decisively influence the internal politics of 
the island. The planters now found themselves saddled with an 
imperial power whose protectionist policies were challenging 
their status by attempting to curtail their prerogatives and 
reduce their mounting importance. Naturally, they were not 
about to relinquish their position without a fight. 

Throughout the century, the Cubans had also progressively 
developed a separate and distinct identity. Although many 
thought of Cuba as another province of Spain and demanded 
equal rights and representation, others longed for an indepen- 
dent nation. Writers, painters, and poets, by looking inward to 
portray themes of their homeland, helped to develop the roots 
of their nationality. Through their works, they fostered not only 
a pride in being Cuban and a love for Cuban subjects but also a 
sort of shame over the fact that the island remained a Spanish 
colony. While Spanish America, with the exception of Puerto 
Rico, had successfully overthrown Spanish power, Cuba was still 
clinging to its colonial ties. 

The war broke out in 1868. It was organized and directed by 
radical Creole landowners in Oriente Province together with a 
group of lawyers and professionals. The peasants did the bulk 
of the fighting, however, with blacks joining the rebel ranks. 
The leadership of the movement was in the hands of the son of 
a wealthy landowner from Oriente Province, Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes y Quesada. 

Cespedes and his group were determined to strike a blow at 
Spanish control of Cuba. When they learned that the Spanish 
authorities had discovered their conspiratorial activities, the 
conspirators were forced to act. On October 10, 1868, Cespedes 
issued the historic call to rebellion, the "Grito de Yara," from 
his plantation, La Demajagua, proclaiming Cuba's indepen- 
dence. He soon freed his slaves, incorporated them into his dis- 
organized and ill-armed force, and made public a manifesto 
explaining the causes of the revolt. Issued by the newly orga- 
nized Revolutionary Junta of Cuba (Junta Revolucionaria de 
Cuba) , the manifesto stated that the revolt was prompted by 
Spain's arbitrary government, excessive taxation, corruption, 
exclusion of Cubans from government employment, and depri- 
vation of political and religious liberty, particularly the rights of 
assembly and petition. It called for complete independence 



25 



Cuba: A Country Study 

from Spain, for the establishment of a republic with universal 
suffrage, and for the indemnified emancipation of slaves. 

The manifesto was followed by the organization of a provi- 
sional government, with Cespedes acting as commander in 
chief of the army and head of the government. Cespedes's 
almost absolute power as well as his failure to decree the imme- 
diate abolition of slavery soon caused opposition within the 
revolutionary ranks. Facing mounting pressure, Cespedes con- 
ceded some of his power and called for a constitutional con- 
vention to establish a more democratic provisional 
government. 

The war centered in eastern Cuba. Cespedes decreed the 
destruction of cane fields and approved the revolutionary prac- 
tice of urging the slaves to revolt and to join the mambises, as 
the Cuban rebels were then called. Numerous skirmishes took 
place, but Cuban forces were unable to obtain a decisive victory 
against the Spanish army. Simultaneously, Cespedes made sev- 
eral unsuccessful attempts to obtain United States recognition 
of Cuban belligerency. 

While Cespedes retained civilian leadership, the military 
aspects of the war were under the leadership of the Dominican 
Maximo Gomez. Unhappy with the treatment Dominicans had 
received from Spain during Spanish occupation of his own 
country (1861-65), and horrified by the exploitation of the 
black slaves, Gomez started to conspire with the Cuban revolu- 
tionaries and joined Cespedes after the Grito de Yara. His expe- 
rience in military strategy was invaluable to the revolutionary 
cause, and he was soon promoted to the rank of general and 
later to commander of Oriente Province. A master of guerrilla 
warfare, Gomez alternated training the Cubans in that type of 
struggle with commanding his forces in numerous battles. 

Antonio Maceo, a mulatto leader, supported Gomez's plans 
and actions. Under Gomez's direction, Maceo had developed 
into one of the most daring fighters of the Cuban army. Show- 
ing extraordinary leadership and tactical capabilities, Maceo 
won respect and admiration from his men, as well as fear and 
scorn from the Spanish troops. He kept tight discipline in his 
encampment, constantly planning and organizing future bat- 
tles. Maceo enjoyed outsmarting and outmaneuvering the 
Spanish generals, and on successive occasions he inflicted 
heavy losses on them. Maceo's incursions into the eastern sugar 
zones not only helped to disrupt the sugar harvest but more 



26 



Historical Setting 



importantly led to the freedom of the slaves, who soon joined 
the ranks of the Cuban army. 

By 1872 Maceo had achieved the rank of general. His promi- 
nent position among revolutionary leaders soon gave rise to 
intrigue and suspicion. Conservative elements that supported 
the war effort began to fear the possibility of the establishment 
of a black republic with Maceo at its head. The example of 
Haiti still loomed in the minds of many. Dissension in the revo- 
lutionary ranks and fears of the blacks slowed down the revolu- 
tionary effort. 

The war dragged on, with neither the Cubans nor the Span- 
iards able to win a decisive victory. Finally, on February 11, 
1878, the Pact of Zanjon ended the Ten Years' War. Most of the 
generals of the Cuban army accepted the pact; Maceo, how- 
ever, refused to capitulate and continued to fight with his now 
depleted army. On March 15, 1878, he held a historic meeting, 
known as the "Protest of Baragua," with the head of the Span- 
ish forces, Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos, requesting inde- 
pendence for Cuba and complete abolition of slavery. When 
these conditions were rejected, he again resumed fighting. 

It was, however, a futile effort. Years of bloodshed and war 
had left the Cuban forces exhausted. Aid from exiles 
decreased, and Maceo now faced the bulk of the Spanish forces 
alone. Realizing the hopeless situation, he left for Jamaica. 
From there he traveled to New York to raise money and weap- 
ons necessary to continue fighting. He soon joined the activi- 
ties of Major General Calixto Garcia, then organizing a new 
rebellion. This uprising in 1879-80, known as the Little War 
(La Guerra Chiquita) , was also to end in disaster. Maceo was 
kept in exile for fear of antagonizing the conservative elements 
in Cuba, and Garcia was captured soon after he landed on the 
island. Exhausted and disillusioned after the long, bitter strug- 
gle and faced with a powerful and determined Spain, the 
Cubans were in no mood to join this new and ill-prepared 
attempt. 

After more than ten years of strife, the Cubans were unable 
to overthrow Spanish power on the island. The reasons for this 
failure are to be found partially in internal dissension, region- 
alism, and petty jealousies among the leaders, and partially in 
lack of internal organization and external support, which 
resulted in chronic shortages of supplies and ammunition. The 
odds against the Cubans were also almost insurmountable. 
They were fighting well-disciplined, well-organized, and well- 



27 



Cuba: A Country Study 

equipped forces augmented steadily by reinforcements from 
Spain. The Spaniards also controlled the seas, preventing the 
smuggling of reinforcements and weapons from abroad. The 
Cubans were thus forced to carry on guerrilla operations in the 
hope of demoralizing the Spanish army or creating an interna- 
tional situation favorable to their cause. 

The protracted war had a profound effect on Cubans. Many 
Creoles fought in parts of the island they had never even seen 
before. Gradually, regionalism collapsed and a common cause 
emerged; the little homeland (patria chica), with its stress on 
local loyalties, gave way to the fatherland. The war also forced 
many to take sides on issues, thus accelerating the process of 
popular participation and integration. Finally, the war pro- 
vided numerous symbols that became part of Cuba's historical 
heritage. The national anthem and flag as well as the national 
weapon, the machete, came out of this war. In particular, the 
dedication of the mambises, who abandoned position and com- 
fort to fight Spanish power, became for future generations an 
example of unselfish sacrifice for the fatherland. 

The impact of the war was particularly felt in the economic 
realm. The destruction caused by the fighting did away with 
the fortunes of many Cuban families. Although the struggle 
was concentrated in eastern Cuba and many sugar plantations 
escaped the ravages of war, the continuous development of a 
landed slavocracy in Cuba suffered a severe blow. Numerous 
participants and sympathizers with the Cuban cause lost their 
properties. Most Peninsulars sided with Spain, and many 
estates passed from Creole to loyalist hands. Because they had 
backed the Spanish cause, some Creole loyalists also profited 
from the losses of their brethren. The growth and power of the 
Creole propertied class was to be further undermined in 1886 
with the abolition of slavery. 

With the first major attempt at independence having ended 
in partial disaster, many Cubans turned to autonomismo (auton- 
omy movement). The movement, which advocated autono- 
mous rule for Cuba under the Spanish monarchy, differed little 
from reformism. Autonomismo had its origins in the first half of 
the century but lost momentum during the periods of annex- 
ation and reformism. Now, after the end of the Ten Years' War, 
it coalesced into the Autonomous Liberal Party (Partido Lib- 
eral Autonomista) . The founders of the party, former annex- 
ationists and reformists, called for a system of local self- 
government patterned on the British colonial model and 



28 



Historical Setting 



requested numerous economic and political reforms, but 
within the Spanish empire. 

It soon became clear, however, that Spain still intended no 
radical changes in its policies. By 1892 the much promised and 
awaited reforms were not forthcoming. Disillusionment and 
frustration began to take hold of those who still hoped for a 
continuous association with Spain. The party warned that 
unless Spain stopped its policy of repression and persecution, 
another rebellion would be inevitable. While the stage was 
being set for the decisive effort at independence, however, the 
forces that advocated independence were still racked by schism 
and indecision. The enthusiasm and prestige of the military 
leaders of the Ten Years' War were not sufficient to coordinate 
and direct the independence effort against Spain. This leader- 
ship vacuum came to be filled by a young poet and revolution- 
ary, Jose Marti. 

Jose Marti and the War for Independence, 1895-1902 

Jose Marti realized very early that independence from Spain 
was the only solution for Cuba and that this could only be 
achieved through a quick war that would at the same time pre- 
vent United States intervention in Cuba. His fear of a military 
dictatorship after independence led in 1884 to a break with 
Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, who were at the time 
engaged in conspiratorial activities. He withdrew from the 
movement temporarily, but by 1887 the three men were work- 
ing together, with Marti assuming political leadership. In 1892 
he formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucio- 
nario Cubano — PRC) in the United States and directed his 
efforts toward organizing a new war against Spain. 

Marti's pilgrimage through the Americas in the 1880s and 
early 1890s helped to unite and organize the Cubans, and with 
Gomez and Maceo he worked tirelessly toward the realization 
of Cuban independence. So well had they organized the anti- 
Spanish forces that their order for the uprising on February 24, 
1895, assured the ultimate expulsion of Spain from the island. 
The war, however, was not the quick and decisive struggle that 
Marti had sought. It took his life on May 19, 1895, dragged on 
for three more years, and eventually prompted the United 
States intervention (1899-1902) that he had feared. 

After Marti's death, the leadership of the war fell to Gomez 
and Maceo, who were now ready to implement their plan to 
invade the western provinces. In repeated attacks, they under- 



29 



Cuba: A Country Study 



mined and defeated the Spanish troops and carried the war to 
the sugar heart of the island. From January to March of 1896, 
Maceo waged a bitter but successful campaign against larger 
Spanish forces in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and La Habana 
(see fig. 1). By mid-1896 the Spanish troops were in retreat, 
and the Cubans seemed victorious throughout the island. 
Then came a change in the Spanish command: the more con- 
ciliatory Marshal Arsenio Martinez Campos was replaced by 
General Valeriano Weyler, a tough and harsh disciplinarian. 
Weyler's policy of concentrating the rural population in garri- 
soned towns and increasing the number of Spanish troops 
allowed the Spaniards to regain the initiative after Maceo's 
death on December 7, 1896, in a minor battle. Yet they were 
unable to defeat the Cuban rebels or even to engage them in a 
major battle. Gomez retreated to the eastern provinces and 
from there carried on guerrilla operations. He rejected any 
compromise with Spain. In January 1898, when the Spanish 
monarchy introduced a plan that would have made Cuba a self- 
governing province within the Spanish empire, Gomez categor- 
ically opposed the plan. 

United States Involvement 

In April 1898, the United States declared war on Spain. The 
reasons for United States involvement were many. A growing 
and energetic nation, the United States was looking for new 
markets for its budding industrial establishment. United States 
investments in Cuba were now threatened by the devastating 
war carried on by the Cubans. National security also demanded 
the control of the Central American isthmus and of its mari- 
time approaches. A strong navy as well as naval bases would be 
essential to protect the future Panama Canal. The rich Spanish 
colony, located 145 kilometers from the Florida coast and dom- 
inating the sea-lanes to the isthmus, was a growing haven for 
investors and the dream of every expansionist in the United 
States. It now seemed ripe to fall into the hands of its northern 
neighbor. 

Throughout the century, United States interest had wavered. 
Early on, United States policy makers supported a Cuba under 
a weak Spain rather than in the hands of other European pow- 
ers. In mid-century, annexation became a temporary hope, 
only to be ended by the United States Civil War. In the 1870s 
and 1880s, United States investments grew in Cuba as a result 
of the war. Taking advantage of the bankruptcy of many Span- 



30 



Jose Marti 
Courtesy Organization of 
American States 




ish and Cuban enterprises, United States capital acquired sugar 
estates and mining interests. When the expansion of European 
beet sugar production closed this market for Cuban sugar, the 
United States became the largest and most important buyer of 
the island's crop. The depressed world price of raw sugar 
ruined many Cuban producers and facilitated United States 
economic penetration. The McKinley Tariff of 1890, which 
placed raw sugar on the free list, led to an increase in Cuban- 
American trade and especially to the expansion of sugar pro- 
duction. Although by 1895 control of the economy was still 
largely in the hands of the Spaniards, United States capital and 
influence, particularly in the sugar industry, were dominant. 



31 



Cuba: A Country Study 

The ingredients for United States involvement were all 
present in 1898. All that was needed was the proper national 
mood and a good excuse to step in. The first was easily 
achieved. The United States wanted intervention. Aroused by 
stories of Spanish cruelty blown out of proportion by irrespon- 
sible "yellow journalists" and by a new sense of Anglo-Saxon 
"racial" responsibility toward the "inferior" people of the Latin 
world, large sectors of public opinion clamored for United 
States involvement and pressured President William McKinley 
to intervene. The excuse was provided by the explosion of the 
United States battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana's harbor early 
in 1898. 

The Spanish-American War was short, decisive, and popular. 
Such defenders of manifest destiny as Alfred T. Mahan, The- 
odore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge seemed vindicated 
by an easy and relatively inexpensive war. United States busi- 
ness interests saw new commercial and investment opportuni- 
ties as a result of the capture of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines. United States strategic interests were also assured 
by the final expulsion of Spain from the New World in 1899 
and the emergence of the United States as the dominant Carib- 
bean power. 

The defenders of imperialism, however, were not unchal- 
lenged. In the United States Congress, Senator Henry M. 
Teller won approval for the Teller Resolution, which pledged 
the United States to support an independent Cuba. Roman 
Catholic and labor leaders criticized the United States and 
called for the granting of complete independence to Cuba. 
Similarly, Cuban leaders complained that Cuba was not a part 
of the Treaty of Paris (1898), which ended the Spanish-Ameri- 
can War, that their soldiers had been excluded from the cities 
by the United States Army, and that despite innumerable sacri- 
fices independence still loomed more as a hope than a reality. 
Although Spain relinquished Cuba under the Treaty of Paris, 
Manuel Sanguily, a staunch defender of Cuba's sovereignty, 
denounced the fact that the most reactionary Spanish ele- 
ments had been permitted to remain on the island and retain 
their possessions. 

Those who criticized United States policies, however, were 
voices crying in the wilderness. This was the finest hour for 
United States expansionists, and they were not about to give up 
Cuba completely. It was not until 1902, after two years of 
United States occupation of the island, that the United States 



32 



Historical Setting 



granted Cuba nominal independence, and only after Congress 
had denned the future relations of the United States and Cuba. 
On February 25, 1901, Senator Orville H. Piatt introduced in 
Congress the Piatt Amendment (see Glossary), which stipu- 
lated the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba's inter- 
nal affairs and to lease a naval base in Cuba. The bill became 
law on March 2. 

On June 12, 1901, a constitutional convention met in 
Havana to draft a constitution. On June 21, by a majority of 
one, it adopted the Piatt Amendment as an annex to the 
Cuban constitution of 1901. The constitution also provided for 
universal suffrage, separation of church and state, a popularly 
elected but all-powerful president, and a weakened Senate and 
Chamber of Deputies. 

Despite the opposition that it generated, the occupation did 
have a number of beneficial and generally supported results. 
The United States faced a difficult task indeed in governing 
Cuba. Famine and disease were rampant. Industrial and agri- 
cultural production were at a standstill. The treasury was 
empty. The Cuban revolutionary army was idle and impatient. 
With no experience in colonial affairs, the United States tack- 
led the job. The military governors, Generals John Brooke 
(1899) and Leonard Wood (1899-1902), supported by a variety 
of Cuban secretaries, were the supreme authority, and under 
them were other United States generals in charge of every 
province. These were soon replaced by Cuban governors. A 
method of food distribution was established that proved effec- 
tive. A system of rural guards, initiated earlier by General 
Leonard Wood in Oriente, was soon extended to all the prov- 
inces, providing employment to many soldiers after the Cuban 
army was disbanded. 

The Wood administration gave particular attention to health 
and education. It built hospitals, improved sanitation and 
health conditions, and eradicated yellow fever, primarily 
through the work of the Cuban scientist Carlos J. Finlay, who 
discovered the mosquito vector of yellow fever. The Wood 
administration established a public school system and modern- 
ized the university. Wood also reorganized the judicial system, 
provided it with buildings and other facilities, and placed the 
judges on salary for the first time. In 1899 Wood proclaimed an 
electoral law that gave the franchise to adult males who were lit- 
erate, owned property, or had served in the revolutionary 
army. Elections for municipal offices were held in June 1900, 



33 



Cuba: A Country Study 

and in September, thirty-one delegates, mostly followers or rep- 
resentatives of the revolutionary army, were elected to the Con- 
stitutional Convention that drafted the constitution of 1901. 

On May 20, 1902, the occupation ended. On that day, Gen- 
eral Wood turned over the presidency to Tomas Estrada Palma 
(president, 1902-06), first elected president of the new repub- 
lic and former successor to Marti as head of the PRC. It was a 
day of national happiness, as the Cubans plunged into a new 
era of political freedom and republican government. Opti- 
mism, however, was tempered by the shadow of the United 
States hanging over the new nation. Looking into the future, a 
few Cubans warned that the immediate task was to resist for- 
eign encroachments. Many still remembered Martfs prophetic 
words: "Once the United States is in Cuba, who will get it out?" 

The Republic, 1902-59 

The Piatt Amendment Years, 1902-34 

Apparently highly favorable conditions accompanied Cuba's 
emergence into independence. There were no major social or 
political problems similar to those that other Latin American 
nations had experienced after their break with Spain. There 
was no large unassimilated indigenous population, and 
although blacks represented a significant proportion of the 
total population, there was no major racial conflict. The two 
groups had learned to live together since colonial times. In 
addition, no strong regionalism or powerful church challenged 
the authority of the state. Furthermore, the liberal conservative 
feud that plagued countries like Mexico during the nineteenth 
century was nonexistent in Cuba. 

The economic situation was also favorable. The infusion of 
foreign capital, the increasing trade with the United States, and 
favorable sugar prices augured a prosperous future. Cuba and 
the United States signed a Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity in 
1903 that guaranteed a 20 percent tariff preference for Cuban 
sugar entering the United States. In return, Cuba granted cer- 
tain United States products preferential treatment. The treaty 
reinforced the close commercial relations between the two 
countries, but it also made Cuba further dependent on a one- 
crop economy and on one all-powerful market. Under the 
terms of the May 1903 Treaty of Relations (also known as the 
Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903) and the Lease Agree- 
ment of July 1903, the United States also acquired rights in per- 



Historical Setting 



petuity to lease a naval coaling station at Guantanamo Bay, 
which has remained the United States Naval Station at 
Guantanamo Bay ever since. 

Despite apparently favorable conditions, Marti's vision of a 
politically and economically independent nation failed to 
materialize in the postindependence years. Whether he would 
have been able to prevent the events that followed the War for 
Independence can only be conjectured. A process of central- 
ization extended the great sugar estates of the colonial period, 
restraining the growth of a rural middle class and creating an 
agrarian proletariat of poor whites and mulattoes. Cuba 
became more and more commercially dependent on the 
United States, and the inclusion of the Piatt Amendment into 
the Cuban constitution of 1901 established United States 
supervision of political developments in Cuba. 

Another problem was Cuba's preservation of the colonial 
Spanish attitude that public office was a source of personal 
profit. Electoral fraud became a standard practice. Politics 
became the means to social advancement, a contest between 
factions for the spoils of office. Personalismo was substituted for 
principle; allegiance to a man or a group was the only way to 
ensure survival in the political arena. The Spanish legacy of 
political and administrative malpractice increased in the new 
nation too suddenly to be checked by a people lacking experi- 
ence in self-government. The United States' dissolution of 
Cuba's veteran army prevented a repetition of the typical nine- 
teenth-century Spanish-American experience. Nevertheless, 
many veterans took an active part in politics, and their influ- 
ence was felt in the years following the establishment of the 
republic in 1902. 

As successor to Spain as the overseer of the island's affairs, 
the United States unwittingly perpetuated the Cubans' lack of 
political responsibility. Cubans enjoyed the assurance that the 
United States would intervene to protect them from foreign 
entanglement or to solve their domestic difficulties, but the sit- 
uation only encouraged an indolent attitude toward their own 
affairs and was not conducive to responsible self-government. 
In the early decades of the republic, the Cubans developed a 
"Piatt Amendment mentality," which led them to rely upon the 
United States for guidance in their political decisions. 

This civic indolence was also not conducive to the growth of 
Cuban nationalism. Although the Cubans were enclosed in a 
geographic unit and shared a common language, religion, and 



35 



Cuba: A Country Study 

background, they lacked national unity and purpose. The 
influence of the United States weakened the forces of national- 
ism in the early part of the century. As the century progressed, 
another force, espanolismo, became an important factor in keep- 
ing the nation divided. When Cuba became independent, 
Spaniards were guaranteed their property rights and were 
allowed to keep commerce and retail trade largely in their own 
hands. Immigration from Spain, furthermore, increased con- 
siderably, and by 1934 there were an estimated 300,000 Span- 
iards on the island. This influx constantly strengthened 
Spanish traditions and customs. Many Spaniards themselves 
remained divided, retaining the ways of their own native prov- 
inces, hoping for an eventual return to Spain and thus failing 
to assimilate into the mainstream of Cuban society. 

A dangerous tendency to solve differences through violence 
also permeated the political atmosphere. In 1906 President 
Estrada Palma called for United States intervention to offset 
the so-called Little August War. Organized by Jose Miguel 
Gomez and his liberal followers, who were outraged by Estrada 
Palma's fraudulent reelection, this revolt aimed at preventing 
Estrada Palma from serving a second term in office. United 
States Marines were sent to end the conflict, initiating a new 
intervention that lasted from 1906 until 1909. 

This second intervention differed significantly from the first. 
The United States was not eager to embark on a new period of 
rule in Cuba, and the provisional governor, Charles E. 
Magoon, turned to dispensing government sinecures, or bote- 
llas, to pacify the various quarreling factions. Magoon also 
embarked on an extensive program of public works, gave 
Havana a new sewerage system, and organized a modern army. 
These accomplishments, however, were partially overshadowed 
by extravagant spending that left Cuba with a debt where there 
once had been a surplus. Magoon also drew up an organic 
body of law for the executive and the judiciary, and for provin- 
cial and municipal government. He also provided an electoral 
law, as well as laws for a civil service and for municipal taxation. 
Evidently, the United States government considered enactment 
of fair legislation that would prevent civil wars to be one of the 
main purposes of the intervention. Having pacified the coun- 
try and introduced this new legislative apparatus, the United 
States called for municipal and national elections. In 1908 the 
Liberals, members of the newly created Liberal Party (Partido 
Liberal), won a solid majority and elected their leader, Jose 



36 




United States troops marching in Havana, 1 908 
United States Marine tents in front of the Palacio de los Capitanes 
Generates, the old palace of the Spanish governors, 1908 
Courtesy Organization of American States 



37 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Miguel Gomez (president, 1909-13), to the presidency. The 
United States seemed willing to allow the democratic process 
to follow its course, and on January 28, 1909, the intervention- 
ist forces were withdrawn from the island. 

The impact of this second intervention was far-reaching in 
other, less positive ways. It removed any pretense of Cuban 
independence, strengthened the Piatt Amendment mentality, 
and increased doubts about the Cubans' ability for self-govern- 
ment. Disillusionment took hold among many leaders, intellec- 
tuals, and writers, and this feeling was transmitted to the mass 
of the population. Cynicism and irresponsibility increased and 
so did the resort to violence to solve political differences. Even 
hitherto peaceful racial relations were affected. 

The 1908 electoral fiasco of a group of radical blacks, who 
had organized a political party called the Independent Colored 
Association (Agrupacion Independiente de Color — AIC), 
increased the frustration of blacks. When the Cuban Senate 
passed a law prohibiting parties along racial lines, the AIC 
staged an uprising in 1912. The uprising alarmed Washington, 
which landed United States Marines in several parts of the 
island, over the protests of President Jose Miguel Gomez. Try- 
ing to avert another full-fledged intervention, Gomez moved 
swiftly and harshly. Government forces captured and executed 
most of the leaders and crushed the rebellion. The AIC col- 
lapsed soon after. It was to be the last time that a revolt along 
strictly racial lines would develop in Cuba. 

The tendency to resort to violence was displayed in two 
other instances at this time. In 1912 veterans of the War for 
Independence demanded the ouster of pro-Spanish elements 
from bureaucratic positions and threatened to take up arms 
against the government of President Gomez. When the United 
States expressed "grave concern" over these events, the veter- 
ans rapidly renounced their violent tactics. The second inci- 
dent occurred again in 1917. This time the Liberal Party 
rebelled to protest the fraudulent reelection of Mario Garcia 
Menocal (president, 1913-1921). Led by former President 
Gomez, the rebels took control of Oriente and Camaguey prov- 
inces. But Menocal, supported by a warning from the United 
States that it would not recognize a government that came to 
power by unconstitutional means, moved troops into the areas 
controlled by the rebels and captured Gomez. The rebellion 
soon died out, and, although its leaders were arrested, they 
were later pardoned. 



38 



Historical Setting 



As a result of the economic downturn of the 1920s, various 
groups protested Cuba's economic dependence on the United 
States. In 1920, after a sharp drop in the price of sugar created 
a severe economic crisis, Cuba was subjected to financial chaos 
and social misery. The crisis accelerated the desire for change 
and led to a questioning of the existing order of society among 
intellectuals and writers and also among other groups that 
were barred from becoming productive members of society. 
This economic crisis led in particular to a resurgence of eco- 
nomic nationalism. Several groups demanded protective legis- 
lation for Cuban interests and questioned the close economic 
ties between the United States and Cuba. The Piatt Amend- 
ment as well as the repeated interventions of the United States 
government in Cuba's internal affairs came under attack. Anti- 
United States feeling, xenophobia, and retrieval of the national 
wealth became the main themes of this blossoming national- 
ism. As the decade progressed, however, its scope was widened 
to include a call for social justice and for an end to political 
corruption and economic dependence on a single crop. 

Liberal Alfredo Zayas y Alonso (president, 1921-24), as cor- 
rupt as his administration was, managed to take advantage of 
this nationalism to reassert Cuba's sovereignty vis-a-vis the 
United States and its special envoy, Enoch Crowder. Although 
his administration was overshadowed by graft and mismanage- 
ment, Zayas retrieved Cuba's credit, averted intervention, and 
through later negotiations secured definite title to the Isla de 
Pinos (now Isla de la Juventud) off the southern coast of Cuba 
after a two-decade delay imposed by the Piatt Amendment. 

The inability of Cuban society to absorb all university gradu- 
ates accentuated the feelings of frustration in a generation that 
found itself with little opportunity to apply its acquired knowl- 
edge. In 1922 university students in Havana created the Federa- 
tion of University Students (Federacion Estudiantil 
Universitaria — FEU), occupied university buildings, and orga- 
nized short-lived student strikes. The students obtained a series 
of academic and administrative reforms, larger government 
subsidies, and the establishment of a University Reform Com- 
mission composed of professors, students, and alumni. 

The university reform movement, which had started as a cru- 
sade for academic reform, developed political overtones in 
1928 when students began protesting the decision of President 
Gerardo Machado y Morales (president, 1925-29, 1929-33) to 
remain in power for another term. Claiming that his economic 



39 



Cuba: A Country Study 



program could not be completed within his four-year term and 
that only he could carry it out, Machado announced his deci- 
sion to reelect himself. In April 1928, a packed constitutional 
convention granted Machado a new six-year period of power 
without reelection and abolished the vice presidency. In 
November, through a fake election in which he was the only 
candidate, Machado was given a new term, to run from May 20, 
1929, to May 20, 1935. 

Whereas a similar attempt by Estrada Palma to remain in 
power had resulted in rebellion, Machado's decision at first 
brought about only a wave of national indignation against the 
invalidation of suffrage. The regime still enjoyed the support of 
the business and conservative sectors of society. Increased reve- 
nues had brought prosperity, and Machado's improved admin- 
istration, especially in the field of public works, had gained him 
a strong following. The Cuban armed forces, organized two 
decades earlier during Gomez's administration, also strongly 
backed the regime. Machado had successfully won over the mil- 
itary through bribes and threats and had purged disloyal offi- 
cers. He used the military in a variety of civilian posts both at 
the national and local levels, thus increasingly militarizing soci- 
ety. The few officers who were discontented with Machado's 
reelection seemed powerless and ineffective to oppose the 
regime. In the midst of growing domestic and international 
problems, the United States looked with indifference at events 
in Cuba and seemed unwilling to become involved in Cuban 
affairs as long as the Machado administration maintained 
order and stability and a friendly posture toward Washington. 
Machado, furthermore, prevented the growth of political 
opposition by winning control of the Conservative Party 
(Partido Conservador) and aligning it both with his own Lib- 
eral Party and with the small Popular Party (Partido Popular) . 
Through bribes and threats, Machado was able to subordinate 
Congress and the judiciary to the executive's will. 

Machado's decision to extend his presidency met with stern 
student opposition, resulting in riots and demonstrations in 
several towns throughout the island. Machado took immediate 
measures to prevent further opposition from that quarter. He 
temporarily closed the university, dissolved the FEU, and abol- 
ished the University Reform Commission. He also tightened 
political control. Several Spanish and European labor leaders 
were expelled from the country as undesirable aliens. Antigov- 
ernment newspapers were closed down, and the military took 



40 



Historical Setting 



an increasingly growing role in surveilling and policing the 
population. Machado warned sternly that he would keep order 
and peace at any cost. 

These measures, however, failed to control the students com- 
pletely. In mid-1927, a small but active group organized the 
University Students Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Univer- 
sitario — DEU; hereafter, Directorio) to oppose the regime. The 
Directorio issued a manifesto defending the right of university 
students to discuss politics and attacking Machado's reelection 
attempts. When students demonstrated in front of the univer- 
sity, Machado rapidly retaliated. Following his orders, the Uni- 
versity Council, composed of faculty and administrative 
officials, formed disciplinary tribunals and expelled most of 
the Directorio leaders from the university. 

A clash with police that left Rafael Trejo, a student leader, 
dead was the turning point in the struggle against the regime. 
From that time on, many Cubans viewed the courageous stu- 
dent generation that battled Machado's police with admiration 
and respect. For some, the "generation of 1930," as these stu- 
dents were later known in Cuban history, seemed irresponsible 
and undisciplined, but for others it became the best exponent 
of disinterested idealism. Embattled by the first shock waves of 
the world depression and oppressed by an increasingly ruthless 
dictator, many Cubans, especially those among the less privi- 
leged sectors of society, turned in hope toward these young 
people. They placed their faith in a generation that, although 
inexperienced and immature, seemed incorruptible and will- 
ing to bring morality to Cuba's public life. 

While the principal leaders of the Directorio were in jail in 
1931, a small group formed a splinter organization, the Stu- 
dent Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estudiantil — AIE). The AIE, 
however, became merely a tool of the Communist Party of 
Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) . The party, founded 
in 1925 and led in the early 1930s by Ruben Martinez Villena, a 
popular poet and intellectual, directed the organization's activ- 
ities and used it to influence the student movement. Through- 
out most of his regime, the communists opposed Machado and 
advocated, as the only correct strategy to overthrow his govern- 
ment, the mobilization of the proletariat, culminating in a gen- 
eral strike. The PCC opposition, however, was ineffectual. 

The DEU and the AIE were not the only groups opposing 
Machado. The Nationalist Union (Union Nacionalista) , 
headed by a War of Independence colonel, Carlos Mendieta, 



41 



Cuba: A Country Study 



also condemned the regime in newspapers and in public dem- 
onstrations. In 1931 Mendieta and Menocal, the former presi- 
dent, organized a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio 
Province. That same year, a group led by engineer Carlos Hevia 
and journalist Sergio Carbo equipped an expedition in the 
United States and landed in Oriente Province, only to be 
crushed by Machado's army. In New York, representatives of 
several anti-Machado organizations united and formed a revo- 
lutionary junta. 

Most prominent, perhaps, of these anti-Machado groups was 
the ABC, a clandestine extremist organization composed of 
intellectuals, students, and the middle sectors of society, estab- 
lished in 1930. Led by several Cuban intellectuals who were 
Harvard graduates, the ABC undermined Machado's position 
through sabotage and terrorist actions, and in December 1932 
published a manifesto in Havana criticizing the underlying 
structure of Cuban society and outlining a detailed program of 
economic and political reforms. Although the means to 
achieve its political and economic program were not clear, the 
ABC called for the elimination of large landholdings, national- 
ization of public services, limitations on land acquisitions by 
United States companies, and producers' cooperatives, as well 
as political liberty and social justice. 

Such was the existing condition on the island when the 
United States, attempting to find a peaceful solution to Cuba's 
political situation, sent Ambassador Benjamin Sumner Welles 
in 1933 to act as mediator between government and opposi- 
tion. By then, United States interests in Cuba had grown signif- 
icantly. Investment was concentrated in land and in the sugar 
industry, but also extended into transportation, natural 
resources, utilities, and the banking system. World War I had 
accelerated this trend, making Cuba more and more depen- 
dent on its neighbor to the North. As economic dependence 
increased, so did political dependence. A new crop of Cuban 
businessmen, technocrats, and, naturally, politicians had devel- 
oped who identified with their counterparts in the United 
States and sought political guidance from Washington and Wall 
Street. This "Piatt Amendment complex" permeated large sec- 
tors of Cuban society, with the exception, perhaps, of some 
writers, intellectuals, and students who saw a danger in the 
close relationship for the development of a Cuban nationality 
and identified the patria with the workers, the poor, and the 
blacks. Their ranks were small, however, and economic pros- 



42 



Historical Setting 



perity drowned their voices. The fear of, or the desire for, 
United States involvement in Cuban affairs was the dominating 
theme, and many Cubans were willing to use the threat of or 
even actual intervention by the United States to further their 
narrow political and economic objectives. 

Most political factions and leaders supported Sumner 
Welles's mediation, with the exception of the radicals and the 
Conservative followers of former President Menocal, the Direc- 
torio, and a few Cuban leaders. The Directorio strongly 
opposed the United States' action. The leaders of the "genera- 
tion of 1930" saw themselves as representatives of the national 
will and heirs to Marti's legacy (see Jose Marti and the War for 
Independence, 1895-1902, this, ch.); their mission was to carry 
on the revolution that "the United States had frustrated in 
1898." Finding inspiration and guidance in Martfs teaching 
and his vision of a just society in a politically and economically 
independent nation, they opposed United States supervision of 
Cuban affairs and the humiliating Piatt Amendment. 

Sumner Welles's mediation efforts culminated in a general 
strike, in dissension within the armed forces, and in several 
small army revolts that forced Machado to resign and leave the 
country on August 12, 1933. This general strike deepened the 
schism between the PCC and the anti-Machado groups. 
Although the party had played an important role in promoting 
the strike, it reversed itself just prior to Machado's fall and 
issued a back-to-work order, fearing that the general strike 
might provoke United States intervention or the establishment 
of a pro-United States government. The failure to support the 
anti-Machado struggle discredited the PCC, especially among 
the students. From that time on, the party, alienated from pro- 
gressive and revolutionary forces within the country, found it 
easier to reach agreements and work with traditional conserva- 
tive political parties and governments, even with military presi- 
dents. 

Sumner Welles and the army appointed Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes to succeed Machado. The son of Cuba's first presi- 
dent during the rebellion against Spain in the 1860s and a pres- 
tigious although uninspiring figure, Cespedes soon received 
United States support and the backing of most anti-Machado 
groups. He annulled Machado's constitutional amendments of 
1928, restored the 1901 constitution, and prepared to bring 
the country back to normalcy. 



43 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Returning Cuba to normalcy seemed an almost impossible 
task amid the worldwide chaos of the early 1930s. The deepen- 
ing economic depression had worsened the people's misery, 
and Machado's overthrow had released a wave of uncontrolled 
anger and anxiety. Looting and disorder were widespread in 
Havana, where armed bands sought out and executed 
Machado's henchmen. In rural areas, discontented peasants 
took over sugar mills and threatened wealthy landowners. 
Although the appointment of Cespedes as president did not 
end the crisis, it reduced political tensions and the level of 
armed conflict. 

An Attempt at Revolution, 1933-34 

Machado's overthrow marked the beginning of an era of 
reform. The revolutionary wave that swept away the dictator- 
ship had begun to acquire the characteristics of a major revolu- 
tion. Although it lacked a defined ideology, this revolution was 
clearly aimed at transforming all phases of national life. The 
leaders of the "generation of 1930" were the best exponents of 
this reformist zeal. Espousing the usual anti-United States and 
nonintervention communist propaganda and advocating mea- 
sures of social and economic significance for the less privileged 
sectors of society, the students monopolized the rhetoric of rev- 
olution. Cespedes's refusal to abrogate the 1901 constitution, 
which was regarded as too closely modeled after the United 
States Constitution and ill-adapted to Cuba's cultural milieu, 
created a crisis. The Directorio, furthermore, linked Cespedes 
to the deposed dictator, pointing to his serving in Machado's 
first cabinet and living abroad as a diplomat. 

In September 1933, the unrest in Cuba's political picture 
again came to a head. Unhappy with both a proposed reduc- 
tion in pay and an order restricting their promotions, the lower 
echelons of the army, led by Sergeant-Stenographer Fulgencio 
Batista y Zaldivar, invited the Directorio to meet with them at 
Camp Columbia in Havana on September 4. Batista's contact 
with Directorio leaders dated back to the anti-Machado strug- 
gle, when he had served as stenographer during some of the 
students' trials. By the time the students arrived at Camp 
Columbia, army discipline had collapsed. Sergeants were in 
command and had arrested numerous army officers. After con- 
sulting with Batista and the army, the Directorio agreed to 
Cespedes's overthrow and named ( five men to form a pentarchy 
(a five-member civilian executive commission) to head a provi- 



44 





Havana's Museum of the Revolution (Museo de la Revolucion) , 
formerly the Presidential Palace (El Palacio Presidencial) , home 
of President Fulgencio Batista until 1 959 

sional government. That same night, Cespedes handed over 
the presidency to the five-member commission, which formally 
took possession of the Presidential Palace. 

September 4, 1933, was a turning point in Cuba's history. It 
marked the army's entrance as an organized force into the run- 
ning of government and Batista's emergence as self-appointed 
chief of the armed forces and the arbiter of Cuba's destiny for 
years to come. On that date, the students and the military, two 
armed groups accustomed to violence, united to rule Cuba. 
The marriage, however, was short-lived. A contest for suprem- 
acy soon began between the students and the military. Very few 
expected the students to win. 

The pentarchy's inability to rule the country became evident 
at once. The group lacked not only the support of the various 
political parties and groups, but also the support of the United 
States. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, sur- 
prised and confused by events on the island, refused to recog- 
nize the five-member government and rushed naval vessels to 
Cuban waters. When one member of the pentarchy promoted 



45 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Sergeant Batista to the rank of colonel without the required 
approval of the other four, another member resigned and the 
regime collapsed. In a meeting with Batista and the army on 
September 10, 1933, the Directorio appointed a university 
physiology professor, Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (president, 
1933-34, 1944-48), as provisional president. 

The new president had no political experience to qualify 
him for the job at such a crucial time. He had won the admira- 
tion of the students when in 1928 he allowed the expelled 
Directorio leaders to read their manifesto to his class. At a time 
when other professors refused the students' request, Grau's ges- 
ture gained for him a following at the university. While he was 
in jail in 1931, Grau and students met again and cemented 
their relationship. When the pentarchy collapsed, their old 
professor was the students' first choice. A witty and intelligent 
man, Grau projected a controversial image. He appeared inde- 
cisive and powerless, yet he was actually cunning and deter- 
mined. 

With Grau, the "generation of 1930" was catapulted into 
power. The students held Cuba's destiny in their hands. It was a 
unique spectacle indeed. Amidst thunder from the left and the 
right, and opposition from most political parties and personali- 
ties, the Directorio held daily meetings to shape governmental: 
policy. 

The Directorio leaders advocated several reforms. Now that 
Machado had been overthrown, they wanted to wipe out all ves- 
tiges of his regime, including corrupt, pro-Machado army offic- 
ers, politicians, office holders, and university professors. They 
called for a complete reorganization of Cuba's economic struc- 
ture, including revision of the foreign debt, tax reforms, and a 
national banking and currency system removing Cuba from 
monetary and financial dependence on the United States. 
Aware that the Piatt Amendment allowed for continuous 
United States interference, they sought its removal. The stu- 
dents also demanded agrarian reform and eventual national- 
ization of the sugar and mining industries. Finally, they wanted 
an autonomous university, sheltered from political interfer- 
ence. 

Grau's regime was the high-water mark of the revolutionary 
process and of the intense nationalism of the generation of 
1930. Nationalist sentiment rather than radical doctrines domi- 
nated the regime's consideration of economic questions. The 
government was pro-labor and opposed the predominance of 



46 



Historical Setting 



foreign capital. Soon after coming to power, Grau abrogated 
the 1901 constitution, promulgated provisional statutes to gov- 
ern Cuba, and called for a constitutional convention with elec- 
tions subsequently set for April 1, 1934. He also demanded the 
abrogation of the Piatt Amendment, which was subsequently 
abrogated on May 29, 1934. Taking immediate action to elimi- 
nate Machado's followers from government positions, Grau 
appointed commissioners to "purge" government offices. 
Because the dictatorship had utilized the machinery of the old 
political parties, Grau issued a decree dissolving them. The gov- 
ernment also complied with one of the oldest demands of the 
university reform movement by granting the University of 
Havana autonomy from government control. 

With the island facing a mounting wave of strikes and social 
unrest, Grau implemented a popular and reformist program. 
On September 20, he issued a decree establishing a maximum 
working day of eight hours. On November 7, the government 
issued a decree on labor organization that sought to Cubanize 
the labor movement and restrict communist and Spanish influ- 
ences by limiting the role of foreign leaders. It required Cuban 
citizenship of all union officials, and all labor organizations 
were ordered to register with the Ministry of Labor. On the fol- 
lowing day, Grau signed the Nationalization of Labor Decree, 
popularly known as the "50 Percent Law." This law required 
that at least half the total working force of all industrial, com- 
mercial, and agricultural enterprises be composed of native 
Cubans (except for managers and technicians, who could not 
be supplanted by natives), and that half the total payroll be 
allotted to Cubans. Although these two decrees gained much 
labor support for the government and diminished communist 
influence in the unions, they also alienated the many Span- 
iards and other foreign minority groups living on the island. 

Grau's measures also aroused United States hostility. The 
United States viewed the unrest in Cuba with much concern. 
The overthrow of the United States-backed Cespedes regime 
was undoubtedly a defeat for President Roosevelt's policy 
toward Cuba in general and for Ambassador Sumner Welles's 
mediation efforts in particular. Grau's seizure of two United 
States-owned sugar mills that had been closed down because of 
labor troubles, and his temporary takeover of the Cuban Elec- 
tric Company because of rate disputes and additional labor 
problems, increased Washington's apprehension. 



47 



Cuba: A Country Study 



The United States refusal to recognize Grau complicated the 
many problems facing him because Cuban political leaders 
considered United States recognition as a key factor for the 
existence of any Cuban government. The United States policy 
condemning the Grau regime encouraged opposition groups 
and rebellious purged army officers. Opposition was strongest 
from the communists, the displaced army officers, and the 
ABC. Student leader Eduardo (Eddie) Chibas bitterly com- 
plained that although the Directorio had never used terrorism 
against the ABC-backed Cespedes regime, the ABC used it to 
combat Grau's government. The ABC seemed unhappy over 
their inability to obtain a share of power and feared that the 
consolidation of the Grau regime might exclude them from 
future political participation. 

Inner conflict in the government contributed to its instabil- 
ity. A faction led by student leader and Minister of Interior 
Antonio Guiteras advocated a continuation of the program of 
social reform. Strongly nationalistic and sincerely motivated, 
Guiteras initiated much of the regime's legislation, and many 
considered him the real brains behind Grau. Another faction, 
which was controlled by Batista and the army, wanted a conser- 
vative program that would bring about United States recogni- 
tion. Grau seemed to have been caught in the middle of these 
conflicting forces. On November 6, 1933, the Directorio, feel- 
ing that its mandate had expired, declared itself dissolved, 
announcing, however, that its members would continue to sup- 
port President Grau. 

By January 1934, it became evident that the regime would 
soon collapse. Student support was rapidly waning, the military 
conspired to take power, and Washington refused to recognize 
a regime that threatened its vested interests in Cuba. In addi- 
tion, industrial and commercial leaders opposed Grau's legisla- 
tion. Fearing that the government's program would attract 
labor support, the communists violently attacked Grau. A 
national teachers' strike for better wages further aggravated the 
already unstable situation. On January 14, Army Chief Fulgen- 
cio Batista forced President Grau to resign. Two days later, 
Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as Cuba's provisional presi- 
dent. Within five days after Mendieta's accession to power, the 
United States recognized Cuba's new government. 

To the United States and to its ambassadors in Cuba — Sum- 
ner Welles and his successor, Jefferson Caffrey — Batista repre- 
sented order and progress under friendly rule. Welles had 



48 



Historical Setting 



been persistently hostile to Grau, distrusting his personality as 
well as his ideas and programs. He was fearful of the social and 
economic revolution that Grau was attempting to enact and 
the damage this might cause to United States interests in Cuba. 
Both Welles and Caffrey looked to Batista as the one leader 
capable of maintaining order while guaranteeing a friendly 
posture to the United States and its corporate interests in 
Cuba. 

The Failure of Reformism, 1944-52 

Despite its short duration, the revolutionary process of 1933 
had a profound impact on subsequent Cuban developments 
and events. It gave university students a taste of power, cata- 
pulted them into the mainstream of politics, and created an 
awareness among the students and the population at large of 
the need, as well as the possibility, for rapid and drastic change. 
It also weakened foreign domination of the economy and 
opened new opportunities for several national sectors hitherto 
prevented from obtaining a bigger share of the national wealth 
because of Spanish and North American presence and control. 
Furthermore, the state's involvement in the management of 
the economy was accelerated, and new impetus given to the 
rise of organized labor. But the failure of the revolution also 
convinced many that it would be almost impossible to bring 
profound structural changes to Cuba while the country 
remained friendly toward the United States. For the more radi- 
cal elements emerging out of the 1933 process, it became clear 
that only an anti-United States revolution that would destroy 
the Batista military could be successful in Cuba. 

In the years following Grau's overthrow, the "generation of 
1930" experienced the harsh facts of Cuba's power politics. The 
students thought that Machado's overthrow would signal the 
beginning of a new era of morality and change. They learned 
differently. Dominated by the army, Cuba's political life 
returned to the corruption and old ways of the past. To govern 
Cuba, Batista chose as allies many of the old politicians 
expelled from power with Machado. Opportunistic and 
unscrupulous individuals assumed important government posi- 
tions, corruption continued, repression and terrorism flour- 
ished. The years of struggle and suffering seemed in vain. 

Students felt disillusioned and frustrated. Most abandoned 
their earlier idealism and found comfort in professional and 
business ventures. Some departed for foreign lands, never to 



49 



Cuba: A Country Study 



return. Others accepted radical ideologies such as communism 
or fascism. Several broke with their past and shared in the 
spoils of office. Desiring to continue fighting for their frus- 
trated revolution, many joined the Cuban Revolutionary Party 
(PRC), which was organized in February 1934. 

Taking their name from Martf's PRC of 1892, this group, also 
known as the Authentic Party, became the repository of revolu- 
tionary virtue. Former Directorio leaders joined the new party, 
and Grau, then living in exile in Mexico, was appointed presi- 
dent. The party's program called for economic and political 
nationalism, social justice, and civil liberties and emphasized 
the right of Cubans to share more fully in the country's eco- 
nomic resources. Although the party was silent on the question 
of peaceful or forceful methods of achieving power, Grau 
seemed at first to favor peaceful opposition to Mendieta and 
Batista. 

In the years that followed, Batista and the army all but domi- 
nated Cuba's political life. Until 1940, when he officially 
assumed the chief-executive office, securing his election 
through a coalition of political parties that included the com- 
munists, Batista maintained tight political control, ruling 
through puppet presidents. In addition to Mendieta, these 
included Jose A. Barnet y Vinageras (president, 1935-36), 
Miguel Mariano Gomez y Arias (president, 1936), and Federico 
Laredo Bru (president, 1936-40). Desiring to win popular sup- 
port and to rival the autenticos (members of the Authentic 
Party), Batista imitated his Mexican counterpart, General 
Lazaro Cardenas (president, 1934-40), by sponsoring an 
impressive body of welfare legislation. Public administration, 
health, sanitation, education, and public works improved. 
Workers were allowed to unionize and organize the Cuban 
Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba — CTC). 
Legislation to provide pensions, insurance, limited working 
hours, and minimum wages largely satisfied the workers' 
demands. 

Batista also made a serious effort to bring education and bet- 
ter living conditions to the countryside. Under his ambitious 
"civic-rural" program, numerous schools were built. Where 
teachers were lacking, he sent army personnel to fill their 
places. The Civic-Military Institute, which he established, pro- 
vided for the housing and education of the orphans of workers, 
soldiers, and peasants. In 1936 he issued the Sugar Coordina- 
tion Law, which protected the tenants of small sugar planta- 



50 



f It 




A view of the National Capitol ( Capitolio Nacional) 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations 
Development Programme 

tions against eviction. Although Batista and his associates 
continued the practice of pocketing some of the funds ear- 
marked for these projects, they nevertheless made a sincere 
attempt to improve the health and educational level of the 
rural population. 

In the late 1930s, Batista called for the drafting of a new con- 
stitution. With elections for a constitutional convention and for 
a new president in sight, politics took a more normal course. 
Grau himself, aware that violence would not bring him to 
power, returned from exile and engaged in electoral practices, 
thus legitimizing the Batista-supported regimes. 

When the convention convened in Havana in early 1940, 
Grau was chosen president of the assembly. Despite pressure 
from both right and left, work went smoothly, with Batista and 
Grau competing for popular support. But when Batista and 



51 



Cuba: A Country Study 

former President Menocal signed a political pact that left 
oppositionist groups in a minority position in the assembly, 
Grau resigned. Nevertheless, there was an unusual degree of 
cooperation among the various political groups, and the consti- 
tution was completed and proclaimed that same year. 

The constitution was in many respects the embodiment of 
the aspirations of the "generation of 1930." The president was 
to serve only one term of four years, although he might be 
reelected after eight years out of office. Many civil liberties and 
social welfare provisions were defined at great length. The state 
was to play a strong role in economic and social development. 
Workers were guaranteed paid vacations, minimum wages, and 
job tenure. Cuban nationals were to be favored over foreigners 
in the establishment of new industries. The University of 
Havana's autonomy received constitutional sanction in Article 
53. The convention thus fulfilled one of the oldest demands of 
the students. 

Batista was the first president elected under the new consti- 
tution. Supported by a coalition of political parties and by the 
communists, he defeated his old rival Grau. His administration 
coincided with World War II, during which Cuba collaborated 
closely with the United States, declaring war on the Axis powers 
in 1941. The United States, in turn, increased aid and trade 
relations with Cuba. It granted Batista credits for agricultural 
development and for public works in Havana. Batista allowed 
for the establishment of a variety of United States military facil- 
ities on Cuban territory, and in early 1941 he concluded a 
sugar deal with the United States authorizing the sale of the 
whole harvest at $.0265 per pound. Many Cubans complained 
that the low price represented an excessive sacrifice for 
Cubans. This burden, combined with a series of war taxes that 
Batista had earlier imposed and shortages of finished goods 
and some food, caused much unhappiness among the popula- 
tion. 

Although Batista enjoyed wartime powers, his administration 
was short of dictatorial. He enjoyed the backing of the proper- 
tied classes, and he cultivated labor support. He also catered to 
the left, allowing the communists complete freedom of opera- 
tion. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the 
Cuban communists ended their denunciation of the United 
States as an imperialist power and began defending President 
Roosevelt as a "great statesman" and the war against Germany 
as a "just war." In 1944 the communists changed the name of 



52 



Historical Setting 



their party from Communist Revolutionary Union (Union Rev- 
olucionaria Comunista — URC) to the People's Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Popular — PSP) and issued a mild political 
program that called for racial equality and women's rights. The 
program failed, however, to attack the United States or even to 
request agrarian reform or large-scale nationalization of for- 
eign properties in Cuba. 

At the end of World War II, as Grau and the autenticos came 
to power, the organized use of violence took on an unprece- 
dented dimension. The relative calm of the war years suddenly 
ended, giving way to a violent and materialistic era. Urban vio- 
lence reappeared, now with tragic proportions. Although part 
of the generation that emerged out of World War II retained a 
redemptionist fanaticism and a desire to fulfill the aspirations 
of "the frustrated revolution," a still larger part evidenced an 
insatiable appetite for power and wealth, and a determination 
to obtain both regardless of obstacles. Violence-prone refugees 
of the Spanish Civil War also extended their activism and rival- 
ries to Cuba. 

Elected to the presidency in 1944, Grau followed a concilia- 
tory policy toward these groups and permitted their prolifera- 
tion, in many instances placing their leaders on government 
payrolls. Fearing the power of these gangs and their trouble- 
making capabilities if employed against the government, Grau 
allowed them almost complete freedom of action. This situa- 
tion continued under the presidency of Grau's protege, Carlos 
Prio Socarras (president, 1948-52). Elected in 1948, the 
former Directorio leader also avoided confronting his old 
friends and continued his predecessor's mild policies. 

A system of nepotism, favoritism, and gangsterism predomi- 
nated. Despite numerous accomplishments that included 
respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and a demo- 
cratic climate, the autenticos failed to provide the country with 
an honest government or to diversify Cuba's one-crop econ- 
omy The reformist zeal evident during Grau's first administra- 
tion had diminished considerably in the intervening decade. 
Grau himself seemed softened after years of exile and frustra- 
tion. He faced, furthermore, determined opposition in Con- 
gress and from conservative elements that had joined his party. 
Not only Grau, but many of the old student leaders of the "gen- 
eration of 1930," shared in the spoils of office. When con- 
fronted with the reality of Cuban politics, their early idealism 
and reformism gave way to materialism and opportunism. 



53 



Cuba: A Country Study 

For many, the autentlcos had failed to fulfill the aspirations of 
the anti-Machado revolution, especially in the area of adminis- 
trative honesty. Perhaps the Cubans expected too much too 
soon. The people still remembered the rapid reforms imple- 
mented during Grau's first administration and expected their 
continuation. 

Grau's failure to bring honesty and order to Cuba's public 
life and the presidential aspirations of Eduardo Chibas, an 
autentico congressman, produced a rift in the party. In 1947 
Chibas and other autentico leaders formed the Cuban People's 
Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano — PPC), Orthodox (Orto- 
doxo) branch, also known as the Orthodox Party (Partido 
Ortodoxo) . Led by Chibas, a former student leader of the gen- 
eration of 1930, the PPC became the repository of the ideals of 
the "frustrated revolution" and the refuge of a new generation 
determined to transform those ideals into reality. 

By 1950 the ortodoxos (PPC members) had become a formi- 
dable political force. Although the party lacked a well-defined 
platform, its nationalistic program of economic independence, 
political liberty, social justice, and honest government, and its 
insistence upon remaining free from political pacts, had won 
for it a considerable following, especially among University of 
Havana students. With the slogan "vergilenza contra dinero" 
(honor versus money), Chibas, now an elected senator, 
pounded on the consciences of the Cubans in his Sunday radio 
programs and sought to awaken their minds to the corruption 
of the autentico administrations. Chibas monopolized the rheto- 
ric of revolution, becoming the exponent of the frustrated old 
generation and the leader of a new generation bent on bring- 
ing morality and honesty to Cuban public life. It was he more 
than anyone else who, with his constant exhortations, calls for 
reform, and attacks on Cuba's political leadership, paved the 
way for the Revolution that followed. 

One of those captivated by the Chibas mystique was Fidel 
Castro Ruz. As a student at the Jesuit Belen High School in 
Havana in the early 1940s, Castro fell under the particular 
influence of two of his teachers, who were admirers of Franco's 
Spain and his fascist Falangist ideology. 

While studying law at the University of Havana in the late 
1940s, Castro participated in the activities of student gangs and 
associated closely with violent leaders. He soon acquired a rep- 
utation for personal ambition, forcefulness, and fine oratory. 
Yet he never became a prominent student leader. On several 



54 



Historical Setting 



occasions, he was defeated in student elections or prevented 
from winning by the nature of student politics. 

Castro, as did many Cubans, followed Chibas with enthusi- 
asm, regarding him as the only hope Cuba had of redeeming 
its political institutions and defending its sovereignty. Yet in 
one of the most bizarre episodes of Cuban political history, 
Chibas committed suicide in August 1951, at the end of his 
radio program. Chibas's death produced a feeling of shock and 
sadness among the masses. It also created a leadership vacuum, 
produced a rift in the Orthodox Party, and facilitated Batista's 
coup d'etat of March 10, 1952. 

By the time of Chibas's death, Cuba's political life was a sad 
spectacle. Although Carlos Prio Socorras, elected president in 
1948, had introduced a number of reforms and gangsterism 
had diminished within the University of Havana, his adminis- 
tration resembled that of his predecessor. Politics came to be 
regarded by the Cuban people with disrespect. To become a 
politician was to enter into an elite, a new class apart from the 
interests of the people. The elected politicians did not owe alle- 
giance to their constituents, not even to their nation, but only 
to themselves and their unsatisfied appetites for power and for- 
tune. Political figures, furthermore, were the objects of popu- 
lar mockery. In particular, the image of the presidency was 
ridiculed and abused. Chibas's criticism, furthermore, helped 
to undermine not only the authority of the autenticos, destroy- 
ing what little prestige they still enjoyed, but also the stability of 
Cuba's already fragile political institutions. The breakdown in 
morale, respect, and values was aggravated by Batista's inter- 
ruption of constitutional government in 1952. What Cubans 
believed would never happen again — the return to military 
rule — became a reality. 

Background to Revolution, 1952-59 

Convinced that he could not win the election scheduled for 
June 1952, Batista overthrew President Carlos Prio's regime in 
a bloodless and masterfully executed coup d'etat on March 10. 
The coup was almost entirely dependent on army backing and 
caught the Cuban population, as well as Prio and his followers, 
by surprise. Batista quickly consolidated his position by replac- 
ing dissenting army officers with his own loyal men, exiling or 
arresting key Prio supporters, and taking temporary control 
over the mass media. Prio himself sought asylum in the Mexi- 
can Embassy and later left the country. 



55 



Cuba: A Country Study 



The ease with which Batista took over underscored the weak- 
ness of Cuba's political institutions. The legislative branch was 
weak and permeated with corruption. Even the judiciary had 
lost prestige because of its subservient role to the executive 
branch. The ortodoxos were leaderless and had been largely 
ineffectual since Chibas's death. The autenticos corruption and 
inability to bring profound structural changes to the Cuban 
economy had cost them a good deal of support and discredited 
them in the eyes of many Cubans. The failure of this demo- 
cratic reformist party was perhaps the single most important 
factor contributing to the 1952 coup and the events that fol- 
lowed. 

By then the importance and power of the business commu- 
nity had grown significantly, helped in part by the rapid eco- 
nomic growth experienced by the island in the 1940s. World 
War II had paralyzed sugar production in many areas of 
Europe and Asia, making possible the further expansion of 
Cuba's sugar industry. At the same time, the deterioration of 
international trade during the war years gave Cuba an extraor- 
dinary amount of foreign exchange that would otherwise have 
gone toward the purchase of agricultural and industrial import 
items. All of this served to accelerate the diversification process 
in Cuba's economic development. Domestic production flour- 
ished, and other new productive activities were established. 
This circumstance was put to good use by Cuban entrepre- 
neurs, who began to occupy relatively important positions in 
the development of the island's economy. 

Yet despite this progress, the Cuban economy suffered from 
certain structural weaknesses that prevented any sustained 
period of rapid economic growth. Chief among these was an 
excessive concentration on sugar production and foreign 
trade, a critical dependency on one major buyer-supplier, sub- 
stantial unemployment and underemployment, and inequali- 
ties between urban and rural living standards. 

Despite the apparent support of business, labor, and peasant 
groups, Batista failed to develop an active base of political back- 
ing. Political loyalties were often the result of intimidation or 
expediency and for that reason were often short-lived. Batista's 
actual political base was now narrower than in the 1930s. Even 
within the armed forces, and particularly in the middle and 
lower echelons of the officer corps, there were numerous dis- 
gruntled ortodoxo and autentico officers who engaged in conspir- 
atorial activities against the regime. 



56 



Historical Setting 



The imposition of strict censorship by the Batista regime 
silenced all criticism. Opposition leaders were either jailed or 
exiled. Repression increased. The voices that clamored for a 
peaceful solution to the interruption of Cuba's constitutional 
process were soon drowned by voices clamoring for violence. 
Cuba again was submerged in terrorism and violence, a vio- 
lence that finally culminated in a major revolution. 

Opposition developed from various sectors. Numerous orto- 
doxos, a faction of the Authentic Party under Grau, and most of 
Cuba's politicians peacefully opposed Batista, hoping for an 
honest election. Another faction of the autenticos, together with 
several Ortodoxo leaders, went underground and began plot- 
ting insurrectionary activities. 

The active banner of rebellion, however, was to be carried by 
university students. Students laid aside their rivalries, directing 
all their efforts against the new regime. Militant anti-Batista stu- 
dent leaders emerged with effective political power, not only in 
the student community, but nationally as well. During the first 
three years of Batista's rule, student opposition was limited to 
sporadic riots, demonstrations, and protests. Although at the 
time these unorganized acts may have seemed unimportant, 
they did help awaken the minds of Cubans to the increasingly 
oppressive nature of Batista's regime and thus paved the way 
for the insurrection that followed. 

A small faction within the ortodoxos advocated violence as the 
correct tactic to combat Batista. Fidel Castro belonged to this 
group. After receiving his law degree from the University of 
Havana in 1950, he joined the party and was nominated to run 
as an ortodoxo candidate to the House of Representatives in the 
aborted 1952 election. Batista's coup thwarted Castro's ambi- 
tions for a parliamentary career, and Castro began organizing a 
small group of followers for his ill-fated attack on the Moncada 
military barracks in Oriente Province on July 26, 1953. 

Expecting army discipline to be low, Castro and his group 
planned a surprise attack to capture the Moncada barracks. 
The attack would coincide with a vigorous publicity campaign 
projecting the movement as an ortodoxo uprising supported by 
pro-ortodoxo army officers. Castro hoped for sufficient confu- 
sion to paralyze the army and thus prevent it from reacting 
against the rebels. Batista would then be forced to resign, and 
the ortodoxos would be catapulted into power with Castro as the 
party's undisputed leader. In reality, the party was not con- 



57 



Cuba: A Country Study 



suited, and its leaders were informed of Castro's plans only the 
day before the Moncada assault. 

Castro's Moncada attack ended in disaster. The garrison's 
discipline was not relaxed, and the army fought back the 
attack. Some of the attackers failed even to enter the military 
barracks. Those who did were massacred. Castro himself 
escaped to the mountains, only to be captured and sentenced 
to prison. 

In "History Will Absolve Me," his speech before the tribunal 
that sentenced him, Castro outlined his political program. He 
associated his movement with the ideals of Marti and Chibas 
and called for reforms that were within the mainstream of 
Cuba's political tradition. At no time during his struggle 
against Batista did Castro outline a program that departed 
from Cuba's political tradition. Although the most radical ele- 
ments of the revolutionary leadership thought that Cuba 
needed major economic changes that would cure the ills of 
monoculture, unemployment and underemployment, and 
dependence, most of the oppositionist leaders to Batista 
wanted political changes. None of these groups offered a pro- 
gram along Marxist lines. The great majority of the Cuban peo- 
ple who supported the anti-Batista struggle were hoping for a 
return to the constitution of 1940, honesty in government, and 
an end to violence. 

Cuba's small communist party, the PSP (People's Socialist 
Party), also opposed Batista, but through peaceful means. 
Since the 1930s, when it supported the Machado dictatorship, 
the party had lost prestige and membership and was a weak, 
ineffectual contender in the political process. Now, as a result 
of the international situation, particularly the pressure of the 
United States, the communists were unable to arrive at a 
modus vivendi with Batista. Not until very late in the anti- 
Batista struggle did the communists join the revolutionary 
forces, and even then their participation contributed little to 
the final overthrow of the regime. 

The mock election of November 1954, from which Batista, 
running unopposed, emerged victorious, placed Cuba at a dan- 
gerous crossroads. The opposition wanted a new election, 
while Batista insisted on remaining in power until his new term 
expired in 1958. Government officials and oppositionist lead- 
ers met throughout 1955 in an attempt to find a compromise. 
The failure to reach an agreement forced the Cuban people 



58 



Historical Setting 



reluctantly onto a road leading to civil war, chaos, and revolu- 
tion. 

The students reacted violently to the failure of political 
groups to find a peaceful solution. At the end of 1955, a series 
of riots shocked the country. On November 27, the FEU orga- 
nized a ceremony to honor the memory of eight students shot 
by Spanish authorities in 1871. Rioting quickly spread to 
Havana. On April 21, a group of university students stoned a 
TV station where a government-sponsored youth program was 
being televised. Several participants were wounded. A police 
cordon was thrown around the grounds of the University of 
Havana, and, on the pretext of searching for hidden arms, gov- 
ernment forces entered the university, demolishing the rector's 
office and destroying documents, scientific equipment, and 
furnishings. Batista replied to the moral indignation of univer- 
sity authorities and students by declaring that the autonomy of 
the university was limited to educational, administrative, and 
internal affairs; when subversive political elements were 
entrenched within the university, the government must enforce 
law and order. 

Instead of seeking to discourage rebellion and demonstra- 
tions, particularly from university students, by moderation, the 
regime encouraged it by meeting terrorism with a counterter- 
rorism that defeated its own ends. No better method could 
have been devised to increase the bitterness and opposition of 
the people. Each murder produced another martyr and new 
adherents to the struggle against Batista. By the end of 1955, 
the leaders of the FEU realized that the efforts of nonpartisan 
organizations to reconcile government and opposition were 
futile. They proposed the creation of an insurrectionary move- 
ment to lead the struggle against Batista. When the FEU pro- 
posal found little response among the electorally oriented 
politicians, the students formed their own clandestine organi- 
zation — the Revolutionary Directorate. 

While student riots and demonstrations were going on, 
other Cubans not connected with student activities were plot- 
ting to unseat Batista. A group known as Montecristi plotted 
with army officers to overthrow the regime, but Batista uncov- 
ered the conspiracy and arrested its principal instigators in 
April 1956. That same month, another group, belonging to 
Prio's Authentic Organization (Organizacion Autentica), 
unsuccessfully attacked the Goicuria army barracks in Matan- 



59 



Cuba: A Country Study 

zas Province. From jail, Fidel Castro exhorted his supporters to 
organize and to cooperate with other groups. 

In 1956 Castro was released from jail and traveled to the 
United States seeking funds for the revolutionary cause and 
organizing his followers into the Twenty-Sixth of July Move- 
ment (Movimiento 26 de Julio), an organization named after 
his ill-fated Moncada attack. In December 1956, Castro and a 
group of more than eighty young revolutionaries, including his 
brother Raul and an Argentine physician, Ernesto "Che" Gue- 
vara, left from Mexico in the small yacht Granma and landed in 
Oriente Province. There, underground commando groups had 
attacked several military installations, touching off a wave of 
sabotage throughout the province. Terrorism flared, and 
bombs exploded. Underground cells derailed trains and sabo- 
taged power lines, blacking out entire towns. 

By the time that Fidel Castro landed on December 2, how- 
ever, the uprising was well on its way to being crushed, and 
most of the leaders of Castro's Twenty-Sixth of July Movement 
were either dead or in jail. In response to the uprising, Batista 
suspended constitutional guarantees and established tighter 
censorship of news. The dreaded military police patrolled the 
streets of Havana day and night, rounding up suspected revolu- 
tionary elements. When Castro found that his actions were not 
supported by the general public, the army, or regular opposi- 
tion parties, he and about a dozen survivors found refuge in 
the Sierra Maestra mountain range and from there began wag- 
ing guerrilla warfare against the regime. 

Despite the instability of the late 1930s, the fall of Machado 
had ushered in almost two decades of political freedom and 
constitutional government. The students and the Cuban peo- 
ple in general saw Batista's regime as only a temporary inter- 
ruption of Cuba's democratic political development and as the 
consequence of Batista's own ambitions for power and Pno's 
corrupt rule rather than a symptom of more profound national 
problems. 

The elimination of Batista's dictatorship became the pana- 
cea to cure all of Cuba's ills. This simplistic thinking served 
Fidel Castro's purposes well during his stay in the Sierra Maes- 
tra. Lacking a well-defined ideology, he proclaimed the over- 
throw of the regime as the nation's sole, overriding task, 
advocating only the most obvious popular reforms. 

The Revolutionary Directorate, together with several auten- 
tico leaders, planned to overthrow the government by assassi- 



60 



Fidel Castro flanked by Raul Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos 
at a Rebel Army camp in the Sierra Maestra 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



61 



Cuba: A Country Study 

nating Batista. Student leaders reasoned that such fast, decisive 
action would cause the regime to crumble and prevent unnec- 
essary loss of life in a possible civil war. On March 13, 1957, in 
one of the boldest actions of the anti-Batista rebellion, a group 
of forty men stormed the presidential palace in the center of 
Havana and almost succeeded in killing Batista. 

Fidel Castro, from his hideout in the mountains, criticized 
the students' attack. In a taped interview shown in the United 
States in May, Castro called it "a useless waste of blood. The life 
of the dictator is of no importance. Here in the Sierra Maestra 
is where to fight." Throughout his stay in the mountains, Castro 
opposed a military coup, the assassination of Batista, or any 
other violent act by a group not directly under the control of 
his Twenty-Sixth of July Movement. 

The defeat suffered at the presidential palace and the death 
of student leader Jose A. Echeverria, perhaps the most popular 
figure opposing Batista, during a simultaneous attack on a 
Havana radio station left the Revolutionary Directorate leader- 
less and disorganized. Almost a year went by before the organi- 
zation recovered from the blow, and even then it never 
regained the prestige and importance that it had enjoyed prior 
to the palace assault. While the Revolutionary Directorate 
declined, Castro, unchallenged in the mountains, grew in pres- 
tige, strength, and following. He gained adherents in the cities 
and won to his side many discontented elements who, whatever 
differences they might have had with his Twenty-Sixth of July 
Movement, found no other insurrectionary organization to 
join. 

Corroded by disaffection, corruption, and internal disputes, 
the army was unable to defeat the guerrillas during Batista's 
final year in power. This inability increased the guerrillas' pres- 
tige and contributed to the internal demoralization of the 
armed forces. The guerrillas had certain other advantages over 
the army. For years the peasantry in the Sierra Maestra had 
been terrified by Batista's Rural Guard (Guardia Rural), and 
they welcomed the protection and promises offered by Castro 
and his group. The knowledge of the terrain and the intelli- 
gence provided by these allies proved invaluable. In addition, 
the guerrillas operated in extremely mobile units in a vast and 
rugged terrain. The Cuban army was not trained in guerrilla 
tactics and also lacked the military leadership capable of carry- 
ing out this type of warfare against highly motivated guerrilla 
fighters. For many of the urban youth who joined Castro in the 



62 



Historical Setting 



mountains, there was a sort of mystique in being a guerrilla, 
fighting for a just cause against an oppressive regime, and liv- 
ing in a rural environment. Finally, the guerrillas were sup- 
ported by an urban network that supplied manpower, weapons, 
money, and other necessary aid. 

Guerrilla warfare in the rural areas was accompanied by 
increased sabotage and terror in the cities. A large and loosely 
related urban resistance movement developed throughout the 
island. Underground cells of the Twenty-Sixth of July Move- 
ment, the closely allied Civic Resistance Movement (Movi- 
miento Civico Revolucionario — MCR), the Revolutionary 
Directorate, and the autenticos conducted bombings, sabotage, 
and kidnappings, as well as distributed propaganda. These 
actions undermined the foundations of the government and 
helped to create the atmosphere of civil war. 

This urban underground developed into the backbone of 
the anti-Batista struggle. It was the work of the urban under- 
ground more than anything else that brought about the down- 
fall of the regime. The action of these groups provoked Batista 
and his repressive forces into such extreme retaliatory mea- 
sures that the Cuban population became almost totally alien- 
ated from the regime. 

United States policy also contributed somewhat to the grow- 
ing demoralization within the military. Although the United 
States had supported the Batista regime, by the fall of 1957 the 
United States government began holding up shipments of 
weapons and munitions. An arms embargo was publicly 
announced in March 1958. Although these arms shipments 
were small and from Batista's point of view not decisive in the 
struggle against Castro, they did represent a sign of continuous 
backing for his administration. Thus, when the embargo was 
declared, many Cubans saw it as a change in Washington's pol- 
icy, indicating disapproval and withdrawal of support for the 
regime. United States actions were undoubtedly a strong blow 
to the declining morale of the Batista regime and of the armed 
forces in particular. 

The regime was further weakened when several institutions 
and sectors of Cuban society began a progressive withdrawal of 
their support. The church, professional and business groups, 
and the press exerted pressure on the government to allow a 
peaceful solution. At first they advocated free elections with 
absolute guarantees for all political parties, but the rigged elec- 
tion of November 1958, in which Batista's hand-picked candi- 



68 



Cuba: A Country Study 

date, Andres Rivero Agiiero, won the presidency for a new four- 
year term, convinced many that violence was the only means of 
eliminating Batista's rule. The army's refusal at the end of 1958 
to continue fighting dealt the final blow to a crumbling 
regime. 

The Cuban Revolution, 1959- 

Fidel Castro Takes Charge 

When Batista and his closest allies escaped to the Dominican 
Republic in the early hours of January 1, 1959, power lay in the 
streets. Of the several groups that fought the Batista regime, 
the Twenty-Sixth of July Movement had an almost undisputed 
claim to fill the vacuum left by the dictator. Castro's charisma 
and his revolutionary prestige made him, in the eyes of the 
Cuban people, the logical occupant of Batista's vacant chair; he 
was the man of the hour, the new messiah. The other insurrec- 
tionary organizations lacked the mystique, the widespread sup- 
port, and the organized cadres of Castro's movement. 

Castro had unquestionable qualities of leadership. Endowed 
with an extraordinary gift of oratory and an exceptional mem- 
ory, he would speak extemporaneously for hours. Like Marti 
had done years earlier, Castro lectured the Cubans on the evils 
of their society and the need for profound and rapid changes. 
The overwhelming majority of the Cubans accepted his leader- 
ship enthusiastically. The atmosphere of gloom that had pre- 
vailed during the Batista era was now converted into euphoria 
and hope for the future. Even those who had failed to partici- 
pate in the anti-Batista struggle fervently joined the revolution- 
ary ranks with a feeling of guilt for their past behavior. 

During the first few weeks in power, Castro assumed no offi- 
cial position except commander of the armed forces. His hand- 
picked president, former Judge Manuel Urrutia, organized a 
government, appointing a civilian cabinet composed mainly of 
prominent anti-Batista political figures. Urrutia then pro- 
ceeded to tear down Batista's governmental structure. 

It soon became clear, however, that real power lay with Fidel 
and his youthful Rebel Army officers. In public addresses, Cas- 
tro announced major public policies without consultation with 
the Urrutia cabinet and complained of the slowness of 
reforms. In mid-February, Prime Minister Jose Miro Cardona 
resigned in favor of Castro, and by October Castro had forced 
Urrutia to resign and had replaced him with Oswaldo Dorticos 



64 




Four Batista men (among seventy-one executed the next day) on 
summary trial on Sunday, January 11, 1 959, with Rebel Army 

members in the audience 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



Torrado (president, 1959-76), an obscure lawyer and former 
communist party member. 

Fidel Castro's formal assumption of power initiated a period 
of increased radicalization. Some of Batista's more prominent 
military and civilian leaders were immediately and publicly 
brought to trial before revolutionary tribunals, and the pro- 
ceedings were televised; hundreds were executed summarily. 
Faced with mounting criticism, the regime ended these public 
trials but continued them in private, while also confiscating 
property of Batista supporters or collaborators. 

On May 17, 1959, the first Agrarian Reform Law was passed. 
It required expropriation of farm lands larger than 404 hect- 
ares and forbade land ownership by foreigners. The law, 
together with a sharp reduction in urban rents, marked the 
beginning of the rapid confiscatory phase of the Revolution, 



65 



Cuba: A Country Study 

which lasted until the formal establishment of the socialist 
economy in April 1961, when Castro proclaimed that the Revo- 
lution was socialist. The revolutionary leadership aimed at agri- 
cultural diversification and industrialization, thus hoping to 
lessen dependence upon sugar. They also sought to weaken 
United States economic presence and influence in Cuba by 
confiscating foreign and domestic enterprises. Natural 
resources, utility companies, the credit system, and most large 
and medium industries fell into the hands of the government. 
As a result of these actions and the Agrarian Reform Law, the 
upper classes were wiped out, and middle-class families lost 
most of their income-producing property. Many emigrated, 
particularly to the United States, or were absorbed into the 
larger proletariat created by the Revolution. A gradual take- 
over of the mass communication media and the educational 
system also took place, and both became powerful tools of the 
state apparatus. In addition, the government initiated a pro- 
gram of low-income housing and a massive literacy campaign, 
which, according to official claims, has wiped out the 30 per- 
cent illiteracy rate that existed prior to the Revolution. 

New equal educational and employment opportunities 
offered to women had the effect of undermining the family, 
one of the most important conservers of the old order. Rela- 
tions between husband and wife were undermined, and the 
family largely lost control of the children. Large numbers of 
children attended free boarding schools and saw their parents 
for only short periods of time during the year. There was, 
therefore, not only frequent separation of husband and wife 
because of the work demands of the Revolution, but also sepa- 
ration of parents from children (see The Family Institution, ch. 
2) . The regime systematically encouraged these developments, 
perhaps aware that the only way to develop Cuba's new socialist 
man was through the destruction of culture-transmitting insti- 
tutions, such as the family and the church. During the 1960s, 
the Castro government sharply curtailed the power and influ- 
ence of the church (see The Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). 

In February 1960, the regime created a Central Planning 
Board (Junta Central de Planificacion — -Juceplan) to plan and 
direct the country's economic development. For the most part, 
the board adopted the organizational models followed by East 
European countries and transformed Cuba's private enterprise 
system into a centralized state-controlled economy. The trans- 
formation resulted in disorganization, bureaucratic chaos, inef- 



66 



Historical Setting 



ficiency, and growing shortages. Agricultural production 
declined sharply, partly as a result of neglect and Castro's plan 
for industrialization, and by 1961 food rationing was intro- 
duced for the first time in Cuba's history. 

The growing radicalization of the regime was accompanied 
by the destruction of possible opposition and by the growth in 
influence of the PSP. Political parties were not permitted to 
function, with the exception of the communist PSP, which later 
merged with Castro's own Twenty-Sixth of July Movement and 
adopted the party's original name, the PCC. Abetted by Castro, 
communists progressively occupied important positions in the 
government, gaining in prestige and influence. As a result, 
former Castro allies became disenchanted with the Revolution, 
believing that Castro had betrayed the ideals that he espoused 
while in the mountains. 

Evidently, Castro saw significant advantages in using the PSP. 
The party provided the trained, disciplined, and organized 
cadres that Castro's movement lacked. But more importantly, 
the party had Moscow's ear, and therefore could serve as the 
bridge for any possible Cuban-Soviet rapprochement. Castro 
knew well that as he developed an anti-American revolution 
and insisted on remaining in power, a conflict with the United 
States would ensue. Only the protective umbrella of the Soviet 
Union could defend him against possible United States pres- 
sures or attack. No other power, Castro reasoned, could or 
would confront the United States over Cuba. 

Ideologically, Fidel Castro was far from being a Marxist. 
Although strongly influenced by Falangist and fascist ideas 
while a high school student, and by Marxist ideas while at the 
University of Havana, Castro embraced none of these ideolo- 
gies and was instead more a product of the Marti-Chibas tradi- 
tion, although he broke with it in several fundamental respects. 
Whereas Marti and Chibas had envisioned reforms in a demo- 
cratic framework in a nation politically and economically inde- 
pendent of the United States, they both advocated friendly 
relations with the "northern colossus." Castro did not. He had 
been anti-United States since his student days, when he distrib- 
uted anti-United States propaganda in Bogota, Colombia, in 
1948. Perhaps because of his anti-North Americanism, and par- 
ticularly his conviction that a major revolution with himself in 
absolute control could not be undertaken within Cuba's politi- 
cal framework and in harmony with the United States, Castro 
broke with the Marti-Chibas tradition. 



67 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Initially, the United States, which recognized the Castro gov- 
ernment on January 7, 1959, followed a "wait and see" policy. 
The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration seemed to have 
been caught by surprise over events in Cuba and failed to grasp 
the magnitude of the changes going on or the nature of the 
leader sponsoring those changes. Differences arose between 
those who, believing that Castro was a Marxist, advocated a 
hard line toward Cuba and those who counseled patience with 
him. 

Although tensions arose in connection with the public trials 
and executions of Batista supporters, serious differences did 
not emerge until after the Agrarian Reform Law had been pro- 
mulgated. The United States protested, to no avail, the expro- 
priations of United States properties without compensation 
that were initiated under the law. Agricultural expropriations 
were followed by additional expropriations of foreign invest- 
ments, notably in the mining and petroleum industry. Compli- 
cating the relations between the two countries were arrests of 
United States citizens, Castro's refusal to meet with United 
States Ambassador Philip W. Bonsai in late 1959, and the sabo- 
tage and raids carried out against the Castro government by 
Cuban exiles operating from United States territory. 

Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Raul Castro believed that the 
political, social, and economic conditions that had produced 
their Revolution in Cuba existed in other parts of Latin Amer- 
ica and that revolutions would occur throughout the conti- 
nent. From 1960 onward, Cuban agents and diplomatic 
representatives established contact with revolutionary groups 
in the area and began distributing propaganda and aid. Several 
Cuban diplomats were expelled for interfering in the internal 
affairs of the countries to which they were accredited. As ten- 
sions mounted between the United States and Cuba, Fidel Cas- 
tro's assertion of the international character of his Revolution 
increased, as did his involvement in promoting violence in 
Latin America. By July 1960, Castro was boasting that he would 
convert "the cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of 
Latin America," and money, propaganda, men, and weapons 
began to flow from Havana in increasing quantities to foment 
the "antiimperialist" revolution. 

The radicalization of the Revolution and the deterioration 
of relations with the United States grew apace with Cuban- 
Soviet rapprochement. During the February 4-13, 1960, visit to 
Havana of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, Cuba 



68 



Cuban government officials, including Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 
Raul Castro, Fidel Castro, and President Osvaldo Dorticos 
Torrado, lead the May Day parade, May 1, 1961. 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

signed a major commercial agreement with the Soviet Union. 
The agreement provided that Cuba would receive, among 
other products, Soviet oil in exchange for sugar. Formal diplo- 
matic relations between the two countries were established on 
May 8, 1960. That April and May, the Cuban government 
nationalized major foreign businesses, including the transpor- 
tation, banking, communications, and educational systems and 
the media. On June 28, the Castro regime confiscated United 
States-owned oil refineries without compensation. On July 26, 
Castro issued the "Declaration of Havana," claiming Cuba's 
right to export revolution and calling for Soviet support. 
Nationalization of United States- and other foreign-owned 
property in Cuba began on August 6. And on October 13, the 
Castro government expropriated most Cuban-owned busi- 
nesses. In October the United States announced an embargo 
on most exports to Cuba, and when Castro restricted the staff 
of the United States embassy to eleven persons, the United 



69 



Cuba: A Country Study 



States, on January 3, 1961, severed diplomatic relations and 
withdrew its ambassador. 

By then the United States had embarked on a more aggres- 
sive policy toward the Castro regime. Groups of Cuban exiles 
were being trained, under the supervision of United States offi- 
cials, in Central American camps for an attack on Cuba. The 
internal situation on the island then seemed propitious for an 
attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime. Although Castro still 
counted on significant popular support, that support had pro- 
gressively decreased. His own Twenty-Sixth of July Movement 
was badly split on the issue of communism. Also, a substantial 
urban guerrilla movement existed throughout the island, com- 
posed of former Castro allies, Batista supporters, Catholic 
groups, and other elements that had been affected by the Rev- 
olution, and significant unrest was evident within the armed 
forces. 

The Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 17-19, 1961, was a tragedy 
of errors. Although the Cuban government did not know the 
date or the exact place where the exile forces would land, the 
fact that an invasion was in the offing was known both within 
and outside of Cuba. The weapons and ammunition that were 
to be used by the invading force were all placed in one ship, 
which was sunk the first day of the invasion. The site for the 
invasion was sparsely populated, surrounded by swamps, and 
offered little access to nearby mountains, where guerrilla oper- 
ations could be carried out if the invasion failed. The invading 
forces could, therefore, all but discount any help from the 
nearby population. 

At the last minute, a confused and indecisive President John 
F. Kennedy canceled some of the air raids by Cuban exiles that 
were intended to cripple Castro's air force. Perhaps trying to 
reassert his authority over the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) -sponsored invasion, to stymie possible world reaction, or 
to appease the Soviets, Kennedy ordered no further United 
States involvement. 

The failure of the invasion and the brutal repression that fol- 
lowed smashed the entire Cuban underground. On the first 
day of the invasion, the regime arrested thousands of real and 
suspected oppositionists. The resistance never recovered from 
that blow. His regime strengthened and consolidated, Fidel 
Castro emerged victorious and boasted of having defeated a 
"Yankee-sponsored invasion." The disillusionment and frustra- 
tion caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster among anti-Castro 



70 



Historical Setting 



forces, both inside and out of Cuba, prevented the growth of 
significant organized opposition. Meanwhile, United States 
prestige in Latin America and throughout the world sank to a 
low point. 

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States turned to 
other methods of dealing with Fidel Castro. It pursued a vigor- 
ous, although only partially successful, policy to isolate the 
Cuban regime and strangle it economically. The nation pres- 
sured its allies throughout the world to reduce their commerce 
with Cuba. In the Organization of American States (OAS — see 
Glossary) , the United States forced the expulsion of Cuba by a 
slim majority in January 1962, and several countries broke dip- 
lomatic relations with the Castro regime at this time. In 1964, 
after Castro had increased subversive activities in Latin Amer- 
ica and had moved fully into the socialist camp, the OAS voted 
to suspend trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba; except 
for Mexico, all countries that had not already done so severed 
relations. 

The single most important event accelerating Soviet military 
involvement in Cuba was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The failure of 
the United States to act decisively against Castro gave the Sovi- 
ets some illusions about United States determination and inter- 
est in Cuba. The Kremlin leaders now perceived that further 
economic and even military involvement in Cuba would not 
entail any danger to the Soviet Union itself and would not seri- 
ously jeopardize United States-Soviet relations. This view was 
further reinforced by President Kennedy's apologetic attitude 
concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion and his generally weak per- 
formance during his summit meeting with Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. 

The Soviets moved swiftly. New trade and cultural agree- 
ments were signed, and increased economic and technical aid 
was sent to Cuba. By mid-1962 the Soviets had embarked on a 
dangerous gamble by surreptitiously introducing nuclear mis- 
siles and bombers into the island. Through these actions, 
Khrushchev and the Kremlin leadership hoped to alter the bal- 
ance of power and force the United States to accept a settle- 
ment of the German issue. A secondary and perhaps less 
important motivation was to extend to Cuba the Soviet nuclear 
umbrella and thus protect Castro from any further hostile 
actions by the United States. 

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy publicly reacted to 
the Soviet challenge, instituting a naval blockade of the island 



71 



Cuba: A Country Study 



and demanding the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from 
Cuba. For the next several days, the world teetered on the 
brink of nuclear holocaust. 

Finally, after a hectic exchange of correspondence, Khru- 
shchev agreed to remove the missiles and bombers, and to 
allow unsupervised inspection of the removal in exchange for 
the United States' pledge not to invade Cuba. Although Castro 
refused to allow a United Nations inspection, the missiles and 
bombers were removed under United States aerial surveil- 
lance, and the crisis ended. The United States has never pub- 
licly acknowledged that it pledged not to invade Cuba, but 
subsequent United States policies indicate that a United States- 
Soviet understanding was reached over Cuba that included a 
United States "hands off policy toward the island. 

The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries 
involved. Although it led to a thaw in United States-Soviet rela- 
tions, it significantly strained Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro 
was not consulted throughout the negotiations between 
Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the unilateral Soviet withdrawal 
of the missiles and bombers wounded Castro's pride and pres- 
tige. It was a humiliating experience for the Cuban leader, who 
was relegated throughout the crisis to a mere pawn on the 
chessboard of international politics. Castro defiantly rejected 
the United States-Soviet understanding and publicly ques- 
tioned Soviet willingness and determination to defend the Rev- 
olution. 

After the missile crisis, Fidel Castro increased contacts with 
communist China, exploiting the Sino-Soviet dispute and pro- 
claiming his intention of remaining neutral and maintaining 
fraternal relations with all socialist states. Cuba also signed vari- 
ous trade and cultural agreements with Beijing, and Castro 
grew increasingly friendly toward the Chinese, praising their 
more militant revolutionary posture. He also defied the Sovi- 
ets, as he joined the Chinese in refusing to sign the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (1963). All of this maneuvering somewhat 
increased Castro's leverage with the Soviets and gained him 
more assistance. 

The Chinese honeymoon was short-lived, however. In 1966 
Fidel Castro blasted the Chinese for reducing rice shipments to 
Cuba below the quantities that Castro alleged had been agreed 
on between the two countries. He described Mao Tse-tung's 
ideological statements as lightweight, called for the creation of 
a "council of elders" to prevent aged leaders from "putting 



72 



A medium-range ballistic missile site in San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio 

Province, on October 23, 1962 
The Soviet cargo vessel Anosov, carrying eight missile transporters 
with canvas-covered missiles, departs Cuba on November 7, 1 962. 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



73 



Cuba: A Country Study 



their whims into effect when senility has taken hold of them," 
and threatened to handle Chinese diplomats the same way "we 
handle the American Embassy." By then Castro had also 
become disappointed with China's attitude toward Vietnam 
and by its propaganda efforts to sway Cubans to its side in the 
Sino-Soviet conflict. Castro's insistence on absolute control of 
the revolutionary movement in Latin America and his aware- 
ness of China's limitations in supplying Cuba's economic needs 
were further key factors in the cooling of the friendship 
between the two nations. Subsequently, relations became more 
cordial, but never reached the closeness achieved before 1966 
(see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization 

Revolutionary Adventurism 

The principal area of Soviet-Cuban conflict in the early 
1960s was Fidel Castro's revolutionary ventures in Latin Amer- 
ica, beginning with his attempt in 1963 to subvert and over- 
throw the Venezuelan government and his guerrilla operations 
in Guatemala and Bolivia. Castro's attempts at revolution all 
ended in disaster, however. His failures weakened his leverage 
with the Soviets, increased Soviet influence with Cuba, and 
forced him to look inward to improve his faltering economy. 

In the early 1970s, Castro's speeches played down the notion 
of Latin American revolution; Castro had come to recognize 
that there were "different roads to power." Although not com- 
pletely renouncing his original goal of exporting his own 
brand of communism, he became more selective in furnishing 
Cuban support. 

The overthrow of the Salvador Allende Gossens regime in 
Chile in September 1973, however, marked a turning point for 
the Cuban-inspired revolutionary struggle in Latin America. 
The Cuban leadership examined its strategy and tactics in the 
area and concluded that the way to power in Latin America was 
not through ballots but through bullets. Beginning in the mid- 
1970s, Castro increased his support to select groups, particu- 
larly in Central America, providing them with propaganda 
material, training, advisers, financial help, and ultimately weap- 
ons. An acceleration of the revolutionary armed struggle in the 
area followed. 

The acceleration coincided with the United States debacle 
in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. The inability of United 



74 



Historical Setting 



States administrations to respond swiftly and decisively to con- 
ditions in Central America, as well as in other parts of the 
world, and to the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa, embold- 
ened the Cuban leader. More than 40,000 Cuban troops, sup- 
ported by Soviet equipment, were transferred to Africa in 
order to bring to power communist regimes in Angola and 
Ethiopia. 

Encouraged by Cuban-Soviet victories in Angola and Ethio- 
pia, the Castro regime focused its attention on the rapidly dete- 
riorating conditions in Nicaragua. Cuba, together with Panama 
and Venezuela, increased support to the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional — 
FSLN), the principal guerrilla group opposing the Anastasio 
Somoza regime. In July 1979, Somoza fled and the FSLN rode 
victorious into Managua. 

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua stands as an imposing 
monument to Cuban strategy and ambitions in the hemi- 
sphere. The overthrow of Somoza gave the Castro line its most 
important boost in two decades. It vindicated, although belat- 
edly, Castro's ideological insistence on violence and guerrilla 
warfare as the correct strategy to attain power in Latin Amer- 
ica. Castro's long-held belief that the political, social, and eco- 
nomic conditions that had produced the Revolution in Cuba 
existed or could be created in other parts of Latin America, 
and that revolution would occur throughout the continent, 
seemed at last justified. 

From that time on, the tempo of Cuban-supported violence 
accelerated in Central America. Aided by an extensive network 
of intelligence, military forces, and sophisticated propaganda 
machinery, the Cuban government increased its support to var- 
ious groups in the area. In cooperation with Sandinista leaders, 
Cuba aided insurgent groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Colombia. Castro's commitment to revolutionary violence had 
been reinforced once again, showing convincingly that the 
Cuban leadership was willing to seize opportunities and take 
risks to expand its influence and power. 

Cuban-Soviet Rapprochement 

By the late 1960s, the Cuban economy was plagued by low 
productivity, mismanagement, poor planning, and shortages of 
almost every item (see Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). Struc- 
tural shortcomings seemed more entrenched than ever. The 
ills of the past were still there, with renewed vengeance. Long- 



75 



Cuba: A Country Study 

term trade agreements with the Soviets were perpetuating 
Cuba's role as a sugar producer, forcing the country to aban- 
don indefinitely any plans for significant diversification and 
industrialization. Trade continued with one large industrial- 
ized nation, whose commercial policies reminded Castro of 
those pursued by Cuba's previous trading partner, the United 
States. Cuba's foreign debt also reached alarming proportions 
without significant improvements in the island's ability to save 
foreign exchange. The unemployment of the pre-Castro era 
gave way to a new type of unemployment in the form of poor 
labor productivity, absenteeism, and an ineffective and over- 
staffed bureaucracy. In response to the situation, the regime 
resorted to coercive methods to ensure a labor supply for criti- 
cal agricultural tasks. The living standard of Cubans also deteri- 
orated, as high capital accumulation was given first priority 
over consumer goods. 

In its second decade, the Cuban Revolution faced critical 
problems. Internally, mounting economic difficulties inspired 
a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation in 
the hope of stimulating productivity. One result was the 
expanded influence of the military in society, and its increas- 
ingly important role in both economic and political life. The 
party, which had remained weak and ineffective throughout 
the 1960s, was enlarged and strengthened its efforts to spread 
its influence throughout society. Meanwhile, the regime con- 
tinued to pursue its aim of transforming Cuba in accordance 
with a new set of values and with the ultimate end of creating a 
new socialist citizen. Externally, the Cuban leadership 
attempted to break out of its isolation in Latin America, 
became selective in its support of revolutionary movements in 
the area, moved even closer to the Soviet Union, increased its 
influence on the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary), and 
embarked on a series of successful military interventions, pri- 
marily on the African continent. 

Although past Cuban-Soviet relations had been punctuated 
by frequent instances of Castro's insubordination and attempts 
to assert his independence, in mid-1968 relations entered a 
period of close collaboration and friendliness. A turning point 
occurred in August 1968, when Castro supported the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, a response dictated primarily by 
political and economic considerations. 

In the early 1970s, Soviet military and economic aid 
increased substantially, and Cuba moved closer to the Soviet 



76 



Soviet rocket-launch vehicles in the fourth anniversary parade 

in Havana on January 2, 1 963 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

Union, becoming in 1972 a member of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA; also known as Comecon — see 
Glossary) . The result was greater direct Soviet influence on the 
island. During this period, Soviet technicians became exten- 
sively involved in managerial and planning activities at the 
national level. The total number of Soviet military and techni- 
cal advisers increased considerably, and numerous economic 
advisers arrived. Of special significance were long-term agree- 
ments between Cuba and the Soviet Union that geared the 
Cuban economy to the Soviet economic plans. A new Inter- 
Governmental Coordinating Committee was also established, 
giving the Kremlin considerable leverage over Cuban develop- 
ments. 

Institutionalization 

In an attempt to increase economic efficiency and in line 
with Soviet objectives, the PCC was expanded and strength- 
ened in the 1970s. The aim was greater party conformity to the 
needs of a socialist society, with principal emphasis on a higher 



77 



Cuba: A Country Study 

level of ideological training and the acquisition of specialized 
knowledge by party members. 

During the early period, the party remained small, disorga- 
nized, and relegated to a secondary position vis-a-vis the mili- 
tary. It lacked a clear and defined role. Internal leadership and 
coordination remained poor, and meetings were few and of 
questionable value. Evidently, Castro saw little need for a well- 
developed party structure, which would have reduced or at 
least rivaled his style of personalista (personalism — see Glossary) 
leadership. Conflict between old-guard communists and 
Fidelistas also created tension and prevented the development 
of a strong organization. Competition from the military or the 
bureaucracy took the best talents away from the party. These 
cadres saw better opportunities for advancement in those other 
sectors than in a party riddled with factionalism and not 
warmly supported by the Uder mdximo (maximum leader) . 

The decade of the 1970s was one of expansion and consoli- 
dation for the party. During the first half of the decade, mem- 
bership expanded from some 55,000 in 1969 to 202,807 at the 
time of the First Party Congress in 1975. During the second 
half, the rapid rate of expansion slowed down somewhat. By 
the time of the Second Party Congress in 1980, there were 
fewer than 400,000 members and candidates. At the Third 
Party Congress (1986), Castro disclosed that full members and 
candidates numbered 482,000. 

The First Party Congress was a watershed in legitimizing the 
position of the party as the guiding and controlling force in 
society. It reassured the Soviet Union of Cuba's loyalty and 
friendship, extolling the Soviets' continuous military and eco- 
nomic aid to the Cuban Revolution, and rehabilitated old- 
guard communists, some of whom had been mistrusted and 
persecuted by the Castroites. The Congress also expanded the 
party's Central Committee from ninety-one to 112 members, 
increased the Political Bureau from eight to thirteen members, 
and maintained the Secretariat at eleven members, with Fidel 
Castro and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries, respec- 
tively. 

In his report to the Congress in 1975, Fidel Castro attempted 
to reconcile the adoption of Soviet-style institutions on the 
island with a renewed emphasis on nationalism and on the his- 
torical roots of the Cuban Revolution. He emphasized that 
Cuban socialism was the culmination of a struggle against 
Spanish colonialism and United States neocolonial involve- 



78 



Historical Setting 



ment in Cuban affairs. With total disregard for Marti's ideas, 
Castro linked the Cuban independence leader with Lenin in 
order to justify Cuba's move into the communist camp. The 
Congress adopted a Five-Year Plan, calling for closer economic 
integration with the Soviet Union and an economic system 
modeled on other socialist states. The approval of the party's 
platform stressing "Marxist-Leninist principles and the leading 
role of the party" was further evidence of the impact of Soviet- 
style orthodoxy on the island. 

Of paramount importance was the adoption of Cuba's first 
socialist constitution, which was approved by a 97.7 percent 
majority in a popular referendum in early 1976. Modeled on 
other communist constitutions, the Cuban document recog- 
nizes the party as "the highest leading force in state and soci- 
ety" and defines the function of mass organizations, such as the 
Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comite de 
Defensa de la Revolution — CDR) and the Federation of Cuban 
Women (Federation de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC). It divided 
the island into fourteen new provinces instead of the six old 
ones. 

The Unchanging Revolution, 1980-89 

In the early 1980s, the Cuban Revolution reached a critical 
stage in its development. Persistent structural and managerial 
problems in the economy, low prices for Cuba's export prod- 
ucts, and an inability to break away from economic depen- 
dence on the Soviet bloc forced a reexamination of basic goals. 
Because production in most key sectors had fallen short of 
expected targets, emphasis was placed on increased planning 
with more modest goals. The regime adopted Soviet economic 
methods, decreased emphasis on moral incentives, and 
attempted to create more efficient economic organizations. In 
the process, the Cubans suffered more austerity, with greater 
rationing of food and consumer goods, and, therefore, harder 
times. Life became increasingly more difficult: people faced 
long lines to obtain the most basic goods, the public transpor- 
tation system was collapsing, and the education and health sys- 
tems were deteriorating rapidly. In desperation, many Cubans 
fled the country, preferring to risk dying in the Straits of Flor- 
ida on flimsy rafts rather than live in Castro's Cuba. 

The establishment of a Soviet-type, centrally planned econ- 
omy burdened Cuba with a vast and cumbersome bureaucracy 
that stifled innovation, productivity, and efficiency. The island 



79 



Cuba: A Country Study 



continued its heavy reliance on sugar for development of the 
domestic economy and for foreign trade, and made little 
attempt to achieve agricultural diversification or industrializa- 
tion. At the same time, Cuba relied on the Soviets for massive 
infusions of aid to meet minimal investment and consumption 
needs and depended almost entirely on Soviet oil exports for 
energy requirements. 

Popular expectations of rapid economic improvement were 
replaced by pessimism. There were signs of decreasing enthusi- 
asm among Cuba's labor force and increasing signs of weari- 
ness with constant revolutionary exhortations. Underem- 
ployment was rampant, and labor productivity was at a low 
point. Absenteeism from the job place became common. 
Cubans stole from state enterprises and fed an already growing 
black market for food and goods. Graft and corruption became 
widespread as Cuban citizens rejected socialist morality and 
laws and struggled to survive on a daily basis. 

Yet this is only one side of the picture. It is in the nature of 
totalitarian regimes that the key question relates not to eco- 
nomics per se, but rather to the effects of economic factors 
upon the levers of political and social control. In an effort to 
increase productivity and forestall any further decline in revo- 
lutionary momentum, the regime increased the militarization 
and regimentation of society and institutionalized its rule by 
expanding the role and influence of the party throughout soci- 
ety. This progressive institutionalization contributed to the fur- 
ther stabilization of the system, while reducing its vulnerability 
to threats of external subversion and internal revolt. From an 
institutional standpoint, the regime appeared equipped to 
withstand the difficult years ahead. Fidel Castro was still domi- 
nant. He remained "the Revolution" and "the maximum 
leader." The evidence seemed to indicate that significant seg- 
ments of the Cuban people continued to be attracted by his 
personalized style of government. Some regarded him as a pro- 
tection against the state structures, resembling a traveling 
ombudsman ready to change or challenge policies of which he 
was the author. His lengthy speeches before huge throngs 
served both as a pedagogical device and as an instantaneous 
plebiscite. Despite some friction within the military after the 
United States invasion of Grenada in 1983 embarrassed the 
Cubans, Castro maintained absolute control of his govern- 
ment, with no other public figure in a position to challenge his 
undisputed authority. 



80 



Historical Setting 



The political elite's values, policy goals, and organizational 
interests were driven to reinforce Fidel Castro's political incli- 
nations and policy preferences. The hard foreign policy objec- 
tives of this group were maintaining Cuba's independence 
from, and opposition to, the United States; actively supporting 
revolutionary movements in Latin America; promoting 
national liberation and socialism in the developing world; 
acquiring influence and supportive allies among the develop- 
ing world states; and securing maximum military, economic, 
and political commitments from the Soviet Union. 

In foreign affairs, the Cuban Revolution achieved significant 
successes. In the late 1970s, Fidel Castro emerged as the leader 
of the Nonaligned Movement. There he espoused four impor- 
tant themes for the future that became the cornerstone of 
Cuba's policy toward the developing world: support for violent 
revolutions; anticolonialism; an end to white supremacy in 
Africa; and reduction of dependency on Western economies. 
These policies coincided with Soviet objectives and produced a 
convergence of Soviet and Cuban actions in the developing 
world. Castro's willingness to commit his Soviet-equipped, well- 
trained armed forces on the African continent gained for Cuba 
much respect and admiration, but also created some fear 
among African leaders. 

The Cuban leadership saw its support for revolution as an 
integral and critical part of Cuba's foreign policy. Helping left- 
ist insurgents throughout the world was a revolutionary com- 
mitment, ensuring that these allies would come to Cuba's aid in 
times of need. But more important, worldwide revolution 
directed against the United States, the principal enemy of the 
Cuban Revolution, was used to divert United States attention 
and resources, and perhaps to restrain its policies and actions 
against the island. The ultimate goal was to ensure the survival 
of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership, the most impor- 
tant objective of Cuba's foreign policy. 

Armed struggle was fundamental to Fidel Castro's mystique 
as well as to the image that he projected onto the larger world 
stage, where he was determined to play a prominent role. 
Other revolutionary leaders might shed, in time, doctrinaire 
excesses in favor of the pragmatic pursuit of comfortable rule. 
Yet there is truly nothing in Castro's personal makeup to sug- 
gest that he would forsake the global floodlights and renounce 
his "internationalist" commitments. 



81 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Perhaps the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the estab- 
lishment, albeit temporarily, of a Marxist regime in Grenada 
were Cuba's most important revolutionary achievements in the 
Western hemisphere. Although the overthrow of the Somoza 
regime in Nicaragua was as much the result of internal opposi- 
tion as of external aid, Cuba claimed a joint effort with Venezu- 
ela and Panama in bringing down the Somoza dynasty. For 
Cuba, Nicaragua exemplified the vindication of the Cuban 
line, which had been emphasizing for years the need for vio- 
lence and particularly guerrilla warfare to attain power in Latin 
America. 

The Sandinista victory gave new life to revolutionary vio- 
lence in Central America, much of it supported by Cuba. Yet 
Cuba's support for insurgent groups in the area, particularly in 
El Salvador and Guatemala, was channeled increasingly 
through Nicaragua. Using Nicaragua or other third countries 
facilitated the flow of weapons, propaganda, and aid, while 
making the task of detection and resistance that much harder. 
Cuba also denied supporting revolutionary groups, thus weak- 
ening United States credibility and influence, while at the same 
time facilitating relations with more conservative governments 
in Latin America. Castro's willingness to come to the aid of the 
Argentine military regime during the Falklands War (1982) 
was a further indication of Cuba's pragmatic and opportunistic 
foreign policy. Throughout these maneuvers in Cuba's foreign 
policy, Castro remained closely tied to the Soviet Union. 
Although there were frictions between Castro and the Kremlin, 
the latter's influence and presence in Cuba were far more 
extensive than ever before. At the same time, solidarity with the 
Soviet Union remained a vital element of Cuba's foreign policy. 
Cuba's policies and actions in the international arena operated 
in the larger framework of Soviet objectives. Castro continued 
to pursue his own policies only as long as they did not clash 
with those of the Soviets. 

Uncomfortable as he felt in the embrace of the Russian bear, 
Castro's options were limited. Although relations with China 
improved from their nadir in 1967, the Chinese seemed unable 
or unwilling to take Cuba on as an expensive client. Beijing 
decried Castro's support of Moscow's policies as "revisionist," 
and the Chinese still remembered his denunciations of Mao in 
the late 1960s with bitterness and anger. 

Increased commercial ties with Canada, Western Europe, 
and Japan beckoned as a healthy development from Cuba's 



82 



Historical Setting 



standpoint. Yet the ability of these countries to absorb the 
island's sugar exports was limited, and Havana had scant cash 
reserves with which to purchase European and Japanese goods. 
Cuba's heavy economic commitment to the Soviet Union and 
the East European countries was an additional deterrent to a 
broadening of its trading partners, and United States pressures 
on Western allies tended to limit their willingness to trade with 
Cuba. 

To be sure, all of this could have enhanced the desire of the 
Castro regime to reduce its reliance on the Soviet Union and to 
reach some accommodation with the United States. Rap- 
prochement with the United States could have led to a loosen- 
ing of the embargo and even access to an important 
neighboring market, if the United States were willing to buy 
Cuban sugar. It could have bolstered Cuba's immediate security 
position and provided Castro with leverage in his dealings with 
the Soviet Union. United States recognition would have meant 
an important psychological victory for Castro. In Latin Amer- 
ica, it would have been interpreted as a defeat for "Yankee 
imperialism" and as an acceptance of the Castro regime as a 
permanent, albeit irritating, phenomenon in the Caribbean. 

Cuban moves toward accommodation with the United States 
would have posed some major problems for the Kremlin. The 
Soviets were not averse to some amelioration in Cuban-United 
States tensions, especially if the result was to reduce Cuba's 
heavy demands for Soviet aid. The Kremlin was fearful, how- 
ever, that ties with the West could foster a desire for increasing 
independence by other Soviet bloc members and lead to pro- 
gressive internal liberalization, as the results of the West Ger- 
man efforts to establish diplomatic and trade relations with 
Eastern Europe showed. Although Cuba was not as critical to 
the Soviet Union as was Eastern Europe, a resumption of 
Cuba's relations with the United States and a significant weak- 
ening in Soviet-Cuban ties would have been seen as leading to 
the eventual subverting of the Revolution and the renunciation 
of membership in the "socialist camp." Moscow viewed Cuba's 
possible defection as a blow to its prestige and as damaging to 
the Soviet power posture vis-a-vis the United States. 

Rapprochement with the United States would also have been 
fraught with danger and uncertainties for the Cuban leader- 
ship. It would have required a loosening of Cuba's military ties 
with the Soviet Union, the abandonment of visible support for 
violent revolutions in Latin America, and the withdrawal of 



83 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Cuban troops from Africa and other parts of the world. These 
were conditions that Castro was not willing to accept. He per- 
ceived them as an attempt by the United States to isolate Cuba 
and strengthen anti-Castro forces within Cuba, thus posing a 
threat to the stability of his regime. Castro, therefore, was not 
able or willing to offer meaningful concessions that would be 
indispensable for United States-Cuban rapprochement. Nego- 
tiations proceeded, however, and ad hoc agreements were 
struck on some issues such as skyjacking and the Mariel 
Boatlift, which brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United 
States in 1980. 

Cuban-Soviet relations, for their part, also were beset with 
serious irritants. Moscow's claim to leadership of the "socialist 
bloc" and its interference in Cuba's internal affairs have 
clashed with the forces of Cuban nationalism. Given Castro's 
personality and past policies, his suspicion, if not dislike, of the 
Soviets, and his desire to play a leading role in world affairs, he 
remained an unstable and unpredictable Soviet ally. Yet in the 
1980s, Castro had no choice but to follow the Soviet lead, while 
attempting to emerge from his isolation in Latin America and 
improve Cuba's faltering economy. 

By the 1990s, Cuba's international relations revolved around 
seven main goals: the survival of the Castro Revolution; the 
internationalization of Castro's personal prestige and cha- 
risma, with a resulting increase in power and influence; the 
maintenance, until the collapse of communism, of a close alli- 
ance with the Soviet Union and its interests throughout the 
world; the preservation of an anti-United States posture in an 
attempt to weaken United States power and influence world- 
wide; the acquisition of influence and supportive allies among 
developing world states; the development of a "new interna- 
tional economic order"; and the continuous support of "move- 
ments of national liberation" in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, 
and Latin America. The image of a nonaligned Cuba was 
repeatedly tarnished, however, by Castro's close partnership 
with the Soviets. His stature suffered as a result of his failure to 
condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 
and to rally Latin American leaders to repudiate their foreign 
debt. 

The Cuban government has helped a broad range of "pro- 
gressive forces," terrorist groups, and religious fanatics oppos- 
ing the United States. Since the 1970s, however, the regime has 
been increasingly willing, despite its Marxist rhetoric, to estab- 



84 



Historical Setting 



lish ties with conservative Latin American states. Clearly, ideol- 
ogy is not the sole factor shaping Cuba's external behavior. 
Cuban interest in developing such relations has been moti- 
vated by a desire to foster Cuban and, in the past, Soviet objec- 
tives, and to undermine United States interests in the area. 

Despite perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (political 
opening) in the Soviet Union and differences with Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Castro remained a close Soviet ally until the end of 
communism in 1991. Since the late 1960s, the relations 
between Havana and Moscow had taken the form of a progres- 
sively closer alliance. The incorporation of Cuba into the Soviet 
camp was evident not only in economic terms (Cuba was a 
member of Comecon and was heavily dependent on Soviet eco- 
nomic and military aid and trade) but also was clearly mani- 
fested in its model of government and its international 
behavior. Undoubtedly, Cuba was subservient in most cases to 
Soviet interests, but Havana had considerable leverage with 
Moscow 7 , as well as some freedom to act and react in external 
affairs (especially in the Caribbean and Latin America in gen- 
eral) . 

Problems and Prospects in the Post-Soviet Era 

In the 1990s, Castro faced some of the old problems that had 
plagued the Cuban Revolution in the past, as well as new and 
critical challenges. Internally, there was growing evidence of 
disillusionment with the party's and Castro's exhortations. 
Absenteeism and youth apathy were increasing. Castro seemed 
to be losing the battle to create a new generation devoted to 
the party and to the Revolution. Despite more than forty years 
of education and indoctrination, the new socialist man was 
nowhere to be found. The loss of this generation represented, 
perhaps, the greatest challenge for the continuity of the Revo- 
lution. 

Economically, the Revolution was extremely weak. Persistent 
structural problems, low prices for Cuba's export products, and 
the inability to obtain aid from the Soviet Union forced yet 
another reexamination of basic goals. The deepening eco- 
nomic crisis, aggravated by the collapse of communism not 
only in the Soviet Union, but also in Eastern Europe, produced 
a new frenzy of planning activity and greater regimentation, in 
the hope of stimulating productivity. Rejecting perestroika and 
glasnost, Castro returned to the failed path of the past, insist- 
ing that the Cubans should work harder, sacrifice more, and 



85 



Cuba: A Country Study 

expect less in the years ahead. Among the populace, pessimism 
and cynicism replaced revolutionary fervor. 

Mild overtures from Castro toward the United States and 
Cuba's deepening economic crisis encouraged those in the 
United States who believed it was time for a rapprochement 
with Cuba. In 1989 Castro tried and executed three high-rank- 
ing officers of the Ministry of Interior and Division General 
Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, former commander of Cuban troops 
in Africa, accusing them of drug trafficking. The execution 
seemed more connected with the elimination of a potential 
rival than with drugs. Denying his or his brother's involvement 
with drugs, Castro called on the United States for cooperation 
in fighting the drug trade. As he had in the past, Castro was 
willing to negotiate and to cooperate with the United States on 
specific issues. 

Mired in economic crisis and without the support of his 
former benefactor, Castro braced for the difficult times ahead. 
Yet he was unwilling to budge and change the Marxist course 
he had set for his Revolution four decades earlier. 

Fearful that economic change could lead to political 
change, he rejected both. He remained committed to the cor- 
nerstones of his policies — a command economy, violent revolu- 
tion, anti-North Americanism, "internationalism," and 
personal rule. Although his support for violent revolution and 
"internationalism'z was quite limited, Castro was unwilling to 
modify or abandon the five cornerstones of his policies. 

* * * 

The study of Cuban history from colonial times to the 
present has produced a wealth of scholarly works both in Cuba 
and abroad. Multivolume histories and general histories of the 
island include Charles E. Chapman's A History of the Cuban 
Republic, Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez et alia's Historia de la nacion 
cubana, Willis F.Johnson's The History of Cuba, Wyatt MacGaffey 
and Clifford R. Barnett's Cuba, Levi Marrero's Cuba, Louis A. 
Perez's Cuba, Fernando Portuondo del Prado's Historia de Cuba, 
Jaime Suchlicki's Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, and Hugh Tho- 
mas's Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. 

The era of Spanish domination has produced an extensive 
and varied literature, including Gerardo Brown Castillo's Cuba 
colonial, Jose M. Carbonell y Rivero's eigh teen-volume Evolucion 
de la cultura cubana, Richard B. Gray's Jose Mar ti: Cuban Patriot, 



86 



Historical Setting 



Pedro Jose Guitera's Historia de la Isla de Cuba, Kenneth T. 
Kiple's Blacks in Colonial Cuba, Allan J. Kuethe's Cuba, 1753- 
1815, Manuel Moreno Fraginals's The Sugarmill, Medardo Vi ti- 
ler's Las ideas en Cuba, and Irene A. Wright's The Early History of 
Cuba, 1492-1586. The institution of slavery and the role of 
blacks in Cuba have been revisited in numerous studies, espe- 
cially since the Castro Revolution, in such works as Arthur F. 
Corwin's Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 
and Franklin W. Knight's Slave Society in Cuba During the Nine- 
teenth Century. 

The independence struggle and United States intervention 
are controversial subjects and have produced a vast literature. 
Since the Revolution, numerous studies have been published 
in Cuba highlighting the role of certain leaders in the wars, 
particularly Antonio Maceo, a mulatto general, and Marti, the 
father of Cuban independence. The Jose Marti National 
Library's Anuario del Centro de Estudios Martianos is the best 
guide to the extensive literature on Marti. Other useful sources 
include Jose Franco's three-volume Antonio Maceo, Herminio 
Portell-Vila's Historia de la Guerra de Cubay losEstados Unidos con- 
tra Espana, Julius Pratt's Expansionists of 1898, and Miguel A. 
Varona Guerrero's La Guerra de Independencia de Cuba. 

The prerevolutionary period that lasted from 1902 until 
1959 produced an incisive and critical literature that examined 
the problems of nationhood and the development of the new 
nation. A few of the useful books include Luis E. Aguilar's 
Cuba, 1933: Prologue to Revolution; Raymond L. Buell's Problems 
of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs', Russel 
H. Fitzgibbon's Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935; Ramiro 
Guerra y Sanchez, Jose M. Cabrera, Juan J. Remos, and Emete- 
rio S. Santovenia's Historia de la nacion cubana; Allan Reed Mil- 
ieu's The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 
1906-1909, Lowry Nelson's Rural Cuba; Louis A. Perez's Army 
Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958; Robert F. Smith's Background to Rev- 
olution: The Development of Modern Cuba; Suchlicki's University 
Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968; Francis Adams 
Truslow's A Report on Cuba; and Medardo Vitier's Las ideas en 
Cuba. 

The Cuban Revolution generated a vast literature that 
focused originally on the causes of the Revolution, the nature 
of the leadership, and United States policy. Later on, studies 
addressed the nature of Castroism, Castro's alliance with the 
Soviets, Castro's internationalism, and the failings of Cuba's 



87 



Cuba: A Country Study 



economic model. A few of the useful books include those by 
Juan M. del Aguila's Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution; James G. 
Blight's and David A. Welch's On the Brink: Americans and Soviets 
Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis', Jorge I. Dommguez's Cuba: 
Order and Revolution; Theodore Draper's Castroism: Theory and 
Practice; Raymond W. Duncan's The Soviet Union and Cuba: Inter- 
ests and Influence; Richard R. Fagen's The Transformation of Politi- 
cal Culture in Cuba; Pamela Falk's Cuban Foreign Policy; Carlos 
Franqui's Diary of the Cuban Revolution; Georgie Anne Geyer's 
Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro; Edward Gon- 
zalez's Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma; Maurice Halp- 
erin's The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro; Cuban Communism, 
edited by Irving L. Horowitz and Suchlicki; Haynes Johnson's 
The Bay of Pigs; Revolutionary Change in Cuba, edited by Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago; Carlos Alberto Montaner's Fidel Castro and the 
Cuban Revolution; Andres Oppenheimer's Castro' s Final Hour, 
Thomas G. Paterson's Contesting Castro; Marifeli Perez-Stable's 
The Cuban Revolution; Elizabeth Stone's Women and the Cuban 
Revolution; three volumes edited by Suchlicki: Cuba, Castro, and 
Revolution, Cuba in a Changing World, and The Cuban Military 
Under Castro; Szulc's Fidel: A Critical Portrait; and Peter Wyden's 
Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



88 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




A view of the smoke-covered Havana skyline and the seaside highway (el 
Malecon), 1996 

Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



CUBA CONFRONTS DAUNTING social issues in its fifth 
decade of socialist rule, despite having a fairly well-educated 
and healthy population and low fertility and mortality rates. 
Many of the widely praised social achievements of the 1970s 
and 1980s — in health, education, and social security — are no 
longer sustainable given the absence of Soviet subsidies and 
the poor performance of the economy. The health sector, 
severely battered by the economic crisis of the "special period 
in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special 
Period — see Glossary), and with some indicators suggesting 
worsening standards, lacks even the most elementary medical 
inputs and no longer delivers the services Cubans had come to 
expect. It is also burdened by a bloated staff of physicians, 
nurses, and other health personnel far too numerous for the 
country's needs. Similar difficulties are plaguing the education 
sector, where even pencils and notebooks are scarce. Cuba has 
far more teachers than it can use productively, its educational 
infrastructure is crumbling, and its study programs are poorly 
attuned to the needs of a country urgently needing to restruc- 
ture its economy and become integrated into the world econ- 
omy (see Performance of the Economy, ch. 3). 

To make matters worse, the financial resources needed to 
maintain the generous safety net developed since Fidel Castro 
Ruz (president, 1976- ) seized power in 1959 are simply not 
available. Pensions for early retirement and extensive unem- 
ployment programs — crucial national entitlements — are taxing 
the country's finances, while providing only miserly benefits. A 
rapidly aging population is adding to the onerous cost of these 
programs. Regardless of developments in the economy, low 
birth rates ensure that problems associated with the elderly 
population will intensify as the number of working-age Cubans 
relative to the elderly continues to decline. On the positive 
side, Cuba can count on a relatively well-trained work force and 
the fact that the number of children relative to the working-age 
population continues to decline further. (The relative decline 
in the number of children counterbalances the increasing 
dependency ratio as the proportion of elderly in the total pop- 
ulation rises.) Under the proper economic incentives system, 
Cuban workers have the potential to become highly produc- 
tive. 



91 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Cuba must also address worrisome environmental trends. 
Concern is most warranted in the agricultural sector, where 
widespread adoption of capital-intensive (see Glossary) meth- 
ods, such as chemical inputs and mechanization; grandiose but 
often poorly conceived infrastructure development plans, such 
as dams and irrigation projects; and central planning (see Glos- 
sary) may have compromised the sustainable use of some of 
the country's soils. Cuba, however, is one of the few developing 
countries that has managed to reverse a long-term deforesta- 
tion trend, although this achievement may now be threatened 
by the country's current inability to import lumber and cook- 
ing fuels. 

Because of the Special Period, economic and social initia- 
tives have been implemented that are reversing a long-term 
commitment to maintaining the national income distribution 
within a narrow band. The free circulation of the dollar, the 
assigning of priority to foreign tourism, and policies designed 
to increase emigrant remittances are having a regressive effect 
on income distribution. Not all Cubans have ready access to 
dollars; most of those who do either have family members 
residing abroad or are employed in, or derive some benefit 
from, the tourism sector. Because relatively few black Cubans 
have emigrated, this particular social group suffers the brunt of 
the perverse income-distribution effects of remittances. So do 
those Cuban families, who, regardless of race, have no immedi- 
ate relatives abroad, or whose wage earners are employed in 
state enterprises or in social sectors, such as health, in which 
the government has proscribed self-employment. The increas- 
ing number of visits by emigrants further contributes to the 
growing income differential trend and serves to highlight 
social disparities. In response to these conditions, social ills less 
visible in Cuba before the Special Period — such as prostitution, 
begging, and property and violent crimes — are on the rise. 

Mass organizations, although still a dominant feature of 
social life in Cuba, have lost much of their influence because of 
general apathy and disillusionment with Cuba's state of affairs. 
A religious revival is underway; many Cubans seem to want to 
fill a spiritual void. Participating in religious ceremonies, an 
activity no longer stigmatized, has become an important social 
safety valve inasmuch as doing so permits citizens to show dis- 
content without fear of government retribution. Pope John 
Paul IPs visit in January 1998 gave added legitimacy to religion 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



as a valid component of Cuban life (see Religion and the State, 
ch. 4). 

Physical and Natural Setting 

Principal Geographic Features 

The Cuban archipelago — two main islands plus 3,715 small 
and large keys and inlets — has a total land surface of 110,860 
square kilometers. It is nine times as large as Jamaica and 
twelve times the size of Puerto Rico. The westernmost of the 
Greater Antilles island chain, the Cuban archipelago is strategi- 
cally located in the Atlantic Ocean, just below the Tropic of 
Cancer at geographic coordinates 21°30'N, 80°00'W, safeguard- 
ing the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico to the west and the 
Caribbean Sea to the south. Cuba lies seventy-seven kilometers 
west of Haiti, 140 kilometers north of Jamaica, 150 kilometers 
south of Key West, and 210 kilometers east of Mexico's Yucatan 
Peninsula. 

Cuba proper is a long and elongated island that accounts for 
94.67 percent of the country's land area, or 104,945 square 
kilometers. The island is 1,250 kilometers in length from east 
to west and averages about 100 kilometers in width. Isla de la 
Juventud (formerly Isla de Pinos), the second largest land 
mass, located southwest of Cuba in the Golfo de Batabano, has 
an area of 2,200 square kilometers, or 1.98 percent of the coun- 
try's total. The remaining keys and inlets cover 3.35 percent of 
the national territory, or 3,715 square kilometers. The small 
keys and inlets are primarily clustered in five subarchipelagos, 
two of which are off the northern coast. The Archipielago de 
los Colorados (with about sixty keys and inlets) is off Pinar del 
Rio Province; and the Archipielago de Sabana and the Archi- 
pielago de Camaguey (with about 400 keys and inlets) run 
along the northern center of the island. The most important 
archipelagos on the southern coast are the Archipielago de los 
Canarreos, which encompasses Isla de la Juventud and 300 
other keys and inlets; the Banco de los Jardines and Jardinillos 
keys, off the Zapata Swamp in central Cuba; and in eastern 
Cuba, in the Golfo de Guacanayabo, the Archipielago de los 
Jardines de la Reina. 

The Cuban coastline measures 5,746 kilometers. The north 
coast accounts for 3,209 kilometers, while the coastline of Isla 
de la Juventud has a length of 327 kilometers. Hundreds of 
kilometers of sandy beaches dot the Cuban archipelago, many 



93 



Cuba: A Country Study 

still in their natural state. Fossilized coral formations occupy 
about half of Cuba's coastline, while living coral reefs are found 
in adjacent waters — often extending for hundreds of kilome- 
ters. The coral reef along Cuba's northern coast is second in 
length in the world only to Australia's Great Barrier Reef. 

Many of Cuba's more than 200 bays, which have narrow 
entrances but ample inner areas, make some of the world's best 
harbors. Several of the country's many harbors, some with deep 
channels and horseshoe shapes, offer excellent protection 
from the fury of the seas. The most important harbors on the 
northern coast — from west to east — are Bahia Honda in Pinar 
del Rio Province; Bahia de Cabanas, Bahia del Mariel, and 
Bahia de La Habana in La Habana Province; Bahia de Matan- 
zas in Matanzas Province; Bahia de Nuevitas in Camagiiey Prov- 
ince; Bahia de Puerto Padre in Las Tunas Province; and Puerto 
Gibara and Bahia de Nipe in Holgum Province. Major harbors 
on the southern coast — from east to west — are located at Bahia 
de Santiago in Santiago de Cuba Province and Cienfuegos in 
Cienfuegos Province. The only major deep-water ports are the 
bays of Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, 
and Santiago de Cuba. Although relatively small, Havana Bay 
(Bahia de La Habana) is the country's most heavily used har- 
bor (see Transportation, ch. 3). 

Topography and Drainage 

Although it has three principal mountain ranges, the Cuban 
landscape is dominated by plains that cover approximately two- 
thirds of the land surface and are, on average, 100 meters 
above sea level. The mountainous zones are isolated and sepa- 
rated by the extensive plains and flatlands. The elevation of the 
ranges is modest even by Caribbean standards. Only in eastern 
Cuba, in the provinces of Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, and 
Granma, do mountain peaks exceed 1,200 meters above sea 
level. Several mountain ranges are found there, including the 
Sierra Maestra (along the southern coast), famous for harbor- 
ing Fidel Castro and his guerrillas between December 1956 and 
January 1959 (see Background to Revolution, 1952-59, ch. 1). 
Cuba's tallest peak, the Pico Real del Turquino, at 1,974 
meters, is in the Sierra Maestra mountain chain (see fig. 2). 
Other important mountain chains in the northern section of 
this region are the Sierra de Nipe, Sierra de Nicaro, Sierra de 
Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toa. In central Cuba, to the south of 
the provinces of Cienfuegos and Sancti Spfritus, is the Sierra de 



94 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



QuCf of Mexico 



9{prtfiM[antic 
Ocean 

D 



x60 



> f , M del I 




^ Cabo 
^ San Antonio^-^ f 

PENINSULA DE h 
<Zh GUANAHACABIBES 



®fl&'a de type 
siicaro 



ntiogo United States W f 
Naval Base < v_ 
tf^ HAITI 



A 



National capital / ' 

Populated place \^_HAITI 



B Mountain (in meters) 

50 100 Kilomete rs 

50 100 Miles 



Figure 2. Topography and 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



Escambray chain. The tallest mountain in this chain, in the 
Sierra de Trinidad, is the Pico San Juan (also known as Pico La 
Cuca), at 1,156 meters. The third mountain range is in Pinar 
del Rio Province in western Cuba. With a modest elevation, the 
Cordillera de Guaniguanico includes the Sierra de los Organos 
and the Sierra del Rosario. The Pan de Guajaibon, at 692 
meters, is the highest peak in this region. 

In between these mountain ranges are flatlands and coastal 
plains, many rich in clay. Some of Cuba's richest soils are found 
in the central provinces, whereas some of the poorest are in the 
eastern regions of the country, as well as in portions of Pinar 
del Rio, the westernmost province. Poor drainage is a serious 
problem in about 37 percent (or 4 million hectares) of the 
country's territory, with about 1 million hectares suffering 
from some degree of salinization. The latter problem is more 
severe in coastal areas exposed to seawater intrusions. Accord- 
ing to a soil-quality typology developed with Soviet assistance, 
of the 6.6 million hectares (or 60.6 percent of the national land 
surface) of agricultural soils, approximately 12 percent (some 
800,000 hectares) consists of highly productive deep and per- 
meable soils. A further 2.3 million hectares (35 percent) are 
lightly waterlogged soils, which can become productive if ade- 
quately drained. The productive potential of the remaining 
agricultural land is modest, with approximately 22 percent 
deemed to be marginal for agriculture. Many of the latter soils 
are easily eroded and prone to salinization. 

In 1996, according to official Cuban statistics, 6,614,500 
hectares, or 60 percent of the total land area ( 1 1 million hect- 
ares), were used for agriculture, whether under permanent 
crops (2,767,100 hectares) or temporary crops (994.5 million 
hectares). Of the remaining noncultivated land, 21 percent (or 
2,311,000 hectares) was in pastures or fallow, and 25.7 percent 
(or 2,831,600 hectares) was forested. Human settlements 
accounted for 6.3 percent (or 694,000 hectares). Approxi- 
mately 537,000 hectares, or 4.9 percent of the land surface, 
were classified as "unusable." 

Cuba has 632 hydrographic basins measuring more than five 
square kilometers, the most important being the Cauto, Zaza, 
and Sagua la Grande. Although the country has numerous riv- 
ers and streams, they tend to be short because of Cuba's narrow 
and elongated shape. The beds of many watercourses dry out 
for months at a time, except during the rainy season. Most riv- 
ers run from the central spine of the island to either the north- 



97 



Cuba: A Country Study 



ern or the southern coast. The average length of the country's 
major rivers is ninety-three kilometers. The Cauto, which flows 
from the eastern mountains to the southern coast, is the coun- 
try's longest, at 370 kilometers. Also among Cuba's longest riv- 
ers are several Cauto tributaries, including the Saldo (126 
kilometers), the Contramestre (ninety-six kilometers), the 
Bayamo (eighty-nine kilometers), and the Cautillo (eighty-four 
kilometers) . After the Cauto, the next two longest rivers are in 
central Cuba. The Sagua la Grande, with a northerly flow and a 
length of 163 kilometers, is the country's second longest, fol- 
lowed by the southern-flowing Zaza (155 kilometers). The 
Almendares, the best-known watercourse in the capital city of 
Havana (La Habana; hereafter, Havana) , is only fifty-two kilo- 
meters long. 

Natural lagoons and other still-water bodies are small and 
few in number. Laguna de la Leche (6,700 hectares) and 
Laguna de Barbacoa (1,900 hectares) are the most prominent 
saltwater lagoons; the two most important freshwater lakes are 
the Ariguanabo and Laguna del Tesoro, each with a surface 
area of approximately 900 hectares. Since the 1960s, a consid- 
erable number of man-made reservoirs (embalses) have been 
built; they numbered nearly 200 large dams and 800 minidams 
by the early 1990s. Natural and artificial water bodies account 
for about 3 percent of the country's land surface, or some 
330,000 hectares. 

Climate and Precipitation 

Cuba's tropical climate is warm and humid. Annual mean 
temperatures vary within a narrow range of 24°C to 27°C, but 
average 25°C. Annual monthly mean temperatures in different 
regions of the country fluctuate between 4.8°C and 6.8°C. Janu- 
ary, the coldest month, has an average temperature of 22.5°C, 
and August, the warmest month, has an average temperature 
of 27.8°C. Average monthly temperatures in Havana range 
from 27°C in July and August to 22°C in January and February; 
the annual average is 24.5°C. Fluctuations in regional tempera- 
tures are primarily determined by elevation, although the 
Caribbean Sea's moderating influence is also an important fac- 
tor. The maximum temperature ever recorded was 40°C. At the 
other extreme, temperatures as low as 1°C to 2°C have been 
noted on the country's highest mountain peak. During the dry 
season, temperatures moderate somewhat, especially in the 
west, as alternate cold and warm fronts dominated by the 



98 



The Rio Yumuri, Guantdnamo Province, as it enters the ocean 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

The dry southeast coast 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 



99 



Cuba: A Country Study 

arrival of dry Arctic masses descend on Cuba and collide with 
warm southern winds. The average relative humidity is 81 per- 
cent. 

On average, Cuba receives about 1,400 millimeters of rain- 
fall a year, although the amount of rainfall from year to year 
can vary greatly. Two well-established dry and rainy seasons 
characterize Cuba's climate. During the dry season, from 
December to April, the country receives, on average, between 
thirty-two and ninety-nine millimeters of rainfall a month. 
Because of the alternating pattern of cold and warm fronts, 
Cuba is prone to receive considerable amounts of rainfall even 
during the dry season. 

The rainy season runs from May through November, during 
which the amount of rainfall increases to between 200 and 260 
millimeters per month. Annual and seasonal variations in rain- 
fall amount are influenced by the frequency and severity of 
hurricanes. Because of its tropical location, Cuba is hit periodi- 
cally by different kinds of storms, especially hurricanes, some 
with winds of more than 200 kilometers an hour and heavy 
rains of up to 300 millimeters in a twenty-four-hour period. 
Hurricane season lasts from July to November. September and 
October are the months of the most frequent storms. 

Throughout the island, precipitation levels increase from 
the coast to inland locations because the volume of precipita- 
tion is influenced by elevation. As a general rule, the drier 
areas are on the southern coast. The Moa-Toa-Baracoa region 
in northeastern Cuba receives the most rainfall (an annual 
average of 3,000 millimeters) , whereas the least amount of rain 
falls in the semidesert cactus-scrub belt of Guantanamo Prov- 
ince (600 millimeters), a region on the southern coast just 
below this mountain range. 

Environmental Trends 

Cuba's environmental record over the last forty years is 
mixed. The country has avoided some ecological calamities, 
such as beach erosion, that have left deep scars in other Carib- 
bean and Central American neighboring countries, while man- 
aging to partially reverse others, such as deforestation. There is 
mounting evidence, however, that some of the economic devel- 
opment policies pursued under socialist rule, mostly when the 
country was the recipient of Soviet subsidies, may have exacer- 
bated certain environmental problems, most of all in agricul- 
ture. Agricultural development was predicated on the large- 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



scale use of mechanical and chemical inputs that, when poorly 
managed, particularly in tropical countries, can damage natu- 
ral ecosystems. The widespread use of fuel-inefficient vehicles 
and industrial equipment imported from the former socialist 
world and excessive reliance on subsidized, cheap imported 
fuel also has had adverse environmental consequences. 

Economic Policy and Regulatory Environment 

Until recently, the regulatory framework for environmental 
protection in Cuba, as in most other countries, was weak and 
poorly articulated. Although some environmental regulations 
had been implemented before the socialist revolution, they 
were largely ignored and seldom enforced. In most respects, 
this situation did not change appreciably after 1959, although 
the 1976 constitution, amended in 1992, incorporates the mod- 
ern notion of sustainable development (see Glossary) and 
makes explicit the right of the state and its citizens to protect 
the environment. Cuba enacted a comprehensive environmen- 
tal law (Law 33) in 1981. 

Decree-Law 118 was adopted in 1990. It allowed various 
agencies to establish a system to protect the environment 
called the National Commission for Environmental Protection 
and Conservation of Natural Resources (Comision Nacional 
para la Protection del Medio Ambiente y la Conservation de 
los Recursos Naturales — Comarna) . The system was chartered 
initially in 1977. Led by a scientific council composed of repre- 
sentatives of numerous national ministries and agencies, 
Comarna was empowered to chart environmental policies, 
study the causes of water and agricultural pollution, and assist 
with the development of plans to protect the environment and 
conserve natural resources. The agency was also tasked with 
reviewing the development plans of other government agen- 
cies and with suggesting measures to minimize adverse environ- 
mental impacts. Comarna, however, reportedly was dissolved in 
1994 and its functions transferred to the new Ministry of Sci- 
ence, Technology, and the Environment. 

In 1994, in the midst of a major economic crisis and follow- 
ing the 1992 Earth Summit (Eco-92) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
a new Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment 
was created as part of a major reorganization of the national 
administrative apparatus. Its tasks include ensuring compliance 
with environmental law, conducting environmental impact 
assessments, making recommendations based on the assess- 



101 



Cuba: A Country Study 



ment findings, assisting with the further development of a body 
of national environmental legislation, and forging closer links 
between scientific knowledge and environmental manage- 
ment. Cuba's current policy of making tourism a principal 
engine of national economic growth has given urgency to these 
tasks. 

In July 1997, a new environmental law approved by the 
National Assembly supplanted Decree-Law 118. A year later, 
the Forestry Law (Law 85) was approved. The intent of this law 
is to promote the sustainable development and effective pro- 
tection of forest resources. In addition, Cuba has ratified most 
international environmental conventions. Enforcement of 
environmental laws has not kept pace, however, with the regu- 
latory framework. The problem largely lies with the broad 
nature of regulations, the weakness of regulatory institutions, 
and the inability of these institutions to enforce their authority 
over other economic sectors that had been expected to regu- 
late themselves and had been granted much discretion within 
the dictates of a command economy. The underlying but faulty 
ideological assumption is that in a socialist economy (devoid of 
the profit motive) state agents would by definition protect the 
environment. A highly centralized and regimented economic 
decision-making approach has also been a leading cause of 
Cuba's environmental deterioration over the last several 
decades. 

Land Use 

Socialist policies substantially altered land-use patterns in 
Cuba. The most notable change was an expansion in cultivated 
land at the expense of pastures, and a sizable increase in the 
amount of forested land. The former was achieved by bringing 
under the plow formerly nonagricultural land that prior to 
1959 had been held in reserve by large sugar mills or because it 
was agriculturally marginal. Forest growth was achieved 
through an aggressive reforestation program. Urban land use 
changed as well through policies designed to slow down the 
demographic growth of Havana and promote the growth of 
secondary cities and towns. Another factor was the creation of 
approximately 335 new towns in agricultural regions. 

The establishment of new rural communities was associated 
with the implementation of an agricultural development 
model dependent on the establishment of large-scale state 
farms and agricultural cooperatives. The new communities 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



were to facilitate capital-intensive agriculture by concentrating 
dispersed rural populations, thus allowing the unimpeded use 
of agricultural tractors and combines in large and contiguous 
fields. They also facilitated the provision of social and educa- 
tional services to families living in close proximity to each 
other. Incentives and disincentives were used to encourage 
small private landowners to settle in these communities. Those 
willing to cede their farms to the state and relocate to these 
communities had access to modern housing and social ser- 
vices; those refusing to do so were provided with only limited 
access to agricultural inputs. In some instances during the 
1960s, peasants were forcibly relocated to new communities to 
deny a base of support to armed guerrilla bands opposing the 
government (the best known instance is that of the Escambray 
mountain population relocated to Pinar del Rio Province in 
western Cuba). By 1987 Cuba was one of the socialist countries 
with the highest concentration of agricultural land in state 
farms (73 percent) and collective farms (12.5 percent), with 
the former averaging 14,260 hectares, or seven times larger 
than the average prerevolutionary latifundio (see Glossary) . 

The agricultural land concentration trend began to be 
reversed in the early 1990s, when, in an attempt to cope with 
the economic consequences of the Special Period, policies 
were implemented to provide more economic incentives to the 
peasantry to increase agricultural production, but, thus far, 
with only limited success. A new type of agricultural coopera- 
tive was introduced, the Basic Units of Cooperative Production 
(Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa — UBPC; see 
Agricultural Cooperatives, ch. 3). Members of these coopera- 
tives do not own the land. Instead, they are granted use of the 
soil for indefinite time periods and limited control over what 
they produce, although the UBPCs continue to be tightly regu- 
lated by the state. By 1994, 2,643 UBPCs, occupying 3 million 
hectares, had been established throughout Cuba. With an aver- 
age size of 1,133 hectares, they were eleven times smaller than 
former state farms. Other measures introduced to increase 
agricultural production have also contributed to the reversal in 
land concentration. For example, several thousand families 
have been provided with small individual farms to produce 
tobacco, coffee, and dairy products. 

Agriculture 

Between 1945 (the date of the last and only prerevolutionary 



103 



Cuba: A Country Study 

agricultural census) and 1989, the country's agricultural land 
area increased by 1.3 million hectares, from 2 million to 3.3 
million hectares. Two-thirds of the additional cultivated land 
was devoted to sugarcane; the amount of land planted with 
other priority crops, such as citrus and rice, also rose signifi- 
cantly. The emphasis on sugar production (and citrus) was con- 
sistent with Cuba's assigned role within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary), the socialist 
trading bloc, as primarily a producer of agricultural commodi- 
ties. In turn, these commodities were exchanged for other agri- 
cultural and industrial supplies, as well as oil and other fuels, in 
commercial terms highly advantageous to Cuba. According to 
Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, the actual amount of agricultural 
land being used by tenancy totaled 6,614,600 hectares in 1997. 

In 1999, the term "desertification" began to be used for the 
first time in official circles to refer to the deterioration of soils 
in several regions of the country. In southern Pinar del Rio 
Province, independent sources (that is, nongovernmental) 
have alleged that desertification (caused by erosion and salin- 
ization) is expanding by 11 kilometers a year. A January 2000 
report by Agencia Ambiental Cubana, a leading independent 
environmental group, whose leader, Eudel Cepero Varela, went 
into exile in 1999, describes the deterioration of Cuban soils as 
an "environmental catastrophe." 

As a result of excessive use of Soviet agricultural inputs, inad- 
equate management of irrigation, costly improvements of soils 
ill-suited for agriculture, and poor soil conservation practices 
within the context of a command economy, the environmental 
situation in Cuba's agricultural sector appears to have deterio- 
rated. Several soil degradation problems have attracted consid- 
erable attention. These include soil compaction (as a result of 
excessive use of heavy farm equipment) in many areas, saliniza- 
tion in others, and a plethora of other problems. Although not 
yet fully documented, there is evidence suggesting that in some 
regions of the country soils are chemically contaminated 
because of poorly regulated pesticide use. In the early 1990s, 
according to official figures, 4.2 million hectares were eroded 
to one degree or another, 1.6 million hectares had been dam- 
aged by compaction, 780,000 hectares were affected by saliniza- 
tion, 2.7 million hectares were poorly drained, and the 
productive potential of 1.1 million hectares had been reduced 
by acidification. The Cauto basin, which covers 301,700 hect- 
ares and is inhabited by about half a million people, has suf- 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



fered serious ecological damage, partly as a result of some of 
these agricultural practices and partly as a result of deforesta- 
tion. 

As Cuba became a principal supplier of agricultural com- 
modities to the Soviet bloc, it became increasingly reliant on 
food imports from the former socialist countries. Cuba has had 
difficulties in feeding its population since the 1960s, despite 
major agricultural investments. Food supplies, as well as most 
other consumer goods, have been tightly rationed for decades, 
although the most vulnerable social groups, such as children, 
pregnant women, and the elderly, are eligible for special alloca- 
tions. The end of European socialism and Soviet subsidies 
made evident the extent to which Cuba had become depen- 
dent on subsidized food imports to feed its population. With- 
out guaranteed export markets and subsidized inputs, 
agricultural production collapsed. In 1995 the country man- 
aged to produce only 3.3 million tons of sugar, 60 percent less 
than in 1990, the peak production year since 1970 (see Agricul- 
ture, ch. 3). The 1998 harvest was even smaller; Cuba managed 
to produce only 3.2 million tons of sugar during 1998. The 
trend was reversed in 1999 and 2000, when 3.8 and 4.1 million 
tons, respectively, were produced. Between 1989 and 1993, beef 
and milk production, as well as the output of eggs and poultry, 
also fell dramatically, as feed grain imports declined by 72 per- 
cent. Equally significant declines, often exceeding 60 percent, 
occurred in the production of rice, citrus, and fruits. Nutri- 
tional standards suffered accordingly. 

In an attempt to arrest the declining agricultural production 
trend, the government has revived traditional agricultural prac- 
tices neglected for decades. These practices include substitut- 
ing beasts of burden for mechanized agricultural equipment, 
increasing reliance on organic fertilizers and biological pest 
controls, and assigning additional land to the production of 
food crops. The attempt to become more food self-sufficient 
also relies on shifting surplus urban labor to the countryside, 
encouraging city and town dwellers to plant urban gardens and 
raise pigs and chickens for home consumption, and reauthoriz- 
ing peasant markets (allowed briefly during the 1980s, but out- 
lawed in 1986). The success of these polices has been limited, 
with no end in sight for food-supply and nutrition problems. 

Water Policies 

By the 1980s, ambitious agricultural development plans and 



105 



Cuba: A Country Study 

population growth had led to a major increase in water 
demand. In response, the socialist government, with extensive 
Soviet technical and financial assistance, embarked on a major 
water-resources development program, which included con- 
struction of numerous dams and more extensive utilization of 
the country's underground water stores. As a result of the dam 
construction program of the microbrigades (see Glossary), the 
country's stored water capacity increased from 48 million cubic 
meters in 1959 to 7 billion cubic meters in 1987, or by a factor 
of 150. The increase in capacity was accompanied by the devel- 
opment of a large-scale irrigation infrastructure that in 1989 
included 500 kilometers of master distribution channels, fifty 
electric pumping stations, irrigation channels to serve more 
than 1 million hectares of agricultural land, and other facili- 
ties. The dam construction program has continued despite the 
economic difficulties of the Special Period. 

By 1989, some 900,000 hectares, or 13.3 percent of the agri- 
cultural land, was irrigated, a considerable increase over the 
amount of land irrigated in prerevolutionary Cuba (estimated 
at 160,000 hectares in 1958). Efforts to increase the irrigated 
land area were unfortunately not accompanied by correspond- 
ing measures to increase the drainage infrastructure, a devel- 
opment linked, as in other countries, with the salinization of 
some of the country's soils. By 2001 the number of hectares 
irrigated had likely declined as a result of the abandonment of 
marginal agricultural land, the dearth of investment resources, 
and poor maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. 

The increase in water demand came in response to policy 
initiatives that mandated either providing secondary cities and 
newly created urban communities in the countryside with 
water-distribution systems, or improving their existing system. 
The upkeep of the aging water infrastructure of metropolitan 
Havana was, meanwhile, largely neglected. In 1992, according 
to official statistics, 83 percent of the urban population and 78 
percent of the rural population were provided with drinking 
water. The number of sewerage lines and other sanitary ser- 
vices also increased rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as efforts 
were made to promote the development of urban areas beyond 
Havana (by 1992, 100 percent and 39 percent of the urban and 
rural population, respectively, were served). There has been, 
however, a rapid deterioration of water-distribution systems in 
both rural and urban sectors as a result of poor infrastructure 
maintenance. The waste of much water has been attributed to 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



poor record keeping and the policy of not charging users 
according to consumption. State enterprises did not begin to 
pay for water consumption in order to promote conservation 
and efficient resource use until the 1980s. And the government 
did not introduce water meters and urban residential con- 
sumption charges until the early 1990s. 

The dam construction program, with its associated natural 
water flow disruptions and excessive aquifer water withdrawal 
rates, has been linked with salinization of coastal aquifers and 
sea-water intrusions. These problems are reported to be most 
acute along Cuba's southwestern coast, where inland sea water 
intrudes as much as two to fifteen kilometers. In 1985 the gov- 
ernment began to address this problem by building a 100-kilo- 
meter underground dike to prevent sea-water intrusions and 
trap fresh water inland. The South Dike (Dique Sur) , which, if 
completed, will run from Majana in western La Habana Prov- 
ince to Batabano in the south-central part of the province, has 
a width of seven meters and is between two and four meters 
deep. It is not known yet whether or not the dike will accom- 
plish its objectives, although concern has been expressed about 
potentially severe adverse environmental consequences. 

Forestry 

Cuba and Costa Rica are the only two Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries to have achieved the rare accomplishment of reversing a 
long-term deforestation trend. In 1992, according to official 
figures, 18.2 percent of Cuba's national territory (approxi- 
mately 2 million hectares) was forested, as compared with 14 
percent in 1959. Two-thirds of the forested areas are set aside 
as protected areas, and one-third is used for harvesting timber. 
The increase in forest cover was achieved through a reforesta- 
tion program, whereby more than 2.5 billion trees were 
planted between 1960 and 1990; by better management of tim- 
ber harvesting; and by the expansion of the country's national 
park system. Article 10 of the 1959 Reforestation Law created 
nine new national parks (Cienaga de Lanier, Cuchillas de Toa, 
Escambray, Gran Piedra, Guanacabibes, Laguna del Tesoro, 
Los Organos, Sierra de Cubitas, and Sierra Maestra) . Cuba also 
has the Sierra de Cristal National Park, as well as a number of 
municipal parks. In support of the reforestation and forest- 
management strategy, Cuba managed to train an important 
cadre of forestry professionals during the last several decades. 
The availability of these professional foresters was crucial in 



107 



Cuba: A Country Study 



overcoming early meager results and mistakes, such as exces- 
sive reliance on a few, poorly adapted tree species. There is lim- 
ited evidence from accounts in the official press suggesting that 
forest resources may be under increasing pressure because of a 
shortage of cooking fuels and because more and more domes- 
tic lumber is being used to build a rapidly growing tourism 
infrastructure. 

Mining 

Strip-mining has caused major environmental damage in the 
Sierra de Nipe mountain range of northeastern Cuba, where 
the country's most abundant nickel reserves are found. With 
close to 20 percent of the world's exploitable nickel resources, 
Cuba has been an important producer since the 1940s. The 
United States government, as part of its World War II effort, 
developed the processing plant at Nicaro. Construction of a 
second nickel processing plant began in Moa Bay in 1953, but 
it did not become operational until 1961. Two other plants 
were built in the 1970s at Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas. 
The environmental damage arising from strip-mining and com- 
pounded by inadequate reclamation efforts is further aggra- 
vated by the discharge of processing by-products into bodies of 
water (12,000 cubic meters a day of light and heavy metals) and 
the atmosphere, inasmuch as processing plants also release vast 
amounts of sulphur compounds into the air (see Mining, ch. 
3). 

Urban and Industrial Pollution 

Sugar mills are highly polluting because they release liquid 
waste products — such as molasses, filter mud, and bagasse com- 
posts, that is, composted stalks and leaves of sugarcane — into 
streams and rivers and can severely damage coastal ecosystems. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, with Cuba's emphasis on increas- 
ing sugar production, the volume of these discharges rose. As a 
result, there have been reports of collapsed fisheries, destroyed 
clam beds, and contaminated shrimp farms. Some corrective 
measures, such as monitoring discharge rates, have been dis- 
cussed, but with unknown results. 

Other major sources of air pollution are fuel-inefficient 
industrial plants, in particular cement plants, and transporta- 
tion equipment acquired from the former socialist bloc. Of six 
cement plants operating in Cuba in the late 1980s, the two that 
relied on the least environmentally friendly dry manufacturing 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



process — at Mariel and Artemisa — were heavy air and water 
polluters. Other heavy polluters are the country's two largest 
fertilizer production plants, located in Cienfuegos and Nuevi- 
tas, and several chemical and metalworking plants in Havana 
and other large cities. In addition, Cuba's old Soviet-designed 
vehicles lack pollution-control devices, and thus release signifi- 
cant amounts of air contaminants. 

Inadequate and poorly maintained sewerage systems are also 
a problem and are responsible for the extensive pollution of 
many streams and harbors. Havana Bay, for example, is notori- 
ous for its contamination: the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP — see Glossary) designated Havana Bay as 
one of the ten most polluted harbors in the world. Pollutants 
tend to accumulate in Havana Bay because of its shape, which 
prevents water from circulating rapidly in and out of the bay. 
The lack of circulation is a serious problem because 300 tons of 
organic matter and forty tons of oil and oil products flow each 
day into the bay, which is relatively shallow and only 3.7 kilome- 
ters in length by 4.6 kilometers in width. 

Environmental Consequences of the Special Period, 1990- 
2000 

The end of Soviet subsidies and of a preferential trade rela- 
tionship with the former socialist bloc that ushered in the Spe- 
cial Period had profound consequences for Cuba's 
environmental situation. As a result of the ensuing deep eco- 
nomic contraction, environmentally damaging agricultural 
practices had to be curtailed, and industrial pollution declined. 
The Special Period's austerity measures and the economic slow- 
down adversely affected every economic sector. Without guar- 
anteed overseas markets and foreign inputs bartered for Cuban 
goods or supplied on credit, agricultural production plum- 
meted. Between 1980 and 1992, fertilizer imports declined by 
80 percent and those of herbicides by 62 percent. The contrac- 
tion in fuel imports was equally severe, declining by 53 percent. 
Machinery imports, including spare parts, were reduced to a 
minimum. Under these conditions, the input-intensive agricul- 
tural model was largely replaced and/or complemented — 
according to agricultural priorities, crops, and so forth — by tra- 
ditional practices, such as the use of beasts of burden, hand 
harvesting, and the application of agricultural byproducts, 
such as organic fertilizers. To the extent that the inputs used in 
capital-intensive agriculture had adverse environmental 



109 



Cuba: A Country Study 

impacts, these impacts were reduced by the unavailability of 
those inputs. The same occurred in the urban industrial and 
transportation sectors where as of the end of 2000 heavily pol- 
luting factories were idle and thousands of bicycles had 
replaced fuel-inefficient Hungarian buses and Soviet trucks. 

On the negative side, the Special Period's emergency eco- 
nomic program rests on the accelerated development of sev- 
eral priority sectors. Foremost is tourism, a sector that had 
been largely neglected by the international tourist trade prior 
to 1990. Cuba is currently embarked on an all-out effort to 
increase the number of hotel beds and tourist resorts to accom- 
modate a growing number of visitors. In 1996 more than 1 mil- 
lion foreign tourists visited Cuba, as compared with 340,000 in 
1990 (see table 10, Appendix). About 1.7 million tourists vis- 
ited Cuba in 1999. Crash infrastructure development programs 
were instituted in previously undisturbed coastal regions and 
offshore keys and inlets. In some of these resort areas, particu- 
larly in Cuba's northern coast, such as the area around Vara- 
dero and the northern keys of Ciego de Avila Province, 
environmental preservation standards appear to have been 
neglected. Other priority sectors, such as oil exploration and 
mining, are also potentially threatening to the environment. 
Several large oil multinationals have been granted exploration 
rights, so far with limited success. Much of the effort has been 
geared to offshore drilling, often in areas adjacent to national 
tourist resort areas, such as Varadero. Increases in oil output 
have been achieved, but mostly of sulfur-rich heavy oils that are 
being used in lieu of imports of lighter oils to fuel the country's 
electric plants. The heavy oils, when burnt, emit large quanti- 
ties of air pollutants. In the Moa Bay region, pollution levels 
have increased in tandem with nickel production. 

Demography 
Population 

In 2000 Cuba had 11.2 million people. Annual population 
growth rates in the late 1990s were low — less than 0.4 percent a 
year, down from 0.67 in 1995 — and projected to decline fur- 
ther by the twenty-first century (see table 2, Appendix). Popu- 
lation size is likely to stabilize or to actually begin to contract by 
the early years of the twenty-first century, given the country's 
low growth rate and continued emigration. Current demo- 
graphic projections assume that population size is unlikely to 



110 



Bicycle traffic on a street in Guantdnamo, 1996 
A view of the city of Guantdnamo, 1996 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



111 



Cuba: A Country Study 



reach 12 million people. According to the United Nations' low- 
variant projection, Cuba's population will peak at about 11.5 
million people by about the year 2015 and begin to decline in 
absolute size thereafter. 

With a population density of 101 inhabitants per square kilo- 
meter in 2000, the country is primarily urban, with 78 percent 
of the population residing in cities and towns. By far the largest 
city is Havana; it had 2,204,333 inhabitants in 1996. The second 
largest city is Santiago de Cuba, which had 405,000 inhabitants 
in 1989. The four next largest cities, with their 1989 popula- 
tions, are Camagiiey (283,000), Holguin (228,000), 
Guantanamo (200,000), and Santa Clara (194,000). Cities and 
towns dot the national landscape. An agglomeration of as few 
as 500 people is defined as urban, as long as it meets several 
minimum requirements, such as having a public electric-power 
network, paved roads, and so forth. 

Cuba's demographic trajectory has been distinctive and, in 
many regards, different from that of other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. The demographic transition (to low birth 
and death rates) began earlier and is more advanced than in 
most countries in the region. Further, international migration 
has played a major role in the country's demographic history. 
Cuba's indigenous population was decimated during the first 
centuries of colonial domination by epidemics and forced 
labor, or was largely absorbed through mestizaje (see Glossary) 
into the general population. In the nineteenth century, more 
than 560,000 African slaves reached Cuban shores, as did 
120,000 Chinese indentured workers, a few hundred Mexican- 
origin contract workers, hundreds of thousands of Spanish 
immigrants, and other Spanish and European settlers seeking 
safehaven in the last (together with Puerto Rico) and "most 
faithful" Spanish colony in the Western Hemisphere. European 
settlers included Spaniards from the former Spanish colonies 
in South America and French planters from Haiti. 

Another major immigration surge followed during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, when some 700,000 
people settled in Cuba, most of Spanish and other European 
origins. This episode also included sizable immigration flows 
from Haiti and Jamaica, as well as smaller ones from Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic, and other Latin American and Carib- 
bean countries. 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



Demographic Transition 

Cuba began its demographic transition (a gradual shift from 
high to low birth and death rates) in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, well before other Caribbean countries began theirs. 
Cuba's mortality started to decline as a result of the basic public 
health and sanitary measures, such as mosquito eradication, 
that began to be implemented during the United States occu- 
pation following the end of the Spanish-American War (1895- 
98), when the country had 1.6 million people. As a result of 
these measures, the incidence and severity of many infectious 
diseases — such as yellow fever, malaria, and smallpox — were 
reduced significantly. A Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Juan Fin- 
lay, was the first to hypothesize in 1881 that yellow fever was 
transmitted by the aedes aegypti mosquito; his theory helped 
physicians throughout the world to conquer this tropical dis- 
ease. Over the next several decades, mortality rates declined 
further as a result of the continued application of public health 
measures, economic growth, and the introduction of medical 
measures since the 1930s. By 1960 life expectancy at birth (for 
both sexes combined) had reached sixty-four years. 

Fertility rates began to decline in the 1920s. Factors likely to 
have influenced the fertility decline were the country's rela- 
tively early modernization, the large influx of European immi- 
grants, and perhaps most of all a severe economic depression. 
The latter was caused by a sharp contraction in demand for 
sugar in international markets that preceded and was later 
magnified by the Great Depression of the 1930s. By 1958 the 
Cuban birth rate stood at twenty-six births per 1,000, with the 
average woman having 3.6 children during her reproductive 
lifetime. This fertility level is comparable with that of Canada 
and the United States at the time, and lower than in several 
European countries. In Latin America, only Argentina and 
Uruguay had attained comparable fertility levels by the mid- 
twentieth century. 

Life expectancy at birth (for both sexes combined) in 2000 
was seventy-five years (seventy-four for males and seventy-seven 
for females). The infant mortality rate had declined to 6.5 
infant deaths per 1,000 live births, placing Cuba among the 
twenty-five countries in the world with the lowest rate in this 
health indicator. Some of the mortality improvements 
responded to public health policies instituted in Cuba since 
1959, such as egalitarian access to heath care services, emphasis 
on primary health care, and the widespread application of 



113 



Cuba: A Country Study 

medical and public health advances. An additional three indi- 
cators in 1997 were at their lowest historical levels: under five- 
year-olds' mortality (9.3 per 1,000 live births), maternal mortal- 
ity (2.2 per 10,000), and low weight at birth (6.9 per 100). The 
trend toward a reduction in infant mortality actually started 
well before 1959. Similar developments in public health led to 
comparable trends in other countries that shared Cuba's gen- 
eral mortality profile in the early 1960s (for example, Costa 
Rica, Chile, and Jamaica), as well as in countries with far less 
favorable mortality indices (for example, Mexico and Colom- 
bia) at the time. For a number of reasons, Cuba's achievements 
have drawn far more attention than those of these countries. 

The post-1959 fertility trend was first characterized by an 
abrupt increase during the 1960s, with the birth rate rising 
from twenty-six births per 1,000 in 1958, to thirty-six in 1963, 
followed by a rapid decline in the early 1970s. In 1999 the birth 
rate stood at 12.5 births per thousand population, the lowest in 
the Western Hemisphere except for Barbados and Canada. 
Between 1970 and 1978, the total fertility rate declined by 
nearly half, from 3.7 to 1.9 children. The latter level is below 
that needed in the long term to assure the continued replace- 
ment of the population through natural increase (the differ- 
ence between the birth and death rate), or approximately 2.1 
births per woman at Cuba's current mortality level. In the 
1990s, the total fertility rate declined even further, dropping, 
according to a press report in Granma, the official newspaper, 
to below 1.5 in 1999. Fertility fluctuations have been associated 
with numerous factors related to changing socioeconomic con- 
ditions in Cuba, including increased female educational attain- 
ment and labor force participation rates. Other important 
considerations are contraceptive availability and induced abor- 
tion. Cuba's abortion rate (abortions per 1,000 women fifteen 
to forty-four years of age) in 1989 was 56.5, a rate exceeded 
only by former socialist bloc countries, and twice as high as in 
the United States. About seven abortions per ten deliveries 
were practiced in Cuba in 1995. In 1995, 2.6 percent of women 
of reproductive age reported an abortion, representing some 
80,000 cases. The continued fertility decline during the 1990s 
may be in response to difficult economic conditions, including 
shortages of basic necessities. Only about two dozen, mostly 
developed countries in the world — including Austria, Ger- 
many, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain — in the late 1990s had 
total fertility rates at or below Cuba's. 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



Since 1959 emigration has been a primary determinant of 
Cuba's demographic evolution and its relatively slow popula- 
tion growth rate. Approximately 800,000 persons emigrated 
from Cuba between 1959 and 1980, primarily for political rea- 
sons or their unhappiness with socioeconomic conditions. 
Three emigration waves dominated this period. Some 215,000 
people, mostly drawn from the country's economic and profes- 
sional elite, left between 1959 and 1962 — the period of the 
most dramatic political and economic changes. A second emi- 
gration surge followed during the "freedom flights" of 1966- 
73, when 344,000 people departed. The third largest outflow 
and the biggest in a single year was in 1980, as 125,000 Cubans 
went to the United States through the Mariel Boatlift and oth- 
ers found their way to other countries. After a decade of only 
modest emigration, the number of people leaving the country 
began to increase again in the early 1990s. Many departed the 
country illegally in makeshift rafts. Another 50,000 tried to 
leave during the 1990-94 period, but were prevented from 
doing so by Cuban authorities, according to Fidel Castro. The 
rafter ( balsero) outflow came to an end when the United States 
and Cuba entered into a migration accord in 1994. Under the 
United States-Cuba Migration Agreement, the United States 
assigned to Cuba a minimum quota of 20,000 legal permanent 
residence permits a year and modified the practice of granting 
preferential treatment to Cuban migrants. Cubans currently 
intercepted by the United States Coast Guard at sea (those 
referred to as "wet feet") are repatriated, while those who man- 
age to reach United States soil (those referred to as "dry feet") 
are allowed to take advantage of the Cuban Adjustment Act 
and remain in the United States. Because of renewed immigra- 
tion, the number of people of Cuban birth residing in the 
United States increased from 737,000 in 1990 to 913,000 in 
1997 (net of deaths). 

Fluctuations in fertility and emigration have contributed to 
the evolution of an irregular and deeply indented age-sex pop- 
ulation pyramid (see fig. 3). The aging of the 1960s baby 
boomers is apparent, as is their childbearing during the 1980s. 
Also of note is the much smaller size of the 1990s birth cohort. 
The country's current median age (thirty-three years) is rela- 
tively high and projected to increase further (to thirty-nine 
years) by the year 2010 (comparable United States figures are 
thirty-four and thirty-seven). In contrast, in 1995 the median 
age for Latin America and the Caribbean was twenty-four, ris- 



115 



Cuba: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



600 



Total Population in 2000 = 11.2 million 




400 



200 



200 



400 



600 



POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Centra de 

Estudios de Poblacion y Desarrollo. Estudiosy datos sobre lapoblacion cubana, 
Havana, May 1997, Table 2, IX; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, The Sex and Age Distribution of the World Populations: The 
1996 Revision, New York, 1997, 307; and information from the United States 
Bureau of the Census. 



Figure 3. Population Distribution by Age-Group and Sex 

ing to twenty-seven years by 2010. A high and rising median age 
translates into a relatively old age structure. Whereas in 2000, 
9.6 percent of the Cuban population was sixty-five years of age 
or older, by 2010 this figure will increase to 12.5 percent, a 
value comparable with that projected for the United States and 
much higher than for Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
whole. By the end of 2000, 1.5 million Cuban citizens, or 13 
percent of Cuba's approximately 11 million people (mid-2000 
figures), were sixty years old or older. By 2010 Cuba will have 
more than 2 million citizens over sixty, a figure that will repre- 
sent 18 percent of the total projected population. 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 

Migration 

Aside from emigration and continued fertility decline, 
another important demographic development during the 
1990s was the resurgence of internal migration from rural 
areas and smaller cities to Havana and, to a lesser extent, to 
other large cities (see table 3, Appendix). This resurgence 
marks a departure from earlier trends because a major objec- 
tive of urban policies over the last four decades has been con- 
taining Havana's demographic growth. During this period, 
infrastructural investments in the city were reduced and redi- 
rected to other parts of the country. As economic conditions 
worsened and living conditions were perceived to be better in 
Havana than in other parts of the country, internal migrants 
began to move to the capital. Between 1993 and 1996, 100,000 
migrants settled in Havana. The migrants have compounded 
problems in a city already suffering from a crumbling infra- 
structure and a severe housing shortage. This situation 
prompted the authorities in May 1997 to issue Decree 217, 
requiring that prospective migrants to Havana must first secure 
a resident's permit from the municipal authorities, a measure 
intended to manage the city's growth. Resumption of large- 
scale emigration, a process that has always disproportionately 
involved Havana residents, should help ease demographic pres- 
sures on the city. 

Racial Composition 

The 1981 Cuban census, following practices akin to those 
used in United States censuses, classified 66 percent of the pop- 
ulation as "white" and 34.0 percent as "nonwhite," the latter 
including black (12.0 percent), mulatto or mestizo (21.9 per- 
cent), and Asian (0.1 percent) (see table 4, Appendix). The 
reliability of these figures, like those from earlier twentieth-cen- 
tury censuses, has been called into question; most analysts have 
concluded that the nonwhite share of the population is much 
higher than suggested by the censuses. 

There is no broad consensus, however, regarding the "true" 
race distribution, although there is demographic evidence sug- 
gesting that since the 1959 Revolution the nonwhite share of 
the population has increased significantly. The socialist govern- 
ment has handled the race statistics issue very gingerly. This 
development, as in other countries with ethnic, religious, or 
racial cleavages, is not entirely surprising given the country's 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



troubled history of slavery and race relations. Race data col- 
lected during the 1970 census were never released, and even 
those available from the 1981 census are very limited. Several 
explanations have been offered for the unwillingness of the 
government to make these statistics public. One interpretation 
is that by not releasing the race statistics the revolutionary 
authorities have attempted to minimize racial distinctions for- 
merly permeating Cuban society. The Revolution presumably 
did away with all racial distinctions. A more skeptical explana- 
tion is that by withholding the data, the socialist government 
can conceal remaining socioeconomic race differentials avow- 
edly eradicated under the more equitable social and economic 
policies pursued over several decades. Yet a third and more 
cynical explanation is that by not releasing the data, the gov- 
ernment withholds from a still racist white population the fact 
that since the Revolution Cuba has become a majority non- 
white country. 

Some analysts have noted that Cuban censuses have always 
inflated, for a variety of reasons, the share of the "white" popu- 
lation, while underestimating that of others — blacks and mulat- 
tos in particular. The broader and most generally accepted 
reason is that in a historically stratified society of African-origin 
black slaves and dominant Spanish-origin whites, being 
regarded as "white" conferred privileges and opportunities 
denied to "nonwhites." Also, as in other countries (for exam- 
ple, in the Caribbean, Brazil, and the United States) cultural 
mores that evolved over centuries of slavery gave rise to racist 
attitudes that assign more positive valuations to notions of 
"whiteness" as opposed to "blackness." "Passing" from one race 
to another (for example, from black to mulatto, mulatto to 
white, or Asian to white) can occur because the designation of 
race, while primarily dependent on physical attributes, also 
involves cultural, social, and economic yardsticks. In the Cuban 
and Caribbean context, contrary to the situation in other soci- 
eties (for example, the United States), being regarded as 
"white" does not necessarily preclude some degree of racial 
intermingling, something that has been occurring in the coun- 
try for centuries. 

The issue of population distribution by race categories is 
made even more complex when consideration is given to how 
the race of any given individual is determined (and by whom). 
While enumerators in the 1931 and 1943 censuses asked 
respondents to assign themselves a race category, in the 1953 



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The Society and Its Environment 



and 1981 censuses enumerators determined the race of 
respondents on the basis of their observations. Between 1943 
and 1953, the shift from self-reports to enumerator designa- 
tions may have contributed to declines of 1 percent and 2 per- 
cent, respectively, in the mulatto and white populations, with a 
corresponding 3 percent increase in the number of those clas- 
sified as black. 

These shifts suggest that enumerators were more prone to 
classify individuals as nonwhite than were the respondents 
themselves. Enumerators in 1981, the year of the most recent 
census, assigned racial categories according to the "concept 
commonly understood by the population, although [the cate- 
gories] may not necessarily reflect races or colors" (when in 
doubt, the enumerators were also instructed to ask respon- 
dents about the racial categories to which those not present in 
the households during the count belonged) . 

In general, however, the evolution of the population's race 
distribution tracks well with known demographic trends, 
including immigration and emigration, although other factors 
(for example, differential completeness of enumeration by 
race, emigration rates by race, fluctuations in fertility by race, 
and infant mortality rates by race) may cloud these trends. For 
example, between 1899 and 1931, when Cuba received hun- 
dreds of thousands of Spanish immigrants, the share of the 
population classified as white increased from 67 percent to 72 
percent. Between 1931 and 1943, in contrast, when Cuban 
authorities deported thousands of Haitian and Jamaican immi- 
grant workers, the black and mulatto share declined from 27 
percent to 25 percent. Race distribution changes between 1953 
(the year of the last population census before the 1959 Revolu- 
tion) and 1981 are particularly consistent with well-established 
fertility, nuptiality, and emigration trends. The percent of the 
population classified as white declined from 73 percent in 1953 
to 66 percent in 1981, whereas the share of mulattos rose from 
14 percent to 22 percent (while the black percentage remained 
almost the same). 

The dominance of white emigration from Cuba since 1959, 
particularly during the first fifteen years after the Revolution, is 
well established; some estimates suggest that more than 90 per- 
cent of those leaving socialist Cuba during this period were 
white. Later emigration has included a more representative 
cross-section of Cuba's racial composition, but the vast majority 
of the emigrants continue to be classified as white. Thus, emi- 



119 



Cuba: A Country Study 



gration alone accounts for a major share of the decline in the 
white population between 1953 and 1981. Perhaps an even 
more important factor explaining the growth of the nonwhite 
population is differential fertility. At the time of the Revolu- 
tion, nonwhite Cubans had birth rates considerably higher 
than white Cubans. Further, higher proportions of the former 
were concentrated in the provinces with the highest fertility 
rates (primarily in easternmost Cuba) , whereas most white emi- 
grants were from Ciudad de La Habana Province, the country's 
region with the lowest fertility. In addition, during the last four 
decades and partly because of more equitable social, educa- 
tional, and employment policies, social barriers to cross-race 
sexual and marital unions have weakened, thus leading to an 
increase in the number of interracial births, another factor 
behind the increase in the mulatto population. 

According to figures from the 1981 census, the provinces 
with the highest percentages of whites are Sancti Spiritus (84 
percent of the population classified as white), Villa Clara (82 
percent), and Ciego de Avila (81 percent), all in central Cuba, 
plus La Habana Province (82 percent), the province that sur- 
rounds the country's capital. Guantanamo (74 percent non- 
white), Santiago de Cuba (70 percent), and Granma (57 
percent) , in eastern Cuba, are the country's provinces with the 
highest nonwhite percentages, followed by the capital, Ciudad 
de La Habana Province (37 percent). 

In summary, there is consensus in the academic literature 
that censuses in Cuba have generally overestimated the share 
of the population classified as "white," while underestimating 
the percent of the nonwhite population, specifically its mulatto 
component. It is also generally accepted that since 1959 the 
share of the Cuban population classified as white has declined 
for several demographic reasons, namely differential fertility, 
selective emigration, and an increase in the number of interra- 
cial births. The actual extent of the bias is as difficult to estab- 
lish as it is to define unambiguous criteria with which to define 
the concept of "race," although some observers claim that 
Cuba has become primarily a nonwhite country. 

Prerevolutionary Society 

Since 1959 there has been scholarly debate regarding the 
nature of prerevolutionary Cuban society. The conclusion 
reached by a majority of analysts is that by developing-country 
standards, Cuba was fairly modernized; others assume that the 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



country was mired in social and economic backwardness. The 
first view has more merit, although in some respects Cuba was a 
dichotomous society: an undetermined minority of the popula- 
tion enjoyed high living standards, but most were poor and 
some quite poor. Estimates of prerevolutionary income distri- 
bution validate this assessment. The richest 40 percent of the 
population received close to 80 percent of total income, and 
the poorest 40 percent only 10 percent. Urban Cuba, particu- 
larly Havana, was home to the elite and most of the country's 
social and cultural amenities. Consumption patterns for the 
country's middle and upper classes were deeply influenced by 
United States geographic proximity and cultural practices. 

Prerevolutionary Cuba's urban educational levels were well 
above national norms. According to the 1953 population cen- 
sus, the last before the Revolution, one out of every four 
Cubans above age ten (24 percent) could not read and write. 
In La Habana Province, site of the capital city, in contrast only 
9 percent were illiterate, whereas in Oriente, the country's 
most educationally backward province, the figure was 35 per- 
cent. The better educational institutions, including the 
nation's leading university, were also in Havana. 

Comparable patterns characterized other demographic and 
social indicators. Access to health and sanitary facilities, as well 
as to other social amenities, was determined by degree of 
urbanization. Regional variations were also present; the coun- 
try's central provinces were generally more developed than the 
provinces of Pinar del Rio and Oriente, at both extremes of the 
country. In urban areas, according to 1953 census data, 42 per- 
cent of dwellings had toilets (86 percent in urban La Habana 
Province), as compared with 8 percent in rural areas. The same 
could be said about the regional distribution of physicians and 
medical facilities. Nutritional standards were generally ade- 
quate: in the mid-1950s, the typical Cuban consumed, accord- 
ing to a national survey, more calories (2,740 calories) than 
daily requirements (2,460 calories). Many rural children, how- 
ever, suffered from infantile protein malnutrition and avitami- 
nosis, although the incidence of anemia among school-age 
children was modest. 

The hierarchical nature of prerevolutionary Cuban society 
was profoundly affected by the cyclical nature of economic 
activity and by the pervasive legacy of slavery. The annual eco- 
nomic cycle was dominated by the sugar harvest {la zafra), 
which coincided with the coffee harvest and the peak period of 



121 



Cuba: A Country Study 

foreign tourist arrivals (late December through March) . Unem- 
ployment, a pervasive problem in prerevolutionary Cuba, nor- 
mally fluctuated in unison with the seasonal cycle, from a low 
of 10 percent during the early months of the year, to more than 
20 percent during the summer months. High levels of urban- 
ization and the limited prevalence of subsistence agriculture 
meant that many of the country's poorest families derived their 
annual income solely from seasonal agricultural wage labor. 
Blacks and mulattos were disproportionately represented 
among the chronically unemployed. 

Social Mobility and Income Distribution 

Profound transformations of Cuba's social and income dis- 
tribution structures accompanied Fidel Castro's Revolution. 
The country's old elite abruptly lost its privileged position as 
members of a younger generation assumed political power and 
began to institute radical social and economic policies, ranging 
from agrarian reform, beginning with the promulgation of the 
first Law of Agrarian Reform on May 17, 1959, to the eventual 
elimination of most forms of private property. Large-scale emi- 
gration of formerly privileged social classes accompanied the 
transformation of Cuban society. Their departure, together 
with the nationalization of private property, the growth of the 
state bureaucracy, the country's militarization, the gradual 
implementation of populist policies, such as crash rural devel- 
opment programs to reduce unemployment, and a rapidly 
expanding educational system, completely reshaped Cuba's 
social structure. In its place emerged an egalitarian and austere 
society with a state-dominated economy. Prior income and sal- 
ary differentials were reduced substantially by state ownership, 
the almost complete elimination of private employment (other 
than for a limited number of small farmers), narrow salary 
scales, and a full employment policy. 

By the early 1970s, income differentials had been reduced 
substantially. According to one estimate, the national income 
flowing to the richest 40 percent of the population had 
declined to 60 percent, increasing to 20 percent for the bottom 
40 percent. Abject poverty was eliminated, thanks to guaran- 
teed employment, a comprehensive social safety net (universal 
disability, as well as pension and survivor coverage), and free 
access to education and health services. Low average levels of 
material consumption remained a concern; access to nonessen- 
tial and "luxury" (by revolutionary Cuba's standards) items 



122 



A street vendor selling churros (fritters) in Havana, 1999 

Courtesy Maria M. Alonso 

continued to be determined largely by political affiliation and 
real or apparent ideological fervor, as in other communist soci- 
eties. Members of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido 
Comunista de Cuba — PCC), "vanguard" workers, and partici- 
pants in "internationalist" missions (internationalism — see 
Glossary) were rewarded through the preferential allocation of 
housing and consumer goods. 

Within the strictures of a socialist state, educational attain- 
ment became the most significant path to social mobility, aside 
from ideological commitment. The elimination of social and 
regional differentials in access to educational opportunities 
played a vital role in this respect, as average educational 
achievement levels increased rapidly between the 1960s and 
the 1980s. The number of secondary school and university 
graduates mushroomed, the former increasing from 76,961 in 
the 1975-76 academic year to 317,598 in 1988-89, and the lat- 
ter from 5,894 in 1975-76 to 33,199 in 1988-89 (see Education, 
this ch.). Equal educational and employment opportunities 
were extended to women, a development that also engendered 
social mobility by reducing traditional gender-based labor 



123 



Cuba: A Country Study 

force barriers. The same approach was used to help erode race 
discrimination. Race and gender discrimination, however, like 
homophobia, continues to linger in Cuban culture, although 
discriminatory practices are legally banned. On the negative 
side, access to technical and professional education is severely 
restricted for those who do not share the socialist ideology, are 
overtly homosexual, or, until recently, for those who were will- 
ing to profess religious beliefs in an officially atheistic state. 

Mass Organizations and Socialization 

Mass organizations have served important social functions in 
Cuba since the early 1960s. As in former communist states such 
as the Soviet Union, mass organizations have been used to 
inculcate socialist values and to mobilize the population in sup- 
port of the state. Mass organizations have also been entrusted 
with security, educational, and public health functions. 
Although in principle voluntary in nature — except for military 
service — mass organization membership since the 1960s has 
been a prerequisite for full participation in the country's politi- 
cal, economic, and social life. Nonmembership is viewed as 
deviant and leads to ostracism by signifying either a refusal to 
accept or actual opposition to the prevailing political and 
social order. Those refusing to join mass organizations pay a 
dear price by being prevented from pursuing higher education 
or engaging in certain occupations, as well as by forfeiting 
material rewards. Given their enormous membership (in some 
instances in the millions), it is far from simple to determine 
what motivates individuals to join mass organizations. Social, 
political, and educational pressures are a major factor. Mem- 
bership may be motivated as much by conviction as by the 
desire to avoid the penalties inherent in failing to join. 

Article 7 of the 1976 constitution recognizes, protects, and 
promotes the establishment of mass organizations. In practice, 
however, Article 61 severely curtails the actions of the various 
mass organizations by stating explicitly that "none of the free- 
doms that are recognized for citizens may be exercised con- 
trary to what is established in the constitution and the law, or 
contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism 
and communism. Violation of this principle is punishable by 
law." 

Among the better known and largest Cuban mass organiza- 
tions are the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 
(Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion — CDR), Federation of 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



Cuban Women (Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC), 
Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores de 
Cuba — CTC) , National Association of Small Farmers (Asoci- 
acion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos — ANAP), Youth 
Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de Trabajo — EJT), and Union of 
Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC). 
There are also several student organizations, such as the Feder- 
ation of University Students (Federacion Estudiantil Universi- 
taria — FEU) and the Federation of Secondary School Students 
(Federacion de Estudiantes de la Ensehanza Media — FEEM) . 

Some of these organizations, however, were actually estab- 
lished before the Revolution. For example, the CTC and the 
FEU were autonomous trade and student organizations, with 
their own political agendas. Although the FEU actively 
opposed the Fulgencio Batista y Zaldfvar dictatorship (1940- 
44, 1952-59), the CTC leadership connived with it. Under 
socialist rule, these historical organizations were transformed 
and became agents of social and political control. 

During the 1990s, some of the mass organizations were rede- 
fined in name by being labeled as nongovernmental organiza- 
tions (NGOs), despite their official origins and orientation. 
This redefinition arose from the government's desire to 
replace some former Soviet subsidies with Western financing in 
order to conduct activities, such as self-employment training, 
generally sponsored by NGOs in other countries. Among the 
mass organizations currently labeled as NGOs are the FMC and 
ANAP. 

Committee for the Defense of the Revolution 

The best-known Cuban mass organization, the Committee 
for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), was established on 
September 28, 1960. A CDR unit was set up on each square 
block throughout all urban areas, and equivalent counterparts 
were located in rural areas. By 1985 there were an estimated 
6.1 million members of CDRs, or about 80 percent of Cuba's 
adult population. Using a pyramidal organization, the CDRs 
continue to operate at the city-block level and are jurisdiction- 
ally connected to the smallest administrative units of the 
National Revolutionary Police (Policia Nacional Revoluciona- 
ria— PNR). 

Originally established to "defend the Revolution" by prevent- 
ing counterrevolutionary activities and monitoring neighbor- 
hood developments, the mission of the CDRs gradually 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



expanded. By the late 1960s, aside from their monitoring mis- 
sion, the CDRs had a major impact on the average citizen's life 
through their functions of revolutionary socialization and 
social control. The block-to-block CDRs are ubiquitous. They 
mobilize the population and ensure that the citizens under 
their purview attend mass rallies and participate in govern- 
ment-sponsored "voluntary" activities, such as the collection of 
bottles and other recyclable materials, blood donation drives, 
or educational programs. Neighborhood CDRs maintain 
detailed records on a person's whereabouts, family and work 
history, involvement in political activities, and overall revolu- 
tionary moral character. They also assist in ensuring compli- 
ance with compulsory military service. CDR approval must be 
obtained when requesting a change of residence; the CDRs are 
charged with registering the family food ration card when peo- 
ple move from one retail distribution location to another. CDR 
endorsements are also required for students applying for mem- 
bership in the UJC (Union of Young Communists) or seeking 
university admission. In the late 1990s, however, participation 
in CDRs was much more perfunctory than in the past. 

Women's and Youth Organizations 

Another well-known Cuban mass organization, founded on 
August 23, 1960, is the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC). 
The FMC's founder, Vilma Espm Guillois, a Rebel Army coordi- 
nator during the 1950s and the wife of Vice President Raul Cas- 
tro Ruz, has been its only president. Espm noted that the FMC 
was established to facilitate the entry of women into the labor 
force and to help them become educationally, politically, and 
socially involved with the Revolution. The FMC has been active 
in efforts to combat illiteracy, in projects to improve educa- 
tional and labor market skills of poorly educated and peasant 
women, and in programs to reduce family burdens of working 
women, such as the establishment of day-care centers. By the 
mid-1970s, 80 percent of Cuban women fourteen years of age 
and older, or about 2.3 million women, were FMC members 
(federadas) . 

Several foreign observers have noted that although the FMC 
has made major contributions to raising the educational and 
labor market skills of Cuban women, it did so through a differ- 
ent prism than women's organizations in developed Western 
countries. Whereas the women's movement in these developed 
countries has sought to drastically modify traditional female 



126 



The Society and Its Environment 



role perceptions, most roles assigned to Cuban women under 
socialism follow traditional gender attitudes. This is not to say 
that gender roles have not changed, but that changes have 
occurred from a "feminine" rather than from a "feminist" per- 
spective. 

The FMC, although nonvigilant in nature, has been instru- 
mental in increasing female participation in neighborhood 
CDRs and other mass organizations, and in mobilizing its mem- 
bers in support of government initiatives. Many of Cuba's pub- 
lic health and educational initiatives have relied on the 
mobilization of FMC human resources. FMC members have 
supported mass vaccination campaigns, promoted maternal- 
child health educational programs sponsored by the national 
health ministry, and participated in numerous adult education 
programs. The FMC has also assisted with the task of integrat- 
ing women into the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias — FAR). The FMC, however, has 
come to be seen in many respects as a bureaucratized and 
unrepresentative entity. 

The government relies on youth and student mass organiza- 
tions to instill socialist and collective values. The process begins 
at FMC day-care centers called Children's Clubs (Circulos 
Infan tiles) and continues as children join the Pioneers Union, 
that is, the Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers (Organization 
de Pionerosjose Marti — OPJM), which was established in April 
1961. All children in Cuba belong to the OPJM. In his July 1983 
speech, Fidel Castro noted that "many Pioneers must be 
trained to become cadres or combatants of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces, or of the militia As they advance through 
the educational system, youth socialization continues through 
the Federation of Secondary School Students (FEEM) and the 
Federation of University Students (FEU) . Youth political edu- 
cation culminates in the Union of Young Communists (UJC), a 
selective organization with membership in the hundreds of 
thousands, rather than the millions. 

Other Mass Organizations 

Most workers belong to the Cuban Workers Federation 
(CTC). As in other socialist countries, the CTC is not an inde- 
pendent organization representing the interests of the workers. 
Rather, it is a transmission belt for government and party com- 
mands to workers. CTC functions have varied over time but 
have included providing a forum for leadership and workers' 



127 



Cuba: A Country Study 



dialogues, garnering worker support to accomplish production 
goals, enforcing labor discipline, and managing the distribu- 
tion of material and other rewards. At local assembly meetings, 
production issues and matters related to labor discipline are 
reviewed, and government policies discussed. During the Spe- 
cial Period, for instance, assembly meetings across the nation 
were convened to discuss emergency measures being intro- 
duced to cope with the economic crisis and related labor 
adjustment policies. These policies included reallocating work- 
ers from one work site to another, closing numerous produc- 
tion facilities, and implementing transitory financial 
compensation mechanisms for dislocated workers. Another 
important function of the CTC is maintaining individual 
worker file records detailing an individual's labor history, 
including skills, training, voluntary labor, absences, merits, and 
demerits (partly based on work discipline and political crite- 
ria) . The CTC also supports government efforts regarding vol- 
untary labor and mass mobilizations. 

The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) , created 
in May 1961, was established with the goal of integrating small 
farmers into the revolutionary process and convincing them to 
voluntarily join collective farms. Small farmers were provided 
with such incentives as centrally located modern housing, elec- 
tricity, schools, and medical services, as well as mechanized 
equipment and other agricultural inputs, if they agreed to farm 
their fields collectively. By the mid-1980s, collective farms num- 
bered close to 1,500 and were, by Cuban standards, relatively 
autonomous and productive. During the Special Period, a new 
form of agricultural cooperative was created as former state 
farm employees were granted land in usufruct. Members of the 
latter group, called Basic Units of Cooperative Production 
(UBPCs — see Agricultural Cooperatives, ch. 3), however, are 
not ANAP members but rather are affiliated with a CTC work- 
ers' union, the National Trade Union of Agricultural and For- 
estry Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Trabaj adores Agncolas y 
Forestales— SNTAF). 

The Military 

Military service, of course, has also acted as a socialization 
agent since mandatory male military service began in 1963. 
Under the 1973 Law of Compulsory Military Service, draftees 
receive a heavy dose of ideological instruction. Other military 
institutional mechanisms that are used to attempt to socialize 



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The Society and Its Environment 



male youths not deemed fit for regular service — whether for 
ideological orientation, social attitudes, or poor academic 
preparation — have included the notorious Military Units in 
Support of Production (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Pro- 
duccion — UMAPs). The intent of the UMAPs' forced labor 
camps, while they were operational in the 1963-65 period, was 
to punish and modify the behavior of "antisocial" individuals, 
including religious believers and homosexuals. In more recent 
years, many draftees have been made to serve in the EJT 
(Youth Labor Army). These militarized but poorly trained 
units perform primarily economic tasks, such as sugarcane har- 
vesting and construction work. 

The Family Institution 

The saga of Elian Gonzalez (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4) 
and the intense emotions it generated within the Cuban-Amer- 
ican community can be explained when placed within the con- 
text of the major changes that the family institution has 
experienced in Cuba over the last four decades. These 
changes, which in part reflect global forces that have influ- 
enced family structures in most countries, were also influenced 
by political and social developments arising from the ideologi- 
cal underpinnings of the 1959 Revolution and some of the pol- 
icies pursued by the Castro government. Some of the leading 
trends involved in this historical evolution were changing 
female roles; a more intrusive state agenda in the upbringing 
and education of children; ideological cleavages that fractured 
the Cuban nation, and within it, many of its families; and large- 
scale, permanent emigration that over time contributed to the 
corrosion of family bonds. 

The global revolution in women's roles, arising from com- 
monly recognized major changes in educational, labor force, 
and reproductive functions, has been echoed in Cuban society. 
It has been manifested, as in other countries, by higher levels 
of female educational attainment and labor force participa- 
tion. Extensive use of contraception and induced abortion 
have led to low childbearing and high divorce rates. High 
divorce rates have contributed to the weakening of traditional 
family bonds. Men and women have opted to exit unsatisfac- 
tory marital relations, thereby giving rise to less permanent and 
more unstable family arrangements, which, in turn, have led to 
an increase in the number of children residing with only one 
biological parent, blended families, and so forth. 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



The Castro regime's Marxist orientation accentuated this 
trend by assigning a prominent political role to educational — 
some may say, indoctrination — policies that directly and indi- 
rectly weaken parental rights over child-rearing practices by 
imposing the ideological views of a monolithic and all-powerful 
state. Article 3 of the Code of the Child and Youth (Law No. 16 
of June 28, 1978), states, for example, that "The communist 
formation of the young generation is a valued aspiration of the 
state, the family, the teachers, the political organizations, and 
the mass organizations that act in order to foster in the youth 
the ideological values of communism." Article 8 goes even fur- 
ther as it reads that the society and the state "work for the effi- 
cient protection of youth against all influences contrary to 
their communist formation." Implied in these articles is the 
overriding power of the state upon universally recognized 
parental rights to choose for their children the values and type 
of education they wish. Further contributing to the weakening 
of parental oversight is the requirement that most children 
eleven years of age and over provide thirty to forty-five days of 
"voluntary" farm labor during their school vacations and the 
separation of students from their families while enrolled and 
residing at boarding schools (see Education, this ch.). 

Another factor that in many instances severely contributed 
to the weakening of the Cuban family was the deep political 
cleavage that accompanied the revolutionary process, particu- 
larly during the 1960s, as Cuban families fractured along ideo- 
logical lines. As members of many families were imprisoned or 
chose what eventually became a permanent exile option, oth- 
ers enthusiastically embraced the revolutionary banner. These 
divisions within families left deep scars that were accentuated 
by permanent emigration — and for many years, by the govern- 
ment prohibition against emigre family visits — and an informal 
yet not so subtle government policy of discouraging party mili- 
tants and government sympathizers from maintaining family 
contacts with their relatives abroad. These policies only began 
to be eased under President Jimmy Carter's administration, 
when family visits on a significant scale were first authorized. In 
fact, many observers feel that the 1980 Mariel Boatlift was a 
direct result of family visits as many disaffected Cubans were 
deeply influenced by contacts with Cuban-American visitors 
and the perceptions of their experiences abroad. 

Visits by Cuban-Americans became more numerous during 
the 1990s. Several developments contributed to the growing 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



number of visitors, not least of which was the Cuban govern- 
ment's decision to ease, if not encourage, family contacts. This 
policy, to some extent forced on the government by the eco- 
nomic difficulties associated with the Special Period, was partly 
intended to facilitate the transfer of emigrants' financial 
resources to their Cuban families. Foreign remittances had 
become an important source of foreign exchange. The gener- 
osity of the Cuban-American community and the resilience of 
family bonds were also at play because in response to the eco- 
nomic crisis and often despite long years without any contact, 
remittances had begun to flow. Family visits followed shortly 
thereafter. Also contributing to the rise in the number of visi- 
tors was the resurgence of large-scale emigration following the 
rafter (balsero) outflow of the early 1990s, and regularized legal 
emigration following the 1994 United States-Cuba Migration 
accord. Many of the most recent emigrants have close relatives 
in Cuba, and their antagonism to the Havana regime is more 
muted. Thus they are less reticent about periodically visiting 
the island nation. The United States government has contrib- 
uted, as well, to the more frequent family contacts by issuing 
more temporary visas, particularly to the elderly, for Cubans to 
visit their relatives here. 

Despite increasing family ties, it is rare indeed today, as it has 
been for the last four decades, for a recent or long-time Cuban 
emigrant to resettle in the country of birth. On a permanent 
basis, families are reunited only abroad. Not even the elderly 
retire in their home country, as so often happens with emi- 
grant communities from other national origins. 

Religion 

Cuba is usually characterized as a country in which religion 
is not a powerful social force. Such views are based on estimates 
of membership in formal religious institutions and on assess- 
ments of the impact of institutionalized religion in Cuban his- 
tory, both before and after the 1959 Revolution. Although 
nearly 90 percent of the population was nominally Roman 
Catholic in prerevolutionary Cuba, the number of practicing 
Roman Catholics was probably less than 10 percent. Other esti- 
mates suggest that about half of all Cubans were agnostic, that 
slightly more than 40 percent were Christian, and that less than 
2 percent practiced Afro-Cuban religions. Membership in 
other religions, including Judaism, was limited. Religiosity esti- 
mates may be considerably higher, however, if due credit is 



131 



Cuba: A Country Study 



given to the cultural relevance of informal religions, particu- 
larly of syncretic Afro-Cuban rites (including espiritismo and 
santeria) , which historically were minimized. Another issue to 
consider is the resurgence of the Roman Catholic Church and 
many Protestant denominations in the 1990s, a development 
perhaps explained by the government's more tolerant attitude 
and the despair gripping many Cubans. Open expression of 
religious faith, further, offers one of the few relatively safe 
channels of expressing dissatisfaction with the government's 
policies. 

The Roman Catholic Church 

Several historical factors contributed to the relative weakness 
of the Roman Catholic Church in prerevolutionary Cuba. The 
church had long been viewed as conservative and as serving 
the country's political elite. During the country's wars of inde- 
pendence (1868-78 and 1895-98) in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, the church was aligned with Spain, the colonial power. 
The church's local hierarchy and most priests were Spanish; 
many chose to return to the Iberian peninsula following the 
colonial army's defeat in the Spanish-American War (1895-98). 
After independence, the church gradually regained some of its 
prestige and influence through its educational and charitable 
deeds, and by ministering to hundreds of thousands of Spanish 
immigrants who settled in Cuba during the first three decades 
of the century. By the late 1950s, however, only about a third of 
all Roman Catholic priests and nuns were Cuban-born; the 
church was still relying heavily on Spanish-born priests and 
nuns, as well as other foreign missionaries. The church was 
present mostly in urban areas, where it enrolled more than 
60,000 students in 212 schools and managed hospitals and 
orphanages. The schools, among the finest in the country, 
were run by various orders — such as the Jesuits, Christian 
Brothers, Dominicans, and Ursuline Sisters — and catered pri- 
marily to the educational needs of the country's middle and 
upper classes. The church also ran Villanueva University (Uni- 
versidad de Villanueva) . Although most Cubans were baptized, 
few, even in the cities, attended mass regularly. The church was 
notably absent from rural Cuba, where only a handful of priests 
were assigned and few peasants ever went to church. 

Church-state relations deteriorated rapidly in the early 1960s 
because of the radicalization of Fidel Castro's government and 
its growing alignment with the Soviet Union, and also because 



132 





The Belen Church and Convent in Old Havana 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations 
Development Programme 



of historical antagonisms between the Roman Catholic Church 
and communism. Even though many Roman Catholics 
remained sympathetic to the goals of the Revolution, increas- 
ing emigration by the upper and middle classes and the depar- 
ture of many priests and nuns eroded the church's base of 
support. Following the failed United States-sponsored Bay of 
Pigs invasion in April 1961 and growing social tensions, the 
government nationalized all private schools, including church- 
affiliated schools. The government's absolute control of the 
mass media and its decision to erase religious holidays from the 
national calendar also curtailed the power of the church. 
Shortly thereafter, in September 1961, the government 
deported 130 priests, bringing the total number left in the 
country to about 200, from about 800 three years earlier. Many 
of the more than 2,000 nuns in the country in 1960 departed as 
well. Cuba officially became an atheistic state in 1962. 

The next decades saw a gradual easing of tensions between 
the government and the Roman Catholic Church. Several fac- 



133 



Cuba: A Country Study 



tors accounted for the rapprochement. Rome and the national 
hierarchy came to terms with the strength of the socialist gov- 
ernment and accepted that pastoral functions had to be con- 
ducted within the new sociopolitical context. In 1969 Cuban 
bishops also denounced the United States economic embargo 
against Cuba. Underlying currents behind these developments 
were the flowering of liberation theology (see Glossary) in 
Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and a growing awareness 
of doctrinal affinity in some social goals between Christianity 
and socialism. By the mid-1980s, government/church coopera- 
tion was evident in some respects, such as the upkeep of 
churches and church training of selected social services gov- 
ernment personnel. 

In practice, however, and until the 1980s, those openly pro- 
fessing a religious faith had to continue to contend with social 
and political penalties. Whereas Article 54 of the 1976 constitu- 
tion provides for freedom of religion, those professing their 
faith publicly were effectively discriminated against. Believers 
were barred from membership in Cuba's elite organizations, 
such as the UJC and the PCC, and thus prevented from gaining 
access to university education and high-level government posi- 
tions. Other restrictions, such as the inability to hold meetings 
in public places or to evangelize through the mass media, con- 
tinued as barriers to the church's activities through the 1980s. 
Although official attitudes had become less restrictive by 2000, 
the government continues to tightly regulate public displays of 
faith. 

Afro-Christian Rites 

Afro-Christian rites, deeply ingrained in Cuba's cultural 
ethos, are one of the leading vehicles through which many 
Cubans of all races, but primarily black and mulatto, manifest 
religious faith. An important African cultural legacy, the Afro- 
Cuban religions constitute a syncretism between Roman Catho- 
lic and African beliefs that evolved over time as slaves pre- 
tended to accept a faith being forced on them by slaveholders. 
Combining elements of several religious traditions, the Afro- 
Cuban rites, like similar rites in Brazil and other former slave- 
holding societies, juxtapose Roman Catholic saints with African 
deities. African deities are known by their African as well as by 
their Roman Catholic names and are depicted as they would be 
in the Roman Catholic Church tradition. For example, the Vir- 
gin Mary, in one of its Afro-Cuban versions, is known as 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



Obatala. This superficiality in appearance conceals the 
strength of underlying African beliefs and rituals, while not 
masking the syncretic relationship between the two religious 
traditions. 

Afro-Cuban religions, while informal and poorly institution- 
alized, are divided into three main rites (reglas), all of West Afri- 
can origin. The Lucumi rite, or santerxa (see Glossary) of 
Yoruba origin, is widely practiced in Nigeria. Of Bantu origin, 
the Congo rite arose along the Congo River all the way to the 
Kalahari Desert. The third rite, practiced by the male Abakua 
society, and also of Nigerian origin, is best known by the name 
given to its followers, Nanigos. These rites combine monotheis- 
tic and polytheistic elements, mysterious and supernatural 
powers associated with living organisms and nonliving natural 
objects, the belief that spirits reside in these organisms and nat- 
ural objects, and complex rituals. The rites also assign impor- 
tant roles to magic, music, and dance. Espiritismo, a less 
Africanized practice, implies the ability to communicate with 
the dead, often through a chosen few who possess the ability to 
do so. 

Tension has always existed between the Roman Catholic 
Church and Afro-Cuban rites, partly because the former recog- 
nizes the popular strength of the latter, and also because of the 
church's inability to come to terms with many features of Afro- 
Cuban religions unacceptable to Rome. Thus, there has always 
been ambivalence, the church embracing the Afro-Cuban 
faithful entering a church to pray, yet maintaining consider- 
able distance between the formal church hierarchy and the 
very informal Afro-Cuban priestly class. A tribute to the 
strength of Afro-Cuban rites in the national culture is the rela- 
tive tolerance shown toward these rites by the socialist govern- 
ment, a predisposition enhanced by the lower-class origins of 
most adherents to these religious beliefs. 

Other Religions 

The Protestant Church had a very limited presence in Cuba 
until the early years of the twentieth century. This situation 
changed during the United States' first Cuban occupation 
(1898-1902), when several denominations — Baptists, Congre- 
gationalists, Episcopalians, Methodists, and Presbyterians — 
established footholds in the country with the financial support 
of United States-based mother churches. As did the Roman 
Catholic Church, Protestant churches emphasized education 



135 



Cuba: A Country Study 



and limited evangelization activities to urban areas. In the Rev- 
olution's early days, there were as many as 100,000 Protestants 
grouped in forty denominations. The government, however, 
nationalized the Protestant schools, and many Protestants emi- 
grated because of disagreement with the Revolution. 

Gradually, Protestant denominations, as had the Roman 
Catholic Church, sought to come to terms with the new politi- 
cal status quo. Because they were less structured, the Protestant 
denominations were regarded by the government as effective 
counterbalances to the more organized Roman Catholic 
Church. Nevertheless, some denominations, for example, Jeho- 
vah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, that have opposed 
such socialist dictates as pledging allegiance to national sym- 
bols have been at times harshly persecuted. 

Although Jews were barred from settling in the Spanish colo- 
nial empire, their presence in Cuba dates to the days of the 
island's discovery and the arrival of Jews who were nominally 
Roman Catholic. The prerevolutionary Cuban colony was 
diverse in origin and included both Sephardic and Ashkenazic 
Jews. The Jewish population peaked in 1959, when it reached 
about 15,000. Between the 1920s and 1940s, Cuba was an 
important transit point for Jews seeking permanent settlement 
in the United States. Most Jews left after the Revolution; in 
1990 only about 300 Jewish families remained. Buddhist and 
Muslim influence in Cuba is very slight. Few traces remain 
today of the legacies of the thousands of Chinese and Arab 
emigrants to Cuba. The former arrived mostly as indentured 
workers during the late nineteenth century, and the latter as 
independent migrants during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century. 

Religion in the Special Period 

Church/ state relations have continued to improve during 
the Special Period. The ban barring religious believers from 
membership in the PCC was lifted in 1991, and in 1992 the 
constitution was amended to make Cuba a secular rather than 
an atheistic state. The church's reception of these measures was 
guarded but generally positive. The 1990s saw a notable 
increase in church attendance, and the church continued to 
seek additional freedoms from the government. 

The difficult church-government dialogue has highlighted 
common points of view, for example, condemnation of the 
United States economic embargo, but has been punctuated by 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



open disagreements. During his visit to Cuba in January 1998, 
Pope John Paul II articulated some of these disagreements. 
Cuba's bishops have also expressed their views in pastoral let- 
ters. In one pastoral letter in particular, issued on September 8, 
1993, and entitled "El amor todo lo espera" ("Love Hopes All 
Things"), the bishops called for national reconciliation among 
all Cubans, including those abroad, and openly called into 
question Cuba's one-party system (see Religion and the State, 
ch. 4). 

Despite these tensions, the government has been allowing 
more public religious ceremonies. It has also granted in princi- 
ple entry permits to several hundred foreign priests and nuns 
and has allowed the church to expand its humanitarian ser- 
vices, such as direct distribution of foreign donations of medi- 
cations. In addition, by inviting the pope to visit, the 
government tacitly recognized the Roman Catholic Church's 
importance as an independent national institution. The PCC's 
Political Bureau made a major gesture when it announced in 
Granma on December 1, 1998, that henceforth December 25 
would be considered a national holiday "for Christians and 
non-Christians, believers and nonbelievers." 

The more positive official attitude toward religion has bene- 
fitted Protestant churches, too, inasmuch as they have been 
allowed to expand their humanitarian activities in response to 
the country's economic crisis. Afro-Cuban rites are also being 
practiced more openly. Some observers have suggested that the 
government is encouraging public displays of these beliefs to 
enhance the country's international tourist appeal. Selective 
repression of religious acts deemed to be contrary to official 
interests continues, however, as does the occasional criticism by 
the official press of some sectors of the Roman Catholic 
Church. In addition, in May 1995, eighty-six Pentecostal 
churches were closed in Camaguey Province. Five years later, 
Granma accused some members of the Church hierarchy of 
"conspiracy" following the celebration of several public events 
that were cosponsored by the Religious Civic Training Center 
(Centro de Formation Civico Religiosa) of Pinar del Rio, a lay 
religious organization, and visitors from a Polish official dele- 
gation. 

Social Consequences of the Papal Visit of January 1 998 

During his January 1998 trip to Cuba, the details of which 
had been carefully negotiated between Rome and Havana, 



137 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Pope John Paul II celebrated four large-scale open masses in 
the cities of Camagiiey, Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de 
Cuba. These masses, attended by hundreds of thousands and 
broadcast on national television, were the first large-scale pub- 
lic events since the early days of the Revolution that were not 
officially organized. Although the open-air masses were a wel- 
come departure from totalitarian control, it is not clear what 
long-term consequences will follow from the pope's visit. 

Massive outward professions of religious faith in a Cuba con- 
fronting economic and ideological difficulties suggest several 
interpretations. The official interpretation is that the massive 
outpouring arose out of curiosity and its encouragement by the 
authorities. A second and more plausible interpretation is that 
Cubans saw the pope's visit as an opportunity to safely demon- 
strate unhappiness without fear of government retribution. A 
complementary interpretation is that Cuba is experiencing a 
renaissance of religious faith as many Cubans seek spiritual 
alternatives to fill the ideological void left by the collapse of 
Marxism-Leninism. Finally, in Cuba's economy of scarcity, orga- 
nized religion has become an increasingly important source of 
hard-to-get products, such as food and medications. The 
Roman Catholic Church has been a distributor of foreign food 
and medical donations, for example. Thus, the popular out- 
pouring may signal that Cubans are beginning to consider 
alternatives to the socialist state, and that religion may offer a 
path through which desired changes can be achieved. The 
greater freedom and economic clout of the Roman Catholic 
Church and other religious institutions, together with the 
pope's visit, will inevitably contribute to the undermining of 
the ideological, social, political, and economic power of the 
Cuban totalitarian state. So will embracing December 25 as a 
national holiday, although public religious manifestations con- 
tinue to be highly regimented by the authorities. 

Health 

Revolutionary Cuba is proud of and constantly proclaims its 
achievements in the health sector. These claims are validated 
by the government's release of copious volumes of statistical 
data with some regularity (such as the Anuario Estadistico of the 
Ministry of Public Health) and by its calling attention to the 
success of domestic programs designed to reduce infectious 
diseases, promote maternal and child health, and develop a 
modern biotechnology industry. Cuba is also proud of the 



138 



Health workers at the health unit for Battalion 2721 in San Jose 
de las Lajas, La Habana Province, 1 998 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

"internationalist" public health assistance programs that it 
launched in Africa and other developing regions (often in sup- 
port of Soviet-assisted internationalist ventures, as in Angola 
and Nicaragua) , the many foreign physicians it has trained at 
home, and the medical services it offers in Havana hospitals to 
fee-paying foreign patients. In 2000 the latter service was 
expanded when Cuba began to offer medical services to 
selected patients from Venezuela in exchange for oil under an 
agreement negotiated between President Fidel Castro and 
President Hugo Chavez Frias. These achievements are partially 
rooted in the relatively advanced medical system inherited by 
the socialist government and in the priority accorded by the 
authorities to the health sector since the earliest days of the 
Revolution. In fact, since 1978 President Castro has often 
boasted about his intent to make Cuba a world "medical 
power" capable of challenging the United States in many pub- 
lic health areas. 



139 



Cuba: A Country Study 



In prerevolutionary Cuba, public hospitals, private physi- 
cians, and mutualist welfare associations provided medical ser- 
vices. The latter, the equivalent of modern-day prepaid medical 
plans, were established in Cuba by Spanish immigrants, 
although the mutualist model was later adopted by labor 
unions, professional groups, and private medical practitioners. 
By 1958 mutualist associations served about half of Havana's 
population, as well as 350,000 members in other cities of the 
country. Although relatively extensive by developing country 
standards of the 1950s, the national health network was prima- 
rily urban-based. It consisted of thirty hospitals and dispensa- 
ries administered by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Assistance plus fourteen other hospitals and sixty dispensaries 
managed by autonomous public entities, such as the National 
Tuberculosis Council (Consejo Nacional de Tuberculosis). The 
primacy of the country's capital was reflected in the national 
distribution of hospital beds: 62 percent of all hospital beds 
were in La Habana Province in 1958. Access to health care for 
the poorest segments of the population, particularly in the 
countryside, and for blacks and mulattos was mostly limited to 
public facilities. 

Redressing these inequities in health care access was at the 
heart of the populist agenda of the Revolution. The early pub- 
lic health reforms were based on four pillars: increasing 
emphasis on preventive medicine, improving overall sanitary 
standards, addressing the nutritional needs of disadvantaged 
social groups, and increasing reliance on public health educa- 
tion. Another important component was expanding the 
national health and hospital infrastructure and equalizing 
access to health care facilities throughout the country, most of 
all in rural areas. Rural medical facilities, capable of providing 
only the most essential services, began to be built in the early 
1960s. Fifty-six rural hospitals and numerous rural medical 
posts were operating by 1975. At the same time, the govern- 
ment aggressively began to expand training programs for phy- 
sicians and other health personnel needed to staff these 
facilities. Physician training became a priority inasmuch as 
approximately half of the prerevolutionary stock of medical 
doctors, dissatisfied with the radicalization of the Revolution, 
emigrated. By the late 1960s, the private practice of medicine 
had largely been banned; only a few older physicians were still 
being allowed to see private patients. 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Ministry of Public Health administers a hierarchical and 
regional system of public health facilities and hospitals, 
whereby the most routine needs of patients are attended to at 
the local level; referrals are made to increasingly specialized 
facilities as the need arises. Each province has a hierarchical 
structure of medical facilities capable of providing all types of 
care, except for the most specialized and costly. The latter are 
available only in selected Havana hospitals. Municipalities 
within each province are divided into basic health units, or 
health areas, which act as service areas for polyclinics (policMni- 
cos) or the traditional basic primary health care facilities. These 
units provide preventive and curative services in internal medi- 
cine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and dentistry, as 
well as elementary sanitary and psychological services. The 
next three levels — municipal, provincial, and national — are 
responsible for increasingly specialized hospital and other ser- 
vices. 

The polyclinics began to be supplemented by "family doc- 
tors" in 1984. The intent of the Family Doctor Program is to 
monitor the health of all Cubans by assigning physician-nurse 
teams to groups of 120 to 150 families. These teams play a 
frontline preventive-medicine role and intervene the moment 
an incipient medical condition is identified. Each family group, 
ranging in size from 600 to 700 individuals, is provided with 
locally based medical dispensaries equipped to provide essen- 
tial preventive services. To be familiar with the communities 
they serve, physician-nurse teams and their families must reside 
there, often in apartments built at or in close proximity to the 
dispensaries. The health teams must also provide health and 
nutrition education, as well as organize adult exercise classes. 
Family Doctor teams must be available at all times, pay home 
calls to patients unable to visit dispensaries, and provide ser- 
vices to the elderly and chronically ill. Family doctors must also 
monitor patient treatment and serve as patients' advocates 
when hospitalizations are required. In 1993 about half of the 
Family Doctor teams were deployed in urban areas. 

In 1997 Cuba had 339,943 health personnel, including 
62,624 physicians and dentists, of which 28,855, or 46 percent, 
were family doctors. The total also included 81,333 nurses and 
more than 56,342 mid-level technicians. The ratio of popula- 
tion to physicians in 1997 was 214, one of the lowest in the 
world, down from 1,393 in 1970. In a May 1998 speech, Fidel 
Castro noted that Cuba has a doctor for every 176 inhabitants. 



141 



Cuba: A Country Study 

As a point of comparison, Cuba has physician-to-population 
ratios 2.5 and two times higher than Canada and the United 
States, respectively, two of the countries that spend the most in 
health care costs. In contrast, the Cuban nurses to physicians 
ratio of 1.3 is about two-thirds lower than in these two coun- 
tries. 

Physicians are trained in twenty-three medical schools, ten of 
which are located in Havana, and four dentistry schools. The 
1993 graduating class consisted of 4,780 doctors, with an addi- 
tional 20,801 students enrolled that year in medical school. 
Interestingly, the 4,781 students in the sixth (and last) year of 
medical training was nearly double the number (2,608) 
enrolled in the first year. The dramatic enrollment decline 
indicates that the educational authorities are concerned about 
a physician surplus created by medical school admission poli- 
cies (which became more selective in the 1990s), declining 
population growth, and lessened demand for Cuban "interna- 
tionalist" physicians since the end of the Cold War. The num- 
ber of medical graduates drastically declined in 1996, when 
they totaled only 3,418, a decline of 28.5 percent in relation to 
1993. 

The health infrastructure in 1997 included 283 hospitals, 
440 Polyclinics, 161 medical posts, 220 maternity homes, 168 
dental clinics, and other facilities. Forty-eight hospitals are in 
Havana, and sixty-four are in rural areas. Other facilities 
included 196 nursing homes for the elderly (sixty-three of 
which provide only day services) and twenty-seven homes for 
the disabled. The total number of hospital beds in 1997, 
including military hospitals, reached 66,195, up from 51,244 in 
1975. The number of social assistance beds has been doubled 
since 1975 to at least 14,201. 

Cuba's contemporary health profile resembles that of devel- 
oped nations. Most causes of death are degenerative in nature, 
for example, cancer and diseases of the heart and cardiovascu- 
lar system. Infectious diseases account for only a small share of 
all deaths. The general outlines of this mortality pattern pre- 
ceded the Revolution, however; by the 1950s, cardiovascular 
diseases and cancer already were the leading causes of death. 

In 1996 the five leading causes of death were diseases of the 
heart (with a death rate of 206 deaths per 100,000 population), 
malignant tumors (137 deaths per 100,000 population), cere- 
brovascular disease (72 deaths per 100,000 population), acci- 
dents (51 deaths per 100,000 population), and influenza and 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



pneumonia (40 deaths per 100,000 population). Deaths from 
these five causes accounted for 70.1 percent of all deaths in 
1996. The death rate from infectious and parasitic diseases was 
low (53 deaths per 100,000 population), representing only 7.4 
percent of all deaths. 

The first individuals identified as human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) -positive were found in Cuba in 1986. Through an 
aggressive prevention program that has included close moni- 
toring of cases, large-scale screening, and extensive education 
programs as well as the controversial practice of isolating 
infected patients by forcibly interning them in sanatoriums, the 
health authorities succeeded in minimizing the number of 
cases. By 1999 only 2,155 cases had been diagnosed as HIV pos- 
itive, 811 of which were known to have developed full-blown 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Some of the 
most controversial practices of the National AIDS Program 
have been somewhat relaxed; for example, patients considered 
to pose low risks of infecting others are being allowed to 
receive treatment on an outpatient basis. At the close of 1995, 
about a fourth of HIV-positive cases were enrolled in the outpa- 
tient program. Vigilance continues to be strict because there is 
concern that, with the combination of a rising tide of foreign 
tourists and the reappearance of prostitution, the disease is 
becoming more widespread. 

As part of its overall health development strategy, and in 
keeping with Fidel Castro's wishes of making Cuba a world 
medical power, major investments have been made since the 
early 1980s to develop a national biotechnology industry. In 
addition to acquiring foreign technology, the government has 
devoted much attention to training abroad the Cuban scien- 
tists currently staffing the Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (Centro de Ingenieria Genetica y Biotec- 
nologfa — CIGB) and other research facilities. Cuba has pro- 
duced some biotechnology health products for domestic use 
and exported small quantities to developing countries and the 
former socialist world. Inadequate marketing capabilities and 
quality-control problems hamper Cuba's ability to sell biotech- 
nology products abroad, but attempts along these lines con- 
tinue to be made through joint-venture agreements with firms 
from Canada and other countries. Some observers have voiced 
concerns that the major biotechnology investments are also 
related to a desire to develop the capacity to produce biological 
weapons. 



143 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Despite the country's emphasis on preventive medicine, 
Cuba's public health approach was and continues to be hospi- 
tal- and physician-intensive. This public-health approach places 
a heavy financial burden on the nation not only by being physi- 
cian-intensive but also by emphasizing other costly medical 
inputs. These include obtaining the latest medical equipment 
and consistently exceeding internationally recommended med- 
ical norms as regards, for example, the number of recom- 
mended prenatal visits and the constant monitoring of healthy 
people by family doctors. Cuba was able to bear these excessive 
costs as long as its economy was cushioned by Soviet subsidies. 
Without subsidies, the unsustainable character of the national 
public health approach became apparent: equipment and 
medicine shortages currently hamper the effectiveness of the 
Cuban health system (see Social Consequences of the Special 
Period, this ch.). These high costs explain why many other 
developing countries were unwilling to emulate Cuba's public 
health model, despite its many well-publicized achievements 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1990s, the provision of 
quality health care services deteriorated to such an extent that 
commonly prescribed medications were often not available and 
patients, when hospitalized, were often asked to bring their 
own bed sheets, towels, and other personal supplies. The gov- 
ernment has even been forced to accept medical donations 
from abroad that are distributed through the Roman Catholic 
Church and other charities. In addition, Cubans residing 
abroad provide an unknown, but very substantial, number of 
the medications consumed. 

Education 

Another priority of Cuba's revolutionary leadership was edu- 
cation. As a result, the country's educational profile was quanti- 
tatively transformed. Although Cuba was a relatively well- 
educated country by developing country standards in the 
1950s, many shortcomings confronted the sector. Among these 
were limited educational opportunities. Access to formal 
schooling depended on one's social class, urban residence, and 
race. Data from the 1953 census reveal that nearly one of every 
four Cubans ten years of age and older was illiterate. Only half 
of primary school-age children and only one in ten of second- 
ary school-age children attended school. The country's public 
universities enrolled 20,000 students, but relatively few pursued 
careers in fields relevant to the country's development, such as 



144 



The Society and Its Environment 



agriculture and engineering. Despite much concern about the 
nation's education situation, the general sense was that stan- 
dards were deteriorating and not enough was being done to 
improve the country's educational system. An extensive net- 
work of private schools made up for some public-sector defi- 
ciencies. In 1958 Cuba had 1,300 secular and religious private 
schools and four private universities. 

The educational reforms begun in 1959 were designed to 
make educational opportunities more accessible and to 
increase the literacy rate. Between 1959 and 1961, at least 1,100 
new schools were built. Crash programs to train new teachers 
were initiated. Volunteers in the 1961 literacy campaign taught 
1 million students, with varying success. On July 6, 1961, the 
government promulgated the Law on the Nationalization of 
Education, by which all private education was nationalized, and 
all schools were placed under the Ministry of Education. 

Since 1959 the increase in the number of teachers and 
school enrollments has been dramatic. Primary school enroll- 
ments rose from 811,000 to 1.7 million between the 1958-59 
and 1970-71 academic years. A few years later, secondary 
school enrollments reflected primary school attendance gains, 
increasing from 88,000 students in 1958-59 to 1.2 million stu- 
dents in 1985-86. University enrollments rose just as markedly, 
from 26,000 in 1965-66 to 269,000 in 1985-86, when they 
peaked. Vocational and adult education programs were also 
expanded. Most previous regional educational differentials 
were erased, although school attainment rates were still some- 
what higher in urban than in rural areas. By the late 1980s, 
more than three-quarters of the population had at least com- 
pleted primary education, and 20 percent had some technical 
training. In 1995 Cuba reported an adult literacy rate of 95.7 
percent. By the late 1990s, there were eighteen teachers per 
1,000 population, and the country had 12,223 schools, includ- 
ing 9,481 primary schools, 1,891 secondary schools, and thirty- 
two higher education institutions. These achievements must be 
placed in the context of similar policies pursued in other coun- 
tries that had comparable successes during the second half of 
the twentieth century. Literacy rates in countries like Argen- 
tina, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay are at levels sim- 
ilar to that of Cuba. 

Cuba has developed a comprehensive national educational 
system that includes the Children's Clubs and preprimary edu- 
cation, primary education schools (first to sixth grades), and 



145 



Cuba: A Country Study 



secondary education (seventh to ninth grades). After basic sec- 
ondary education, students are tracked into preuniversity edu- 
cation (tenth to twelfth grades) or vocational/technical 
training. Secondary education includes, as well, the training of 
kindergarten, preprimary, primary, and secondary education 
teachers. Adult education programs are available for peasants 
at the primary (Educacion Obrera Campesina), secondary 
(Secundaria Obrera Campesina), and university (Facultad 
Obrera Campesina) levels. Adults can also attend language 
schools. Students thirteen to sixteen years of age with poor 
scholastic records can enroll in remedial schools providing 
vocational training. Schools also cater to the needs of handi- 
capped children and young adults. At the apex of the educa- 
tional system are thirty-five centers for higher education under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher 
Education, and other government entities, including the mili- 
tary. 

In the 1995-96 academic year, student enrollment in pri- 
mary, secondary, and higher education was, respectively, 
933,000, 639,000, and 111,000. Declines in primary and sec- 
ondary school enrollments in 1995-96, as compared with ear- 
lier years, such as the 1970s, resulted from a contraction in the 
number of school-age children because of low birth rates. Uni- 
versity enrollment declines, on the other hand, were caused by 
deliberate state policies formulated in the 1990s to reduce the 
number of university graduates, to the benefit of vocational 
training. This policy was guided by the conclusion that Cuba 
had a surplus of university graduates but lacked a sufficient 
supply of trained technicians, especially in the agricultural sec- 
tor. In the mid-1990s, 60 percent of students completing pri- 
mary education were enrolled in vocational and technical 
training, while the remaining 40 percent were channeled into 
pre-university schools, in effect reversing the previous distribu- 
tion of students. 

One of the most commented on features of Cuban educa- 
tion is its emphasis on combining work and study. The objec- 
tive of this practice, begun in the 1960s, was to create a "new 
man" with strong work habits. The practice was also designed 
to erase social distinctions between physical and intellectual 
work, as well as between urban and rural lifestyles. Through 
the Schools in the Countryside (Escuelas al Campo) and, since 
the 1970s, the Basic Secondary Schools in the Countryside 
(Escuelas Secundarias Basicas en el Campo) programs, many 



146 



The Society and Its Environment 



Cuban children have attended coeducational boarding schools 
that combine formal schooling with agricultural, industrial, or 
manufacturing work. By working, the students presumably help 
finance their own education. Another important objective of 
the work-study program is the ideological preparation of the 
nation's youth. While separated from their parents and living 
in boarding schools, they are exposed to socialist ideological 
messages. In the 1989-90 academic year, of the 728,000 stu- 
dents enrolled in basic secondary and preuniversity education, 
27 percent and 63 percent, respectively, were attending schools 
in the countryside. Parents have objected to the schools-in-the- 
countryside concept, alleging, among other things, that such 
schools adversely affect the parent-child relationship, that par- 
ents have difficulty visiting their offspring, and that the schools 
provide poor living conditions. By isolating children from their 
parents for long periods of time, the state obviously gains the 
upper hand in its attempt to inculcate political and other val- 
ues that may be at odds with parental preferences, a practice 
that has been commonplace in totalitarian societies. This con- 
cern was at the heart of the Cuban-American community's 
objection to the return of Elian Gonzalez to Cuba. 

Ideological criteria have had a very important role in educa- 
tional policies, particularly regarding university enrollments. In 
order to enroll, university applicants not only must submit pre- 
university transcripts and provide evidence of passing an 
entrance examination, but also must pass a test designed to 
evaluate the applicant's ideological commitment to revolution- 
ary principles. Representatives from one of the country's mass 
organizations must also submit a report vouching for the appli- 
cant's ideological standing. Admission to academic fields con- 
sidered politically and ideologically sensitive, such as political 
science and economics, is dependent on ideological criteria. 
Such screening is not applied so consistently to fields such as 
the natural sciences, however. Before the late 1980s, professing 
a religious belief disqualified an applicant from admission. 

At all levels of the educational system, the ideological con- 
tent of formal education is considerable. In recent years, this 
content has been revised in response to changes in political 
and economic circumstances. For example, since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union the teaching of Marxist philosophy and 
economics has been downplayed. The emphasis is now placed 
on Cuba's historical nationalistic roots and the teaching of mar- 
ket economics and modern managerial principles. Educational 



147 



Cuba: A Country Study 



content in the social and political realms, however, largely con- 
tinues to reflect the Revolution's ideological perspectives to the 
exclusion of all others. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba hosted large numbers of 
international students (at all school levels) from African and 
Latin American countries closely aligned with Cuba during the 
Cold War. Many of the students on scholarships financed by the 
Cuban government — mostly from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozam- 
bique, Namibia, and Nicaragua — were boarded in schools in 
the countryside established for them on Isla de la Juventud. 
National student groups were kept together in schools assigned 
to them, where they were instructed by Cuban teachers, 
although teachers from the students' own countries taught lan- 
guage, history, and cultural studies. These programs were obvi- 
ously loaded with a heavy ideological content. As many as 
22,000 foreign students attended Cuban schools in 1986. With 
the end of the Cold War and Cuba's financial crisis of the 
1990s, most of the foreign-student programs were phased out, 
although Cuba still provides university training to foreign stu- 
dents. In the 1989-90 academic year, more than 4,000 foreign 
students were enrolled in Cuban universities, while more than 
6,000 Cubans attended Soviet and East European universities. 

In 1999 Cuba announced that it would considerably expand 
physician training for foreigners in the country through the 
establishment in Havana of the Latin American Medical Uni- 
versity (Universidad Latinoamericana de Medicina); the uni- 
versity was to have an initial enrollment of 1,000 scholarship 
students from Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The 
impetus for the establishment of this medical education institu- 
tion, at a time when Cuba could hardly afford it, was the emer- 
gency caused in Central America by Hurricane Mitch in late 
1998. During the recovery, Cuba provided emergency medical 
brigades to the countries in need, in addition to offering medi- 
cal educational opportunities to aspiring physicians from these 
and other countries. Aside from being a generous humanitar- 
ian gesture, the assistance gave Cuba an opportunity to gain 
influence with these countries as it sought closer political and 
economic ties with formerly hostile neighbors. The geographi- 
cal reach of the new medical training institution has been fur- 
ther expanded and now enrolls students from many other 
countries. To allay concern about ideological indoctrination, 
the Cuban government has even stated its willingness to mini- 
mize discussions of political perspectives at this university. The 



148 



As many as 300 passengers crowd into Havana 's large-capacity 

public buses called camelos (camels). 

Courtesy Maria M. Alonso 

quality of the medical education being imparted at the facility, 
however, is questionable given that many of the admitted stu- 
dents have deficient backgrounds and need remedial crash 
courses on basic sciences and other disciplines. In private, 
many Cubans question the reasonableness of this initiative at a 
time when Cuba faces so many unmet domestic economic 
needs. 

Social Consequences of the Special Period 

In social terms, the consequences of the Special Period have 
been monumental. Severe problems have crippled the for- 
merly vaunted Cuban health and educational systems. Massive 
labor force realignment measures offer convincing testimony 
of Cuba's extreme reliance on Soviet subsidies and how ineffec- 
tively they were utilized. Because of the economic crisis, social 
ills presumably eradicated in the 1960s, such as prostitution, 
have reemerged. Explosive growth in foreign tourism and emi- 
grant remittances are inexorably altering Cuba's socialist social 
fabric. 

Health and Education 

Health and education, the social sectors much praised for 



149 



Cuba: A Country Study 

their achievements under Fidel Castro's rule, have been 
severely affected by the economic austerity of the Special 
Period. Cuban hospitals and other public health facilities are 
experiencing chronic and severe shortages of medicines and 
other basic supplies. The government has authorized Catholic 
Relief Services (Caritas), which is the Roman Catholic 
Church's humanitarian arm, and other religious and humani- 
tarian organizations to import and distribute medical dona- 
tions because they cannot be found in government 
pharmacies. Food shortages have been blamed for serious 
nutritional problems. Daily caloric and protein intake declined 
drastically after 1990. Vitamin B-12 deficits among Cubans also 
led to a serious outbreak of optic neuropathy that was responsi- 
ble for the temporary blindness of 50,000 people in 1991-93; 
the outbreak was arrested by the emergency nationwide distri- 
bution of vitamin supplements. In addition, the proportion of 
newborns with low birth weights began to rise in the early 
1990s, as did the number of underweight pregnant women. 
Mortality rates have also risen among elderly nursing-home res- 
idents. 

As domestic health care standards deteriorated, Cuba was 
promoting medical services for paying foreign patients at the 
country's leading medical institutions. This practice has led to 
charges that the medical needs of Cuban patients are being 
sacrificed ("medical apartheid") for the benefit of foreigners. 
The government responds that the foreign currency earned by 
treating foreign patients benefits all Cubans because the earn- 
ings are used to buy medical supplies abroad. That health stan- 
dards have not deteriorated even further is thanks to the 
importance accorded the sector and the extensive health care 
infrastructure, including medical personnel, developed in ear- 
lier decades. 

Since the onset of the Special Period in the early 1990s, the 
educational system, like other sectors of the economy, has suf- 
fered from severe funding cutbacks. Thousands of teachers are 
reported to have left their posts for employment in other bet- 
ter-paying sectors, such as tourism, where dollars can be 
earned. This trend has led to expressions of alarm over a likely 
and growing teacher shortage. However, the number of teach- 
ers trained in Cuba is so large and the decline in the number of 
students (because of declining birth rates) so significant, that 
this concern seems groundless. Although no schools have been 
shut down, schools are poorly maintained, and educational 



150 



The Society and Its Environment 



supplies are scarce. In addition, some educational facilities 
have been abandoned or converted to other uses because of 
the declining number of students. The government has also 
taken steps to reduce university enrollments. 

The Social Safety Net 

The extensive and generous social safety net developed by 
socialist Cuba is currently incapable of providing the protec- 
tion for which it was designed: government financial resources 
have contracted dramatically. Left to its own domestic 
resources, Cuba can no longer afford to extend extremely lib- 
eral social and economic benefits. These include, aside from 
full employment, generous social entitlements, such as early 
retirement (at age sixty for men, and fifty-five for women) and 
a broad array of partially or wholly subsidized social services, 
such as meals in government-owned cafeterias and public 
transportation. An extreme example of such entitlements was 
described by the Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Traba- 
jadores de Cuba — CTC) in 1996, when it announced that 38 
percent of all workers managed to obtain a disability certificate 
in 1995 entitling them to retire and receive a pension. Many of 
these "retirees" are known to then engage in informal sector 
economic activities or to seek employment in state enterprises 
other than the one from which they retired. Demographic 
trends further aggravate the erosion of the safety net. As was 
indicated earlier, Cuba's population is aging rapidly, and as the 
number of elderly increases, the demands placed on the social 
safety net grow apace. 

Employment Policies 

Cuba's employment situation is at the crux of the economic 
crisis. According to United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC — see Glossary) esti- 
mates, in 1996 Cuba had an equivalent unemployment rate 
(combined unemployment and underemployment (see Glos- 
sary) rates) of 34 percent, which translates into the need to cre- 
ate 1 million new jobs. The government has responded to the 
crisis by expanding unemployment benefits, shifting urban 
labor to the countryside, and reassigning and re-training sur- 
plus workers. Because the government lacks sufficient financial 
resources, these adjustment mechanisms have been unable to 
prevent a brutal contraction in real income for the average 
Cuban worker (see Labor, ch. 3). 



151 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Remittances and Closer Bonds with the Emigre Community 

The economic crisis has intensified and in many cases 
reawakened family bonds severed by decades of emigration. 
The emigre community has responded generously to the plea 
for assistance received from relatives in Cuba, even when fami- 
lies had not been in contact for many years. Cuban families 
abroad are remitting hundreds of millions of dollars (up to 
US$500 million annually, although ECLAC claims the figure 
may be as high as US$800 million) in assistance, including food 
and medicines. To facilitate the inflow of remittances, previous 
restrictive measures imposed by the Cuban government have 
been lifted. These measures extend to the easing of visa proce- 
dures as a means to encourage emigrant visits. Among the most 
decisive measure was the 1993 decision to decriminalize the 
holding of United States dollars and to authorize the free circu- 
lation of United States currency. 

Closer ties between Cubans at home and abroad have impor- 
tant social implications. They chip away at the ideological and 
political cleavages separating Cuban families, and thereby lead 
to the questioning of the official stigmatization of those who 
left for ideological or material reasons. Second, and perhaps 
most important, remittance inflows have substantially modified 
the country's pattern of income distribution and granted a 
measure of economic freedom to families formerly totally 
dependent on the state. The latter fact has curbed the power of 
the state, particularly given the fact that a few dollars are the 
peso equivalent of the average monthly salary. The regressive 
effects of remittances are substantial given that not all families 
have access to them. Families without close relatives abroad are 
excluded, including those belonging to social categories 
underrepresented in the emigration stream, such as Cubans of 
African descent (see Attracting Foreign Investment and Remit- 
tances, ch. 3). 

Tourism 

In response to government policies to promote interna- 
tional tourism, millions of foreign tourists have traveled to 
Cuba since the early 1990s. If current trends persist, the annual 
number of foreign tourists visiting Cuba will rise to as many as 2 
million annually — more than 1.6 million tourists visited in 
1999 — by the beginning of the twenty-first century, as com- 
pared with 270,000 in 1989 (see Tourism, ch. 3). This develop- 



152 



The Society and Its Environment 



ment, together with the dollarization of the domestic economy, 
will further accelerate a process of social change in a country 
that up to the late 1980s was largely, although not completely, 
isolated from outside influences. This impact is already evident 
in numerous ways. 

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of foreign tourists has 
led to charges of "tourism apartheid," or the discrimination to 
which Cubans without dollars are subjected by not being able 
to pay for services available only in tourist facilities, such as 
hotels and nightclubs. Like foreign remittances, tourism also 
contributes to increases in income differentials. Workers in the 
foreign tourist sector have access to dollars (in tips and other 
compensation) and other goods not available to workers in 
other economic sectors. Foreign tourists, through their life- 
styles and behaviors, such as consumerism, provide alternative 
role models at variance with those of socialism. They also pro- 
vide a conduit for news from the outside world. The culture of 
service in the tourism sector, essential if the industry is to pros- 
per, to some extent is inimical to egalitarian socialist principles. 
With hundreds of thousands of foreign visitors present, it is no 
longer wise for the government to openly suppress social and 
political dissent. Tourism, by contributing to a more relaxed 
social environment, will force the government, albeit reluc- 
tantly, to tolerate alternative behaviors that challenge conform- 
ist socialist norms. 

Tourism and the poverty associated with the economic crisis 
have contributed to the resurgence of several social ills that 
had presumably been eradicated under socialism. Prostitution 
is endemic, particularly in tourist areas, and until recently the 
government has been unable or unwilling to stop it, despite 
some high-visibility attempts to do so. Many prostitutes are 
young, well-educated women (and men) who practice the 
ancient trade to feed families or purchase expensive (by Cuban 
standards) and coveted foreign goods in dollar-only stores. Sex- 
ually suggestive advertisements in Europe and South America 
lure tourists seeking amorous adventures while enjoying afford- 
able vacation packages. In early 1999, the authorities took dras- 
tic measures to remove prostitutes from the streets of Havana 
and from important tourist resorts. The measures included the 
institutionalization of repeat offenders, forcing young prosti- 
tutes from the interior of the country to return to their places 
of origin, and reeducation plans. To what extent these policies 
will be effective, however, remains to be seen because the eco- 



153 



Cuba: A Country Study 

nomic conditions behind prostitution have not changed, nor 
are they likely to change in the near future. 

Petty crime, as well as a rising trend of violent crime, much 
of it targeting foreign visitors, is a cause of concern (see Crime 
and Punishment, ch. 5). Drug use is on the increase as well, 
although its incidence is still low. The allegiance of the people 
to the socialist state is gravely compromised by these develop- 
ments. They are indicative of the implosion of the implicit cra- 
dle-to-grave social bargain promised and delivered by the once- 
subsidized socialist government. 

Outlook 

Any reasonable observer must forecast that profound social 
changes are in store for Cuba. Four decades of social engineer- 
ing designed to create a society populated by men and women 
schooled in Marxist-Leninist principles and committed to 
internationalist solidarity were rattled by the disintegration of 
the communist world. The austere social environment created 
by the Revolution, including many of its social welfare institu- 
tions, managed to function relatively well as long as Cuba's inef- 
ficient economy was sheltered from outside shocks, and costly 
health, education, and safety-net programs could be sustained 
with external financial transfers. In this context, the educa- 
tional system and highly structured mass organizations con- 
veyed ideological messages whose credibility was enhanced by 
socialist Cuba's ability to construct an equitable, if totalitarian, 
society. These social achievements had an important symbolic 
value in legitimizing socialist Cuba's policies, even providing a 
veneer of justification for its totalitarian excesses. Repressing 
competing worldviews, whether in the political, economic, 
social, or religious realms, was feasible in a totalitarian state 
that controlled practically all aspects of the country's life. Out- 
side influences were contained in a Cuba only partially open to 
the outside world; the permanent exile option, often employed 
on a massive scale, was used to rid the country of those citizens 
most unhappy with government policies. 

The context is vastly different today. Whether the leadership 
wants it or not, Cuba must open to the world. Foreign values 
and influences are coming into Cuba in the form of interna- 
tional tourism; with the tourists come the demonstration 
effects of consumer societies and a growing appetite for mate- 
rial well-being, as well as more tolerant social and political atti- 
tudes. As this happens and as the distribution of income 



154 



The Society and Its Environment 



becomes more unequal, socioeconomic differentials can only 
increase and alternative ideological viewpoints become more 
widespread. Past ideological messages are as irrelevant today as 
they are impractical. The socialist government is no longer 
able to deliver on its social-compact promises of equity and uni- 
versal access to quality social services. It is difficult to predict 
the long-term consequences of these developments. The 
Cuban people show many signs of restlessness, ideological 
exhaustion, and the search for viable individual alternatives. 
The only thing certain is that social relations and Cuba's social 
fabric in the early twenty-first century will be vastly different 
from those dreamed of and partially achieved by the revolu- 
tionary leadership in the 1970s and 1980s. 

* * * 

The literature on Cuba is vast and growing, in Spanish as 
well as in English and other languages. Much of it touches on 
the country's social history and contemporary social conditions 
up to the early 1990s. Among the most comprehensive and 
authoritative references is the journal Cuban Studies /Estudios 
Cubanos, published since 1970 by the University of Pittsburgh 
Press. Also replete with information is Cuba in Transition (avail- 
able on the Internet at http://www.ascecuba.org), the pro- 
ceedings of the annual meeting of the Association for the 
Study of the Cuban Economy, published since 1991. Aside from 
books on specific topics published by university and academic 
presses, edited collections (with varying ideological tinges) are 
available. They focus on different facets of Cuban affairs, dat- 
ing back to the 1960s, and cover developments since the early 
1990s. Of particular note are the ten editions of Cuban Commu- 
nism, a comprehensive compilation of essays culled from many 
sources and edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. 

Many of the excellent studies conducted over the years 
about Cuba's social situation do not capture the reality of the 
country since the early 1990s given the drastic changes that 
have occurred. But important sources that could be consulted 
on the evolution of different facets of social life in Cuba 
include Juan Clark's Mitoy realidad, Julie Feinsilver's Healing the 
Masses, and Julie Marie Bunck's Fidel Castro and the Quest for a 
Revolutionary Culture in Cuba. One noted source dealing with 
contemporary Cuba, but with a major emphasis on economics, 
is La economia cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeno en los 



155 



Cuba: A Country Study 



noventa, a study sponsored by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and published in 
1997 by the Fondo de Cultura Economica in Mexico City. 

Among major American newspapers, the most extensive 
Cuban coverage is provided by the Miami Herald, in particular 
by its Spanish-language version, El Nuevo Herald. Excellent but 
more sporadic coverage can also be found in other major 
national newspapers, such as the New York Times and the Wash- 
ington Post, both (like the Miami Herald and other newspapers) 
accessible through the Internet. Internet readers have at their 
reach a wealth of additional information on Cuba that can be 
located in various Web pages and associated links. Selected web 
pages range from those of Florida-produced Cuba Free Press and 
Cuba Press, which offer accounts of daily life provided by inde- 
pendent, and often persecuted, journalists in Cuba, to English- 
language versions of official Cuban newspapers, such as the 
daily Granma, Cuba's most important newspaper, and the 
weekly Granma International [Havana]. Equally important 
sources of news on Cuba are the various international news 
agencies, such as the Associated Press and Cuba's own official 
news agency, Prensa Latina. These news agencies can also be 
accessed through the Internet. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



156 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Havana's main train station, 1999 
Courtesy Maria M. Alonso 



NEARLY FOUR DECADES SINCE the triumph of the Revolu- 
tion of 1959, the Cuban economy remains based on agricul- 
ture, notwithstanding the rhetoric of Cuba's government. 
Sugar remains the mainstay of the economy, the largest 
employer, and the main generator of net export revenues (see 
Key Economic Sectors, this ch.). The tourism industry grew 
rapidly in the 1990s, however, spurred by foreign investment in 
the form of joint ventures. By the late 1990s, gross revenue gen- 
erated by tourism had surpassed that earned by sugar. Net reve- 
nues generated by tourism are only about one-third of gross 
revenue, however, reflecting the high import content of activi- 
ties of this industry. 

Cuba remains nominally a centrally planned economy (see 
Glossary) , and the Cuban government controls the bulk of the 
productive resources of the nation. By the 1980s, however, 
some economic activities for private gain existed. Such activi- 
ties included agriculture (private farmers owned a small por- 
tion of the island's agricultural land); the sale of some personal 
services; and, for a period in the early 1980s, farmers' markets 
and artisan markets. In addition, black market (see Glossary) 
operations were illegally conducted outside of state control. 
Other illegal activities with economic consequences included 
unauthorized use of government resources and corruption. 

During the 1990s, Cuba faced perhaps its most serious eco- 
nomic crisis of the twentieth century. The crisis was triggered 
by the breakup of economic and trade relations with East Euro- 
pean countries and the Soviet Union as these countries aban- 
doned socialism and began their transition to market 
economies. The results have been devastating for Cuba and for 
the Cuban people: a contraction in national product of one- 
third to one-half between 1989 and 1993, a fall in exports by 79 
percent and imports by 75 percent, a tripling of the budget def- 
icit, and sharp declines in the standard of living of the popula- 
tion. The economic crisis of the 1990s, and the austerity 
measures put in place to try to overcome it, are referred to by 
the Cuban government as the "special period in peacetime" 
(periodo especial en tiempo de paz; hereafter Special Period — see 
Glossary) . 

In the summer of 1993, faced with a badly deteriorating eco- 
nomic picture, the Cuban government began to take steps to 



159 



Cuba: A Country Study 



liberalize certain areas of the economy, attract foreign invest- 
ment by offering tax holidays and other incentives to foreign 
investors, and attain some measure of macroeconomic stabili- 
zation. The pace of reforms slowed down in 1995, although the 
National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 
Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly) passed a 
tax code and Foreign Investment Decree-Law 77 that year. Law 
77 clarifies the concept of private property and provides a legal 
basis for transferring state property to joint ventures estab- 
lished with foreign partners. Law 77 also authorizes 100 per- 
cent foreign ownership of investments, simplifies the screening 
of foreign investment, and explicitly allows foreign investment 
in real estate. 

In 1996 the National Assembly passed legislation to create 
free-trade zones and in 1997 a bill to reform the banking sys- 
tem. Far from being a well-articulated set of reforms to liberal- 
ize the Cuban economy and make it more efficient and 
productive, the reforms were opportunistic measures to ease 
the economic crisis and maintain the Cuban government and 
the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — 
PCC) in political control. Modest positive economic growth 
during 1994-98 arrested the economic deterioration experi- 
enced over the first half of the 1990s, but did not result in a sig- 
nificant improvement in the standard of living of the 
population. 

Several of the reform measures implemented in the 1990s 
stimulated economic activity outside of the control of the state. 
These reform measures included the decriminalization of the 
holding and use of foreign currencies, the breakup of state 
farms and their reinstitution as cooperatives, the authorization 
of self-employment, the reestablishment of agricultural and 
artisan markets, the decentralization of foreign trade, and the 
creation of semiautonomous corporations. By 1998 about one- 
quarter of the Cuban labor force was engaged in activities out- 
side of the state sector, compared with about 5 percent in 1989. 

Attraction of foreign investment was one of the bright spots 
of the Cuban economy in the 1990s, although the levels of 
incoming investment were very small in comparison with the 
foreign support that was lost as a result of the change in eco- 
nomic and trade relations with the former Soviet Union and 
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The impact on invest- 
ment of the Helms-Burton Act (see Glossary), adopted by the 
United States in 1996, is difficult to ascertain given the secrecy 



160 



The Economy 



with which the Cuban government deals with foreign invest- 
ment information. 

Cuba has had great difficulties in borrowing funds in inter- 
national markets since it suspended service on its convertible 
currency (see Glossary) on July 1, 1986. As a result, the island 
has had to rely on short-term loans at very high interest rates. 
At the end of 1998, Cuba's convertible currency debt 
amounted to more than US$11.2 billion. In addition, Cuba has 
a substantial debt with the former Soviet Union (this debt has 
been assumed by Russia) and with East European nations 
denominated in rubles. Very little is known about the magni- 
tude of this debt or the exchange rate at which it is to be con- 
verted to either pesos or dollars for purposes of repayment. 

In the second half of the 1990s, foreign remittances — the 
funds that Cuban individuals and families receive from rela- 
tives and friends living abroad — became the lifeline of the 
external sector of the Cuban economy. The Cuban govern- 
ment adopted policies that facilitate the use of remittances by 
Cuban citizens and encourage relatives and friends abroad to 
increase remittance levels. These policies include permitting 
Cuban citizens to hold foreign currencies, establish stores 
where such currencies can be used, and set up a system of 
exchange houses to facilitate conversion into domestic cur- 
rency. According to Cuban official sources, foreign remittances 
amounted to 820 million pesos in 1998 (for value of the peso — 
see Glossary) . 

Performance of the Economy 
Background 

Buffered by economic assistance from the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries, the Cuban economy showed positive 
economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. According to official 
statistics, the global social product (GSP — see Glossary), a 
broad, Soviet-style measure of the economy under Cuba's Mate- 
rial Product System (MPS — see Glossary) , grew at an average 
annual rate of 7.5 percent during the first half of the 1970s and 
3.5 percent during the second half. In 1972 Cuba became a 
member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA; also known as Comecon — see Glossary), the organiza- 
tion that promoted and guided trade and economic coopera- 
tion among the socialist countries. In that same year, Cuba and 
the Soviet Union formalized a system of preferential prices — 



161 



Cuba: A Country Study 



that is, higher than world market prices — for Cuban sugar 
exports that would result in very large price subsidies for the 
island throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 

In the first half of the 1980s, socialist Cuba recorded its 
strongest economic performance, with GSP growing at an aver- 
age annual rate of 7.2 percent. Economic growth slowed dur- 
ing the second half of the 1980s, when GSP growth rates of 1.2 
percent in 1986, -3.9 percent in 1987, 2.2 percent in 1988, and 
1.1 percent in 1989 were recorded. During this period, Cuba 
was engaged in the "rectification process of errors and negative 
tendencies" (proceso de rectification de errores y tendencias negati- 
vas — see Glossary) and began to face a tightening of its eco- 
nomic relations with the Soviet Union under former president 
Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of economic and governmental 
reform (perestroika) . 

In late September 1990, Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) 
announced that the country had entered a Special Period. He 
likened the economic situation — sharply reduced levels of 
imports of fuel, food, raw materials, machinery, and spare 
parts — to what would have ensued from the imposition of an 
air and naval blockade in a war situation. Surviving this Special 
Period would require emergency measures similar to those 
called for in a war setting. Indeed, in the 1990s Cuba has faced 
its most serious economic crisis in the twentieth century. 

The events that triggered Cuba's economic crisis are 
undoubtedly related to the shift in trade and economic rela- 
tions with the former socialist countries that began in 1989 as 
these economic partners abandoned central planning and 
began their transition toward market economies. In the late 
1980s, East European countries and the former Soviet Union 
purchased 85 percent of Cuba's exports, provided a like share 
of imports, and were the main source of the island's develop- 
ment financing. The disappearance of the socialist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and these coun- 
tries' demand that henceforth trade relations be conducted 
using convertible currencies and following normal commercial 
practices, meant that the economic support that the socialist 
community had given Cuba for nearly three decades vanished 
almost overnight. 

External sector shocks triggered the economic crisis of the 
1990s, but they alone are not responsible for its occurrence, 
severity, or length. The underlying causes of the crisis are the 
well-known inefficiencies of centrally planned economies, com- 



162 



The Economy 



pounded by distortions created by massive inflows of resources 
from the socialist bloc and the leadership's refusal to under- 
take the necessary political and economic reforms. 

The Economic Crisis of the 1990s 

Official information on the performance of the Cuban econ- 
omy during the 1990s remains scanty. The official statistical 
yearbook, Anuario estadistico, which was published annually dur- 
ing the 1970s and 1980s, ceased publication with the issue for 
1989 and did not appear again until the issue for 1996, under 
the auspices of the newly formed National Statistical Office 
(Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas — ONE) . Beginning in August 
1995, the Cuban National Bank (Banco Nacional de Cuba — 
BNC) and its successor, the Cuban Central Bank (Banco Cen- 
tral de Cuba — BCC) , have published annual reports on the 
performance of the Cuban economy that include some statisti- 
cal information. The national product statistics in the BNC, 
BCC, and ONE reports follow the System of National Accounts 
(SNA — see Glossary), a different methodology than was used 
by socialist Cuba through the early 1990s, thereby making long- 
term comparisons impossible. 

In mid-1997, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC — see Glossary) of the United 
Nations released a comprehensive study of the Cuban economy 
prepared with the cooperation of the Cuban government. A 
statistical annex to this report — reportedly based on informa- 
tion provided by Cuban government statistical agencies — pro- 
vides economic data not published directly by the Cuban 
authorities. Using information contained in the BNC, BCC, 
ONE, and ECLAC reports, analysts may be able to gauge the 
depth and breadth of the economic crisis of the 1990s. 

National Product 

After falling freely since 1989 — by 3 percent in 1990, 11 per- 
cent in 1991, 12 percent in 1992, and 15 percent in 1993 — the 
Cuban economy apparently hit bottom around mid-1994. The 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) at constant prices 
of 1981 was about 12.8 billion pesos in 1993, 35 percent lower 
than in 1989 (see Table 5, Appendix). 

According to official statistics, the GDP grew by 0.7 percent 
in 1994, 2.5 percent in 1995, 7.8 percent in 1996, 2.5 percent in 
1997, and 1.2 percent in 1998. As had been the practice in the 
1990s, Cuba has not provided detailed statistics to support 



163 



Cuba: A Country Study 



reported growth rates. Experts on the Cuban economy have 
raised fundamental questions about the reliability of Cuban 
economic statistics for 1996 and, by extension, about those for 
other years and more broadly about the Cuban system of 
national accounts. If the official statistics are taken at face 
value, the cumulative GDP growth rate over the 1993-98 
period is about 16 percent, compared with a contraction of 35 
percent between 1989 and 1993. 

Foreign Trade 

Cuban merchandise exports in 1993 amounted to less than 

I. 2 billion pesos, 79 percent lower than the nearly 5.4 billion 
pesos recorded in 1989 (see Foreign Economic Relations, this 
ch.; table 6, Appendix). Over the same period, merchandise 
imports fell from 8.1 billion pesos to slightly more than 2.0 bil- 
lion pesos, or by 75 percent. Exports began to recover in 1994, 
rising to about 1.3 billion pesos in 1994, 1.5 billion pesos in 
1995, and 1.9 billion pesos in 1996, then falling to 1.8 billion 
pesos in 1997 and 1.4 billion pesos in 1998. Meanwhile, 
imports were 2.0 billion pesos in 1994, 2.9 billion pesos in 
1995, 3.6 billion pesos in 1996, 4.0 billion pesos in 1997, and 
4.2 billion pesos in 1998. In 1998 exports and imports were still 
substantially lower than in 1989, by 73 percent and 49 percent, 
respectively. 

State Budget 

During the crisis, the nation's budget deficit nearly tripled, 
deteriorating from 1.4 billion pesos in 1989 to nearly 5.1 billion 
pesos in 1993 (see table 7, Appendix). In 1993 the budget defi- 
cit amounted to more than 30 percent of the GDP. Shortages of 
consumer products in the state distribution system, coupled 
with low (officially set) prices for basic consumption goods, the 
lack of a tax system, and government policies of continuing to 
pay a portion (60 percent) of salaries to idle workers, led to a 
sharp rise of monetary balances in the hands of the popula- 
tion. These balances grew from about 4 billion pesos in 1989 to 

II. 4 billion pesos in 1993. 

The government's budget deficit fell to the pre-crisis level of 
-1.6 billion pesos in 1994, -766 million pesos in 1995, -570 mil- 
lion pesos in 1996, -459 million pesos in 1997, and -560 million 
pesos in 1998. Meanwhile, monetary balances in the hands of 
the population declined to 9.9 billion pesos in 1994 and 9.3 bil- 



164 



The Economy 



lion pesos in 1995, but rose again in 1996 to 9.5 billion pesos 
and reached 9.7 billion pesos in 1998. 

Performance of Economic Sectors 

The economic crisis affected nearly all sectors of the econ- 
omy. As discussed above, GDP fell by 35 percent during 1989- 
93, according to official statistics. However, the performance of 
several key sectors of the economy was significantly worse: out- 
put of the construction sector fell by 71.4 percent, agriculture 
by 51.9 percent, transportation by 45.8 percent, commerce by 
43.0 percent, and manufacturing by 36.5 percent. The down- 
turn of the construction industry was attributed to a sharp con- 
traction in domestic investment and shortages of construction 
materials; nonsugar agriculture was adversely affected by the 
lack of imported inputs — for example, fertilizers, pesticides, 
and spare parts for machinery — and of manpower to cultivate 
the land and harvest crops. Sugar production, still the mainstay 
of the economy and the most significant source of export reve- 
nue in the early 1990s, fell from 7.3 million tons in 1989 to 4.1 
million tons in 1993, or by 43.8 percent, contributing to the 
decline in the output of the manufacturing sector. Nickel pro- 
duction declined by 35.2 percent. By 1995, however, the manu- 
facturing sector had increased its share of GDP by 2 percent, to 
27 percent (see fig. 4). 

Two bright spots for the Cuban economy during the gloomy 
1989-93 period were the oil and tourism industries. Domestic 
oil production for the first time exceeded 1 million tons in 
1993. Between 1989 and 1993, the number of international 
tourists visiting the island jumped from 300,000 to 546,000 per- 
sons, and gross income from tourism increased more than 
fourfold (from 166 to 720 million pesos). 

Population consumption of food, consumer durables (see 
Glossary), and nondurables, such as vegetables, dropped 
sharply in the early 1990s, with rationing reinstated for a wide 
range of staple food, personal hygiene, and clothing items. 
Moreover, monthly rationing allowances were trimmed back so 
that the typical household could satisfy only about two weeks of 
its consumption needs through the rationing system. The cut- 
backs forced most consumers to turn to more expensive alter- 
natives — especially the very active black market — and affected, 
in particular, consumption levels of pensioners. Electricity 
shortages and blackouts became commonplace, and public 
transportation was cut back sharply. The availability and quality 



165 



Cuba: A Country Study 



FY 1995 - GDP 13,184.5 million pesos (at 1981 prices) 



TRANSPORT 
(INCLUDING 
COMMUNICATIONS AND 
FINANCE SERVICES WAREHOUSING) 
(INCLUDING BUSINESS J^L— . _ TRADE (INCLUDING 

HOTELS AND 




AND REAL ESTATE) 

3.7% 



COMMUNITY, 
PERSONAL, 

AND SOCIAL 
SERVICES 
26.9% 



AGRICULTURE 

FISHING, FORESTRY, 

AND HUNTING 

6 go /o ELECTRICITY, 

GAS, AND WATER 

2.9% 



RESTAURANTS) 

22.6% 



CONSTRUCTION 

3.1% 
MINING AND 
QUARRYING 
1.2% 



MANUFACTURING 
27.0% 



Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Informe economico 1995, 
Havana, August 1995, Appendix A. 



Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1995 



of public health and education services, two of the most lauded 
accomplishments of Fidel Castro's government, also declined 
severely. 

Economic Reforms 

Far from an articulated and comprehensive blueprint to 
transform the economic system into a market-oriented one, the 
reform measures taken to date represent a survival strategy — 
modest, opportunistic measures that seek to allow the govern- 
ment and the PCC to cope with the economic crisis and remain 
in power. In the summer of 1993, Cuba took steps to liberalize 
certain areas of the domestic economy and to attract foreign 



166 



The Economy 



resources. A second set of initiatives, including stabilization 
measures, was implemented in May 1994 together with a sweep- 
ing law, Decree-Law 149, against "improper enrichment." 

In mid-1995, however, Fidel Castro vowed not to abandon 
Cuba's socialist principles and Marxist-Leninist convictions. 
Subsequently, the pace of change slowed down as the govern- 
ment postponed implementation of enterprise-restructuring 
measures that would inevitably have resulted in the shutdown 
of inefficient plants and increased unemployment. 

In March 1996, Raul Castro Ruz, the minister of defense and 
vice president, strongly criticized some of the economic 
changes that had been implemented. He lashed out at foreign 
influences associated with the international tourism industry 
and the wealth acquired by individuals engaged in legal forms 
of self-employment, and called for renewed ideological vigor in 
defense of communism. Raul Castro's broadside squelched an 
incipient domestic dialogue on reforms centered on the work 
of several Cuban economists. 

Stabilizing the Economy 

Cuba's macroeconomic situation in the early 1990s was dis- 
mal. The country had a very large government budget deficit, 
very high levels of repressed inflation (manifested through 
physical shortages and rampant black markets) , and large cash 
balances in the hands of the population. To address these 
problems, Cuba took a number of actions to introduce fiscal 
discipline, including reducing government expenditures, 
increasing revenues, and reforming the tax system. 

Meeting in early May 1994, the National Assembly adopted a 
resolution calling for strict discipline in the implementation of 
the budget law and for reductions in expenditures and 
increases in revenues at all levels of government. On the 
expenditures side, the National Assembly directed the execu- 
tive to take concrete steps to reduce subsidies to loss-making 
enterprises, stimulate personal savings, increase revenue collec- 
tion through increases in prices of nonessential goods and 
some services, and develop a comprehensive tax system that 
would be equitable, foster production and work effort, and 
raise sufficient revenue to balance the state budget. A reorgani- 
zation of the central state administration reduced the number 
of entities from fifty to thirty-two, eliminating altogether 984 
organizational units, such as departments, sections, and direc- 
torates, and reducing personnel and administrative expenses. 



167 



Cuba: A Country Study 



On the revenue side, the Executive Committee of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers decreed increases in the prices of cigarettes and 
alcoholic beverages, gasoline, electricity, and public transporta- 
tion, and in the rates for sending mail and telegrams; elimi- 
nated subsidies to workplace cafeterias; and imposed a charge 
for services formerly provided free, such as school lunches, 
some medications, and attendance at sports and cultural 
events. Assessing fees on self-employed workers is a new source 
of government revenue. 

The results of the implementation of austerity measures in 
1994-95 were sharp reductions in the budget deficit and in the 
amount of currency in circulation. All areas of government 
expenditure were subject to cuts, particularly subsidies to 
enterprises. The budget deficit in 1994 was 1.6 billion pesos, 50 
percent lower than the projected deficit of 3.2 billion pesos. 
For 1995 the budget deficit was anticipated at 1 billion pesos, 
but the actual deficit was 766 million pesos, and it was 570 mil- 
lion pesos in 1996, 459 million pesos in 1997, and 560 million 
pesos in 1998. The budget deficit as a share of GDP was 39.5 
percent in 1993, 12.6 percent in 1994, 5.8 percent in 1995, 4.0 
percent in 1996, 3.1 percent in 1997, and 3.8 percent in 1998. 

Currency in circulation fell from 11.0 billion pesos at the 
end of 1993 to 9.9 billion pesos at the end of 1994, or by 10 per- 
cent, as a result of increased savings and price increases. Cash 
holdings were 9.5 billion pesos in 1995, 9.4 billion pesos in 
1997, and 9.7 billion pesos in 1998. 

In August 1994, the National Assembly approved a new and 
very broad tax code, to be implemented gradually beginning in 
October 1994. The new system levies taxes on the income of 
enterprises, including joint ventures with foreign investors, as 
well as on the value of assets owned; earned income; sales; con- 
sumption of products, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, 
domestic electric appliances, and other luxury goods; public 
services, such as electricity, water and sewer, telephone, tele- 
grams, transportation, restaurants, and lodging; real estate 
holdings; gasoline- or draft animal-powered transportation 
vehicles; transfer of property, including inheritances; public 
documents issued; payrolls; and use of natural resources. The 
law also provides for employer contributions to social security, 
user fees on roads (tolls) and airport services, and charges for 
advertising of products or services. Implementation of the law 
has been gradual, with personal income taxes, user fees on air- 



168 



A pedicab and its driver in Havana 
A knife sharpener plying his trade on a Havana street 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 

port services, and charges on advertising becoming effective in 
October 1994 and the rest since 1995. 

Stimulating Production 

Cuba took some tentative steps to liberalize selected sectors 
of the economy to stimulate production. The most significant 
such steps were those related to the liberalization of self- 
employment, agricultural production and sales, and the decen- 
tralization of foreign trade. Concern about the possibility that 
economic liberalization measures would bring about the 
enrichment of some individuals prompted the adoption, in 
March 1994, of Decree-Law 149 (effective that May) to facili- 
tate the prosecution of "profiteers." 

In September 1993, the Cuban government authorized self- 
employment in more than 100 occupations, primarily those 
related to transportation, home repair, and personal services. 
It took this long overdue measure in order to legitimize a 
booming black market for personal services and handicraft 
production and to absorb the large number of workers unem- 
ployed and underemployed because of the idling of their work- 
places. 



169 



Cuba: A Country Study 

However, under Decree-Law 186, restrictions on self-employ- 
ment remain quite severe. Professionals with a university 
degree cannot become self-employed in the occupation for 
which they were trained; moreover, physicians, dentists, teach- 
ers, professors, and researchers are not allowed to engage in 
self-employment because education and public health services 
continue to be supplied by the state. Even with regard to the 
occupations where self-employment is allowed, restrictions 
apply: the self-employed have to request a license, cannot hire 
others, have to pay fees and taxes to the government, and are 
limited on how they sell the goods or service they produce. In 
October 1993, the state expanded the list of occupations ame- 
nable to self-employment by twenty occupations. In June 1995, 
it designated additional occupations for self-employment, 
bringing the number of authorized occupations to 140; in July 
1995, the Ministry of Labor authorized university graduates to 
become self-employed, provided the occupations they per- 
formed differed from those for which they were trained — for 
example, an engineer could be self-employed as a messenger 
or a taxi driver. 

Shortly after self-employment was authorized, there was an 
explosion of home restaurants — commonly called paladares 
(see Glossary) — set up pursuant to the provisions of the law 
that authorized self-employment related to food preparation. 
Most of the home restaurants were modest operations and pro- 
vided relatively simple staple foods, but some were fancy and 
charged high prices. The government first banned home res- 
taurants, arguing that they were inconsistent with the autho- 
rized forms of self-employment, but in 1995 it reversed course 
and explicitly authorized them, provided they sat twelve or 
fewer customers and complied with a stiff schedule of monthly 
fees. At the end of 1995, approximately 208,000 workers had 
been authorized to engage in self-employment, less than 5 per- 
cent of the economically active population of 4.5 million work- 
ers and about one-fifth of the estimated 1 million workers who 
would be subject to dismissals in an overall rationalization of 
state enterprises. 

New fees and taxes — pursuant to the 1994 tax code — began 
to be charged to the self-employed effective February 1, 1996. 
Fees paid by self-employed taxi drivers jumped from 100 to 400 
pesos per month, manicurists from 60 to 100 pesos, hair dress- 
ers from 90 to 200 pesos, and paladares charging prices in 
domestic currency (pesos) to 800 pesos per month. The new 



170 



The Economy 



progressive income tax system levied taxes of 10 percent on 
annual incomes up to 2,400 pesos and 50 percent on annual 
incomes exceeding 60,000 pesos. By January 1998, the number 
of self-employed had fallen to about 160,000, from about 
209,000 in March 1996, and reportedly has continued to fall. 

In September 1993, the Council of State approved breaking 
up state farms into a new form of agricultural cooperatives, the 
Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Basicas de 
Production Cooperativa — UBPC) . The UBPCs have the use of 
the land they work for an indefinite period of time, own the 
output they produce, have the ability to sell their output to the 
state through the state procurement system or through other 
means, have the authority to contract and pay for the technical 
and material resources they use, have their own bank accounts 
and buy necessary inputs on credit, and are able to elect their 
own management, which must report to its members periodi- 
cally. The UBPCs also have to pay taxes. The rationale for the 
policy change was that the shift from state farms to coopera- 
tives would give workers greater incentives to increase produc- 
tion with the least expenditure of material resources. 

In essence, the UBPCs operate as production cooperatives 
within each state farm, breaking up the larger estates and creat- 
ing smaller units that compete with one another. Workers of 
former state farms shift from being wage workers in the employ 
of the state to being cooperative members, with their earnings 
connected to the profitability of their units. Cooperatives are 
able, within some constraints, to make decisions regarding how 
they use their land. They are permitted to set aside some land 
for growing agricultural products and raise livestock to meet 
their own consumption needs. 

In early May 1994, the Council of State adopted a broad stat- 
ute that would allow confiscation of assets and income of indi- 
viduals who had obtained them through "improper 
enrichment" {enriquecimiento indebido). This law grants the gov- 
ernment sweeping powers to confiscate cash, goods, and assets 
of individuals found guilty of "profiteering" and provides for 
retroactive application of sanctions against this offense. Sei- 
zures ordered by the Office of the National Prosecutor in 
"improper enrichment" cases are not appealable. 

In late September 1994, Cuba authorized agricultural mar- 
kets (agros — see Glossary), locations at which producers of 
selected agricultural products can sell a portion of their output 
at prices set by demand and supply. Before an agricultural pro- 



171 



Cuba: A Country Study 

ducer — private farmer, cooperative member, or even state 
enterprise — can sell his or her output in the new markets, sales 
obligations to the state procurement system ( acopio — see Glos- 
sary) must be met. Participants in the agricultural markets 
would also have to pay a fee to participate and a tax on sales 
conducted. In most respects, the agricultural markets autho- 
rized in September 1994 are similar to the farmers' free mar- 
kets ( mercados libres campesinos) that were in operation during 
1980-86 and scuttled during rectification. 

In October 1994, following on the establishment of agricul- 
tural markets, the Cuban government announced that it would 
also allow the free sale of a wide range of consumer products 
through a network of artisan and manufactured products mar- 
kets. The new markets could be used by artisans to sell handi- 
crafts and also by the government to dispose of inventories of 
manufactured goods and surplus products made by state enter- 
prises. These markets resemble very closely the artisan markets 
that were in operation during 1980-86 and eliminated during 
rectification. 

Prior to the 1990s, Cuban foreign trade was a state monop- 
oly, based on Article 18 of the socialist constitution of 1976, 
which decrees that "foreign trade is the exclusive function of 
the state." Cuban foreign trade institutions mirrored those of 
the Soviet Union and East European socialist nations: exports 
were conducted by specialized enterprises of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade; imports were primarily the responsibility of the 
State Committee for Technical and Material Supply (Comite 
Estatal de Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material — CEATM) . 

Among the reforms to the constitution implemented in 1992 
was a reformulation of Article 18 that eliminated the state 
monopoly over the conduct of foreign trade, and shifted the 
role of the state to directing and controlling foreign trade. 
Cuba has created various foreign trade corporations that oper- 
ate largely independently of the state. Examples are Acemex, 
S.A., a private shipping company registered in Liechtenstein; 
Diplomatic Corps Service Company (Empresa para Prestacion 
de Servicios al Cuerpo Diplomatico — Cubalse), which imports 
consumer goods for the diplomatic corps and foreign techni- 
cians residing in Cuba and exports beverages, tobacco, leather 
goods, and foodstuffs; Havana Tourism Company (Havanatur) ; 
International Tourism and Trade Corporation (Corporacion 
de Turismo y Comercio Internacional — Cubanacan), a tourist 
agency; the military-owned tourism company Gaviota; the Pan- 



172 



An artisan market on Cathedral 
Plaza (La Plaza de la Catedral) in 
Havana, 1997 



The Agricultural Market (Mercado 
Agropecuario) in Havana, 1997 
Courtesy Mark P Sullivan 



Cuba: A Country Study 

ama-based Import-Export Company (Compania Importadora- 
Exportadora — Cimex); Union of Caribbean Construction 
Enterprises (Union de Empresas de Construction del Caribe — 
Uneca) ; and International Financial Bank (Banco Financiero 
Internacional — BFI) , a commercial bank that promotes Cuban 
exports and banking relations. Cuba has also experimented 
with the establishment of quasi-private companies called 
sociedades anonimas (S.A.), stock companies controlled by gov- 
ernment loyalists. Cuba's sociedades anonimas have considerable 
autonomy from the state. Many organizations that produce 
goods and services are also permitted to import and export, 
with many working on the basis of self-financing arrangements 
using convertible currency. 

The slight economic recovery registered in 1994 was report- 
edly fed by sharp growth in the manufacturing sector (7.6 per- 
cent) and in the electricity industry (4.4 percent). Cuba 
reported a growth rate of 2.5 percent for 1995, 7.8 percent for 
1996, 2.5 percent for 1997, and 1.2 percent for 1998. Unfortu- 
nately, the requisite data and information on methodology to 
confirm aggregate growth trends are not available. Data on 
detailed physical output data, product prices adjusted for infla- 
tion, and the relative importance of each product within a sec- 
tor and within the economy at large are also not available. The 
fragmentary data that are available raise some questions. For 
example, the recovery of the manufacturing sector suggested 
by the official statistics is incongruent with the poor perfor- 
mance of the sugar industry, a principal component of that sec- 
tor. With the exception of nickel — where foreign investment 
has played a key role — manufactured products showed output 
in 1998 below the level reached in 1989. 

Agricultural production continued to decline despite the 
breakup of state farms and creation of the UBPCs. By the end 
of 1994, the state had distributed the bulk of agricultural land 
to the UBPCs, retaining only 25 percent. Unable to obtain nec- 
essary inputs, the UBPCs struggled to adjust to their new inde- 
pendent status after being part of large enterprises and 
accustomed to extensive use of mechanization, fertilizers, and 
pesticides; most of the 1,500 sugarcane UBPCs were unprofit- 
able in 1994. 

Overall, the agricultural sector has continued to perform 
poorly. By 1997 production of tubers, plantains, corn, and 
beans had reached or exceeded 1989 levels, but other agricul- 
tural products, such as vegetables, rice, citrus, other fruits, 



174 



The Economy 



tobacco, eggs, and milk were still below the level reached in 
1989 (see table 8, Appendix). 

The agricultural markets reportedly got off to a good start, 
quickly increasing the amount and variety of produce available 
to the public, although at very high prices. According to a 1998 
Cuban survey, the origin of produce sold through the farmers' 
free markets was as follows: private farmers, 60 percent of 
meats and 50 percent of all other products; state sector, 39 per- 
cent and 51 percent, respectively; and cooperatives (including 
the UBPCs), 0.2 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. Prices in 
farmers' markets continue to be very high and unaffordable to 
the average Cuban consumer. The average monthly salary of 
workers in the state sector was 203 pesos in 1998 and 1997, and 
200 pesos in 1996. Meanwhile, prices in agricultural markets in 
La Habana (hereafter, Havana) in August 1998 were 4.50 pesos 
for a pound of rice, 10 to 12 pesos for a pound of beans, 2 
pesos for one egg, and 23 to 25 pesos for a pound of pork. 

Attracting Foreign Investment and Remittances 

To ease severe external-sector pressures, Cuba has taken a 
number of steps to reform its foreign sector. Cuba's main inter- 
est has been to attract foreign resources — primarily in the form 
of remittances and foreign investment — that can help reacti- 
vate its economy. 

In the summer of 1993, Cuba decriminalized the holding 
and use of convertible currency (mostly United States dollars) 
by Cuban citizens. The government also created special stores 
at which Cuban citizens holding convertible currencies can 
shop and obtain items that are not available to Cubans holding 
pesos. In addition, the government liberalized travel to the 
island by relatives and friends of Cuban citizens. The intent of 
the measures was to stimulate convertible currency remittances 
to Cuban citizens from family and friends living abroad, mostly 
in the United States, and to reduce the importance of a very 
active convertible currency black market. 

Other complementary steps have been taken to accommo- 
date the needs of citizens holding convertible currencies. In 
September 1995, the BNC for the first time began to accept 
from the population deposits denominated in convertible cur- 
rency and offered to pay interest on such savings also in con- 
vertible currency. And in mid-October 1995, the government 
created Exchange Houses (Casas de Cambio — Cadeca), at 



175 



Cuba: A Country Study 

which Cuban citizens can buy and sell foreign currencies at 
rates close to those prevailing in the black market. 

In December 1994, Cuba announced the creation of a new 
currency, the convertible peso (peso convertible — see Glossary) , 
that would gradually replace the United States dollar and other 
foreign currencies within the island. The convertible peso, val- 
ued at par with the United States dollar, would eventually be 
the currency used in the tourism sector and in outlets autho- 
rized since mid-1993 to sell goods for foreign currencies. 
Incentive payments to workers of certain key industries that 
generate hard currency — for example, tourism, oil extraction 
and tobacco — are now made in convertible pesos rather than 
in foreign currencies, as had been the practice. 

Cuba first passed legislation allowing foreign investment on 
the island — mostly in the form of joint ventures — in February 
1982. This innovation generated very little interest among 
Western investors until the 1990s, when Cuba began an aggres- 
sive campaign to attract foreign capital. In 1992 the National 
Assembly passed a number of amendments to the 1976 consti- 
tution clarifying the concept of private property and providing 
a legal basis for transferring state property to joint ventures 
with foreign partners. 

One of the areas in which Cuba has been particularly active 
in seeking foreign investment has been mining. In December 
1994, the National Assembly passed a new Mining Law, which 
became effective in January 1995, aimed at encouraging for- 
eign investment in exploration and production of oil and min- 
erals. In the 1990s, mining has received a boost from foreign 
joint ventures, primarily with Canadian investors (see Mining, 
this ch.). 

To institutionalize the "irreversibility" of the opening to for- 
eign investment, in September 1995 the National Assembly 
adopted Foreign Investment Law 77, which codifies the de 
facto rules under which joint ventures had been operating and 
introduces some changes to the legal framework for foreign 
investment. The law guarantees that investors in Cuba will be 
protected from expropriation, except for "public utility or 
social interest"; will be able to sell shares of investment to the 
state or to a third party, depending on the initial agreement; 
and will be able to fully transfer profits abroad. The new law for 
the first time permits 100-percent foreign ownership of invest- 
ments, up from the 49 percent allowed by the earlier statute. 
Similarly, the new law simplifies the screening of foreign invest- 



176 



The Economy 



ment practiced by Cuba, explicitly allows foreign investments 
in real estate, and authorizes the establishment of free-trade 
zones. However, the 1995 Foreign Investment Law does not 
change regulations that ban joint ventures from directly hiring 
Cuban citizens as employees. Such hiring continues to be car- 
ried out by an entity of the Cuban government with power to 
select, hire, and fire employees, powers that individual joint 
ventures do not have. 

Complementing the September 1995 Foreign Investment 
Law, the Council of State passed legislation in June 1996 creat- 
ing export-processing zones, that is, free-trade zones and indus- 
trial parks (zonas francas y parques industriales) . Investors settling 
in the free-trade zones are subject to a special and more benefi- 
cial regime regarding customs, banking, taxes, labor, migra- 
tion, public order, and foreign trade. Specifically, investments 
in free-trade zones are exempt from tariffs (see Glossary) and 
other levies on imports and are also exempt from taxes for a 
twelve-year period. Regulations establishing an official registry 
of export-processing zone operators and investors and issuing 
special customs regulations applicable to foreign investments 
locating in the zones were issued in October 1996. 

Since 1960, when the private banks were nationalized, the 
BNC has operated as both a central bank (see Glossary) and a 
commercial bank, arranging short- and long-term credits, 
financing investments and operations with other countries, 
and acting as a clearing and payments center. Under a centrally 
planned system, the BNC's main function was financing the 
implementation of the national economic plan as reflected in 
the national budget. In 1984 the BFI was created to operate 
solely with convertible currencies and to support the activities 
of foreign investors. 

In response to the perception by foreign investors that the 
financial sector was not sufficiently developed, Cuba has taken 
a number of steps to allow more choice. In 1994 Cuba granted 
a license to ING Bank of Holland to operate on the island, the 
first foreign bank to be so permitted since 1960. In 1995 similar 
licenses were issued to the General Society of France (Societe 
Generale de France) and to the Sabadell Bank (Banco 
Sabadell) of Spain. Other foreign banks have also been allowed 
to establish representative offices in Cuba. Moreover, in order 
to expand the number of financial services available to foreign 
investors and semiautonomous enterprises, the BNC created 
the New Banking Group (Grupo Nueva Banca — GNB), a hold- 



177 



Cuba: A Country Study 

ing company, to supervise the operations of Cuba's reformed 
financial sector. The network of new financial institutions 
under the GNB's supervision includes, in addition to the 
already mentioned Cadeca and BFI, the Agro-Industrial and 
Commercial Bank (Banco Agro-Industrial y Comercial) , which 
provides commercial banking services to farmers and coopera- 
tives; the International Bank of Commerce (Banco Internacio- 
nal de Comercio S.A. — BICSA) , a merchant bank that, like the 
BFI, provides trade finance to Cuban institutions and arranges 
financing transactions with overseas lenders; the Investment 
Bank (Banco de Inversiones), which provides medium- and 
long-term development finance; the Metropolitan Bank 
(Banco Metropolitano), which caters to diplomats and other 
private customers; the National Financier (Financiera Nacio- 
nal — FINSA) , an export-import bank that provides short-term 
finance for Cuban enterprises; and the People's Savings Bank 
(Banco Popular de Ahorro), which provides retail banking. 

In May 1997, the Council of State finally passed long- 
expected legislation to reform the banking system. Decree-Law 
172 established the BCC (Cuban Central Bank) as an autono- 
mous and independent entity and assigned to it the traditional 
central banking functions. The BNC, which, as mentioned 
above, had performed central and commercial banking func- 
tions since 1960, continued to operate, but its role was rele- 
gated to commercial banking. Decree-Law 173, also passed in 
May 1997, set out the legal framework for registration and 
operation of commercial banks and financial institutions 
under the supervision of the BCC. 

As a result of its dollarization policies, Cuba de facto 
adopted a dual currency system that has introduced severe ine- 
qualities on the island. Citizens with access to foreign currency 
(dollars) — because they receive remittances from family or 
friends abroad, tips in the tourism sector, or bonuses paid by 
the government in hard currency to stimulate production of 
exportables — have access to goods and services not available to 
those citizens without it. In the second half of the 1990s, remit- 
tances became a very significant source of foreign currency to 
Cuba (see Foreign Economic Relations, this ch.). 

According to government officials, 231 joint ventures had 
been created as of the end of May 1995. By the end of 1998, the 
number of joint ventures had increased to 345. There are no 
reliable statistics on the amount of foreign investment that has 
actually flowed into the Cuban economy. Cuban government 



178 



The Economy 



officials have used the figure of about US$2.1 billion for the 
1985-95 period, a figure that may overstate actual investment. 
Although small when compared with the volume of resources 
that flowed into Cuba from the former Soviet Union and East- 
ern Europe, incoming foreign investment has had a salutary 
effect on the island's economy: it has eased somewhat Cuba's 
very severe shortage of international financing, provided 
access to new technology, financed imports of raw materials 
and equipment that have kept workers at their jobs, and cre- 
ated markets for exports that otherwise would not have been 
available to domestic entities. 

Structure of the Economy 
Background 

Since the early 1960s, Cuba's official economy has been 
organized along the lines of the socialist, centrally planned 
model. In addition to central economic planning, some of the 
elements of this model, common to the former Soviet Union 
and other centrally planned economies, are as follows: govern- 
ment control over the bulk of the economic resources of the 
country, especially major industries, foreign trade, banking, 
and usually commerce and land; and state regulation and sub- 
ordination of a highly circumscribed private sector. 

With the collapse of economic and commercial relations 
with the former Soviet Union and East European socialist 
countries, application of the central planning model in Cuba 
began to break down. Institutions created to support central 
planning and economic and trade relations with socialist coun- 
tries, such as the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de 
Planificacion — Juceplan), became obsolete and began to 
undergo a process of transformation and adjustment to the 
new economic reality. Additional space has been created for 
the nonstate sector through the expansion of the number of 
occupations suitable for self-employment, the conversion of 
state farms into cooperatives, and the reinstatement of farmers' 
markets. 

At a rhetorical level, economic policies pursued by Cuba's 
socialist government have supported industrialization and 
diversification of the economy away from sugar. The reality is 
that Cuba continues to be primarily an agricultural country, 
and sugar remains the mainstay of the economy, its largest 
employer, and primary net generator of export revenue. 



179 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Cuba's specialization in sugar and other basic commodities was 
formalized through its participation in the CMEA (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance), within which the island was 
assigned the role of supplier of raw materials to other members 
of that organization. 

In the 1990s, Cuba focused its efforts on reviving its sugar 
industry, increasing nonsugar agricultural production, and 
stimulating development of its tourism and biotechnology 
industries. The record so far has been mixed, with the sugar 
industry continuing to perform poorly and food production 
also lagging behind. The tourism industry has been the focus 
of a significant number of joint ventures with foreign enter- 
prises and has become a major contributor to economic activ- 
ity, particularly the generation of convertible currency. 

Key Economic Sectors 

Agriculture 

In 1997 Cuba had 6,686,700 hectares of agricultural land, of 
which 3,701,400 hectares were cultivated. However, the culti- 
vated land suffers from various degrees of soil degradation (see 
Topography and Drainage, ch. 2). In 1997 the state directly 
controlled 24.4 percent of the agricultural land and the non- 
state sector, 75.6 percent. The nonstate sector includes the 
newly formed UBPCs, the former state farms converted to 
cooperatives. The UBPCs alone accounted for 47.0 percent of 
cultivated land. In addition to sugarcane, state enterprises and 
UBPCs specialize in the production of rice, citrus, coffee, and 
tobacco, as well as livestock. In addition to UBPCs, nonstate 
actors include Agricultural-Livestock Cooperatives (Cooperati- 
vas de Produccion Agropecuaria — CPA) , Credit and Services 
Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Creditos y Servicios — CCS), and 
individual farmers. 

A large portion of the nation's industrial capacity and agri- 
cultural lands are devoted to sugar production. During the 
1975-87 period, the sugar industry was the largest recipient of 
investment resources, averaging about 20 percent of manufac- 
turing investment. Similarly, investments in sugar agriculture 
took about one-third of overall agricultural investment during 
this same period. 

By the mid-1990s, Cuba's sugar industrial complex com- 
prised 156 sugar mills; seventeen refineries; more than fifty 
plants producing derivatives, such as pulp and paper made 



180 



A fertile farming valley near Havana 
Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 
Sugarcane workers in Camaguey Province 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 



181 



Cuba: A Country Study 

from bagasse (that is, stalks and leaves that remain after sugar- 
cane is ground for sugar production), bagasse boards, ethanol, 
rum, yeast, and wax; electric-power generation plants; mechan- 
ical shops that produce parts for the sugar industrial facilities 
and manage their maintenance; an extensive internal transpor- 
tation network; and eight export shipping terminals capable of 
handling sugar in bulk. Although many of the sugar mills date 
from the 1920s, most of them have been thoroughly over- 
hauled. 

A large sugar industry such as Cuba's requires prodigious 
volumes of cane as inputs into the industrial process. Assuming 
an industrial yield of 1 1 percent — roughly the average yield 
obtained in Cuba in 1950-80 — means that the agricultural sec- 
tor must deliver 100 tons of sugarcane to mills to produce 
eleven tons of raw sugar. The timely delivery of such large 
amounts of sugarcane to mills requires very close coordination 
between agricultural and industrial sectors: the sugarcane must 
both be ground at a time when its sucrose content is highest 
and enter the mills in a steady flow to avoid costly (in terms of 
energy consumption) shutdowns. 

Socialist Cuba has experimented with different forms of 
organization to manage the sugar process. Three of these orga- 
nizational methods have included totally separate agricultural 
and industrial enterprises controlled by different ministries, 
joint management of agricultural and industrial activities 
under a single Ministry of the Sugar Industry, and agroindus- 
trial complexes, where both sets of activities are coordinated by 
one management team. However, these organizational changes 
have not been able to resolve the agricultural bottlenecks that 
have plagued the Cuban sugar industry. 

In 1989 nearly 2.0 million hectares were devoted to sugar- 
cane cultivation, with the state sector accounting for more than 
1.9 million hectares and the nonstate sector for less than 
100,000 hectares. That is, 53 percent of cultivated land in that 
year was devoted to sugarcane production. It is also clear from 
the above data that sugarcane production was skewed toward 
the state sector, with the nonstate sector controlling less than 5 
percent of sugarcane lands. In 1997, 1.8 million hectares, or 48 
percent of cultivated land, was devoted to sugarcane produc- 
tion. 

Implementation of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law and sub- 
sequent confiscatory laws with respect to the sugar industry 
resulted in the expropriation of large amounts of land con- 



182 



The Economy 



trolled by sugar mills. These lands were first organized as coop- 
eratives and in 1962 converted into state farms. In state farms, 
agricultural workers were essentially wage earners, with no 
involvement in management decisions. Sugarcane state farms 
were unwieldy and notorious for their low productivity and fail- 
ure to meet production targets. In part to try to improve their 
management and performance, state farms were broken up 
and converted into smaller UBPCs in September 1993. 

Cuba has made significant gains in harvesting its sugarcane 
crop through mechanical means. Cutting and loading sugar- 
cane by hand is exhausting and dangerous work. Cuba's social- 
ist government has made a sustained effort to mechanize these 
tasks and has been largely successful, thereby freeing a signifi- 
cant number of workers to participate in other economic activ- 
ities. By the end of the 1980s, about 70 percent of harvested 
sugarcane was cut by mechanical harvesters, and almost 100 
percent was loaded mechanically (generally using front load- 
ers). Although mechanization of the harvest has eliminated 
the problem of shortages of cane cutters, it has created new 
problems, such as increased extraneous matter entering sugar 
mills (which lowers yield and often results in equipment break- 
downs) and higher demand for fuel and spare parts for the 
equipment. 

Consistent with its plan to expand sugar production to about 
11 million tons per year by 1990 and 13 to 14 million tons per 
year by 2000, in the 1980s Cuba began to build new sugar- 
grinding capacity. At least seven new mills (of a planned fif- 
teen) were built, each capable of producing about 100,000 tons 
of sugar in a 150-day zafra (harvest). However, production fell 
behind schedule during the late 1980s, averaging about 7.5 
million tons per annum during 1985-89. Then the crisis of the 
1990s took a heavier toll on the industry. At first, production 
fell gradually, from 8.1 million tons in 1989 to 8.0 in 1990, 7.6 
in 1991, and 7.0 in 1992, but then fell precipitously to 4.1 in 
1993, 3.9 in 1994, and 3.3 in 1995 (the lowest output in fifty 
years). Production recovered somewhat in 1996, when 4.4 mil- 
lion tons were produced, but slumped again to 4.2 million tons 
in 1997 and 3.2 million tons in 1998 (see table 9, Appendix). 

In addition to sugarcane, Cuba produces a broad range of 
other agricultural products, among them roots and tubers, veg- 
etables, grains, beans, citrus, plantain and bananas, tropical 
fruits, coffee, tobacco, livestock, and forest products. No statis- 
tics on the relative importance of each of these products (in 



183 



Cuba: A Country Study 



terms of value) within the nonsugar agricultural sector are 
available. Other important segments of the nonsugar agricul- 
ture sector in terms of land area devoted to cultivation in 1997 
are rice (6.1 percent of total area); pastures (9.9 percent); cof- 
fee (3.8 percent); beans, bananas, and plantains (3.3 percent); 
and citrus (2.5 percent). Most of the output of the nonsugar 
agricultural sector is consumed domestically, but some prod- 
ucts — for example, tobacco and citrus — are significant genera- 
tors of export revenue. 

The cattle-raising industry, seriously affected by the collapse 
of trade with the former Soviet bloc, has suffered from pro- 
longed neglect. Its problems began after 1959 when govern- 
ment experts, relying on genetics and artificial insemination, 
introduced a radical change into the composition of the herd, 
which previously consisted primarily of Cebu and Criollo 
breeds. The new breeds produce more milk but are less resis- 
tant to the tropical climate and require greater attention and 
expenditures. By the beginning of the 1970s, the national herd 
declined by one-quarter, and by 1997 there were only 0.42 head 
of cattle per capita, close to the lowest figure on record in the 
twentieth century. 

Cuba's agriculture relies heavily on the use of imported 
inputs and of mechanized equipment. Shortages of imported 
fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, fuels, and spare parts for 
equipment have taken a heavy toll on agricultural production. 
Nonsugar producers have been seriously affected. Output of 
key agricultural products was lower in 1993 than in 1989: 
tubers by 17 percent, vegetables by 36 percent, grains by 61 
percent, beans by 38 percent, citrus by 22 percent, eggs by 46 
percent, and milk by 66 percent. At the same time that produc- 
tion slumped, sharp reductions in food imports gave rise to 
severe food shortages. The government responded by institut- 
ing an ambitious food production program that had as its 
objective securing increases in the output of staple foods and 
becoming self-sufficient in food production. Although the food 
program has failed to achieve most of its objectives, by 1997 
food production had improved in nearly all categories over 
1993, although production levels of many commodities 
remained below levels in 1989. To increase the domestic rice 
yield, the government in 1996, for the first time in decades, 
began to encourage the planting of small rice pads (known 
officially as "popular rice") by individual farms. This practice, 



184 



The Economy 



which was widespread before 1959, was almost eradicated in 
subsequent years. 

In accordance with the national acopio procurement system 
instituted in 1962 and covering all agricultural products, non- 
state producers are required to sell certain volumes of their 
output to the state. Statistics on the contribution by nonstate 
producers to acopio in 1980 provide insights into the range of 
agricultural commodities produced in the nonstate sector. 
Thus, the latter producers contributed 6.5 percent of the rice, 
57.9 percent of the papayas, and 87.7 percent of the green pep- 
pers procured by the state, suggesting that the nonstate sector 
specialized in fruits and vegetables. The breakup of state farms 
and the creation of the UBPCs in September 1993 have 
expanded considerably the role of the nonstate agricultural 
sector. By 1997 the 1,567 UBPCs controlled 3 million hectares 
of land (37 percent of Cuba's state and private land not dedi- 
cated to sugarcane) and employed almost 122,000 workers, 
114,000 of whom are members and the rest contracted labor- 
ers. 

Manufacturing 

In 1986, the most recent year for which these data are avail- 
able, Cuba's manufacturing sector consisted of 827 enterprises, 
employing 726,000 workers. The size of the enterprises varied 
significantly, with twenty-six having more than 4,000 workers 
each, nineteen between 3,001 and 4,000 workers, ninety-three 
between 2,001 and 3,000 workers, 190 between 1,001 and 2,000 
workers, and 499 up to 1,000 workers. Industries with the larg- 
est number of enterprises manufactured nonelectrical machin- 
ery (150 enterprises), sugar (148 enterprises), and foodstuffs 
(145 enterprises). The majority (nineteen out of twenty-six) of 
the largest manufacturing plants, that is, those employing 
more than 4,000 workers, were part of the sugar industry; other 
industries having plants with more than 4,000 workers were 
textiles (three), mining and nonferrous metallurgy (one), 
apparel (one), fishing (one), and beverages and tobacco 
(one). 

In addition to the sugar and nickel mining industries, the 
most significant contributors to national product in 1989 
within the manufacturing sector were the following industries: 
beverages and tobacco, foodstuffs, nonelectrical machinery, 
chemical, electricity generation, and construction materials. 
Enterprises producing beverages and foodstuffs are under the 



185 



Cuba: A Country Study 



control of the Ministry of Foodstuffs Industry. Among the most 
important products of this industry are dairy products, pro- 
cessed meats and fruits, beverages and liquors (including rum 
and beer) , and bakery products. The nonelectrical machinery 
industry produces a range of outputs, from transportation 
equipment for the railroads to consumer products such as 
metal pots and pans; however, it is also heavily geared to supply- 
ing and servicing the sugar industry, including producing 
Soviet-designed KTP mechanical harvesters and equipment for 
sugar mills. The chemical industry specializes in the produc- 
tion of fertilizers and rubber and plastic products. Cement pro- 
duction dominates the construction materials industry. 

During the economic crisis, the manufacturing sector was 
affected severely. Over the 1989-93 period, production fell as 
follows: steel, down 69 percent; cotton yarn, 85 percent; tex- 
tiles, 77 percent; pasta, 75 percent; lard, 99 percent; powdered 
milk, 75 percent; cement, 74 percent; crushed stone, 85 per- 
cent; and cement blocks, 74 percent. Although production of 
most manufactured products improved in the second half of 
the 1990s, production levels in 1998 of key manufactured prod- 
ucts were below 1989 levels, with the exception of nickel, oxy- 
gen gas, canned meats, and soft drinks. 

Mining 

Metal commodities produced in Cuba include chromite, 
cobalt, copper, crude steel, and nickel (see fig. 5). Other non- 
fuel industrial mineral products include cement, gypsum, lime, 
ammonia, salt, silica sand, and sulfur. Nickel is the most impor- 
tant metal to the Cuban economy and the export sector. In 
1998 Cuba was the eighth leading producer of nickel in the 
world, producing about 4 percent of total primary nickel pro- 
duction. Cuba's nickel reserves, among the largest in the world, 
are concentrated in the northeastern region of the country, 
around the town of Moa in Holguin Province, and consist pri- 
marily of laterites in which nickel is mixed with other metals 
such as iron, chrome, and cobalt. The Moa-Baracoa massif is 
not only the site of the country's largest reserves of nickel and 
cobalt, but also of considerable deposits of chromite. 

In the 1990s, Cuba's nickel-processing industry consisted of 
three plants: the Comandante Rene Ramos Latour plant, 
located in Nicaro, which began operations in 1943 and pro- 
duces nickel oxide; the Comandante Pedro Soto Alba plant, 
located in Moa Bay, which began operations in 1959 and pro- 



186 



® 


National capital 




Populated place 




Natural gas pipeline 




Planned natural 




gas pipeline 




Tanker terminal 


50 


100 Kilometers 


1 ' 




50 100 Miles 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 

^nfi Atlantic 
Ocean 






United States 
Naval Base 



d 

HAITI 



<$2? Cement 

-Sjfc- Chromium 

Co Cobalt 

w Copper, mine output 

Q Fertilizer 

Gold 

4b Iron ore 



I 

Ni 



Kaol 
Leac 
Mag 
Man 
Natu 
Nick 
*Nuc 




'partially constructed 
NOTE — Underlined symbol indicates proc 



Source: Based on information froi 
48-9; Major Pipelines of the 



Figure 5. Minerals, Natura 



188 



The Economy 



duces nickel and cobalt sulfides; and the Comandante Ernesto 
"Che" Guevara plant, located in Punta Gorda, which began 
operations in 1988 and produces nickel oxide. Construction of 
a fourth plant at Las Camariocas, which was being carried out 
with financial assistance from the CMEA countries, has been 
suspended until new forms of foreign financing are found. 

As a result of the economic crisis of the 1990s, nickel produc- 
tion fell steadily from approximately 47,000 tons (mineral con- 
tent) in 1989 to approximately 27,000 tons (mineral content) 
in 1994, or by 43 percent, mainly because of maintenance 
problems and energy shortages. Production bounced back in 
1995, when nearly 43,000 tons (mineral content) were pro- 
duced. A significant factor in the recovery of the nickel indus- 
try has been influxes of capital and technology and export 
markets provided by foreign investors. In 1994 Sherritt Interna- 
tional, a Canadian company, entered into a fifty-fifty joint ven- 
ture arrangement with Cuba's General Nickel Company 
(Compama General del Niquel). The joint venture agreement 
included mineral concessions; the operation of the nickel-pro- 
duction facility Comandante Pedro Soto Alba at Moa Bay and a 
nickel refinery in Fort Saskatchewan, Alberta, Canada, owned 
by Sherritt; and a joint enterprise to market the products pro- 
duced by the joint venture. Other reported foreign investments 
in the nickel industry include a credit from a Dutch bank to 
modernize facilities and an agreement between the Western 
Mining Company of Australia and the Cuban Commercial 
Caribbean Nickel Company to assess and develop mineral 
deposits in the Pinares de Mayari area. 

Joint ventures with foreign investors have also been active in 
exploration and production of copper, silver, gold, and other 
minerals. Cuba's state mining agency, Geominera, has entered 
into joint venture agreements with a number of Canadian com- 
panies: Joutel Resources Limited, Republic Goldfields, Mira- 
mar Mining Corporation, Caribgold Resources, Homer 
Goldmines, and Macdonald Mines Exploration. Cuba has 
granted concessions to the foreign companies to explore for 
silver, gold, and copper in specific areas of the country. The 
joint ventures have also taken over the exploitation of existing 
mining operations, injecting capital to purchase equipment 
and fund operating expenses. 



189 




Figure 5. Minerals, Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Thermal Resources, 1996 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Energy 

Cuba has traditionally relied on imports to meet its energy 
requirements. The island is not well endowed with energy 
resources: coal is not found in commercial quantities; hydro- 
electric resources are limited by rivers that have low heads, 
carry relatively small quantities of water, and are subject to 
uneven flow during the year; and oil and natural gas deposits 
discovered to date are woefully inadequate to meet demand. 
Biomass (in the form of bagasse) is an important energy source 
for the sugar industry. However, the use of bagasse by the econ- 
omy at large is constrained by its bulkiness, its low caloric value, 
and its demand by the sugar industry and several factories, 
which use bagasse as a raw material for producing building and 
consumer products. In 1988 Cuba met 70 percent of its energy 
requirements with liquid fuels (crude oil, light oil products, 
and heavy oil products), about 29 percent with biomass, and 
the remaining 1 percent with other energy sources such as 
coal, coke, and hydroelectricity. 

In the 1990s, Cuba relied on oil to generate more than 80 
percent of its electricity. Cuba's electricity generation industry 
had a combined generation capacity of 4.33 gigawatt hours in 
1997 and 15.274 billion kilowatt hours in 1998. With the excep- 
tion of several small hydroelectric plants with a combined 
capacity of 55.4 megawatt hours, the remaining power plants 
were fueled with oil, oil products, and natural gas. Cuba's elec- 
tricity consumption in 1998 totaled 14.205 billion kilowatt 
hours. 

Cuba began an ambitious nuclear power program in the 
early 1980s, with the objective of meeting up to one-fifth of 
electricity demand through nuclear power. The first nuclear 
reactor, being built with technology and financial assistance 
from the Soviet Union at Juragua, on Cuba's southern coast, 
has been delayed because of lack of financial resources, and it 
is now questionable whether the project will ever be com- 
pleted. 

Oil has been produced in Cuba commercially since 1915, 
but domestic production has traditionally provided only a 
small fraction of consumption. Domestic oil production's share 
of apparent consumption (domestic production plus imports 
minus exports) has been estimated at about 1 to 3 percent in 
the 1960s and 1970s and 6 to 9 percent in the 1980s. Despite 
this increase, domestically produced oil still accounted for less 
than one-fifth of the depressed oil consumption level of about 



190 



The Economy 



5 million tons in the first half of the 1990s. Apparent consump- 
tion of oil and oil products was in the range of 10 to 12 million 
tons per annum in the late 1980s. Domestically produced oil 
(mostly heavy crude) rose from 0.67 million tons in 1990 to 
nearly 1.7 million tons by 1998. 

Oil exploration (onshore and offshore) and production 
have been a priority in the 1990s, mainly through partnerships 
with foreign companies. In 1994 at least eleven foreign compa- 
nies were involved in oil exploration and production in Cuban 
territory, both on land and offshore; eleven others were work- 
ing in oil production services. Firms from Britain, France, Can- 
ada, Germany, and Sweden were operating eighteen of thirty- 
three oil fields in the nation. Almost 90 percent of Cuba's still 
limited oil production is concentrated in an extensive line of 
coastal territory running north of Havana and Matanzas prov- 
inces, and in the area between Sancti Spiritus and Ciego de 
Avila provinces. 

As a result of the 1992 reorganization of Cuba's petroleum 
industry, a new state enterprise, Cubapetroleum (Cubapetro- 
leo — Cupet), was established, under the Ministry of Basic 
Industries, with responsibility for the entire petroleum sector: 
exploration, drilling, and refining and distribution. Another 
entity, Commercial Cupet (Comercial Cupet), is in charge of 
negotiating with foreign companies. 

Production partnership agreements appear to be risk con- 
tracts, where the foreign entity typically undertakes the invest- 
ment risk and shares the oil that may be produced with the 
domestic partner. As a result of foreign participation, oil pro- 
duction has been one of the few economic activities not 
severely affected by the economic crisis. Crude oil production 
dipped from around 700,000 tons in 1989-90 to 527,000 tons 
in 1991, but recovered to 882,000 tons in 1992 and for the first 
time exceeded 1 million tons in 1994, when 1,107,600 tons 
were produced. Oil production was roughly 1.5 million tons in 
1995-97 and 1.7 million tons in 1998. 

The Soviet Union was Cuba's primary source of energy (pri- 
marily oil and oil products) imports from 1960 to 1990. Domes- 
tic energy demand rose rapidly through the end of the 1980s, 
with imports from the Soviet Union increasing as well. In the 
1960s, Cuba imported 4 to 6 million tons of Soviet oil and oil 
products per annum; in 1985-88 Cuban oil imports exceeded 
13 million tons per annum. Not all of the imported Soviet oil 
was consumed domestically. During the 1980s, Cuba reex- 



191 



Cuba: A Country Study 



ported significant quantities of Soviet oil to the world market 
to generate convertible currencies; as many as 3.6 to 3.7 mil- 
lion tons of Soviet oil were reexported in 1985-86. 

Oil imports from the Soviet Union were disrupted begin- 
ning in 1990. In August 1990, the Cuban government 
announced the imposition of mandatory energy conservation 
measures to address a 2-million-ton shortfall in Soviet deliveries 
of oil and oil products. The shift in pricing of Soviet (and sub- 
sequently Russian) oil exports to convertible currency forced 
Cuba to cut imports drastically. It is estimated that Cuba's oil 
and oil products imports in the second half of the 1990s are in 
the range of 5 to 7 million tons per annum; even with higher 
domestic oil output, domestic production was about 20 percent 
of apparent consumption. 

Cuba relies on three refineries — located in Cabaiguan, 
Havana, and Santiago de Cuba — to process domestic and 
imported crude oil into a range of derivatives demanded by 
Cuban industries, agriculture, the transportation sector, and 
consumers. A fourth refinery, at Cienfuegos, with a capacity of 
3 million tons of crude per year, is still only partially com- 
pleted. The others date from the 1950s and were expropriated 
in 1960 from the international oil companies (Esso, Texaco, 
and Royal-Dutch Shell) that operated on the island prior to the 
revolutionary takeover of 1959. In the late 1980s, Cuba com- 
pleted an oil import facility at the port of Matanzas and a pipe- 
line linking it with the new Cienfuegos refinery. 

Transportation 

A relatively small and densely populated country that relies 
heavily on foreign trade, Cuba has a well-developed transporta- 
tion infrastructure. By 1997 Cuba had an estimated 60,858 kilo- 
meters of highways, including 29,820 kilometers of paved roads 
and 31,038 kilometers of unpaved roads. The country's rail- 
roads total 4,807 kilometers of standard gauge. The highways, 
railroads, and air and maritime transportation services provide 
access to almost every location on the island (see fig. 6). Cuba 
also has an infrastructure of ports, airports, and warehouses to 
support extensive foreign trade. 

For many years, the main highway was the Central Highway, 
mostly a two-lane highway running for 1,200 kilometers from 
Pinar del Rio in the west to Santiago de Cuba in the east. In the 
late 1970s, construction began on a new eight-lane National 
Expressway (commonly known as "Ocho Vias," or Eight 



192 



The Economy 



Lanes) , which now reportedly runs the length of Cuba, from 
Pinar del Rio in the west to Santiago de Cuba in the east. Pri- 
vate ownership of vehicles is very low. Passenger transportation 
within the island depends heavily on public buses and trucks. 
Cuba's stock of passenger cars and commercial vehicles in 1988 
was 241,300 units, of which 208,400 (86.4 percent) were com- 
mercial vehicles. In 1985 Cuba had thirty-eight motor vehicles 
per 1,000 population, a rate much lower than for developed 
countries (United States, 717; Canada, 567; Australia, 532; Ger- 
many, 451) and also for the more highly developed Latin 
American countries (Argentina, 175; Brazil, 88; Chile, 73; Mex- 
ico, 94; Uruguay, 117; Venezuela, 117). 

Land transportation has been severely affected by the eco- 
nomic crisis. Lack of spare parts for the bus and truck fleet has 
reduced significantly the number of vehicles in operation. 
(Hungary and the former Soviet Union scrapped production 
of some of these vehicles and spare parts.) Moreover, fuel 
shortages have forced cutbacks in the number of routes and 
their frequency. Transportation bottlenecks have affected labor 
productivity because workers are unable to get to their jobs on 
time or have to spend an inordinately long period of time in 
reporting to their jobs. 

Railroad transportation has been neglected since 1959 in 
favor of truck transport, despite being much more energy effi- 
cient than truck transport, particularly in transporting sugar- 
cane. Cuba's poorly maintained railroad system consists of one 
main axis running the length of the island, connecting all of 
the major urban centers, economic zones, and ports, either 
directly or through branches. A bit more than one-third of the 
railroads carry both passengers and freight, with the rest dedi- 
cated to the transport of sugarcane. A major reconstruction of 
the central railroad line began in the late 1970s; equipment 
was updated with diesel locomotives manufactured in the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Railroad transportation has 
also been affected by shortages of fuel and spare parts during 
the Special Period; the four daily trips from Havana to Santiago 
de Cuba have been reduced to one a day, and frequent equip- 
ment breakdowns have made the system largely unreliable. 

Cuba has eleven main ports capable of handling general 
export and import cargoes. The most important of these are 
Antilla, Cienfuegos, Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nuevitas, and 
Santiago de Cuba (see Principal Geographic Features, ch. 2). 
The major deep-water ports are the bays of Cienfuegos, 



193 



Cuba: A Country Study 




194 



The Economy 



Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, Nipe, Nuevitas, and Santiago de 
Cuba. 

Havana is by far the most important port. In addition, Cuba 
has eight bulk sugar loading terminals, one supertanker termi- 
nal at Matanzas, and several other smaller import facilities, as 
well as specialized port facilities for the fishing fleet. Number 
one in sugar export, the port of Cienfuegos is capable of han- 
dling one-third of Cuba's sugar production through its bulk 
sugar terminal. Its pier for handling oil and oil byproducts 
allows the berthing of ships up to 50,000 tons. 

In part because of the fast-growing tourism industry, Cuba 
has made considerable investments in upgrading and expand- 
ing its airport infrastructure. Ten of the seventeen civilian air- 
ports can now handle international flights, and nine of them 
are linked to the nine largest tourist resorts. Of Cuba's 170 air- 
ports in 1999, seventy-seven were paved and ninety-three 
unpaved. Cuba's main international airports include 
Camaguey, Ciego de Avila, Cienfuegos, Havana, Matanzas, San- 
tiago de Cuba, and Varadero. In May 1997, Cuba began a 
US$70 million, seven-month modernization project at its two 
most important airports, those in Havana and Varadero, as a 
result of an agreement between the Cuban Airport Services 
Enterprise (Empresa Cubana de Aeropuertos S.A. — ECASA) 
and the British company, Airport Planning Development 
(APD). Inaugurated in mid-1998, the Jose Marti International 
Airport's new terminal expands the Havana airport's capacity 
to 3 million people per year. The main national airports that 
handle primarily domestic flights include Baracoa, Bayamo, 
Cayo Largo, Guantanamo, Holguin, Manzanillo, Moa, Nicaro, 
Nueva Gerona, and Santa Clara. The Consolidated Cuban Avia- 
tion Company (Empresa Consolidada Cubana de Aviacion — 
Cubana) , Cuba's flag carrier, moves 45 percent of international 
tourism into Cuba and manages all seventeen civilian airports. 

Telecommunications 

Cuba's telecommunications infrastructure improved in the 
late 1990s as a result of government efforts to increase the 
availability of telephones throughout the island and the partici- 
pation of foreign investors. Telephone density remains low by 
global standards, approximately between 4.5 and 5.5 tele- 
phones per 100 inhabitants, and is below the telephone density 
of neighboring Caribbean countries. Approximately 45 per- 



195 



Cuba: A Country Study 

cent of Cuba's telephone lines serve residents within Havana's 
metropolitan area. 

The island's national infrastructure supports national and 
international telecommunications services utilizing wired and 
wireless facilities. The majority of the infrastructure dates to 
the period before the 1959 revolution and uses technology that 
has surpassed its life cycle multiple times. Newer facilities were 
installed during the 1990s with the assistance of foreign tele- 
communications services partners. 

Cuba's first private investment participation in the telecom- 
munications industry began in 1991, when a joint venture was 
formed between Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, 
S.A. (ETECSA) , the state-owned telecommunications company, 
and Telefonos Internacionales de Mexico, S.A. (TIMSA) , creat- 
ing Telefonos Celulares de Cuba, S.A, (Cubacel). Cubacel 
became a provider of cellular telephone service within the city 
of Havana and the tourist corridor connecting Havana and 
Varadero. In 1998 a Canadian company, Sherritt International 
Corporation, acquired 37 percent of Cubacel for US$38.2 mil- 
lion. This acquisition gave Sherritt twenty-year rights for the 
800 Megahertz (MHz) bands for provisioning of analog and 
digital telecommunications services. The target industry sec- 
tors are tourism, diplomatic corps, joint ventures, and govern- 
ment; most of the current 5,500 to 7,000 subscribers come 
from these sectors. A second wireless cellular system is 
planned. 

In June 1994, Cuba announced a joint venture between 
ETECSA and Grupo Domos Internacional, a holding group 
based in Monterey, Mexico, wherein Grupo Domos would own 
49 percent of the island's telephone infrastructure. Planned 
investments of approximately US$700 million by Grupo Domos 
in the development and upgrade of the telephone infrastruc- 
ture ran aground because of the group's financial difficulties 
associated with Mexico's economic recession of 1995. Domos 
subsequently sold its participation in the joint venture to Italy's 
largest telecommunications concern, STET International 
Netherlands N.V. In 1997 the United States approved a private 
agreement between STET and the International Telephone 
and Telegraph (ITT) company, the owner of Cuba's telephone 
system prior to the revolution, wherein STET agreed to pay 
approximately US$25 million to ITT for the right to use its tele- 
phone system and avoid sanctions under the Helms-Burton 
Act. 



196 



The Economy 



Estimates of required investment for upgrading Cuba's 
national infrastructure range from US$900 million for the 
national telephone infrastructure to approximately US$2.5 bil- 
lion for upgrading the full complement of voice, data, and 
video communications infrastructure. These estimates support 
a plan to increase the national telephone density from its 
present levels to approximately eleven per 100 inhabitants, 
while increasing the density to fifteen per 100 inhabitants in 
the city of Havana. To attain a density of nine per 100 by the 
year 2004 would require the installation of approximately 
100,000 telephones per year. New telephone line installation 
has been programmed at approximately 70,000 per year, with 
an increased emphasis on the installation of public telephones 
throughout the island. An additional 8,000 coin- and card- 
operated public telephones (CCOPT) were planned for instal- 
lation during 2000, with a planned deployment of an addi- 
tional 52,000 public telephones by the year 2004. 

The bulk of the conversion to digital facilities by 2000 
occurred within the city of Havana consistent with the plan to 
increase telephone density in areas that promise a higher 
return on investment. As part of the infrastructure improve- 
ment effort, approximately 11,200 lines were assigned for 
award by municipal governments to residential users. 

Future development and deployment of Cuba's telecommu- 
nications infrastructure will be limited by per capita disposable 
income. The latter is a primary factor that has slowed the 
deployment of telephone service into the population main- 
stream. CCOPTs have served to fill this economic void. United 
States foreign policy is having and will have an impact on the 
development and growth rate of Cuba's telecommunications 
infrastructure because foreign investors have been careful not 
to violate United States law. 

Cuba receives hard-currency revenue from its international 
long-distance services. Approximately 70 percent of Cuba's 
international calls are made to or from the United States, con- 
necting the island to the large Cuban-American community liv- 
ing in the United States. Annual revenue from United States- 
Cuba long-distance services ranges from US$50 million to 
US$70 million for Cuba and approximately US$60 million to 
US$80 million for United States-based carriers that provide 
such service. 

Cuba's government has realized the importance of the devel- 
opment of a telecommunications infrastructure in support of 



197 



Cuba: A Country Study 

its economic development efforts and has prioritized the devel- 
opment of limited high bandwidth facilities, including Internet 
access for the diplomatic corps, joint ventures, and the govern- 
ment, education, tourism and financial sectors. Although lim- 
ited, this development has allowed sectors such as banking to 
provide and support basic services such as automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) . Chinese interests have created an additional 
force within the telecommunications industry, including the 
manufacture of telecommunications hardware for internal use 
and export. Cuba's telecommunications system naturally also 
includes television and radio. In 1997 Cuba had fifty-eight tele- 
vision broadcast stations and 2.64 million televisions. Cuban 
radio became a more dynamic mass medium in the late 1990s. 
The number of radio broadcast stations in 1998 totaled 169 
AM, fifty-five FM, and one shortwave. The country had 3.9 mil- 
lion radios in 1997. 

Tourism 

After shunning international tourism in the 1960s on the 
grounds that it represented foreign exploitation and behavior 
that was inconsistent with a socialist society, Cuba created the 
National Institute of Tourism (Instituto Nacional de Turismo — 
Intur) in the mid-1970s and began to encourage international 
tourism. In the 1980s, international tourism was recognized as 
a potentially important source of revenue for the island, but it 
became apparent that after more than two decades of neglect, 
the tourism infrastructure had deteriorated to the point that 
Cuba was incapable of competing with other tourist destina- 
tions. Cuba created two semiautonomous corporations — Cuba- 
nacan in 1987 and Grupo Gaviota in 1989 — to enlist foreign 
participation in the international tourism industry. The 
emphasis has been on building a physical infrastructure for the 
industry and improving the quality of services so as to be able 
to compete in the international tourism market. 

Tourism is the sector of the economy that first began to 
attract foreign investment, with the first joint venture estab- 
lished in 1988. Particularly active in joint venturing in the tour- 
ism industry have been investors from Canada, Germany, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, and Spain. In many instances, the 
joint ventures are actually closer to management contracts: the 
foreign partner assumes management of a tourism facility, 
obtaining a flow of tourists from its home market, and ensuring 



198 




199 



Cuba: A Country Study 



that the quality of the tourism services meets international 
standards. 

The Cuban tourism industry has thrived in the 1990s. This 
growth is reflected in the increasing capacity to accommodate 
tourists; the stock of hotel rooms increased from about 32,000 
in 1991 to about 41,000 in 1997 (see table 10, Appendix). 
Meanwhile, the stock of hotel rooms suitable for international 
tourism more than doubled between 1990 and 1996, from 
12,900 to 26,900 rooms, evidence that new construction is 
aimed at the international tourism market and that some of 
the stock of hotel rooms have been upgraded to meet higher 
international standards. 

The number of foreign visitors nearly tripled, going from 
340,000 in 1990 to nearly 1.2 million in 1997. Gross revenue 
from international tourism in 1997 has been estimated at 1,543 
million pesos. About a third is estimated to be net revenue. 

With regard to efficiency indicators, the occupancy rate of 
hotel rooms overall was nearly 70 percent in 1991; it fell to 
about 60 percent in subsequent years. For hotel rooms suitable 
for international tourism, the occupancy rate increased from 
about 40 percent in the early 1990s to more than 50 percent in 
1995-96. However, the average length of stay of foreign visitors 
declined from 8.7 days in 1990-91 to 7.3 days in 1996. 

Income per visitor per day increased steadily over the 1990- 
96 period, from US$82.50 in 1990 to US$187.80 in 1996. 
According to an industry expert, Cuba continues to be 
regarded as an inexpensive "package" destination, reflecting 
the initial tourism strategy of quickly penetrating source mar- 
kets by offering low, all-inclusive packages. Moreover, the abil- 
ity to increase prices is hindered by the lack of quality of 
products and services in other associated industries: food and 
beverage operations, retail facilities, recreation and entertain- 
ment activities, and other tourism infrastructure. 

Labor 

The 1981 population census, the last such census conducted 
on the island, revealed that 52.3 percent of the population fif- 
teen years of age and over was economically active (that is, 
employed or looking for work, excluding retirees, students, 
those unable to work, and persons who were primarily home- 
makers). With respect to gender, 71.5 percent of males and 
32.8 percent of females fifteen years of age and over were eco- 
nomically active. 



200 



The Economy 



Labor statistics published by the Cuban government 
through the 1980s were scanty and tended to focus on employ- 
ment in the state sector. This emphasis on state-sector employ- 
ment reflected both the very small role of the nonstate sector 
in the economy and the full employment policy of the govern- 
ment. Cuban economist Jose Luis Rodriguez has estimated that 
in 1988 the Cuban state controlled all of the industrial, con- 
struction, retail trade, wholesale and foreign trade, banking, 
and education sectors, almost all of the transportation sector, 
and 92 percent of the agricultural sector. The full employment 
policy pursued by the government resulted in bloated payrolls 
of state enterprises, very low open unemployment rates — for 
example, a reported 1.3 percent in the 1970 census of popula- 
tion and 3.4 percent in the 1981 census — but very high rates of 
underemployment (see Glossary). 

Since 1962, wages of Cuban workers have been set on the 
basis of a uniform, nationwide wage scale for various categories 
of jobs. Prior to a wage reform carried out in 1981 to stem the 
flight of workers from the agricultural sector, average earnings 
of agricultural workers were substantially below those of other 
sectors of the economy. They were, for example, about 20 per- 
cent below the overall average for all workers in 1975 and 14 
percent in 1980. After 1981 the gap between wages of agricul- 
tural and nonagricultural workers was closed. By 1988-89, aver- 
age monthly earnings of agricultural workers were at, or near, 
the average for workers in the productive sphere and higher 
than the average earnings of workers in certain sectors within 
the productive sphere, such as commerce and communica- 
tions. 

In 1989 average monthly earnings of Cuban workers in each 
of the main economic sectors, in pesos per month, were cul- 
ture and arts, 223; science and technology, 217; transportation, 
211; administration, 201; construction, 201; public health, 
social security and tourism, 195; education, 191; finance and 
insurance, 190; agriculture, 186; industry, 186; forestry, 184; 
communications, 176; community and personal services, 164; 
and commerce, 163. Within the industrial sector, average 
monthly earnings ranged from 237 pesos per month for work- 
ers in electricity production and distribution to 141 pesos per 
month for workers in the apparel industry. 

Statistics released by Cuba to ECLAC (Economic Commis- 
sion for Latin America and the Caribbean) permit an examina- 
tion of the labor market in the 1990s. In 1989, the year just 



201 



Cuba: A Country Study 



prior to the beginning of the economic crisis, 92.1 percent of 
the economically active population was reported as being 
employed and 7.9 percent as unemployed. Of those employed, 
80.1 percent held jobs as state civilian employees, 13.8 percent 
held other state jobs, and 5.3 percent held nonstate jobs, such 
as cooperative members, private farmers, and self-employed or 
salaried workers. With regard to the unemployed, four-fifths 
had lost their jobs and were seeking a new one, while one-fifth 
were new entrants into the labor force seeking a first job. 

During the 1990s, the economically active population actu- 
ally declined, from 4.7 million persons in 1989 to 4.5 million 
persons in 1995, recovering to 4.6 million in 1996 (see table 11, 
Appendix) . The decline in the economically active population 
is attributable to several factors, among them declining fertility, 
the shift of some persons from the formal to the informal econ- 
omy, early retirement, and emigration. Employment also fell 
during the 1990s; in 1996 total employment was nearly 3 per- 
cent below the corresponding level in 1989. 

State-sector employment in 1989 was roughly 4.1 million 
workers, of whom 3.5 million were civilian employees and 
600,000 were classified as other state employees. During the 
1990s, state-sector employment fell sharply, reflecting the 
severe dislocations suffered by state enterprises and sharp 
reductions in the size of the armed forces. By 1996 overall state 
employment was roughly 3.2 million workers, 22 percent lower 
than in 1989. State civilian employment was 24 percent lower 
in 1997 than in 1990; particularly significant were reductions in 
state employment in agriculture and related activities (77 per- 
cent) because of the creation of UBPCs and in manufacturing 
(18 percent) (see table 12, Appendix). 

The sharp reductions in economic activity of the 1990s are 
not reflected in the open unemployment statistics because of 
explicit government policies to shield workers from the impact 
of the economic crisis and the rapid growth of employment in 
the nonstate sector. However, severe reductions in imports of 
fuels, raw materials, and spare parts have significantly reduced 
economic activity and labor demand. In September 1990, for 
example, President Castro announced that several recently 
completed investments would remain idle, among them a 
nickel production plant and an oil refinery, and that an exist- 
ing nickel-producing plant would cease to operate because of 
lack of fuel. In mid-October 1990, the Ministry of Light Indus- 
try reported that 321 factories under its control were operating 



202 



The Economy 



at the rate of twenty-four hours per week and that twenty-six 
others had been shut down altogether. In 1992 the State Com- 
mittee on Labor and Social Security (Comite Estatal de Trabajo 
y Seguridad Social — CETSS) reported that 155,000 workers 
had lost their jobs as a result of the lack of imported inputs. 
Finally, in May 1993 about 60 percent of Cuba's factories were 
reportedly idle because of shortages of fuels, raw materials, and 
spare parts. Yet the number of workers who had lost their jobs 
and were seeking new employment peaked at nearly 300,000 
workers in 1989 and fell to fewer than 215,000 workers in 
1992-93. 

The Fourth Congress of the PCC, held in October 1991, 
addressed the problem of worker dislocations and adopted 
new rules as part of its resolution on economic development. 
The document assures a basic income for every family or 
worker and maintains the right of each citizen to work. In 
those cases where it is not possible to keep someone working, 
the worker will retain the right to the post and will receive a 
percentage of his or her salary, according to current legisla- 
tion." 

In July 1990, in anticipation of the worst in economic dislo- 
cations, the CETSS adopted rules to facilitate the transfer of 
dislocated workers ( trabajadores disponibles) from one workplace 
to another. The rules identified agriculture as the employer of 
last resort, that is, a sector of the economy that could absorb 
additional workers from other sectors. The rules also retained 
the existing system of payments to dislocated workers, which 
ranged from one month to a maximum of one year depending 
on the length of service in the job (payments for a full year 
were available only to workers with job tenure of more than ten 
years) and calculated on the basis of a declining wage replace- 
ment formula of 100 percent for the first month, 70 percent 
for the second month, and 50 percent for subsequent months. 

In November 1990, as the economic situation deteriorated 
and it became increasingly clear that the nature and depth of 
the dislocations could not be addressed by shifting workers 
from one workplace to another, the CETSS issued new rules to 
deal with the problem of redundant or surplus workers ( traba- 
jadores sobrantes) . The new rules made it easier to reassign work- 
ers to other workplaces or occupations and modified the 
compensation system to recognize the long-term duration of 
the dislocations. Thus, time limits on payment of compensa- 
tion were removed, and the wage replacement percentages 



203 



Cuba: A Country Study 

were readjusted to 100 percent for the first month and 60 per- 
cent for each subsequent month. While receiving these bene- 
fits, workers maintained an association with their workplaces — 
even if their workplaces were shut down — and therefore were 
not considered unemployed. 

At the same time that state-sector employment was shrink- 
ing, employment in the nonstate sector was growing at a very 
fast pace: nonstate-sector employment increased more than 
four-fold, from about 230,000 in 1989 to more than 1 million in 
1996, absorbing a large portion of workers shed by the state 
sector. It should be noted, however, that the growth of employ- 
ment in the nonstate sector does not uniformly represent net 
job creation because structural shifts have occurred that affect 
the distribution of employment between the state and nonstate 
sectors. The most significant shift is with regard to the agricul- 
tural sector, where the creation of the UBPCs added approxi- 
mately 240,000 workers to the nonstate sector in 1994; these 
workers were formerly employees of state farms and were 
counted as employees of the state sector. Similarly, it is not 
clear that increases in the category of "salaried workers" actu- 
ally represent new job creation because they may reflect the 
shift of some state enterprises to joint ventures with foreign 
investors or to sociedades anonimas (stock companies) operating 
outside of the state sector. 

The only available statistics regarding the distribution of 
employment by economic activity are for employees of the state 
civilian sector. Although these statistics were a good proxy for 
overall employment during the time period when the state con- 
trolled the bulk of economic activities, they are less so now 
because of structural changes that have occurred, and there- 
fore must be examined with much caution. 

In 1990 the manufacturing sector accounted for about 19 
percent of state civilian employment, while the percentage for 
the agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing sectors totaled 22 
percent. Other significant economic activities in terms of 
employment were commerce, restaurants, and hotels (12 per- 
cent); and construction (nearly 9 percent). Employment in 
manufacturing, construction, commerce, restaurants, and 
hotels declined during the 1990s, consistent with reports that 
these areas of economic activity were particularly hard hit by 
shortages of imports. 

Employment in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 
rose in the early 1990s, consistent with information suggesting 



204 




A 1950s-era North American automobile (una maquina) 

still in use in Havana, 1997 
Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 

that workers dislocated from manufacturing, construction, and 
other activities were being reassigned to agricultural activities. 
The sharp drop in agricultural employment in 1994 did not 
necessarily reflect a reversal of this trend but rather the shift of 
a large number of state workers to the nonstate sector upon the 
creation of the UBPCs. 

The Second Economy 

The term second economy originates from the literature on 
centrally planned economies. It has been used by scholars to 
comprise economic activities outside the first, official, or 
planned economy. Certain characteristics of centrally planned 
economies — overwhelming government ownership of the 
means of production, tautness or rigidity of central plans, and 
suppressed inflation — account for both the quantitative impor- 
tance of the first economy and the pervasiveness of activities 
outside of it. 

Cuba's first economy consists of economic activities under 
the control of the socialist state and subject to the central plan. 
Through the late 1980s, although the Cuban state controlled 



205 



Cuba: A Country Study 



nearly all economic activities on the island, some economic 
activities for private gain were permitted to exist alongside the 
planned state economy. These second economy activities 
included agriculture, where private farmers controlled a por- 
tion of the land; the sale of certain personal services; and, for a 
period during the early 1980s, farmers' markets and artisan 
markets. Other economic activities outside of state control 
were those conducted illegally, such as black-market operations 
and unauthorized use of government resources. 

There are no readily available measures or estimates of the 
magnitude of Cuba's second economy. However, an examina- 
tion of official statistics on overall agricultural output, civilian 
employment, and the structure of the population's income sug- 
gests that private, legal economic activity in the 1980s probably 
accounted for about 6 percent of GSP (global social product) , 
employed about 230,000 workers, or about 5 percent of civilian 
employment, and accounted for 5 to 6 percent of the popula- 
tion's income. It is even more difficult to estimate the value of 
illegal economic activities because participants in illegal eco- 
nomic activities place a high premium on the anonymity of 
their actions and deal almost exclusively with cash transactions 
in order to avoid audit trails that could reveal their activities. 

As the bottom fell out of the first economy during the early 
1990s, the second economy expanded to fill the gap. Accord- 
ing to the Domestic Consumer Demand Institute (Instituto de 
la Demanda Interna — IDI), the value of black-market transac- 
tions rose from 17 percent of retail sales in 1990 to more than 
60 percent in 1992 as money supply expanded and the avail- 
ability of goods and services through the state distribution sys- 
tem contracted. Illegal forms of self-employment reportedly 
also increased during the early 1990s. 

Several of the policy initiatives pursued in the 1990s have 
stimulated the second economy. These initiatives include the 
creation of the UBPCs, authorization of self-employment, stim- 
ulation of joint ventures with foreign investors, creation of agri- 
cultural and artisan markets, decriminalization of the use of 
convertible currencies, establishment of government-operated 
foreign currency Exchange Houses, decentralization of foreign 
trade activities, and formation of semiautonomous corpora- 
tions. That the economic policies to overcome the economic 
crisis are centered on second-economy activities is a tacit 
admission that the first economy is no longer viable in an eco- 
nomic environment in which there are no trade subsidies or 



206 



The Economy 



economic assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Background, 1960-90 

Beginning in the early 1960s, and through around 1990, 
Cuba's external sector was segmented into two parts: economic 
relations with the socialist world, conducted within the frame- 
work of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 
and economic relations with market economies, mainly West 
European nations, Canada, Japan, and some key developing 
countries. Economic relations with the socialist countries were 
by far the more significant quantitatively; relations with market 
economies, although quantitatively small, were strategically sig- 
nificant, however, because they afforded Cuba the possibility to 
import goods and services and obtain technology not available 
from the socialist nations. 

Relations with Socialist Countries 

Cuba's economic relations with the Soviet Union and social- 
ist countries were based on a web of bilateral agreements cover- 
ing merchandise trade, payments, credits, and technical 
assistance. During the 1961-69 period alone, Cuba concluded 
more than 400 bilateral agreements with socialist countries. To 
coordinate the burgeoning economic and scientific-technical 
assistance relationship, several government-to-government 
commissions were established in the 1960s and 1970s with the 
German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (in 1964), Bul- 
garia and Czechoslovakia (1965), Hungary (1966), Romania 
(1967), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) (1968), Poland (1969), and the Soviet Union (1970). 
Economic relations with socialist countries deepened after 
1972, when Cuba became a member of the CMEA. 

The bulk of Cuba's trade with socialist countries was con- 
ducted through bilateral balancing agreements — tantamount 
to barter arrangements — in which individual transactions were 
made and accounts settled, using either the currency of one of 
the partner countries or "transferable rubles." The latter was 
an artificial currency whose sole role was to serve as the unit of 
account in transactions among socialist countries. Because nei- 
ther the currencies of socialist countries nor the "transferable 
ruble" could be freely converted or exchanged into "hard" cur- 



207 



Cuba: A Country Study 



rencies — for example, the United States dollar, Deutsche mark, 
and Japanese yen — to purchase goods and services in interna- 
tional markets, socialist nations made efforts to balance trade 
bilaterally each year. To the extent that trade was not balanced 
annually, the gap was covered by "soft" (transferable ruble) 
credits. 

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began to purchase Cuban 
sugar at prices that were fixed for several years (typically, five 
years) . Because world market prices for sugar fluctuated — 
sometimes exceeding, but more often falling below the con- 
tracted price — the arrangement tended to favor Cuba. In 
December 1972, Cuba and the Soviet Union signed two agree- 
ments that formalized a system of preferential, that is, higher 
than world market, prices for Cuban nickel and sugar exports. 
The price of nickel was set for five-year intervals, but it was 
raised whenever the world market price exceeded this thresh- 
old by a substantial margin. In 1981-84, for example, Cuba 
greatly benefitted from Soviet concessionary prices for nickel 
imports, which were more than twice the world market price. 

In the aftermath of very high world market prices for sugar 
in 1974 and 1975, the contract price for Cuban sugar exports 
to the Soviet Union and other CMEA nations was renegotiated 
and adjusted upward. In 1975 Cuba and the Soviet Union 
agreed to a mechanism whereby sugar export prices were 
adjusted annually, above a very high base price, in proportion 
to changes in the prices of a basket of commodities Cuba 
imported from the Soviet Union. As a result of this indexing 
arrangement, henceforth the price of Cuban sugar exports to 
the Soviet Union consistently exceeded the world market price 
by a considerable margin. Cuba also negotiated agreements 
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania, all of which granted preferential prices 
to Cuban sugar exports. In addition, Cuba benefitted in the 
1960s, 1970s, and the first half of the 1980s from pricing 
arrangements in intra-CMEA trade that held the price of oil 
below the world market price. 

The Soviet Union became revolutionary Cuba's almost sole 
supplier of oil and oil products in 1960, on the heels of the 
Cuban government's takeover of the refineries operated by 
Western multinational oil companies. The price of Soviet oil 
exports, like the prices of other basic commodities traded by 
socialist countries among themselves, was fixed for a five-year 
period, purportedly to avoid fluctuations in capitalist world 



208 



The Economy 



markets. Because of this arrangement, Cuba was spared the 
shock associated with the quadrupling of world oil market 
prices that occurred in 1973 and additional price increases in 
1974. In 1975, however, the Soviet Union began to adjust prices 
of oil exports to its CMEA allies annually, based on a moving 
average of world market prices in the previous five years. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, as world oil market 
prices rose, Cuba benefitted from this arrangement. But as 
world oil market prices fell in the mid-1980s, the arrangement 
worked to Cuba's disadvantage, with the island paying prices in 
the late 1980s for Soviet oil that were above the world market 
price. Over the entire 1960-90 period, however, the oil price 
supply arrangements with the Soviet Union resulted in net 
gains for Cuba. 

From 1962 to 1974, Cuba's merchandise trade turnover — 
the sum of merchandise exports and imports- — averaged 24 
percent of GSP; in 1985-89 it averaged 50 percent, evidencing 
greater openness of the economy and the greater influence of 
trade. Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and the other 
socialist countries had accounted for the bulk of Cuba's trade, 
far outstripping trade with capitalist countries and with devel- 
oping countries. Over the 1983-89 period, the socialist country 
members of the CMEA (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Ger- 
many, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) 
absorbed 82.9 percent of Cuba's exports and accounted for 
82.7 percent of Cuba's imports; other socialist countries (Alba- 
nia, China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia) 
accounted for 3.9 percent of exports and 3.1 percent of 
imports; capitalist countries were responsible for 9.3 percent of 
exports and 9.9 percent of imports; and developing countries 
accounted for 6.8 percent of exports and 6.5 percent of 
imports. 

Merchandise trade deficits set records in the 1980s, as Cuba's 
imports rose at a much faster rate than exports. The deficit 
rose from 660 million pesos in 1980 to 2.0 billion in 1985; in 
1989 the deficit recorded an all-time record high when it 
reached more than 2.7 billion pesos. The percentage of the 
overall trade deficit incurred with the Soviet Union rose 
steadily in the second half of the 1980s, from about 50 percent 
in 1984-85 to more than 80 percent in 1988-89. These huge 
deficits in bilateral trade were routinely financed through 
transferable ruble credits underwritten by the Soviet Union. 



209 



Cuba: A Country Study 



The large trade deficits with the Soviet Union are the more 
remarkable given the very favorable terms of trade (see Glos- 
sary) for Cuba's main exports (sugar and nickel) and imports 
(oil) . The socialist practice of fixing commodity prices for mul- 
tiyear periods (typically the five-year period covered by a plan) 
eliminated the world market commodity price fluctuations. 
They also resulted in transfers from one country to the other 
(nonrepayable subsidies) whenever intra-CMEA prices 
diverged from world market prices. 

Another oil trade arrangement between Cuba and the Soviet 
Union that benefitted Cuba was the latter country's ability to 
reexport Soviet oil to buyers willing to pay with convertible cur- 
rency. In 1977 Cuba reexported more than 900,000 tons of oil 
obtained from the Soviet Union; the volume of reexported oil 
rose to 2 million tons in 1982 and peaked at 3.7 million tons in 
1986. The significance of these exports for the Cuban economy 
should not be underestimated. In 1986 and 1987, oil reexports 
overtook sugar as Cuba's most significant convertible currency 
export earner, contributing 30 and 27 percent, respectively, of 
convertible currency earnings in those two years. 

Economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has estimated the magnitude 
of Soviet nonrepayable price subsidies to Cuba related to sugar, 
nickel, and oil trade on the basis of differences between the 
prices paid (in the case of sugar and nickel) or charged (in the 
case of oil) by the Soviet Union and world market prices. His 
estimates put overall Soviet nonrepayable price subsidies over 
the 1960-90 period at 39.4 billion pesos, of which 28.5 percent 
were granted during 1976-80, 40.0 percent during 1981-85, 
and 25.7 percent during 1986-90. 

Relations with Capitalist Countries 

Meanwhile, Cuban trade with developed market economies 
and with many developing countries was conducted following 
common commercial practices and using convertible curren- 
cies. Cuba earned convertible currencies through sale of its 
exports (especially sugar) and used such earnings to finance 
imports from convertible currency areas. On occasion, Western 
governments, financial institutions, or suppliers provided con- 
vertible currency credits to Cuba to finance imports; these 
interest-bearing credits were repayable in convertible curren- 
cies subject to a predetermined schedule. Because of currency 
inconvertibility, Cuba could not apply surpluses in trade with 



210 



The Economy 



the socialist countries to offset deficits with developed market 
economies or to service debt with these nations. 

In conclusion, Cuba's external accounts were segmented 
into nonconvertible or soft currency accounts that covered 
most of the country's commercial and financial relations with 
the socialist nations, and convertible currency accounts that 
applied to economic relations with the rest of the world. The 
nonconvertible currency accounts dominated: over the 1978- 
85 period, for example, Cuba sold 76 percent of its exports and 
purchased 83 percent of its imports using these currencies. 

Even after the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had 
begun to disappear, Cuba continued to argue for maintaining 
the CMEA and the preferential relations it had enjoyed with 
socialist countries. At the January 1990 meeting of the CMEA, 
the Soviet Union proposed that, effective January 1, 1991, 
trade among member countries be conducted on the basis of 
market prices and convertible currencies. The Cuban repre- 
sentative took issue with the proposal, arguing that it would 
restore the "production anarchy" associated with markets and 
result in unfair terms of trade for developing countries within 
the CMEA (Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam), and calling for a 
continuation of preferential treatment for these countries. Not 
only were Cuba's arguments ignored, but a few months later 
the CMEA was dissolved. The CMEA's dissolution forced Cuba 
to adjust in a very short period of time to commercial relations 
based on world market prices and convertible currencies and 
eliminated the dichotomy in external sector accounts between 
nonconvertible and convertible currency accounts. 

Foreign Trade and Finance 

Currency 

The official Cuban currency is the peso (for value of the 
peso — see Glossary). From 1914 to 1971, the peso was 
exchanged at par with the United States dollar, but since 1961 
the Cuban currency has not been freely exchanged in interna- 
tional markets. The peso was linked to the pound sterling for 
trade purposes beginning in 1961. With the floating of the 
United States dollar in 1971, the value of the peso appreciated 
vis-a-vis the United States dollar through its link with the 
pound. The link with the pound was reportedly severed in 1974 
by Cuban monetary authorities; beginning in 1976, the peso 
was placed on a controlled float, its value determined on the 



211 



Cuba: A Country Study 



basis of the value of a basket of currencies that accounted for 
the bulk of Cuba's international transactions. 

It is widely accepted that the official exchange rate of the 
peso vis-a-vis the United States dollar vastly overstates the pur- 
chasing power of the peso, but the precise extent of overvalua- 
tion has been difficult to establish. Pick's Currency Yearbook 
reported black-market Cuban peso exchange rates resulting 
from unauthorized dealings of foreign currency banknotes 
and/ or unlicensed transfers abroad in the range of six to ten 
pesos for one United States dollar in 1970-72, about nine pesos 
for one United States dollar in 1973-76, and ten to fifteen 
pesos for one United States dollar in 1977-79. In the 1980s, the 
black-market rate was reported to be four to eight pesos for 
one United States dollar. 

The value of the peso dropped precipitously in the 1990s as 
Cuban citizens expressed a very strong preference for holding 
United States dollars to obtain goods and services that were not 
available through the centrally planned first economy. In mid- 
1994 the peso reached probably its lowest point when it was 
exchanged at about 150 pesos for one United States dollar. In 
the second half of the 1990s, the unofficial exchange rate fluc- 
tuated in the range of twenty to twenty-two pesos for one 
United States dollar (twenty-two in 2000). 

Cuban official statistics are invariably reported on the basis 
of domestic currency, that is, pesos. Given the large disparity 
between the official and unofficial exchange rate, it is difficult 
to determine which exchange rate to use to convert Cuban 
pesos data to a convertible currency, such as the United States 
dollar, for international comparisons and other purposes. 
Thus, much caution must be exercised in using statistics 
regarding the foreign sector that may have been converted to 
United States dollars or some other convertible currency. 

Merchandise Trade 

Cuban merchandise exports in 1993 amounted to slightly 
more than 1.1 billion pesos, 79 percent lower than the 5.4 bil- 
lion recorded in 1989. Over the same period, merchandise 
imports fell from 8.1 billion to slightly more than 2.0 billion 
pesos, or by 75 percent. In 1994 exports recovered slightly, 
increasing by about 17 percent to about 1.3 billion, while 
imports fell by about 1 percent. In 1996 exports peaked at 
nearly 1.9 billion pesos, falling to 1.8 billion in 1997 and 1.4 bil- 



212 



The Economy 



lion in 1998. Meanwhile, imports grew steadily, to 4.1 billion 
pesos in 1997 and 4.2 billion in 1998. 

Prior to the changes in international economic relations 
that occurred in the 1990s, Cuba routinely ran a very large 
merchandise trade deficit, financed mainly by bilateral credits 
from the Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Soviet Union 
as a source of trade financing meant that Cuba had to reduce 
its imports drastically to bring them closer to exports. Lacking 
financing from the former Soviet Union, Cuba saw its trade 
deficit fall sharply in 1992, to 535 million pesos, but grow there- 
after to about 950 million pesos in 1993, 970 million pesos in 
1994, 1.5 billion pesos in 1995, 1.8 billion pesos in 1996, 2.2 bil- 
lion pesos in 1997, and nearly 2.8 billion pesos in 1998. The 
1998 trade deficit was five-fold its level in 1992. 

Russia occupied first place among destinations of Cuban 
merchandise exports in 1997, taking about 17 percent of 
Cuba's exports. Other top destinations of Cuban exports in 
1997 (in descending order) were Canada, Spain, Egypt, China, 
Japan, Iran, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Dominican Republic, 
and the United Kingdom. 

Spain was Cuba's largest supplier of merchandise imports in 
1997, providing 12 percent of imports. Other significant suppli- 
ers of merchandise imports to Cuba in 1997 (in descending 
order) were Venezuela, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Canada, 
France, China, Italy, and Vietnam. 

With regard to the composition of merchandise exports, 
sugar and related products remain the most significant 
exports. Sugar and related products accounted for more than 
50 percent of the value of Cuban merchandise exports in the 
first half of the 1990s, falling below this mark for the first time 
in 1997 (47 percent). According to statistics of the Interna- 
tional Sugar Organization, Russia remained the top importer 
of Cuban sugar, accounting for 41 percent of the quantity of 
exports in 1997, with Egypt, China, Iran, and Japan also signifi- 
cant purchasers of Cuban sugar. Products of the mining indus- 
try, especially nickel, were the second most significant category 
of merchandise exports. Canada and the Netherlands pur- 
chased almost all such exports. 

Fuels continue to be Cuba's most significant merchandise 
import, accounting for 33 to 35 percent of the total value of 
imports in the early 1990s and about 25 percent in 1997. Russia 
continues to be a principal supplier of Cuba's fuels, but Latin 
American countries — Venezuela, Mexico, and the Netherlands 



213 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Antilles — also provided significant amounts of fuels during 
some years in the 1990s. The Cuban leadership slashed imports 
of machinery, semifinished goods, raw materials, and con- 
sumer goods to be able to finance imports of fuels and foods: 
in 1993, imports of machinery amounted to 13 percent of their 
level in 1989, raw materials 15 percent, consumer goods 22 per- 
cent, and semifinished goods 26 percent. In 1995-97, imports 
in all four of these categories rose, contributing to the signifi- 
cant expansion of the merchandise trade deficit that occurred 
between 1994 and 1997. 

Development Assistance 

Socialist countries were the source of nearly all of the devel- 
opment finance received by revolutionary Cuba. No systematic 
data exist on development assistance to Cuba, but scattered 
information suggests that aid was substantial. Originating pri- 
marily from the Soviet Union, the aid covered a wide range of 
economic activities and took mostly the form of loans repay- 
able at very low interest rates. 

According to Cuban sources, during the 1981-85 period the 
Soviet Union provided the island with 1.8 billion rubles in 
development assistance (mostly loans), while East European 
socialist countries granted about 1 billion rubles and the 
CMEA another 1 billion rubles in multilateral assistance. Up 
through 1986, the Soviet Union had assisted Cuba in complet- 
ing 360 development projects, and 289 others were in progress. 
Enterprises built with Soviet assistance were responsible for 15 
percent of gross industrial output, 100 percent of the nation's 
output of steel plates, 90 percent of its steel products, 50 per- 
cent of mixed fertilizers, 70 percent of nitrogen fertilizers, 70 
percent of electricity, 50 percent of products of the metalwork- 
ing industry, 100 percent of the repair of Soviet vehicles, and 
65 percent of textiles. 

Economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has estimated that the Soviet 
Union provided resources to Cuba amounting to more than 
US$65 billion during the 1960-90 period; about 67 percent of 
this total was extended in the 1980s. Approximately 40 percent 
of the flow of resources (about US$25.7 billion) took the form 
of repayable loans — credits to finance trade deficits (27 per- 
cent) and development credits (13 percent). As indicated 
above, about 60 percent (US$39.4 billion) was in the form of 
nonrepayable price subsidies. 



214 



The Economy 



Debt 

Cuba has not officially released information on its debt with 
the former Soviet Union and East European socialist countries. 
According to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the then-Soviet prime 
minister, Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union on November 1, 
1989, amounted to 15.49 billion transferable rubles; Cuba was 
the largest debtor country to the Soviet Union, accounting for 
18.1 percent of outstanding debt. Cuba reportedly also had 
outstanding debt of more than 1 billion rubles with Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and a debt of 2 billion East Ger- 
man marks with East Germany in 1989. 

Mesa-Lago has estimated Cuba's overall debt to the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 at nearly US$27 billion 
(using the official exchange rate of one ruble equals US$1.58) 
and at US$30.2 billion in 1990 (using the official exchange rate 
of one ruble equals US$1.78). Because the value of the ruble 
vis-a-vis the United States dollar fell sharply in the 1990s, so has 
the value of the Cuban debt in United States dollar terms. No 
information is available on the currency in which the Cuban 
debt to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is to be 
valued or to be repaid. 

In 1969 Cuba's convertible currency debt was small, amount- 
ing to US$291 million; it grew rapidly in the 1970s, reaching 
more than US$1.3 billion in 1975 and nearly US$3.3 billion in 
1979 as Cuba borrowed heavily from commercial banks flush 
with "petrodollars" and official lenders willing to back sales of 
machinery and equipment to the island. In 1982 a sharp reduc- 
tion in short-term loans and deposits prompted Cuba to seek to 
reschedule its convertible currency debt due in 1982-85. Cuba 
succeeded in getting some short-term relief, but a sharp deteri- 
oration in the balance of payments (see Glossary) in 1985 led 
to Cuba's decision to suspend payment on convertible currency 
effective July 1, 1986. The unpaid debt and accrued service 
payments amounted to nearly US$6.1 billion in 1987, US$6.5 
billion in 1988, and US$6.2 billion in 1989. 

Cuba suspended service on its convertible currency debt 
effective July 1, 1986. Although this action had a favorable 
impact on the balance of payments because service payments 
were avoided, it seriously impaired Cuba's ability to turn to for- 
eign markets to obtain new long-term credits. As a result, since 
the mid-1980s Cuba has had to rely primarily on short-term 
debt at very high interest rates. Loans amounted to US$473 
million in 1995. Convertible currency capital flows into the 



215 



Cuba: A Country Study 



island during the 1960-90 period consisted primarily of loans 
from private and public institutions and supplier credits as 
Cuba effectively banned foreign investment. 

Outstanding debt grew from nearly US$8.8 billion in 1993 to 
about US$9.1 billion in 1994, US$10.5 billion in 1995, and 
US$11.2 billion in 1998 (see table 13, Appendix). The fact that 
the outstanding debt grew does not mean that Cuba actually 
obtained fresh loans: the year-to-year value of the outstanding 
debt is affected by several factors, among them the accumula- 
tion of unpaid interest and relative changes in the value of cur- 
rencies in which the debt was contracted. 

Balance of Payments 

Socialist Cuba began to publish balance of payments statis- 
tics in the 1990s. During the 1980s, Cuba did publish balance 
of payments statistics for its convertible currency accounts, in a 
series of reports that were issued beginning in 1982 by the BNC 
(Cuban National Bank) to support renegotiation of the con- 
vertible currency debt held by Western creditors. These partial 
balance of payments statistics are of very limited value because 
convertible currency transactions accounted for only a small 
share of overall economic activity in Cuba during the 1980s. 
The lack of comprehensive balance of payments statistics 
means that there are no data on important components of the 
external sector, such as overall trade in services, transfers, and 
capital flows. 

The shift in Cuban external economic relations in the 1990s 
to the use of convertible currencies did away with the dichot- 
omy in external accounts, eliminating the soft currency 
accounts. The BNC and its successor, the BCC, have published 
balance of payments statistics (in pesos, at the official rate of 
one peso equals US$1) for 1993-98 purporting to cover the 
totality of external economic relations (see table 14, Appen- 
dix). 

Cuba ran surpluses in services trade every year during the 
1993-98 period; the surpluses were quite sizable, particularly 
after 1994. The favorable balance in the services export 
account presumably reflects the performance of the interna- 
tional tourism industry. As discussed above, foreign investment 
has played an important role in the development of this indus- 
try. 

Income generated by tourism rose by 535 percent between 
1990 and 1997; it first exceeded the US$1 billion mark in 1995 



216 



Taxis and buses waiting for tourists in downtown Havana 

Courtesy Suzanne Petrie 



and reached more than US$1.5 billion in 1997. Tourism sur- 
passed nickel to become the second largest source of revenue 
in 1991 and overtook sugar exports in 1994. It should be noted, 
however, that these income figures refer to gross income and 
include the value of imported goods and services consumed by 
visitors; the foreign exchange cost of capital investment; pay- 
ments that leave Cuba in the form of profits, interest payments, 
royalties, management fees, payments to foreign travel agents 
and so on; the cost of advertising and promoting travel to 
Cuba; the overseas cost of training service personnel; and avia- 
tion receipts from its airlines and airport fees. 

A better measure of tourism's contribution to the balance of 
payments would be net receipts, that is, gross receipts minus 
the associated convertible-currency imports and other expen- 
ditures. For the Cuban tourism industry, net receipts are a frac- 
tion of gross income: in the range of 30 to 38 percent, 
according to studies conducted by the Ministry of Tourism, 
and about 33 percent according to Francoise Simon, an expert 
in international tourism. Reports on the performance of the 
Cuban tourism industry often do not distinguish between gross 



217 



Cuba: A Country Study 



and net receipts, with Cuban officials tending to report only 
gross receipts, which are, of course, larger. 

Transfers 

In the balance of payments methodology, transfers are flows 
of resources from one economy to another for which there is 
no quid pro quo. Transfers could be official — for example, for- 
eign grants or aid in kind for which no repayment is 
required — or private remittances from persons who have emi- 
grated to relatives or friends who have remained at home. 
According to ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean), net transfers were negative in 1989-90, 
meaning that resources actually flowed out of the Cuban econ- 
omy in those two years in the form of transfers; they turned 
positive beginning in 1991, however, and boomed thereafter. 
According to Cuban official statistics, transfers were US$263 
million in 1993, US$646 million in 1995, and US$820 million 
in 1998. Transfers have been Cuba's most significant source of 
convertible currency since 1996, exceeding gross revenue from 
sugar or nickel and net revenues from tourism. 

According to ECLAC, transfers received by Cuba are pre- 
dominantly private and take the form of cash remittances from 
residents of the United States to persons in Cuba. The primary 
motivation for private remittances to Cuba appears to be the 
desire on the part of emigrants to ease the economic hardships 
being experienced by relatives and friends on the island during 
the Special Period. The ECLAC private remittance estimates 
should be used with caution, as they seem to be derived as a 
residual from the balance of payments rather than through 
direct measurement. 

Investment 

Balance of payments statistics report that direct investment 
on the island amounted to US$54 million in 1993, US$563 mil- 
lion in 1994, US$4.7 million in 1995, US$82 million in 1996, 
US$442 million in 1997, and US$207 million in 1998. These 
statistics are significant for at least two reasons: First, they are 
the first official statistics on actual investment flows reported by 
the Cuban government. And second, they suggest lower invest- 
ment flows than had been reported by Cuban officials and are 
found in Cuban investment promotional literature. 

Cuban officials have cited the threat of possible action by the 
United States government against potential or actual investors 



218 



The Economy 



as justification for the secrecy with which they treat investment 
data. The rationale behind the policy of "minimum reporting," 
as articulated by Vice President Carlos Lage Davila, is "the pres- 
sure which everyone who comes to invest in Cuba is subjected 
to by the United States." Although this may be so, it is also pos- 
sible that the lack of transparency in reporting foreign invest- 
ment information may be a deliberate act to influence the 
investment climate by giving the impression that larger invest- 
ments have occurred, or are under negotiation, than is actually 
the case. 

Cuban officials have reported flows of foreign investment 
that appear too optimistic in the light of other information and 
the balance of payments data mentioned above. For example, 
in October 1991, Julio Garcia Oliveras, chairman of the Cuban 
Chamber of Commerce, reported that negotiations were ongo- 
ing with investors representing investments of US$1.2 billion. 
Carlos Lage stated in November 1994 that by the end of 1994 
joint ventures would have provided Cuba with US$1.5 billion in 
investment. By the end of 1995, according to official sources, 
foreign investment had reached more than US$2.1 billion. 

Official estimates of foreign investment probably overstate 
actual equity capital flows into the island for several reasons. 
First, multiyear disbursements may be involved. Second, some 
investments may be contingent on performance. Third, some 
investments may take the form of assets rather than fresh 
investments. Fourth, some of the investments may be manage- 
ment contracts, production partnership agreements (particu- 
larly in mining and oil exploration), or debt-equity swaps, 
where funds invested are minimal. And fifth, others may actu- 
ally be supplier contracts rather than equity investments. At 
best, the figures reported by Cuban government officials might 
represent the intentions of foreign investors, but they signifi- 
cantly overstate actual capital that has flowed onto the island. 
Thus, according to the United States-Cuba Trade and Eco- 
nomic Council (see Glossary), investments amounting to 
nearly US$6.1 billion had been "announced" through March 
1999. However, the volume "committed or delivered" was a 
more modest US$1.8 billion, or 29.5 percent of the announced 
amount. 

Although legislation authorizing the creation of joint ven- 
tures was enacted in 1982, only three joint ventures were estab- 
lished during the 1982-90 period (see table 15, Appendix). 
Foreign investment activity increased in 1992-94, with thirty- 



219 



Cuba: A Country Study 



three joint ventures established in 1992, sixty in 1993, and sev- 
enty-four in 1994, but slowed in 1995, when thirty-one joint 
ventures were created. In all, Cuban government statistics indi- 
cate that 212 joint ventures with foreign investors had been 
established through the end of 1995; Spanish investors were 
responsible for the largest number of joint ventures (forty- 
seven, or 22 percent) followed by Canada (twenty-six, or 12 
percent), Italy (seventeen, or 8 percent), and France and Mex- 
ico (thirteen, or 6 percent each). The largest concentration of 
joint ventures was in the industrial sector (fifty-six, or 26 per- 
cent), followed by tourism (thirty-four, or 16 percent), mining 
(twenty-eight, or 13 percent), and the oil sector (twenty-five, or 
12 percent) (see table 16, Appendix). 

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
(the Helms-Burton Act), enacted by the United States in 1996, 
gives United States citizens who hold valid claims a right of 
action in United States courts against those who knowingly 
"traffic" in their confiscated Cuban properties. Title IV allows 
the exclusion of these violators of United States property 
claims and their immediate families from the United States. 
Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (see Glossary) have 
vigorously protested the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, 
claiming that it impinges on their sovereignty and that its extra- 
territorial reach is inconsistent with international obligations 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO — see Glossary) and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA — see 
Glossary) . 

According to Ibrahim Ferradaz, the then minister of foreign 
investment and economic cooperation, 260 joint ventures with 
foreign capital had been established on the island by the end 
of 1996 in thirty-four sectors of the economy. This number 
showed an increase of forty-eight joint ventures or 23 percent 
over the 212 joint ventures at the end of 1995. During the first 
half of 1997, according to Ferradaz, more joint venture deals 
were consummated than during a like period in 1996, and 140 
new projects were under active consideration. Ferradaz stated 
that the impact of the Helms-Burton Act on foreign investment 
in Cuba was "difficult to estimate," noting that some foreign 
investors had "become fearful [of Helms-Burton] and called 
off their projects." More recent data indicates that there were 
345 joint ventures by the end of 1998. The main sources of for- 
eign capital, as measured by the number of joint ventures, were 
Spain (seventy joint ventures), Canada (sixty-six), Italy (fifty- 



220 



The Economy 



two), the United Kingdom (fifteen) and France (fourteen). 
The main recipients of foreign investment, again as measured 
by the number of joint ventures, were mining, oil and heavy 
industry (eighty-eight joint ventures) , tourism (fifty-eight), 
light industry (thirty), food processing (twenty-four) and agri- 
culture (seventeen). 

Cuba's first two export processing zones, created pursuant to 
Decree-Law 165 of 1996, opened in May 1997 in Berroa and 
Wajay, near the city of Havana. These zones were followed by 
another export processing zone in the port of Mariel. 

Economic Outlook 

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the prospects for the 
economy of socialist Cuba appear bleak. Although the eco- 
nomic free fall experienced at the beginning of the decade has 
been arrested since about 1994, there is no end in sight for the 
Special Period. Growth rates recorded since then have been 
quite modest and do not come close to offsetting the large 
drop in economic activity. At the current rates of growth, it will 
take more than ten years for the Cuban economy to return to 
1989 levels. 

The foreign sector, critical to the performance of the Cuban 
economy, has improved its performance during the second 
half of the 1990s, but the level of foreign resources attracted 
into the country is still very small in comparison with the subsi- 
dies and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries to which Cuba had grown accustomed. Cuba 
has very limited access to foreign financial markets, and it is 
not a member of the international financial institutions that 
could assist it in overcoming balance of payments difficulties. 
Cuba has played but a marginal role in the process of eco- 
nomic integration of the Western Hemisphere, a situation that 
is not likely to change until Cuba and the United States nor- 
malize diplomatic and economic relations. Foreign investment 
is having a positive impact on the economy; in addition to pro- 
viding foreign resources, it also transfers technology and pro- 
vides additional markets for Cuban exports. However, its 
magnitude is too small to overcome the scarcity of foreign 
exchange. In the next few years, the external sector is likely to 
perform as it has since the mid-1990s, providing just enough 
foreign resources to allow the economy to continue to operate 
at very low levels of capacity and efficiency. 



221 



Cuba: A Country Study 

The process of economic reforms that began in 1993 slowed 
down after the economy reached bottom and began to recover 
in 1994. Since then, there have been no significant policy 
departures. Critical reforms, such as the liberalization of 
prices, enterprise reform, privatization, and the creation of fac- 
tor markets, have been put on hold indefinitely because the 
government fears that their implementation would weaken its 
political stranglehold on the Cuban nation. Unless Cuba sheds 
its statist model entirely, adopts a free-market economy consis- 
tent with the principles of the international trading system, and 
changes its political system to allow some space for alternatives 
outside of the PCC, the economy is likely to continue to stag- 
nate, to the detriment of the standard of living of the Cuban 
people. 

* * * 

Detailed information on the performance of the Cuban 
economy in the 1990s is limited and often inconsistent. In the 
late 1990s, Cuba published the first statistical yearbooks since 
1989, the Estadistico, 1996 -and Anuario estadistico, 1997. These 
two volumes begin to fill the statistical gap since Anuario 
estadistico de Cuba 1989, which contains statistical information 
through 1989 (1988 in some instances). Reports by the 
National Bank of Cuba (BNC) and its successor the Cuban 
Central Bank (BCC) released since the mid-1990s — Economic 
Report 1994 and Informe economico 1997 — contain some useful 
data. In 1997 the United Nations' ECLAC published a massive 
volume titled La economia cubana: Reformas estructurales y desem- 
peno en los noventa with nearly seventy tables prepared from 
information made available by the BNC, the Ministry of 
Finance and Prices, the ONE (National Statistical Office), and 
other instrumentalities of the Cuban government. Since the 
early 1990s, the United States Central Intelligence Agency has 
been preparing estimates of Cuban merchandise foreign trade 
based on information from Cuba's trading partners; its latest 
issue, Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics, 1998 is the best source 
of information on Cuban foreign trade. 

The most solid analysis of Cuba's economic policies and 
reforms during the 1990s is Carmelo Mesa-Lago's Are Economic 
Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? A Cuban perspective on 
economic reforms, including reform proposals that the Cuban 
government has been unwilling to undertake, is Cuba: La 



222 



The Economy 



restructuracion de la economia: Una contribution al debate by Julio 
Carranza Valdes, Luis Gutierrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal 
Gonzalez. Another important source of analysis on the Cuban 
economy is the proceedings series of the Association for the 
Study of the Cuban Economy titled Cuba in Transition, which 
have appeared annually beginning in 1990 (for the series, see 
http:/ /www.lanic. utexas.edu/la/ cb/cuba/asce/index.html) . 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliogra- 
phy.) 



223 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




The National Capitol (El Capitolio Nacional), the seat of government until 
1959, now houses the Cuban Academy of Sciences (Academia de Ciencias de 
Cuba) and the National Library of Science and Technology (Biblioteca Nacio- 
nal de Cienciay Tecnologia). 
Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 



SUDDENLY, DRAMATICALLY, ALMOST unexpectedly, the 
Cold War came to an end in Europe, and the world changed. 
Communist governments tumbled throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe in 1989, and, by the end of 1991, the Soviet 
Union itself collapsed. Constitutional governments, increas- 
ingly democratic, emerged in the 1990s in much of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 

For Fidel Castro Ruz (president, 1976- ) and his associates 
in the Cuban government and the Communist Party of Cuba 
(Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) , these results were a catas- 
trophe. As a result of a trade protocol signed in Moscow in late 
December 1990, Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba ended as of 
January 1, 1991. Bilateral trade between Cuba and the Soviet 
Union would henceforth be conducted at world market prices. 
Whereas in the past Cuba had dealt with only sixty-two Soviet 
agencies and enterprises, the trade protocol abolished the cen- 
tral management of trade relations and required Cuba to 
develop commercial relations with some 25,000 Soviet firms. 
The Russian government, successor to the Soviet Union, 
retained similar policies: trade with Cuba would be conducted 
on a commercial basis presuming no "special relationship" 
between Russia and Cuba. Stunned and inexperienced, Cuban 
government officials at first had great difficulty coping with 
these changes. And, bereft of economic subsidies, Cuba's econ- 
omy collapsed (see The Economic Crisis of the 1990s, ch. 3). 

Cuba also lost the political and military protection provided 
by the Soviet Union that it had enjoyed since 1960. Cuban lead- 
ers, consequently, felt nakedly vulnerable facing the United 
States. The United States government, for its part, increased its 
pressure on the Cuban government in the 1990s to force it to 
change or, preferably, to fall. 

Cuba was unable to pay on its own for the costs of its world- 
wide activist foreign policy. Absent Soviet backing, the Cuban 
government risked United States retaliation for overseas mili- 
tary expeditions. Consequently, Cuban foreign policy retreated 
across the board. In September 1989, Cuba completed the 
repatriation of its troops from Ethiopia. In March 1990, all 
Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua were brought home. In 
May 1991, Cuba's last troops were repatriated from Angola. 
Also in 1990 and 1991, Cuba brought back its troops and mili- 



227 



Cuba: A Country Study 

tary advisers from various other countries. Cuba's global mili- 
tary deployments ended nearly instantaneously as the Cold 
War was winding down in Europe and as Cuba was rapidly los- 
ing Soviet political, economic, and military backing. Cuba had 
become once again only a Caribbean island archipelago — no 
longer an aspirant to major-power status astride the world 
stage. 

Born bristling in radicalism, Cuban state socialism changed 
in the 1990s. In 1960 the government expropriated all foreign 
firms. In 1989 it launched a campaign to attract private foreign 
direct investment once again (see Economic Reforms, ch. 3). 
In May 1990, President Castro inaugurated the first of many 
foreign-owned hotels on Cuba's premier tourist beach at Vara- 
dero. He announced that Cuba would henceforth seek foreign 
investment to develop its economy. These policies would soon 
be endorsed by the PCC's executive organ, the Political Bureau 
(Buro Politico). These changes had implications well beyond 
their economic significance. In reversing the regime's found- 
ing policies, President Castro and his comrades signaled that 
they could no longer govern Cuba as they had and as they 
would still prefer. Other modest market-oriented economic 
policy reforms further communicated to the population the 
state's retreat from orthodox bureaucratic socialism (see Eco- 
nomic Reforms, ch. 3). Cuban leaders were compelled to 
change by a world suddenly averse to their brand of bureau- 
cratic socialism. 

The capacity of the Cuban state weakened at home as well. 
This weakening was in part a consequence of the leadership's 
unexpected inability to govern as had been their practice. Citi- 
zens who witnessed Fidel Castro's reluctant retreat from the 
policies he still cherished and had long implemented felt newly 
free to begin to take their lives into their own hands. An illegal 
economy or black market (see Glossary) boomed in Cuba in 
the early 1990s (see The Second Economy, ch. 3). The govern- 
ment could no longer prevent it, nor could it assure an accept- 
able standard of living to the population. The grip of the state 
loosened gradually in various aspects of social life. Religious 
activity revived (see Religion in the Special Period, 1990-97, 
ch. 2), and intellectual life became more independent in some 
respects. Human rights and political opposition activists under- 
took bolder actions, and their groups became more likely to 
endure. 



228 



Government and Politics 



The story of Cuban politics in the 1990s, therefore, has three 
principal strands. First, government and PCC leaders have 
sought to retain enough political support to continue to gov- 
ern, adapting policies, streamlining organizations, and replac- 
ing personnel to make their survival more likely. Particularly 
significant have been a major replacement of the political lead- 
ership just below the very top of the regime and a substantial 
downsizing of the armed forces (see Ministry of the Revolu- 
tionary Armed Forces, ch. 5). Second, a slow political transi- 
tion has gotten underway, unloved by the rulers but 
constructed by Cuban citizens who, step by step, have edged 
away from the control that the state and the PCC had held over 
Cuban life for the preceding decades. Third, internationally, 
the Cuban government has designed a strategy to resist United 
States pressures and to fashion a new network of international 
relations for the only surviving communist regime outside East 
Asia. Cuban leaders have gained support in Europe, Latin 
America, the Middle East, Canada, and East Asia from govern- 
ments that object to United States attempts to force them to 
follow United States policy toward Cuba. This "negative" inter- 
national coalition in opposition to United States policy is a key 
to the Cuban regime's capacity to survive seemingly against all 
odds years after the Soviet Union crashed. 

Institutional Structure 

Cuba features a formidable array of state, government, and 
partisan entities. Some have endured for nearly forty years, and 
all have lasted for at least two decades. And yet, in the 1990s as 
in earlier decades, these formal institutions manifest only one 
of the two "faces of power" in Cuba. Officeholders in state, gov- 
ernment, and PCC organs and in the mass organizations often 
have less power than it would seem from a description of their 
formal rights and duties. 

The other "face of power" in Cuba is intensely personal. It 
derives its clout from the Revolution in the 1950s and from 
"revolutionary accomplishments" in the years that followed. A 
key feature of these "accomplishments" is that they appeared to 
require heroic deeds and leaders who succeeded in reaching 
an impossible dream. Fidel Castro epitomizes this source of 
power. His towering role in Cuban politics at times has allowed 
him to override institutional rules and constraints to veto some 
policies and enact others. Other men (and some, but not very 
many, women) have also acquired significant public standing as 



229 



Cuba: A Country Study 

a result of their heroic deeds over the years, but most of them 
died during the revolution of the 1950s and in the 1960s. Fidel 
Castro's capacity to make policies happen, or to stop their 
implementation, and his unmatched capacity to pick and 
choose officials to whom he delegates extraordinary powers 
shape the capacity of these institutions to function. 

The Constitution 

The Fourth Congress of the PCC met in October 1991 to 
review the debris from the collapse of the communist world in 
Europe and its impact on Cuba. One of its decisions was to 
revise Cuba's constitution of 1976. The leadership closely con- 
trolled the process of constitutional revision, and PCC and 
National Assembly committees carried out the task. Although 
the text was open to discussion by Cubans through the coun- 
try's official mass organizations and other means, no plebiscite 
was held to approve the substantially revised text. The PCC and 
the National Assembly approved the new constitutional text in 
July 1992. 

The new constitution signaled Cuba's changed circum- 
stances and, especially, a more tolerant approach to certain dif- 
ferences within society. Unlike the old constitution, the text of 
the new constitution makes no reference to the Soviet Union, a 
country that had ceased to exist. The normative chapters of the 
constitution seek to embrace all Cubans, not just those ideolog- 
ically committed to Marxism-Leninism. Its preamble and open- 
ing chapters invoke the mantle of nationalism in an attempt to 
cover all Cubans. The new Article 1 (unlike its predecessor) 
refers to Jose Marti and affirms that the socialist state seeks to 
serve all and the good of all. The PCC remains enshrined in 
Article 5 as the single party, still Marxist-Leninist, but now also 
a follower of Jose Marti. Whereas the old Article 54 proclaimed 
that the state based its actions on and advocated a "scientific 
materialist conception of the universe," while also guarantee- 
ing freedom of conscience and worship, the new Article 55 
omits all reference to scientific materialism and simply seeks to 
guarantee freedom of religion. In these and other symbolically 
significant ways, the 1992 constitution seeks to include all 
Cubans ready to pledge their allegiance and otherwise 
attempts to marginalize none. 

The 1992 constitution retroactively legitimizes the changed 
property regime inaugurated with the search to lure foreign 
investment that started in 1989 and was made public in 1990. 



230 



Government and Politics 



The 1976 constitution had authorized only state property, 
except for what individuals were authorized to own directly. 
The 1992 constitution limits state ownership to the "fundamen- 
tal" means of production (Article 14). Article 15 goes further, 
however. It opens by seemingly prohibiting the privatization of 
most enterprises and other forms of economic activities, but it 
goes on to authorize the privatization of every property, pro- 
vided such transfer of ownership is approved by the Executive 
Committee (Comite Ejecutivo) of the Council of Ministers 
(Consejo de Ministros) . 

The ideological and property regime shifts of the 1992 con- 
stitution made the political regime more inclusive and, espe- 
cially, more tolerant of religious belief, behavior, and 
organizations. They signaled as well a much greater emphasis 
in public discourse on Cuban nationalism rather than on the 
canonical texts of Marxism, Leninism, socialism, or commu- 
nism. The changes in the property regime, of course, acceler- 
ated the process of private foreign direct investment. 

The 1992 constitution remains deeply authoritarian, how- 
ever. The PCC remains the only legal political party. The bill of 
rights is as riddled with exceptions as it was in the 1976 consti- 
tution. The new Article 53 is identical to its predecessor in rec- 
ognizing freedom of expression, but only so long as it 
conforms to the "goals of a socialist society." All mass media 
must remain in state hands. And the article also enables the 
government to further regulate whatever residual freedoms 
remain. Other articles recognize the privacy of the home and 
of personal correspondence, unless, of course, the law states 
otherwise. Finally, Article 62 (like its predecessor) prohibits the 
use of any of these freedoms "against the existence and pur- 
poses of the socialist state." Indeed, in one important respect 
the 1992 constitution is more authoritarian than its predeces- 
sor. The new Article 67 empowers the president of the Council 
of State (Fidel Castro) on his own authority to declare a state of 
emergency and to modify the exercise of rights or the obliga- 
tions embedded in the constitution. 

National Assembly of People's Power 

The 1992 constitution also institutes some modest changes 
in the design of the organs of the state (see fig. 7). The 1992 
constitution, like its predecessor, vests all formal legislative 
powers (including the powers of amending the constitution) in 
the National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional 



231 



Cuba: A Country Study 



LEGISLATIVE 
BRANCH 



EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 



JUDICIAL 
BRANCH 



NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY 

OF 
PEOPLE'S 
POWER 
(601 members) 



PRESIDENT OF THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE 
AND COUNCIL OF 
MINISTRIES 



COUNCIL OF STATE 
(31 members) 

I 



EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE OF 
THE COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS 
(7 members) 



OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF 
THE REPUBLIC 

I 



PEOPLES 
SUPREME 
COURT 
(5 chambers) 



PROVINCIAL 
PROSECUTORS' 
OFFICE 

» 



MUNICIPAL 
PROSECUTORS' 
OFFICE 



MILITARY 
PROSECUTORS' 
OFFICE 



PROVINCIAL 
PEOPLE'S 
COURTS 
(14 courts, each 
with 4 chambers) 

I 



MUNICIPAL 
PEOPLE'S 
COURTS 
(169 courts) 





CABINET MINISTRIES 




(27) 


AGRICULTURE 


FOREIGN RELATIONS 


AUDITING AND CONTROL 


FOREIGN TRADE 


BASIC INDUSTRY 


HIGHER EDUCATION 


COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 


INTERIOR 


COMMUNICATIONS 


IRON, STEEL, AND MACHINE INDUSTRY 


CONSTRUCTION 


JUSTICE 


CULTURE 


LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY 


DOMESTIC TRADE 


LIGHT INDUSTRY 


ECONOMY AND PLANNING 


PUBLIC HEALTH 


EDUCATION 


REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES 


FINANCE AND PRICES 


SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENVIRONMENT 


FISHING INDUSTRY 


SUGAR INDUSTRY 


FOOD INDUSTRY 


TOURISM 


FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 


TRANSPORTATION 


ECONOMIC COOPERATION 





PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES 
(14) 



PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES 
(14, each with a president 
and at least 75 members) 



MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLIES 
(169) 



PRESIDENTS 
(14) 



MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES 
(169, each with a president) 



PRESIDENTS 

(169) 



Direction, control, or supervision 
Election, direct appointment, or nomination 
Policy influence 



Source: Based on information from Roberto Segre, Mario Coyula, and Joseph L. 

Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis, New York: 1997, 178; and 
Jorge I. Dominguez. 



Figure 7. Central Administrative Structure, 2001 



232 



Government and Politics 



del Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly) . The 
National Assembly has the formal powers, among others, to 
declare war in the event of military aggression; make peace; 
enact or modify legislation; approve the budget and the 
national economic plan; elect the members of the Council of 
State (Consejo de Estado), including its president; and elect 
the members of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo Popu- 
lar). (The Supreme Court cannot judge the constitutionality of 
National Assembly decisions.) National Assembly leaders also 
generally oversee the rule-making activities and electoral pro- 
cesses of the provincial assemblies and municipal assemblies. 

Despite all of its functions, the National Assembly is not a 
powerful institution. For the most part, it ratifies decisions 
made prior to its meetings; it typically votes unanimously or 
nearly unanimously to endorse government bills. Deputies 
have other full-time jobs, and the National Assembly character- 
istically meets only twice a year, three times at most. Each time 
it usually meets for two or three days. Founded in 1976, the 
National Assembly became, in the 1990s, simultaneously mar- 
ginally less institutionalized but also more effective. Institution- 
alization declined because officials at times failed to observe 
their own rules. For example, National Assembly elections 
should have been held in 1991 but were postponed until Feb- 
ruary 1993 in order to defer the electoral process well past the 
shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist 
regimes. And, at times in the 1990s, National Assembly sessions 
were canceled or deferred arbitrarily instead of meeting at 
their normal times. 

The National Assembly became more effective, however, 
under the leadership of Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada, who 
became its president in March 1993. Alarcon reinvigorated the 
National Assembly's working commissions, which aid the 
National Assembly and the Council of State in carrying out 
their functions. Alarcon urged the commissions to audit the 
operation of state agencies, ask questions, and write reports. 
The National Assembly's debate in its standing commissions 
has at times forced the executive branch to amend, reconsider, 
or delay the submission of bills for formal approval. Among the 
most vigorously debated bills was the Law on Foreign Invest- 
ment, finally approved after much delay and several drafts in 
September 1995. Alarcon has also urged deputies to remain in 
closer touch with the voters and to campaign actively for office 
as if they were contested. In these respects, the National Assem- 



233 



Cuba: A Country Study 

bly's political efficacy has risen, and so has Alarcon's political 
star. 

National Assembly deputies are elected for five-year terms. 
In 1998 the new National Assembly had 601 members. The 
1992 constitution mandates that the deputies be elected 
directly by the people, in contrast to the previous system, in 
which the provincial assemblies elected the deputies. However, 
the Electoral Law of 1992 requires that the number of candi- 
dates equal the number of posts to be filled. The old Electoral 
Law required that a provincial assembly (Asamblea Provincial) 
be given a choice of nominees somewhat larger than the num- 
ber of posts to be filled. Thus, the change in national electoral 
procedures had the appearance of democratization while 
embodying a reduction in effective choice. The election of 
deputies through the provincial assemblies had fostered some 
competition within the elite; the 1992 changes reduced the 
level of open political contestation. 

Candidates for National Assembly deputy, candidates for 
membership in the Council of State, and candidates for 
National Assembly president, vice president, and secretary 
originate with a National Commission for Candidacies. This 
commission is constituted of appointees designated by the offi- 
cially sponsored mass organizations. These mass organizations 
are the Cuban Workers Federation (Central de Trabajadores 
de Cuba — CTC), the Federation of Cuban Women (Fede- 
racion de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC), the Committee for the 
Defense of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revolu- 
cion — CDR) , the National Association of Small Farmers (Aso- 
ciacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos — ANAP) , the Fed- 
eration of University Students, and the Federation of Second- 
ary School Students (Federacion de Estudiantes de la 
Ensenanza Media — FEEM) (see Mass Organizations, this ch.). 
The CTC representative chairs the commission. The commis- 
sion, which consults various national, provincial, and munici- 
pal leaders, proposes a list of precandidates (with a number of 
precandidates equal to no fewer than twice the number to be 
elected) to a similarly constituted commission at the municipal 
level. The latter commission formally nominates the candidates 
for deputy. Those nominated for candidacy are almost certain 
to be elected because the final list of candidates equals the 
number of posts to be filled. 

After the 1993 national elections, reelected incumbents con- 
stituted only 1 7 percent of the new National Assembly. This fig- 



234 



Government and Politics 



ure was not the result of voter discontent (all the incumbents 
who stood for reelection were reelected), but of a prior elite 
decision not to renominate most incumbents. In contrast, after 
the 1998 national elections, reelected incumbents constituted 
35 percent of the new National Assembly. (Average age in the 
National Assembly rose from forty-three to forty-five from one 
election to the next.) In general, this pattern of sweeping per- 
sonnel change in the early 1990s but somewhat greater conti- 
nuity in the late 1990s reflected the top leadership's greater 
confidence that it had removed the "dead wood" and identified 
a good political team to ensure the continuation of the politi- 
cal regime. A similar pattern would be evident in the composi- 
tion of the PCC's Central Committee (Comite Central) (see 
Political Bureau and Central Committee, this ch.). 

The proportion of female members of the National Assem- 
bly rose from 23 to 28 percent from the 1993 to the 1998 elec- 
tions. In addition, 78 percent of the deputies were university 
graduates in 1998 (versus 75 percent in 1993). The number of 
deputies on active duty in the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — FAR) or in the Ministry of 
Interior remained the same (thirty-five deputies). The number 
of high PCC officials dropped substantially, however, from 24 
percent to 11 percent in part as a result of the downsizing of 
the PCC's Central Committee in 1997. 

Council of State 

The Council of State is elected by the National Assembly and 
is empowered to make all decisions on behalf of the National 
Assembly when the latter is not in session, which is most of the 
time. Among other powers, the Council of State can appoint 
and remove ministers, ambassadors, and other high officials, 
issue decrees with the force of law, declare war or make peace, 
ratify treaties, and suspend or revoke the decisions by all pro- 
vincial or local governments. In ef fect, the Council of State, not 
the National Assembly, is the routine, constitutionally authori- 
tative collective decision maker. 

The president of the Council of State, who under the consti- 
tution is also president of the Council of Ministers, is the chief 
of state. These functions had been performed by different indi- 
viduals before the adoption of the 1976 constitution, as had 
been the norm in communist countries. Since 1976, these posts 
have been held by Fidel Castro, who, in taking on these func- 



235 



Cuba: A Country Study 

tions, adopted a pattern of presidentialism familiar to Latin 
Americans. 

The six vice presidents of the Council of State are among 
Cuba's most important politicians. The first vice president is 
General of the Army Raul Castro Ruz, minister of the FAR and 
Fidel Castro's formally designated successor. The other vice 
presidents are Commander of the Revolution Juan Almeida 
Bosque, who has long played a role in maintaining discipline 
and morale in the military and the PCC; Army Corps General 
Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of interior and decorated 
hero of the republic of Cuba for his role in Cuba's wars in 
Africa; Carlos Lage Davila, secretary of the Executive Commit- 
tee of the Council of Ministers and, in effect, chief operating 
officer for the Cuban economy; Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, 
long-time secretary of organization of the PCC's Central Com- 
mittee; and Esteban Lazo Hernandez, first secretary of the PCC 
in Havana City Province (Ciudad de La Habana Province) . 

The Council of State has thirty-one members, including its 
president, vice presidents, and secretary, all of whom were 
reelected in 1998. Its membership had been relatively stable 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. Six leaders — the Castro 
brothers, Almeida, Armando Hart Davalos, Machado, and 
Pedro Miret Prieto — have been members of the Council of 
State since its establishment in 1977 and were reelected again 
in 1998. In 1998, however, there was a major overhaul of the 
council's membership, the only top leadership organ to be 
reorganized so thoroughly in the late 1990s. Only seventeen of 
the thirty-one members of the 1993 Council of State were 
reelected in 1998; only two of the departing fourteen members 
had died. On balance, there were three fewer ministers in the 
1998 Council of State, two fewer generals, and none of the 
three members of the old council without significant political 
responsibilities. However, three local government officials 
joined the Council, as did two intellectuals. Some of the rota- 
tion was intended to retain the representation of a political 
role that had passed from one individual to another. By tradi- 
tion, the heads of the most important mass organizations 
belong to the Council of State. The number of women in the 
Council of State was the same in 1993 and in 1998: five women, 
one more than in the first Council of State chosen in 1976. 
There are six Afro-Cubans in the 1998 Council of State (the 
non-white share of Cuba's population was one-third in the 1981 
census) . In general, the slight changes in membership led away 



236 




Fidel Castro Ruz in the early 
1980s 

Courtesy Ministry of Foreign 
Relations 



from those with administrative responsibilities and toward 
those with political responsibilities, paying little attention to 
concerns for gender or racial representation. 

Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive and admin- 
istrative organ. The constitution empowers it to issue regula- 
tions to administer laws and decrees and to authorize 
exceptions to state ownership of the means of production. It 
responds to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. 
Ministers are formally chosen by the National Assembly on the 
recommendation of the president of the Council of State, but 
they can be changed as well by the Council of State, on its pres- 
ident's recommendation. 

Ministers are replaced one by one, or in small numbers. 
There has never been a wholesale replacement of the Council 
of Ministers; there is no provision for such National Assembly 
action in the constitution. In the 1990s, the National Assembly 
began to ask for more information from ministers about the 
work of their agencies, but ministers are, in practice, princi- 
pally responsible to the Executive Committee of the Council of 
Ministers and to President Castro. On April 21, 1994, the 
Cuban government adopted a drastic reorganization and sim- 
plification of its administrative structure, reducing the number 
of ministries to twenty-seven and abolishing, combining, or 



237 



Cuba: A Country Study 

downsizing another sixteen major agencies of the national gov- 
ernment. In 2000, the Council of Ministers included a presi- 
dent (Fidel Castro), a first vice president (Raul Castro), a 
secretary (Carlos Lage), four vice presidents, a minister of gov- 
ernment, twenty-six ministers, the president of the central 
bank, and the directors of four cabinet-level institutes. 

Courts 

The Supreme Court of Cuba is organized into five chambers: 
criminal, civil and administrative, labor, state security, and mili- 
tary. The members of the Supreme Court are nominated by the 
minister of justice and confirmed by the National Assembly, 
with two exceptions. First, the Supreme Court's president and 
vice president are nominated by the president of the Council 
of State (Fidel Castro); second, the members of the military 
chamber are nominated jointly by the ministers of justice and 
the FAR (the latter minister is Raul Castro). The minister of 
justice exercises administrative control over all the courts, 
including the Supreme Court; the Ministry of Justice thus has 
full authority over budget, payroll, and personnel. 

The Supreme Court and all the courts are subordinate to 
the National Assembly and the Council of State (Article 121). 
The Supreme Court has no authority to declare a law unconsti- 
tutional. The courts are formally much less independent, 
therefore, than in other political systems. Judges are appointed 
for a term, not for life, and they can be removed from office if 
proper cause is shown. As a result of these measures, the courts 
show considerable deference to executive authority and are 
marked by political timidity. 

There are also provincial courts in each province. These 
courts have four chambers, the same as for the Supreme Court 
except for the military chamber. The provincial courts exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes for which punishment will not exceed 
eight years; thus, about three-quarters of all crimes fall within 
its realm. 

There are municipal courts in each municipality. They serve 
as trial courts at the lowest level, and they have jurisdiction over 
minor crimes that typically carry a penalty of imprisonment for 
less than one year or small fines. They are also the courts of 
first instance in civil and labor cases. Municipal courts are not 
divided into chambers, but trials are always held before a panel 
of three judges. 



238 



Government and Politics 



All of Cuba's courts have both professional and lay judges. 
Each of the chambers of the Supreme Court, for example, has 
professional and lay judges, as is also the case at the provincial 
and municipal levels. The reliance on lay judges reflects a polit- 
ical judgment that decisions in courts belong to the people, 
and that ordinary citizens with relatively little training are 
appropriate judges nonetheless. (In United States jurispru- 
dence, the role of juries bears some resemblance to this Cuban 
procedure.) Professional judges are selected through a com- 
petitive examination administered by the Ministry of Justice. 
About half of Cuba's judges are members of the PCC, with a 
higher proportion of PCC members in the Supreme Court. 

The role of the Cuban courts is quite similar to that in other 
countries. The courts are key institutions in law enforcement. 
In Cuba they also seek to educate the population about their 
rights and obligations. The Supreme Court, as an appellate 
court, is responsible for ensuring uniformity in the application 
of law throughout the country; the Supreme Court revokes 
lower-court decisions that are contrary to law or precedent. 

Cuban courts are unusual in one respect: they are very harsh 
in their treatment of the political opposition. Cubans can be 
jailed for speaking ill of their rulers or for organizing groups to 
contest political power. The number of political prisoners has 
declined from the very high levels of the 1960s, but it remains 
characteristically in the hundreds. In the 1990s, the Cuban gov- 
ernment often released some political prisoners at the request 
of visiting foreign dignitaries. For example, in 1998, many 
political and common prisoners were released on the occasion 
of Pope John Paul IPs visit to Cuba that January. Nonetheless, 
the existing rules to protect "state security" make it probable 
that the overall number of political prisoners remains the 
same: some are freed, but others are arrested. 

The Office of the State Prosecutor (FiscaHa General de la 
Republica) is subordinate to the National Assembly, which for- 
mally elects the prosecutor (Fiscal General de la Republica) , 
and the Council of State. The prosecutor has wide latitude to 
review the past conduct and prospective actions of all organs of 
state power. The prosecutor has specific oversight over all law 
enforcement, with a rank equal to a Supreme Court justice. 
The prosecutor is directly responsible for cases of treason or 
corruption. 



239 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Provincial and Local Government 

Cuba has fourteen provinces. From west to east, they are: 
Pinar del Rio, La Habana, Ciudad de La Habana, Matanzas, 
Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, Sancti Spiritus, Ciego de Avila, 
Camaguey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba, 
and Guantanamo. The Isla de lajuventud (Isle of Youth), the 
Cuban archipelago's second-largest island, is a special munici- 
pality. The entire national territory is subdivided into 169 
municipalities. 

Each province is formally governed by a provincial assembly 
and each municipality by a municipal assembly (Asamblea 
Municipal) . The respective assemblies elect municipal commit- 
tees. The president of a provincial assembly's provincial com- 
mittee functions as a provincial governor; the president of a 
municipal assembly's municipal committee functions as mayor. 
Provincial assembly delegates serve for five years; municipal 
assembly delegates serve for two and one-half years. Provincial 
assemblies must have no fewer than seventy-five members, 
although some are larger because of a province's greater popu- 
lation. 

The Provincial Commission for Candidacies, constituted in 
the same manner as the National Commission, proposes pre- 
candidates for provincial assembly delegates to the Municipal 
Commission for Candidacies. The list of precandidates equals 
no fewer than twice the number of posts to be filled. The 
Municipal Commission formally nominates the candidates for 
delegates. As at the national level, the number of candidates 
for provincial delegate equals the number of seats to be filled. 
Voters have no choice among candidates for provincial dele- 
gates, just as they have no choice among candidates in the vote 
for national deputies. (The Provincial Commission also nomi- 
nates the candidates for provincial assembly president, vice 
president, and secretary.) 

The Municipal Commission for Candidacies is constituted in 
the same way as its national and provincial counterparts. For- 
mally, it nominates candidates for municipal assembly presi- 
dent and vice president. The Municipal Commission also 
formally sorts out the precandidacies for provincial delegate 
and national deputy, and presents the respective lists to the 
municipal assembly for final nomination. As a practical matter, 
the political process that leads to these nominations is con- 
trolled carefully from national headquarters. Nonetheless, 
because the number of precandidates is twice the number of 



240 




241 



Cuba: A Country Study 



eventual nominations and posts, there is some significant com- 
petition among insiders for these symbolically important posts. 

The elections for municipal assembly are different, however. 
Nominations come from assemblies of neighbors held at the 
precinct level. For each post, there must be at least two candi- 
dates, and there may be more. To be elected, a candidate must 
receive more than half the valid votes cast. Because of multiple 
candidacies, runoff elections between the top two contenders 
from the first round are common in many municipalities. In 
the municipal elections in spring 2000, for example, 5.7 per- 
cent of these municipal posts were filled in the second round. 
Overall, approximately half of the incumbent municipal assem- 
bly members were reelected in these elections. 

Research by Cuban scholars shows that many voters are often 
unaware whether candidates for municipal assembly delegate 
are members of the PCC. Membership in the PCC serves typi- 
cally neither as an asset nor as a liability in local elections, 
although, in fact, most elected officials are party members. The 
main motivations for voters are whether local candidates have a 
reputation for honesty, good neighborliness, and humane sen- 
sibilities. Cubans vote for their friends and neighbors for local 
office in ways not unlike voters do in United States local elec- 
tions. Thus, it is noteworthy that many of these are, indeed, 
PCC members; the party members seem to be held in high 
regard even if the PCC as an institution is not an object of pop- 
ular affection. 

Municipal governments provide social services and run 
retail trade enterprises, as well as restaurants and cafeterias, at 
the local level. They also build residential housing. They have 
no control over provincial and national enterprises that have 
offices or subsidiaries in the municipality, but they can at times 
develop collaborative relations with the larger state firms for 
the benefit of the community. Through their relations with 
local governments, large national state enterprises, in effect, 
have local "charitable" activities that are somewhat similar to 
the practices of large firms in other countries. 

The main limitation on the scope of municipal government 
is the principle of double subordination. That is, local firms 
and agencies supposedly owned and operated by the munici- 
pality must still meet the standards for quality of performance 
and personnel set at the national level. In practice, this princi- 
ple has greatly limited the municipality's actual discretionary 



242 



Government and Politics 



powers; there are few significant policies they can change on 
their own. 

In 1988 the government authorized the creation of People's 
Councils (Consejos Populares) to expedite the administration 
of services at the local level. There are several People's Coun- 
cils within each municipality. Each People's Council includes 
the municipal delegates elected within a given territory as well 
as representatives from the mass organizations and state institu- 
tions operating within that locality. People's Councils became, 
in effect, one more layer in Cuba's administrative structure; 
they did not materially change the efficacy of the delivery of 
services or the quality of political representation. 

Cuba's provinces face significant problems in carrying out 
their tasks. From 1986 to 1996, the percentage of nationwide 
budget expenditures disbursed at the provincial and municipal 
levels fell from 35 percent to 27 percent. For the most part, this 
drop was accounted for by the collapse of subnational govern- 
ment entrepreneurial and investment expenditures, while local 
governments attempted to sustain their funding of basic ser- 
vices. In 1996 every provincial government ran a deficit 
(although Havana's budget was nearly balanced) . The size of 
the deficit of the provincial governments of Ciego de Avila, Las 
Tunas, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, Sancti Spiritus, Santiago de 
Cuba, and Villa Clara was equal to more than half of the reve- 
nues of these provinces. The size of the deficit of the provincial 
governments of Granma and Guantanamo was larger than the 
revenues of these provinces. 

National and Local Elections 

Elections for the National Assembly are held in multimem- 
ber districts. Voters have three choices: they can vote for the 
single official slate; they can vote for some of the candidates on 
the official slate (but never for opposition party candidates) ; or 
they can cast a blank ballot. To be elected, a candidate has to 
receive more than half of the valid votes cast. No candidate 
failed to be elected in the 1993 and 1998 National Assembly 
elections. The government, the PCC, and the mass organiza- 
tions campaign vigorously to increase voting turnout, and, in 
particular, they urge citizens to vote for the entire single official 
slate. Thus, one measure of lawful dissent is the percentage of 
Cubans who vote for something other than the single slate (see 
Table 17, Appendix). 



243 



Cuba: A Country Study 



In the 1998 National Assembly elections, the overall results 
were slightly more favorable to the government than in 1993, 
reflecting the trend toward economic stabilization and recov- 
ery during the intervening years. In 1998, 89.7 percent of the 
voters cast their ballots for the single slate, and only 5 percent 
of the voters voided their ballots or voted blank. The results 
were also more favorable to the government in La Habana 
Province, where the single slate received 88.4 percent of the 
votes cast and the percentage of null or blank ballots fell to 7 
percent. These results necessarily imply, however, that the sin- 
gle slate performed less well in some of the other provinces. 

Comparative inter-provincial data, available for the 1993 
National Assembly election and the 1997 and 2000 municipal 
elections, show a fairly consistent geographic distribution of 
dissent (see Table 18, Appendix) . Voiding one's ballot or voting 
blank are the only two means of expressing displeasure with 
the political system at the municipal level, so the percentage of 
voters who choose them is somewhat larger than in national 
elections. At the National Assembly level, there is the addi- 
tional option of not voting for the entire official slate. In all 
three elections, the largest proportion of dissenters was found 
in the western provinces (Pinar del Rio, Ciudad de La Habana, 
La Habana, Matanzas, Villa Clara, and the special municipality 
of Isla de lajuventud, or Isle of Youth). And in all three elec- 
tions, the smallest proportion of dissenters was evident in four 
eastern provinces: Las Tunas, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and 
Guantanamo. The overall trend toward a decline in voting null 
or blank was evident in both National Assembly and municipal 
elections in the 1990s. 

Cuba's Electoral Law of 1992 treated national, provincial, 
and municipal elections differently with regard to campaign- 
ing. Up until 1992, there was no campaigning at all for any 
post. At the municipal level, the "campaign" was limited to the 
posting of the photographs and biographies of the candidates 
in public places. These biographies were prepared and posted 
by the public authorities and could include derogatory com- 
ments about the candidates. At the provincial and national lev- 
els, provincial delegates and national deputies were chosen by 
the municipal assemblies. Their names were made known only 
after they were so chosen. 

The 1992 Electoral Law did not change the procedures for 
municipal elections. For provincial and national elections, as 
already noted, one change enacted in 1992 was direct popular 



244 



Government and Politics 



election — a change rendered nearly meaningless because there 
was no choice among candidates in the 1993 and 1998 
National Assembly and provincial assembly elections. 

Another change was the posting of photographs and biogra- 
phies of provincial and national candidates in public places 
and encouraging candidates to meet voters and answer ques- 
tions. Thus, since 1992, the Electoral Law has featured multi- 
candidate single-party elections with no effective campaigning 
at the municipal level and entirely uncompetitive rules but 
some campaigning at the provincial and national levels. 

At all levels, the political regime sharply constrained the 
freedom of political association. Cubans were not free to associ- 
ate in a political party other than the PCC to contest elections. 
Candidates for office in different provinces and municipalities 
on the official slate could not even associate into formally con- 
stituted "factions." The public authorities and the PCC 
retained the right to shape associational patterns at all levels. 

Communist Party of Cuba 

Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses 

In October 1991, the Fourth Congress of the PCC met to 
assess the wreckage of international communism. The Soviet 
Union was on the verge of disintegration, and the Soviet Com- 
munist Party was rapidly losing its hold on power. The Fourth 
Congress declared that the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the communist regimes of Europe was a "political disaster" that 
stemmed from avoidable mistakes, which the PCC would avoid. 
One consequence, according to the Fourth Congress, was the 
establishment of a "unipolar world" in which United States mil- 
itary power reigned. And one manifestation of that power was 
the Gulf War on Iraq, which was designed to intimidate any 
government daring to differ with the United States. 

Thus, the Fourth Congress took heart that Cuba had been 
invited to the first Summit of Iberoamerican heads of govern- 
ment, held in Guadalajara, Mexico, months earlier, and hoped 
that Latin American countries would join to advance their 
common interests. It hailed the world's remaining communist 
governments, all of them in East Asia. But it reached out gener- 
ally to governments everywhere in search of support. It under- 
lined the repatriation of Cuban troops from African soil and 
Cuba's disposition to work within the United Nations system. It 
clearly sought to avoid needless trouble. 



245 



Cuba: A Country Study 

At home, the Fourth Congress affirmed its conviction that 
Marxism-Leninism remained its guide to the future, but it 
noted — for the first time in the history of these documents — 
that this ideology "should not be applied dogmatically." More- 
over, the PCC would apply these principles taking into account 
Cuba's new circumstances. The Fourth Congress recognized 
that "the world has changed. Today the enemies of the people 
feel stronger than ever." But it stated its conviction that a 
greater strength is the "will to independence, freedom, and 
development of every people. The duty of every revolutionary 
continues to be to make the Revolution, and to defend it." 
Thus, the Fourth Congress proclaimed that it would make no 
concessions, for concessions are the path to ruin. Defiant still, 
Fidel Castro's government was not ready to fold. 

And yet, the Fourth Congress understood that it had to 
adjust to the changed international circumstances. One adjust- 
ment has already been mentioned: the full repatriation of 
Cuban troops, mainly from Africa but also from other coun- 
tries, which was completed by the time the Fourth Congress 
met. A more regime-changing adjustment was the reorienta- 
tion of economic policy. The Fourth Congress set its own prior- 
ity clearly: "The supreme objective [is] to save the Homeland, 
the Revolution, and Socialism." The Fourth Congress endorsed 
the continued use of traditional instruments, such as mass 
mobilizations, to produce food or address other tasks; these 
measures had typically been inefficient in their use of resources 
and often ineffective in terms of reaching their objectives, how- 
ever. 

In Cuba's newly dire circumstances, the Fourth Congress 
understood that it had to authorize changes in economic pol- 
icy. It endorsed the development of an international tourism 
industry as a new engine of growth that, by the late 1990s, had 
become a crucial earner of foreign exchange (see Key Eco- 
nomic Sectors, ch. 3). The Fourth Congress authorized a slight 
liberalization of self-employment, especially in services, even 
though clear preference was expressed for centralization of 
ownership, management, and planning; such liberalization of 
self-employment would be implemented two years later. 

More dramatically, the Fourth Congress authorized retroac- 
tively a new policy on foreign direct investment. In so doing, 
the Fourth Congress departed from a foundational decision at 
the origins of revolutionary rule in Cuba, namely, the expropri- 
ation of all foreign firms. The Fourth Congress affirmed that 



246 



Government and Politics 



foreign investment should be not just tolerated but "promoted" 
and that considerable flexibility should govern its terms of 
entry. 

An important social and political change had also been 
authorized by the PCC's Political Bureau prior to the Fourth 
Congress and simply ratified by it. In the "Call to the Fourth 
Congress," the party pledged "sincere communication with . . . 
members of various religious denominations who share our life 
and endorse our program . . . although some aspects of their 
ideology may differ from ours." At the Fourth Congress, PCC 
Statutes were changed to permit religious believers to join its 
ranks provided they otherwise supported the party's program. 

Despite these significant changes, the main thrust of the 
Fourth Party Congress was to resist widespread political 
change. In December 1991, Carlos Aldana Escalante, PCC sec- 
retary for ideology and for international relations and Fidel 
Castro's principal political agent in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, addressed the National Assembly. Aldana had been the 
only top PCC leader who had ever implied in public that he 
thought well of "reform communism" in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Aldana rectified his 
views. He denounced those who still advocated the implemen- 
tation in Cuba of reforms akin to those blamed for the collapse 
of communist regimes in Europe. Despite his adoption of this 
harder line, Aldana, too, was dismissed from office for various 
reasons in September 1992. 

In October 1997, the Fifth Congress of the PCC convened, 
to the general relief of its members. They had survived. Their 
political regime had endured. Cuba had succeeded in resisting 
the sharper onslaught of United States policies during the 
1990s. The Cuban economy had nosedived in the early years of 
the decade as a consequence of the ending of Soviet subsidies 
and the disruption of Cuban international trade, but the econ- 
omy's decline had stopped in 1994, and a modest economic 
recovery had begun. Cuba was the only extant communist 
regime outside East Asia. The forecasts of many in Washington 
and Miami that the Cuban regime would tumble like other 
communist regimes had proved off the mark. From the per- 
spective of the leadership of the PCC, Cuba's survival was a 
stunning triumph. 

Nonetheless, there was a cloud hovering over the party. Fidel 
Castro had disappeared from public view during the preceding 
summer months. Now he looked gaunt, having lost much 



247 



Cuba: A Country Study 



weight in the interim. As if seeking to reassure the 1,500 dele- 
gates to the Fifth Congress that he was still in fine shape, Castro 
spoke for six hours and forty minutes. He recalled the difficult 
days of the early 1990s and detailed the significance of their 
success in overcoming those problems. The PCC, he believed, 
had made "acceptable concessions" in its preferred policies in 
order to survive. As he had said so many times during the early 
1990s, Castro emphasized that he did not like the policies that 
he and the government and the party had been compelled to 
authorize, in particular the large-scale development of the 
tourism industry and the welcome to foreign investment. But 
these policies were necessary to obtain capital, technology, and 
access to markets, and they had already proven successful, he 
said. 

Castro noted new sources of concern. Market-oriented poli- 
cies had generated new inequalities. Crime had increased. And 
some of the newly preferred strategies for development, such 
as Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Basicas de 
Produccion Cooperativa — UBPC), which are semi-private agri- 
cultural cooperatives, were not working well. But he praised 
the party's resourcefulness in overcoming the "setbacks, bitter- 
ness, and deceptions" associated with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The PCC had rallied to the defense of the regime, said 
Castro, and it had prevailed. 

The principal debate at the Fifth Congress centered on the 
new economic policy of the 1990s. Successful though it had 
been in rescuing the Cuban economy from further catastro- 
phes, it was very different from the preferences of many Fifth 
Congress delegates for a centralized command economy. Vice 
President Carlos Lage, the political architect of the economic 
reforms, admitted that prices in those food markets and restau- 
rants where demand and supply were allowed to play freely 
were often well above the purchasing power of Cuban workers. 
But he resisted suggestions for renewed state intervention in 
these markets, arguing instead for further incentives to 
increase production. Lage warned that renewed statism would 
stimulate criminality and the black market. Lage also resisted a 
generalized salary increase; the nation could not afford it. He 
preached the virtues of efficiency, balanced budgets, and con- 
trol of inflation. Fortunately for Lage, he was publicly backed 
by Fidel Castro. Castro acknowledged the problems and reiter- 
ated his dislike of these "painful remedies," but argued that 
current economic policies were sound. 



248 



Government and Politics 

The Fifth Congress's resolution on the economy reflected 
the prevailing balance of power. The Fifth Congress took note 
that the United States should be expected to continue its "eco- 
nomic war" on Cuba. Consequently, Cuba would continue to 
face an adverse international economic and financial environ- 
ment. Therefore, the "key objective of economic policy is effi- 
ciency," provided, to be sure, that all of the changes already 
adopted or about to be introduced "would always be directed 
to preserve the socialist essence of the Revolution." 

The Fifth Congress stood firm on political changes. Perhaps 
its aversion to change is best summarized in the title of the 
political resolution approved by the Fifth Congress: "The Party 
of Unity, Democracy, and the Human Rights That We Defend." 
The closing phrase of the title implied that there were some 
human rights that this party chose not to defend. 

Political Bureau and Central Committee 

Political Bureau 

The PCC's Political Bureau is the party's leading decision- 
making institution, and Cuba's most important decision-mak- 
ing entity (see fig. 8). The Political Bureau meets regularly to 
discuss the nation's key issues. Membership on the Political 
Bureau best identifies Cuba's most powerful leaders. Political 
Bureau members typically have responsibilities in other 
spheres of public life as heads of key provinces, military com- 
mands, mass organizations, or major PCC posts. Three leaders 
have led the Political Bureau since 1965 — Fidel Castro, first sec- 
retary of the PCC; Raul Castro, second secretary of the party; 
and Juan Almeida, chief of the party's disciplinary commission. 

From 1965 through 1980, no member was ever dropped 
from the Political Bureau, although its membership expanded 
from eight in 1965 to thirteen in 1975 and sixteen in 1980. By 
the time of the Third Party Congress (1986), death and volun- 
tary and involuntary retirements had led to a six-member 
reduction (37 percent) from the Political Bureau's 1980 mem- 
bership; meanwhile, four new members joined the bureau in 
1986, leaving its membership at fourteen members. 

The Fourth Party Congress (1991) witnessed the most dra- 
matic change in membership in the Political Bureau since its 
founding. The Congress wanted to promote a younger and 
more dynamic leadership. Six of the members (43 percent) left 
the bureau during the Congress. Because the Political Bureau's 



249 



Cuba: A Country Study 





POLITICAL BUREAU 

(24 members) 
First Secretary: Fidel Castro Ruz 
Second Secretary: General Raul Castro Ruz 






A 

■ 










PARTY CONGRESS 
(1,500 members; meets 
every five to six years) 


> 


CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
(150 members) 



PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES 
(14 committees, 14 first secretaries) 

I 

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES 
(169 committees, 169 first secretaries) 



PARTY CELLS 



Directs, controls, or supervises 
Elects, appoints, or nominates 



Source: Based on information from Jorge I. Domfnguez; and Raimundo Lopez, 
"Prela Report on PCC Membership, Percentages," October 8, 1997. 

Figure 8. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido 
Comunista de Cuba — PCC), 2001 

size had expanded to twenty-five members, seventeen of its 
1991 members (68 percent) were new — unprecedented since 
the party's founding in 1965. The Fifth Party Congress (1997) 
dropped nine members (36 percent) of the Political Bureau 
and added only eight new members. Thus, the Fifth Party Con- 
gress's Political Bureau (twenty-four members) suffered from 
less volatility than had its predecessor, as would be expected 
from a leadership that felt more politically secure. 



250 



Government and Politics 



By the conclusion of the Fifth Congress, only the Castro 
brothers and Almeida had served continuously on the Political 
Bureau since 1965, and only Jose Ramon Machado, party orga- 
nization secretary, had been a member since 1975. The next 
two longest-serving members, both since 1986, were Army 
Corps General Abelardo Colome Ibarra, minister of interior, 
and Esteban Lazo, who had served at various times as party pro- 
vincial secretary in Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, and Ciudad de 
La Habana Province. 

In sum, only six of the twenty-four members of the 1997 
Political Bureau had been members of Cuba's top decision- 
making organ before the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
Cuba's top leadership, therefore, has already undergone an 
important transition at the levels just below the Castro brothers 
and their closest associates. Most Political Bureau members in 
the 1990s are themselves the product of a transition that took 
place under the communist political system. They do not count 
on Soviet subsidies. They do not count on external military 
support. They do not expect to be engaged in military or other 
foreign expeditions. They are much readier to experiment at 
home with various economic policy changes. They are younger. 
The median birth year of the 1997 Political Bureau was 1943; 
six were born after the assault on the Moncada barracks on July 
26, 1953. They expect to have a political future in Cuba regard- 
less of the name of the nation's president or the form of its 
political regime. The transition among Cuba's political elite is 
already underway. 

In 1991 three women belonged to the twenty-five-member 
Political Bureau; that number dropped to two in 1997. In 1991 
four military officers on active duty belonged to the Political 
Bureau; that number rose to five in 1997. In 1991 five of the 
provincial first secretaries belonged to the Political Bureau; 
that number rose to six in 1997. The post of provincial first sec- 
retary is perhaps Cuba's most challenging position, for all sub- 
national responsibilities fall on the persons occupying these 
posts. Not surprisingly, three of the five provincial first secretar- 
ies from 1991 were dropped from the Political Bureau to be 
replaced by others. In the judgment of their superiors, the dis- 
missed first secretaries were poor managers. 

In contrast to previous decades, in 1991 Carlos Lage, secre- 
tary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, 
was the only civilian minister on the Political Bureau. The PCC 
leadership clearly understood that its problem in 1991 was emi- 



251 



Cuba: A Country Study 

nently political: how to survive the collapse of European com- 
munism and retain the support, or at least the forbearance, of 
the Cuban people. By 1997 three of the Political Bureau mem- 
bers first chosen at the previous party congress had switched 
jobs to become government ministers: Alfredo Jordan Morales, 
minister of agriculture; Abel Prieto Jimenez, minister of cul- 
ture; and Roberto Robaina Gonzalez, minister of foreign rela- 
tions. They were joined by Marcos Portal Leon, minister of 
basic industries. Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro 
became minister of the sugar industry, although he remained 
formally on active military duty. In 1997, with six out of twenty- 
four Political Bureau members serving also as members of the 
cabinet (along with FAR Minister General Raul Castro, Interior 
Minister Army Corps General Abelardo Colome, and President 
Fidel Castro), the PCC leadership signaled a higher priority for 
improving the tasks of governance and in particular the econ- 
omy's performance. 

Central Committee 

The PCC's Central Committee, a much larger group than 
the Political Bureau, is made up of many key leaders from 
intermediate levels of responsibility. The Central Committee 
met infrequently in the late 1960s; for the most part, it con- 
vened only in times of crisis. The committee met more regu- 
larly in the 1970s and 1980s; the original party statutes called 
for a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum approximately 
every six months to enable the Central Committee to have an 
impact on major decisions. The party statutes in place since the 
1997 party congress stipulate a plenum meeting at least once a 
year. 

The history of membership on the Central Committee 
resembles that of the Political Bureau. The 1975 First Party 
Congress reelected 77 percent of the 100 founding members of 
the 1965 Central Committee. The 1980 Second Party Congress 
reelected 79 percent of the 1975 full members still active in 
1980; the size of the committee had expanded to 148 in 1980. 
The 1986 Third Party Congress reelected 61 percent. The 
lower rate of continuity in 1986 parallels what was happening 
at the Political Bureau. The size of the Central Committee 
remained stable at 146. 

In 1991 the Fourth Party Congress removed half of the mem- 
bers of the old Central Committee, and it expanded the size of 
the new Central Committee to 225. Consequently, only 32 per- 



252 



Government and Politics 



cent of the new Central Committee members had served on 
the previous committee. Not only was the rate of continuity the 
lowest since the Central Committee had been founded, but the 
proportion of newcomers was the highest since the PCC's 
founding. 

The Fifth Party Congress stabilized membership on the Cen- 
tral Committee just as it had done for the Political Bureau. The 
expansion of the size of the Central Committee in 1991 had 
been a temporary experiment that the Fifth Party Congress 
reversed in 1997. The size of the Central Committee shrank to 
150 members, and 56 percent of the members of the 1991 Cen- 
tral Committee were dismissed. The 1997 Central Committee's 
veterans from 1991 constituted, however, two-thirds of the 
membership of the new Central Committee, and accordingly 
the new body was far more experienced than its predecessor. 

The oversized and inexperienced Central Committee in 
place between 1991 and 1997 was the least important Central 
Committee since the late 1960s. Then, as in most of the 1990s, 
the Central Committee met rarely — in the 1990s less often than 
expected from the party statutes. Moreover, although the party 
statutes mandate a PCC congress every five years, the Fourth 
Party Congress met nearly six years after its predecessor. The 
Fifth Congress met a full year late. In general, the Central 
Committee's excessive size, inexperience, and infrequency of 
meetings in the 1990s marked a process of party de-institution- 
alization that the Fifth Congress sought to reverse, hence the 
reduction in size and the renewed premium on experience. 
One result of these processes, however, was to install and sus- 
tain a Central Committee that was younger than its predeces- 
sors in the 1970s and 1980s. The Political Bureau and the 
Central Committee finished the century with a young and 
energetic leadership, steeled in Cuba's troubled life in the 
1990s, ready for political competition with any challenger. 

The Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress 
has an additional characteristic: 36 percent of its members 
have posts only in the PCC and its youth wing, the Union of 
Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC). 
This Central Committee is full of municipal party first secretar- 
ies, not just first secretaries at the level of provinces or on the 
staff of national party headquarters. This Central Committee 
represents the party elite better than its predecessors. It is 
much less a mere assembly of those who have performed meri- 
torious service in various spheres of life. It is no longer broadly 



253 



Cuba: A Country Study 

representative of Cuban society and institutions. Its members 
seek to rule. 

Party Organization, Membership, and Role 

Formally, the PCC is governed by its party congresses. These 
adopt the party's statutes and its programs, and choose the 
membership of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. 
Party congresses are to meet every five years, the Central Com- 
mittee Plenum every year, and the Political Bureau once a 
week. In practice, as already noted, the Political Bureau is the 
party's most important entity and the only one whose actual 
power corresponds to the formal organization. 

Party structure was simplified in the 1990s. The post of 
"alternate" for various posts (including Political Bureau and 
Central Committee member) was eliminated. The party Secre- 
tariat is no longer a separate body but simply the party's staff at 
various levels. The party's subnational organization matches 
the number of provinces and municipalities. The most rapidly 
replaced significant party post is that of provincial secretary; 
that job requires mediation between the demands of the center 
and the localities and is difficult to perform. 

The PCC is a party of selection. Not everyone who wishes to 
belong to the party has the right to join it, although all party 
members must seek to be a member. Party members are chosen 
through a complex process. First, all candidates for party mem- 
bership must be chosen as "exemplary workers" at assemblies 
held at their workplace. Then, a party commission in charge of 
membership scrutinizes each candidacy and is empowered to 
reject any and all. A variant on this procedure is through mem- 
bership in the UJC, the party's youth wing. Ordinarily, the party 
hopes that UJC members will, in due course, also be chosen as 
exemplary workers, but the party commissions can bypass such 
procedures. 

Concerned that party membership might drop in Cuba in 
the 1990s as it had in formerly communist Europe in the late 
1980s, the Fourth Party Congress liberalized membership pro- 
cedures in two ways. First, it eliminated all discrimination 
against religious believers; the party no longer required a per- 
son to be an atheist or an agnostic to qualify for membership. 
Second, the probation time for young UJC members to be eligi- 
ble for party membership was cut from three to two years. As a 
result, in the 1990s party membership grew on average some 
46,000 persons per year, compared with an annual member- 



254 




Havana Headquarters of the Union of Young Communists (Union 

de Jovenes Comunistas — UJC), 1997 
Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 

ship growth of only about 27,000 persons in the 1980s. Party 
membership grew to 800,000 members by the time of the Fifth 
Party Congress in 1997 out of a population of about eleven mil- 
lion people. In 1997 about 30 percent of the members had 
joined during the 1990s. Workers constituted about one-third 
of the entire party membership. Another half-million belonged 
to the UJC. 

The PCC's manner of filling public offices differs from how 
political parties elsewhere in the world go about this pursuit. 
Elected public offices wield relatively modest power in Cuba. 
The National Assembly meets infrequently and has limited 
powers. Provincial and municipal assemblies have limited 
resources to carry on with their tasks. Although the PCC 
screens who is elected to these offices, it focuses its attention 
on appointed offices that wield significant power. The PCC 
commission at the appropriate level must clear and endorse 
every officeholder for such posts prior to appointment. Heads 
of central government agencies, state enterprises, hospitals, 
military commands, and so forth must all be cleared and 



255 



Cuba: A Country Study 

endorsed. This type of control is the party's principal source of 
power. 

PCC officials, especially at the subnational level, also play key 
roles as problem solvers and coordinators. When difficulties 
arise in a province or a municipality, the party first secretary is 
often the only person well positioned to appeal through the 
party hierarchy for additional support or resources from 
Havana. The party first secretary in the provinces and the 
municipalities functions also as an arbiter in disputes that may 
arise in various spheres of life. More controversially, the party 
municipal or provincial secretary often assumes the responsi- 
bility of breaking a national policy directive on the grounds 
that local conditions are not propitious. This last role implies 
that party provincial and municipal secretaries are, in some 
instances, high risk-takers, but it also explains why provincial 
first secretaries are vulnerable to dismissal. 

The PCC organs are loci for discussion and debate over 
national, sectoral, provincial, or municipal policies. Although 
the Central Committee had become less representative of 
Cuban society by the late 1990s, PCC cells (the party's lowest 
units) and various assemblies often congregate leaders from 
various spheres of life effectively. These fora provide opportu- 
nities to clear the air in a heated dispute and to review, under- 
stand, and influence decisions issued from on high. 

The party generally orients policies at various levels and with 
varying degrees of specificity. In contrast to previous decades, 
in the 1990s the party's national staff became smaller, and party 
officials were instructed to interfere less in the routine running 
of government agencies, state enterprises, and social service 
entities. The party in the 1990s retained its key tasks, as out- 
lined above, but withdrew in many cases from becoming a sub- 
stitute policy executor. This behavior was consistent with 
turning the party into, and using it, as a political machine. 

Mass Organizations 

Three of Cuba's principal mass organizations were founded 
shortly after revolutionary victory, between late 1959 and 1961. 
The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) groups women mem- 
bers, as might be expected. The National Association of Small 
Farmers (ANAP) brings together smallholders regardless of 
their crops of specialization. Following the 1963 agrarian 
reform, many such private smallholders remained. Some culti- 
vated plots on their own or with their families; others did so as 



256 



Government and Politics 



members of cooperatives. All belonged to the ANAP. The Com- 
mittees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) were estab- 
lished in every neighborhood to uncover plots against the 
government. "Revolutionary vigilance" was their main task. 
The CDRs were also responsible for rooting out common crime 
and, from time to time, collaborated in such activities as mass 
vaccination campaigns, garbage recycling, park clean-ups, and 
the like. 

The fourth mass organization is much older: the Cuban 
Workers Federation (CTC) was founded in the 1930s. The CTC 
groups all Cubans who are gainfully employed. It is organized 
into federations according to sectors of economic activity, not 
according to professional categories or trades. The CTC has a 
presence in every work center, and it and the ANAP often sub- 
stitute for government agencies in dispute resolution. 

From the 1960s to the 1980s, these mass organizations were 
means by which the government and the PCC implemented 
policies and monitored the population. The moment of high- 
est recognition of their role came at the Second Party Congress 
in 1980, when all four heads of the mass organizations became 
alternate members of the party's Political Bureau. 

By the 1980s, however, the capacities of the mass organiza- 
tions had begun to weaken. Consider the ANAP. One of the top 
national objectives in the rural sector was to promote Agricul- 
tural-Livestock Cooperatives (Cooperativas de Produccion 
Agropecuaria — CPAs) ; the national leadership thought it more 
rational for smallholders to pool their resources. CPA member- 
ship jumped from 9,103 in 1978 to 82,611 in 1983, but by 1990 
membership had dropped to 62,130. The number of hectares 
in CPAs peaked in 1986; after this high point, the organizations 
lost nearly a fifth of their pooled land. 

A generalized weakening of the capacity of the various mass 
organizations became evident in the late 1980s. PCC leaders, 
worried that these longstanding means of control were break- 
ing down, took decisive action in the early 1990s by replacing 
the leaders of three mass organizations. Thus, Orlando Lugo 
Fonte replaced Jose Ramirez Cruz, the longtime ANAP presi- 
dent; Juan Contino replaced Armando Acosta Cordero, the 
longtime national coordinator of the CDRs; and Pedro Ross 
Leal replaced the longtime CTC secretary-general, Roberto 
Veiga Menendez. Lugo Fonte and Contino joined the PCC 
Central Committee in 1991; Ross Leal was elevated to the Polit- 
ical Bureau that same year. 



257 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Vilma Espm founded the FMC and has remained its only 
president. She is Raul Castro's wife, Fidel's sister-in-law. Espm 
was promoted to alternate member of the Political Bureau in 
1980 and to full Political Bureau membership in 1986. In 1991 
she became a member of the Central Committee but remained 
as FMC president. 

Notwithstanding these attempts to reinvigorate the mass 
organizations, primarily through new leadership, the FMC, the 
CDRs, and the ANAP remain weaker than in decades past in 
terms of representing and mobilizing the population. The 
CDRs hit bottom in the early 1990s; in the mid-1990s, they 
responded to their reduced capacity by concentrating on some 
strategic tasks where they are still capable of delivering impor- 
tant support for the political regime. For example, the CDRs 
came to play an important role in Cuba's electoral process in 
the 1990s. (As the 1990s closed, the CDRs counted 7.5 million 
people on their membership rolls.) During the 1998 National 
Assembly elections, the CDRs campaigned steadily and mas- 
sively on behalf of a vote for the single official slate; they com- 
bated both blank voting and the process of voting selectively 
for some but not all candidates on the official ballot. On elec- 
tion day, the CDRs visited some homes repeatedly to ensure the 
highest possible turnout. The CDRs were literally an arm of the 
PCC working to achieve the desired electoral results. 

The CTC, in contrast, found a new, albeit still limited, role in 
the 1990s: defending the interests of workers in some respects 
and questioning some of the recommendations of government 
technocrats. In this latter stance, the CTC differed from its 
prior role of just helping the government implement its objec- 
tives. In the 1990s, labor unions, for example, delayed legisla- 
tion that would have forced recalcitrant workers to relocate to 
other jobs. As a result, Cuban state firms remained overstaffed 
and inefficient, but the government was spared from political 
protest and overt unemployment remained relatively low. 
Unions also resisted stricter sanctions against labor absentee- 
ism (thus making it easier for workers to moonlight as self- 
employed) , and fought off linking wages to productivity. The 
CTC also spoke out in late 1993 when the government adopted 
some of its most far-reaching economic reforms and, spurred 
by Finance Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Garcia, the govern- 
ment's leading technocrat, began to consider whether to 
impose taxes on self-employed and salaried workers. The CTC 
opposed the imposition of taxes on the payrolls of salaried 



258 



Government and Politics 



workers and supported a nationwide discussion of the pro- 
posed measures in "workers' parliaments" during the first half 
of 1994. In the end, taxes were imposed on self-employed but 
not on salaried workers (see Tax Reform, ch. 3). 

The changes that took place in the 1990s increased the 
CTC's autonomy from the state and imbued it with some claims 
to represent the interests of state workers. This new political 
role, of course, came at the expense of delaying or impeding 
economic reform, but it no doubt made the CTC more impor- 
tant. During this period, the CDRs, on the other hand, became 
even more closely connected to the PCC's partisan interests. 
The ANAP and the FMC have yet to find an effective new role. 

Civil Organizations 

Religion and the State 

The Cuban state is secular, according to the constitution. In 
fact, in the 1960s government policy was designed to weaken 
the Roman Catholic Church and other forms of organized reli- 
gious behavior, while respecting "freedom of religion" at its 
narrowest level: Cubans remained free to worship. Active 
churchgoers and their children, however, risked being discrim- 
inated against when applying to selective schools and the uni- 
versity and when seeking promotions in the workplace. The 
PCC was formally atheist until 1991, and membership in the 
party was often a prerequisite for jobs carrying significant 
responsibilities. Therefore, the Cuban leadership's decision to 
drop atheism as a formal requirement for party membership in 
1991 and, more generally, in the 1990s to discontinue the 
active campaigns against organized religion were significant 
decisions with broad impact. 

In fact, Cuba witnessed a religious revival in many faiths in 
the 1990s. The revival began from a fairly low baseline. A large 
survey (N=3105, with N meaning the size of the random poll 
sample) conducted in the early 1990s by Cuba's Center for Psy- 
chological and Sociological Research (Centro de Investiga- 
ciones Psicologicas y Sociologicas — CIPS) showed that 65 
percent of respondents believed in the possibility of magical 
cures while 43 percent thought well of burial ceremonies. But 
only 17 percent approved of baptisms, only 6 percent attended 
religious services, and only 2 percent admitted to belonging to 
a religious grouping. In 1997 a Cuban government survey 
showed that more than four-fifths of Cubans believed in some- 



259 



Cuba: A Country Study 

thing transcendent, while 15 percent admitted to belonging to 
a religious grouping. 

Although its social base of support remains modest, the 
Roman Catholic Church is Cuba's most hierarchically orga- 
nized community of faith (see Roman Catholic Church, ch. 2). 
The rebuilding of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba began 
in the mid-1980s in preparation for the 1986 Roman Catholic 
Congress, the first to be held since 1959. Congress participants 
reviewed the situation of the church in Cuba, through history 
and in the present. They formulated broad recommendations 
for pastoral action and provided the first sustained critique of 
aspects of Cuban government policy. The final document 
issued by the Congress complained of discrimination in job 
promotions suffered by Roman Catholics, criticized official 
atheism, and called attention to "moral deficiencies" in con- 
temporary Cuba, including "duplicity, mendacity, fraud." 

In the early 1990s, Roman Catholic bishops criticized the 
government and party policies more sharply. The bishops 
issued their pastoral letter, "Love Hopes All Things," on Sep- 
tember 8, 1993, the feast of Our Lady of Charity of Cobre, 
Cuba's patroness, and coincidentally the grimmest moment in 
Cuba's sharp economic collapse of the early 1990s. The bishops 
developed several controversial themes that would resurface 
during the pope's visit in January 1998. In 1993 the bishops 
claimed the right to speak to all Cubans, including politicians. 
"We bishops of Cuba," they added, "reject any kind of measure 
that in order to punish the Cuban government serves to aggra- 
vate the problems of our people," specifically mentioning the 
United States embargo and other sanctions on Cuba. The bish- 
ops criticized official practice "that leads to identifying terms 
that cannot be made synonymous, such as homeland and social- 
ism . . . Cuban and revolutionary." They chided the authorities 
for limiting freedoms, for "excessive surveillance by the state 
security agencies that even extends into the strictly private life 
of individuals." They lamented the "high number of prisoners 
being held," including those "being punished for economic or 
political reasons 

In November 1996, President Fidel Castro visited Pope John 
Paul II at the Vatican and invited him to visit Cuba. The Roman 
Catholic bishops had first invited the pope in 1989, and infor- 
mal discussions had been underway since earlier in the 1980s, 
but the Cuban government had delayed issuing its own invita- 
tion. In preparation for the papal visit that took place in Jan u- 



260 



On the occasion of the June 29, 1997, open-air mass held in 
Havana, the first in almost four decades, a sign advertises 
the up coming January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II. 

Courtesy Mark P Sullivan 

ary 1998, the first ever to Cuba by a pope, church and state 
negotiated extensively. The Cuban government agreed to per- 
mit outdoor masses, not limiting them just to the period of the 
pope's visit, and authorized religious processions outside 
church buildings. In addition, in December 1997, Christmas 
Day became an official holiday for the first time since 1969. 
The Cuban mass media covered some of the preparation for 
the pope's visit, and during the visit radio and television broad- 
cast all public events live. Cardinal Jaime Ortega, archbishop of 
Havana, was given a half-hour of free television time shortly 
before the pope's visit to explain the meaning and significance 
of the forthcoming events. The government also allowed thou- 
sands of international pilgrims, including Cuban-Americans, to 
visit Cuba for the duration of the visit, and allowed the church 
to import paper and other materials to publish necessary infor- 
mation. 

Because the pope's visit took place well after a process of 
social and religious change had begun, his visit may have a 
longer-lasting impact on Cuban society and politics than if it 



261 



Cuba: A Country Study 



had taken place without such prior changes. Thus, the papal 
visit may be a catalyst or an accelerator of further changes. The 
Roman Catholic church in Cuba has begun to behave like its 
brethren in former communist countries or in former Latin 
American dictatorships. Some parishes sponsor book or film 
clubs, or other groups to discuss issues of common concern, 
not just exclusively religious issues. Several dioceses also pub- 
lish magazines that cover a wide array of topics, not just those 
of religious significance. For example, the Havana archdioce- 
san magazine Palabra Nueva often publishes articles that assess 
and criticize government economic policy. Vitral, the magazine 
of the diocese of Pinar del Rio, has been the boldest in chal- 
lenging aspects of government policy. 

It is difficult to assess the relative size of Cuba's various com- 
munities of faith. Nonetheless, both before the Revolution and 
in the 1990s it is likely that the largest such community is heir 
to Cuba's Afro-Cuban religious traditions. Santeria, regla depalo, 
spiritualism, and other forms of Afro-Cuban religiosity com- 
mand significant popular allegiance, probably more than 
Roman Catholicism. The already mentioned large survey from 
the early 1990s, for example, suggests strong support for beliefs 
and practices often associated with Afro-Cuban practices. 
According to the survey, more Cubans believed in the worth of 
consulting a babalao (an Afro-Cuban religious leader) than a 
priest. In the western provinces, Roman Catholic Church atten- 
dance once a month reached 20 percent by late 1994, but, even 
after the pope's visit in 1998, consistent weekly church atten- 
dance nationwide was only about 3 percent, although the pro- 
portion was much higher in Havana than in eastern Cuba. 

During the 1990s, evangelical Protestantism reportedly grew 
rapidly in Cuba, as was the case elsewhere in Latin America and 
in former communist Europe. More traditional forms of Prot- 
estantism did not grow much, however. To the extent that reli- 
gious belief and behavior remained a form of distancing 
oneself from the government and the PCC, then the fact that 
other forms of religiosity grew faster than mainstream Protes- 
tantism could be explained in political terms: Cubans were 
unwilling to join those communities of faith perceived as too 
close to the political regime, and some Protestant pastors from 
mainline Protestant faiths had agreed to serve on the govern- 
ment's single official slate for National Assembly elections. 

Cuba also has a small Jewish community but no resident 
rabbi, although one or two are in training and rabbis from the 



262 



Government and Politics 



United States visit Cuba for services on holy days. The Jewish 
community has also grown, as older and younger Jews have 
sought to explore their religious tradition. (Some Jews, how- 
ever, have used this reactivation of their community links as a 
means to emigrate to Israel. If they are active members of a 
Temple, Jews have found it more likely that Israel will accept 
them as immigrants and that the Cuban government will per- 
mit their emigration.) 

Nongovernmental Organizations 

Cuba's most important nonreligious nongovernmental orga- 
nizations (NGOs) are often government operated nongovern- 
mental organizations (GONGOs). This is the case for two 
reasons. The nature and extent of government and PCC con- 
trol over Cuban society and political life have been very exten- 
sive. The principal forms of societal organization, for example, 
have been the mass organizations, already discussed. By the 
late 1970s and thereafter, however, the government and party 
found it useful to establish organizations with a greater margin 
of autonomy. In the 1990s, one additional motivation was that 
GONGOs could more readily obtain international assistance 
from NGOs in Western Europe and Canada. 

There are many examples of GONGOs. They include sports 
clubs; environmental organizations; a Cuban variant of a 
national rifle association; professional associations of lawyers, 
economists, engineers, and so forth; as well as many intellec- 
tual and scientific organizations, including think tanks. The 
think tanks focused on political, economic, and social analysis, 
were founded directly by the PCC, and followed its guidelines 
fairly closely through the 1980s. The Center for the Study of 
the World Economy (Centro de Investigaciones de la 
Economia Mundial — CIEM) , for example, conducted research 
principally on the Soviet Union and East European communist 
countries until their collapse, but also on the Cuban economy. 
The director and deputy director of the CIEM, Oswaldo Mar- 
tinez and Jose Luis Rodriguez, respectively, successively held 
the post of minister of economy in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, 
more than one-half of the publications produced by the CIPS 
(Center for Psychological and Sociological Research) were clas- 
sified for the use of government and party officials, not for 
wider academic circulation. 

In the mid-1990s, the most notable GONGO was the Center 
for American Studies (Centro de Estudios sobre America — 



263 



Cuba: A Country Study 



CEA). Founded in the late 1970s by the PCC to generate infor- 
mation and analysis about the United States, Canada, and 
Latin America, the CEA, by the early 1990s, was strikingly inde- 
pendent in the development of its work while remaining well 
connected to some high-ranking government and party offi- 
cials. Central Committee members and staff, National Assem- 
bly leaders and staff, and ministers of government solicited the 
work of CEA staff and at times attended CEA workshops and 
conferences. 

In the early 1990s, CEA economists working on Cuba distin- 
guished themselves by the originality of their thought and their 
willingness to venture past the officially established canon for 
discussion of economic policy. One CEA-produced book, Cuba: 
La restructuracion de la economia, una propuesta para el debate, pro- 
vides a searching diagnosis and critique of Cuba's economic 
circumstances and proposes economic policies different from 
those the government was then pursuing. The CEA economists 
wished to accelerate the use of market incentives and instru- 
ments, although still within a socialist framework. The CEA 
sociologists and political scientists had also been working on 
domestic Cuban politics and society. In the spring of 1994, they 
held a conference to assess the quality of Cuban democracy. In 
that conference and in the resulting book that was published in 
1995, some foreign authors were included as well. The publica- 
tion of these two CEA books, however, alarmed some within 
the leadership. 

In March 1996, Raul Castro, minister of the FAR, read a 
wide-ranging report on behalf of the Political Bureau to the 
Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee. One part of the text 
sharply criticized the CEA, accusing its academics of parroting 
the line of United States scholars on Cuba and, more generally, 
of serving United States interests and undermining revolution- 
ary ideology. There followed an investigation led by Jose 
Ramon Balaguer Cabrera, party secretary for ideology. The 
terms of the investigation resembled a witch hunt. The CEA 
senior staff held together, however, insisting that they were 
good revolutionaries and good communists. (The United 
States government from time to time had denied CEA academ- 
ics visas to enter the United States precisely for these reasons.) 
Although they "confessed" to minor issues (for example, some- 
thing could have been done better) , they held firm in defense 
of their substantive ideas and professions of loyalty. In the end, 
although they had to leave the CEA (the institution became a 



264 



A view of Havana from Fort Spain (Fortaleza La Espana) 
Courtesy Danielle Hayes, United Nations Development Programme 

pale shadow of its former self) , each of the senior academics at 
first found employment that, for the most part, permitted the 
continuation of much of their academic research. None was 
immediately expelled from the PCC. The survival of the CEA 
academics depended greatly on the expression of international 
support by scholars and governments in many countries that 
had come to value CEA researchers. 

NGOs, no matter what their origin might have been, create 
spaces between state and society, between ruling party and pri- 
vate citizens. Such an occurrence has been an aspect of the 
Cuban experience in the 1990s. The CEA case is instructive 
because the CEA was able to resist more effectively than would 
have been the case in Cuba in previous decades. 

Human Rights and Opposition Groups 

It is not news that the Cuban government harasses or jails 
human rights activists and groups as well as the political opposi- 
tion. The news in the 1990s was that the government was no 
longer succeeding in its repression. Since the defeat and 
destruction of violent counterrevolutionary forces in the mid- 
1960s, the government has not feared violent opposition. But, 
beginning slowly and haltingly in the late 1970s and gathering 



265 



Cuba: A Country Study 



steam in the 1980s, a human rights movement finally blos- 
somed in Cuba in the 1990s. 

In the 1990s, when the government jailed human rights 
activists or opposition political leaders or destroyed some of 
their organizations, others, hitherto unknown, replaced them. 
Thus, the work of these groups has continued even if the faces 
and names of the people and organizations have changed. 

A high-water mark for human rights groups was reached in 
1995-96. On October 10, 1995 (the anniversary of the begin- 
ning of Cuba's first war of independence), an organization 
called the Cuban Council (Concilio Cubano) was founded. 
The Concilio was an attempt by some 140 small, unofficial 
opposition groups to coalesce around a minimal program. The 
Concilio's aims were a general amnesty for all political prison- 
ers, full respect for the present constitution and fundamental 
laws, a call on the Cuban government to fulfill its obligations to 
respect human rights under the United Nations Charter, a 
demand for freedom of economic organization, and a call for 
free and direct elections on the basis of the pluralist nature of 
society. 

In November 1995, the Concilio reaffirmed its commitment 
to use only peaceful means to achieve its aims. In short, the 
Concilio respected the country's constitution and legal frame- 
work while demanding changes within them. In December the 
Concilio formally asked the government for permission to hold 
a large gathering on February 24, 1996 (the anniversary of the 
beginning of Cuba's last war of independence). On February 
15, however, the government launched a wave of repression 
against Concilio leaders and members; the next day it banned 
the gathering. The Concilio's principal leader and national del- 
egate, Leonel Morejon, served a prison term for his role in the 
organization; several others were jailed as well. 

The Concilio Cubano episode was noteworthy because it was 
the largest and most ambitious attempt to consolidate human 
rights and opposition groups. Throughout the 1990s, the 
repression of human rights and opposition activity and the 
rebirth in due course were a recurring pattern. In the late 
1990s, human rights and opposition activists founded new 
groups, some of which created new, smaller coalitions. The gov- 
ernment again resorted to repression, and the activists and 
oppositionists rebounded as well. 

As in decades past, in the 1990s the government responded 
to opposition efforts by forcing some activists into exile and 



266 



Government and Politics 



sometimes, in effect, deporting them. One means of assuring 
political stability since 1959 has been the government's export 
of its opposition. Many Concilio Cubano leaders and members 
went into exile after the 1996 crackdown, for example. The 
government often releases political prisoners only on the con- 
dition that they emigrate. 

Mass Media 

In the 1990s, as in decades past, the state owned and oper- 
ated all mass media, except for publications of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Because of the high cost of importing news- 
print, in the early 1990s the government sharply cut back on 
the publication of newspapers and magazines. Many journals 
and magazines were shut down; the circulation of newspapers 
was cut back. 

The principal daily newspaper is Granma, official organ of 
the PCC. Granma reads like a collection of press releases. It 
often publishes the full texts of official speeches and is gener- 
ally devoid of editorial or substantive variety. In the late 1990s, 
it resumed occasional publication of abbreviated "letters to the 
editor" along with responses to them, thereby providing a 
glimpse of how official Cuba addresses popular questions. 
Juventud Rebelde is the official organ of the UJC (Communist 
Youth Union) . In the 1990s, it changed from a daily to a weekly. 
It is likely to feature opinion pieces that provide a slightly wider 
range of political and social commentary. Bohemia is a news- 
magazine of long standing that at times presents investigative 
reporting of problems that government leaders wish to bring to 
light. 

By the end of the 1950s, Cuba had an impressive nationwide 
network of television broadcast companies and television sets. 
Fidel Castro employed television extensively in 1959 and there- 
after to communicate his vision and his policies to the Cuban 
people. The Cuban Revolution was the first revolution whose 
leaders made extensive use of television. In the 1990s, however, 
the costs of production for television led the government to 
reduce the number of channels and of hours of transmission. 
Nonetheless, television remains the principal source of com- 
munication for entertainment and news. 

In the 1990s, however, radio, a lower-cost alternative to print 
or television media, became the more dynamic mass medium. 
Moreover, the Cuban government's response to the United 
States-sponsored Radio Marti Program led to wider freedom of 



267 



Cuba: A Country Study 



programming for radio. Consequently, Cuban radio engages in 
investigative reporting of various misdeeds, ranging from stores 
that do not open when they should or that sell shoddy mer- 
chandise, to incidents of crime and corruption. Live talk shows 
urge listeners to call in with their questions and complaints. 
Some radio programs broadcast internationally popular music, 
instead of the establishment revolutionary or "solidarity" music 
favored by official Cuba. In 1993, for example, Radio Taino was 
revamped to broadcast with the characteristics of commercial- 
style radio. It featured contemporary Cuban and international 
Latin dance music, and it carried advertising from foreign 
firms operating in Cuba. 

In the 1990s, the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to 
accept donations to import materials and equipment to pub- 
lish the texts necessary for the liturgy and to publish magazines 
of substantial circulation. As already mentioned, several archdi- 
oceses publish magazines and other limited-circulation publi- 
cations. The most important one, Palabra Nueva, sponsored by 
the Archdiocese of Havana, features articles on religious 
themes, but it has also published regularly on economics and 
social issues, at times diverging significantly and critically from 
government policies. 

Political Processes 

Emerging Political Leaders 

Cuba's political processes at the start of the twenty-first cen- 
tury were more complex than in decades past. President Fidel 
Castro remained at the pinnacle of power. Although aging (he 
was born in 1926) and less healthy than in prior years, his 
energy and talents remained extraordinary. He could still 
deliver multi-hour speeches with few notes; and he still kept 
the hours of a night owl, insisting on seeing foreign leaders at 
midnight or thereafter when the latter were exhausted and he 
was in his prime. Castro is still thoughtful, eloquent, inspiring, 
decisive, and charming. He is also ruthless, brutal, intolerant, 
egomaniacal, and manipulative. These and other traits make 
him a politician who is revered and feared, admired and 
loathed, but whom none take lightly. 

Fidel's slightly younger brother Raul Castro (born in 1931), 
the FAR minister, is the designated successor. Raul Castro lacks 
the more attractive qualities of his brother's public personality, 
but he has inspired respect and loyalty among subordinates for 



268 



A view of downtown Havana (Old Havana), including the 
National Capitol (Capitolio Nacional), 1996 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

his painstaking and effective construction of Cuba's armed 
forces. Although no longer a formidable force, the FAR won 
the wars that it fought twice in Angola against South African 
invasions (1975-76, 1987-88) and once on Ethiopian soil 
against Somalia's invasion (1977-78). 

Other important political leaders will most likely continue to 
play a role in Cuba's future politics. PCC Organization Secre- 
tary Jose Ramon Machado was a winner in the composition of 
the Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Party Congress and 
positioned himself well for the future. Army Corps General 
Abelardo Colome, "Hero of the Republic of Cuba" for his com- 
bat service in overseas wars, rose through a professional career 
in the army and in the late 1980s became interior minister. 
National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon revitalized 
Cuba's parliament and, to some degree, political life by reach- 
ing out to a wider number of loyal "revolutionary" Cubans who 
were not necessarily PCC cadres. Alarcon has remained the 
government's chief of relations with the United States. Esteban 
Lazo Hernandez is the party's expert on subnational govern- 
ment, having served as first party secretary in more provinces 
(including La Habana) than anyone else. Lazo (born in 1944) 



269 



Cuba: A Country Study 



is the Afro-Cuban who best combines relative youth and signifi- 
cant experience at the top of the leadership. Carlos Lage, vice 
president of the Council of State, heads the economic cabinet 
and, backed by Minister of Economy and Planning Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Garcia, was the political architect of Cuba's eco- 
nomic reforms of the 1990s. Younger than these others, Lage 
portrays on national television and in person an image of quiet 
competence and candor. Also playing political roles wider than 
their ministerial portfolios imply are Culture Minister Abel Pri- 
eto, Division General and Sugar Industry Minister Ulises 
Rosales del Toro, and Basic Industries Minister Marcos Portal. 
Portal in particular was the champion of more efficient admin- 
istrators in state enterprises. 

In the 1990s, unlike the 1960s, Cuba had no clearly identifi- 
able "factions" within the party, but it has witnessed varying cur- 
rents of opinion. These combine and overlap. In general, PCC 
cadres and Secretary Machado tend to oppose most economic, 
political, and religious reforms. Leading military and internal 
security officers in contrast, favor various market reforms. FAR 
Minister Raul Castro, for example, took the lead in 1994 to 
advocate market reforms in agriculture, contrary to what had 
been Fidel Castro's position. The Ministry of Interior, too, 
favors economic reforms to decriminalize activities that would 
otherwise occur illegally; ministry officials believe that they 
have tougher enemies to fight than parents seeking milk for 
their children. Vice President Lage and National Assembly 
President Alarcon, among others, have been more willing than 
other national leaders to support the various economic and 
political experiments that took place in the 1990s. 

Political Aspects of the Security and Military Forces 

Cuban state security remains effective in many ways. In the 
summer of 1994, it controlled and suffocated with a profes- 
sional use of force a large riot that took place in downtown 
Havana, as thousands of Cubans protested the use of force 
against those seeking to emigrate without prior lawful authori- 
zation. Cuban leaders quietly pointed out that the People's Lib- 
eration Army of the People's Republic of China used massive 
force in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989 to put down pro- 
tests. The Cuban military was not called in to put down this 
riot, however, because internal security forces handled the inci- 
dent effectively, with restrained use of force. Internal security 



270 



Government and Politics 



forces also effectively suppressed illegal job actions and 
attempted strikes at various moments in the 1990s. 

Politically, several factors are noteworthy about the FAR. 
Most Cuban military officers are also PCC members. In the 
1990s, military officers on active duty constituted a consistent 
fifth of the membership of the party's Political Bureau. Two of 
the key members of the Political Bureau were Generals Raul 
Castro and Abelardo Colome. And, after the 1997 Fifth Party 
Congress, the military represented 17 percent of the member- 
ship of the party's Central Committee, continuing a slide evi- 
dent over the decades but retaining significant clout (see also 
The Military in the Government and Party, ch. 5). 

In the 1990s, the FAR became a pale shadow of its former 
self, as regards combat readiness and effectiveness. Cuba 
stopped receiving weaponry free of charge from the Soviet 
Union at the beginning of the decade, and it could not afford 
to import sufficient new equipment or even spare parts. As a 
result, the FAR had to reduce the frequency and scope of its 
military exercises. Its size shrank greatly, downsizing to not 
more than 65,000 regular troops. From 1989 to 1997, the size 
of the military and internal security budget (in pesos) was cut 
by 45 percent. The leadership's downsizing of the FAR was a 
major political and budgetary contribution to any future gov- 
ernment of Cuba. 

To facilitate the demobilization of personnel and to supple- 
ment the meager peso-denominated pensions, the government 
created semi-private companies (they operate as private com- 
panies, but the state is the sole shareholder) to employ former 
officers. The military-run tourist firm Gaviota is one example; 
many of its taxi drivers, former military officers, are paid in dol- 
lars by tourists. However, military officers on active duty are 
prohibited from moonlighting and discouraged from receiving 
funds from their overseas relatives. As a result, the standard of 
living of military officers dropped appreciably relative to other 
Cubans who enjoyed lawful access to self-employment or to dol- 
lar remittances. Some officers moonlighted, nonetheless, and 
in so doing broke the law they were sworn to uphold. 

The Widening of Public Space 

The most notable change in elite political processes in the 
1990s was that some disputes could no longer be resolved just 
in private as had hitherto been quite common. In the 1990s, 
some disputes became quite public. The new Foreign Invest- 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

ment Law 77 of 1995 was vigorously debated and its approval 
consequently delayed. Another publicly debated case, that 
relating to the imposition of payroll taxes, was the first instance 
in which an economic initiative advocated by the leadership 
was defeated. Fidel Castro's need to explain and defend pub- 
licly his invitation to Pope John Paul II both at the Fifth Party 
Congress and in the days prior to the pope's arrival was yet 
another example. 

The widening of public space was most closely associated, 
however, with the weakening of the government's control. The 
boom of illegal markets in the 1990s, discussed in previous 
chapters, is the best example of weakened control. The govern- 
ment had been an intrusive micromanager of economic life, 
shaping the work place and earnings decisions and outcomes 
for every Cuban. In the 1990s, that changed. Lawfully or not, 
many Cubans took hold of their economic lives and became 
largely independent of the state for their livelihood. Given the 
context of past decades, this was a major political change, not 
just an economic change. 

Moreover, President Fidel Castro repeatedly made it clear 
that he detested authorizing the limited market-oriented poli- 
cies that he felt compelled to authorize in the 1990s to ensure 
his government's survival. For Cubans long-accustomed to a 
ruler who had governed with vast discretion, this, too, was a 
stunning political change. Fidel Castro could no longer govern 
his way. 

Human rights and opposition activists understood this new 
modest but nonetheless real opening. Each of them might suf- 
fer repression, abuse, or imprisonment, but they were newly 
confident that others would pick up their fallen standard to 
continue to press for wider spaces for democratic liberties. 
Cuba's government could no longer prevail even in the one 
area that had always mattered the most, namely, the capacity to 
eliminate all organized opposition. 

The academics associated with the Center for American 
Studies (CEA) did not consider themselves dissidents or oppo- 
sitionists but loyal PCC members; nonetheless, the party leader- 
ship came down hard on them. And yet, these academics 
resisted, as well, in ways unlike in the past. They did not break 
ranks. They did not betray each other. And, to a surprising 
degree, they succeeded in continuing at least some aspects of 
their academic work. 



272 



Government and Politics 



"Do not be afraid," said Pope John Paul II during his visit to 
Cuba in January 1998. Posters with the pope's photograph, 
plastered all over the country, reiterated this fundamental mes- 
sage. Cubans took the pope's message to heart in their partici- 
pation in the events associated with his visit. The pope's 
pilgrimage to Cuba, as already noted, was likely to have some 
lasting impact because it rode the crest of a wave of renewed 
interest in religiosity. 

The political attitudes of Cubans also changed. In the spring 
of 1990, Cuba's newsmagazine Bohemia conducted a nationwide 
public opinion poll (N=957). Asked about municipal govern- 
ment, more than 40 percent of respondents failed to express 
trust in the delegate elected from their district; nearly 60 per- 
cent believed that improvements needed to be made in Cuba's 
local government structures and procedures. In the spring of 
1990, the PCC also sponsored a nationwide survey. Only 20 per- 
cent of respondents said that the food supply was good, and 
only 10 percent said that the quality of transportation was 
good. Having thus reported criticism on certain matters, the 
poll was believable when it reported that 77 percent of respon- 
dents thought that health services were good and 83 percent 
believed in the efficacy of the country's schooling. Cubans 
were, therefore, unhappy with the capacity of their govern- 
ment institutions and leaders to represent and serve many of 
their interests, but they continued to be impressed by perfor- 
mance in education and health care. This legacy of at least par- 
tial public support was crucial for regime survival at its moment 
of greatest peril, when so many Cubans had come to feel free 
to express their severe unhappiness even to PCC pollsters. 

In late 1994, an affiliate of the Gallup Poll conducted a large 
survey in Cuba's western provinces. A large proportion of 
respondents had no difficulty reporting complaints. Only a 
quarter of Cubans believed that their needs for food were fully 
met, although half believed their health care needs were being 
met and nearly three-quarters were satisfied with Cuba's educa- 
tion programs. Only one in ten Cubans called themselves 
"communists" although half thought of themselves as "revolu- 
tionaries"; a quarter said that they were not supporters of the 
regime. Half of those surveyed were interested in setting up 
small businesses, if the government were to authorize them. 
More Cubans supported the value of equality than the value of 
freedom. 



273 



Cuba: A Country Study 

These views suggest that Cubans had absorbed — and sup- 
ported — a number of socialist values but that many also dis- 
agreed significantly with the government and were not afraid 
to voice those disagreements to pollsters. Support for the PCC 
was quite low even though, as noted before, many individual 
party members were highly regarded by their neighbors. 

Cuban politics changed slowly but decisively in the 1990s. 
Political leaders could not and did not govern as had been 
their custom. They were forced to authorize some changes and 
permit others, even when they disapproved of them. Cubans 
began to act through the market, legally or not, and chose to 
explore new political, religious, and intellectual alternatives. 

The PCC and government leaders, in turn, had enacted 
important changes on their own to shape Cuba's present and 
future. The leadership was substantially overhauled in the early 
1990s. New, younger people were appointed to significant 
posts. The armed forces were downsized sharply. After a period 
of decline and deinstitutionalization early in the 1990s, the gov- 
ernment took some steps to strengthen and rearticulate regime 
institutions as the decade closed. The regime's leaders and 
institutions, however, had changed in perceptible ways even if 
their purpose continued to be the retention of power. 

Cuba in the 1990s was in the throes of a political transition, 
although its end point was uncertain. This "transition to some- 
where" did not imply a transition to a liberal democratic 
regime as had occurred elsewhere in Latin America or in much 
of the former communist world. It was associated with more 
open spaces for a private and public life autonomous from gov- 
ernment and party power, and with rules that enabled market 
processes to operate. Whether Cuba's transition would evolve 
toward democratization remained unclear as the decade 
reached a close. 

Foreign Relations 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe, Cuba was bereft 
of international allies. Its trade, investments, military support, 
and political relations had been disproportionately concen- 
trated and dependent on governments that no longer existed. 
As 1990 opened, the Soviet Union required that all bilateral 
trade be conducted at international market prices by whatever 
private or state enterprises engaged in pertinent activities. No 



274 



The North East Gate, Marine Barracks, Ground Defense Force, 
U. S. Naval Base, Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, 1 993 

longer would bilateral trade be mandated and carried out by 
the central government in Moscow. 

During the 1990s, Cuban economic relations with Central 
and Eastern Europe plummeted. Cuban economic relations 
with Russia focused principally on barter trade, at market 
prices, exchanging sugar for petroleum (see The Economic 
Crisis of the 1990s, ch. 3). Cuba refused to service its large 
accumulated international debt to the Russian Federation, but 
that was no different from its general policy on nonservicing of 
any debts. Russian ground troops, who had been stationed in 
Cuba since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, also departed in 
1992. 

Russia and Cuba retained two somewhat more complicated 
relationships. The Russian government paid rent to Cuba for 
the use of electronic eavesdropping facilities set up south of 
Havana at Lourdes (see Relations with Russia, ch. 5) at the 
height of the Cold War. And Russia and Cuba continued to 
negotiate over the fate of the nearly completed but mothballed 
nuclear power plant near Cienfuegos in south central Cuba. 
The investment costs of completing the nuclear power plant, 
however, were beyond the capacities of both governments. 



275 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Cuba accepted international inspection of these facilities by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

Cuban relations with China recovered only gradually from 
the sharp bilateral split that had become manifest in 1966. 
With the collapse of European communism, however, political 
relations warmed more quickly between these two remaining 
communist governments. The Cuban government sought to 
learn fast and well the magic secrets of China's creation of mar- 
ket Leninism. Economic relations between the two countries 
remained basically what they had been, however: significant for 
Cuba, modest for China, and conducted at international mar- 
ket prices. Sino-Cuban military relations are modest in scope. 

Between 1989 and 1991, Cuba repatriated its overseas troops 
from all countries to which they had been deployed. In 1992 it 
announced that it had stopped providing military support to 
revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow governments in 
other countries. 

The international dimensions of the Cuban government's 
strategy for survival required the active cultivation of foreign 
investment and, therefore, of better political relations with 
market-economy countries. To resist the increased United 
States economic and political pressures on Cuba, Fidel Castro's 
government needed to find some international support. 

United States actions led to some sympathy for Cuba. In 
October 1992, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban 
Democracy Act (see Glossary), whose principal sponsor was 
Representative Robert G. Torricelli. The new law prohibited 
United States subsidiaries in third countries from trading with 
Cuba. Other governments deemed it an extraterritorial sec- 
ondary boycott in violation of the rules under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glossary). In 
March 1996, the United States Congress enacted the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (also known as the 
Helms-Burton Act), sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and 
Representative Dan Burton. However, invoking procedures in 
the law itself, President William Jefferson Clinton suspended 
the enforcement of the act's key feature, Title III, which autho- 
rizes United States citizens and firms to sue in United States 
courts those firms from other countries that "traffic" with 
Cuba. The law is broadly written to affect most foreign invest- 
ment in Cuba as well as trade. 

These laws provoked strong opposition from Canada, the 
European Union (EU — see Glossary), the Caribbean, and 



276 



Government and Politics 



Latin American countries, among others. The EU, Canada, 
Argentina, and Mexico enacted blocking legislation to prevent 
their firms from complying with these United States laws and to 
protect them if they were sued in United States courts. At the 
annual Iberoamerican summits of heads of state, opposition to 
these United States policies rose markedly. Although the 
Iberoamerican summits endorsed democracy and human 
rights strongly, President Fidel Castro was welcomed at each of 
these events, and his government's authoritarian practices were 
never explicitly criticized. 

Within days of the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, 
in November 1992, for the first time ever Cuba gained over- 
whelming support in the United Nations General Assembly for 
a resolution condemning United States policies toward Cuba. 
The enactment of the Helms-Burton Act further tilted the vote 
in the General Assembly against the United States. In 1992 the 
vote was fifty-nine in favor of Cuba's resolution; three nations, 
including the United States, voted against the motion; and sev- 
enty-one abstained. In November 1997, 143 countries voted to 
condemn United States policy, three voted against, and only 
seventeen abstained. United States policy served Cuba's pur- 
poses well. (In separate motions, however, the General Assem- 
bly repeatedly criticized the Cuban government's violations of 
human rights.) 

Cuban policy was most effective within the Anglophone 
Caribbean. Cuba was admitted to the Caribbean Tourism Orga- 
nization in 1992, and in 1994 became a founding member of 
the Association of Caribbean States (see Glossary) led by the 
Anglophone Caribbean. Caribbean countries became among 
the most vocal opponents of United States policy toward Cuba. 

In September 1993, the European Parliament (see Glossary) 
condemned the Cuban Democracy Act, and in September 1994 
it called upon Cuba to enact democratic reforms. Also in 1993, 
the European Commission (see Glossary) created for the first 
time a humanitarian aid program for Cuba, although Cuba 
remained the only Latin American country with which the EU 
had not concluded a formal cooperation agreement. In 
response to the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, European 
governments challenged the United States and refused to 
accept its imposition on European firms. 

The government of Canada, along with those of various 
Caribbean countries, went the farthest in opposing United 
States policies. Canada strengthened its legislation to block the 



277 



Cuba: A Country Study 

impact of United States law on Canadian firms, established a 
program of official development assistance in addition to 
humanitarian aid, and financed the business activities of Cana- 
dian firms with Cuba. It facilitated the work of Canadian NGOs 
in Cuba. And in 1998, Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien 
visited Havana. 

Cuban relations with the United States featured three key 
events in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the riot in Havana in 
the summer of 1994, the Cuban government lifted all require- 
ments for an exit permit to emigrate and encouraged unautho- 
rized emigration by boat or raft to the United States. Tens of 
thousands of Cubans took to the seas. Many were seized by 
United States Coast Guard and Navy ships and held for months 
at the United States base at Guantanamo Bay. Eventually, the 
United States and Cuba reached agreements in September 
1994 and May 1995 to end the crisis. The United States 
accepted almost all Cubans who had emigrated illegally in 
1994, although a few criminals were excluded and returned to 
Cuba, which accepted them. The United States promised to 
accept no fewer than 20,000 legal immigrants per year for the 
indefinite future. The United States also undertook to inter- 
cept on the high seas and return to Cuba those seeking to 
enter the United States illegally and without a credible claim to 
refugee status; this policy has been enforced. Cuba agreed to 
accept those whom the United States had intercepted and not 
to discriminate against them. It also agreed to reimpose its bar- 
riers on unlawful exit. 

The next significant episode occurred on February 24, 1996, 
when at least one, perhaps three, unarmed civilian aircraft 
piloted by Cuban-American members of a group called Broth- 
ers to the Rescue flew into Cuban airspace. (On a prior trip, 
Brothers to the Rescue airplanes had dropped antigovernment 
leaflets over Havana.) As they were fleeing the pursuit of 
Cuban Air Force jets, two of the planes were shot down over 
international waters. This Cuban action, condemned by the 
International Civil Aviation Association, triggered the enact- 
ment of the Helms-Burton Act. 

In November 1999, a five-year-old boy, Elian Gonzalez, was 
rescued in the Straits of Florida, hanging on a raft after his 
mother had drowned. At first, the United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service allowed his great-uncle to obtain 
provisional custody. Soon, however, the boy's father, Juan 
Miguel Gonzalez, claimed custody, requesting the boy's return 



278 



Government and Politics 



to Cuba. An intense seven-month legal and political battle 
developed over the child's custody, engaging both national gov- 
ernments, various local governments in southern Florida as 
well as state and Federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 
Consistent with their new migration relations, the United 
States and Cuban governments assumed similar positions on 
the issue and ultimately prevailed: Elian Gonzalez, accompa- 
nied by his father, returned to Cuba in June 2000. In the 
United States, the political battle over Elian was fierce; in Cuba, 
the government used the incident to mobilize nationalist sup- 
port. In the end, the Cuban American community's insistence 
that the boy should remain in the United States, and not with 
his father in Cuba, received little support. The Elian Gonzalez 
case may have begun a re-thinking of United States policy 
toward Cuba. 

During the 1990s, the United States and Cuba also con- 
structed modest confidence-building measures to prevent acci- 
dental war and minimize the likelihood of accidents. These 
included frequent contact between the two countries' coast 
guards to enforce the migration agreements and carry out 
search-and-rescue operations. Regular procedures for contact 
were also established between both sides at the Guantanamo 
base. In anticipation of potential trouble, both governments 
inform each other in great detail and, to the extent possible, 
coordinate their actions. 

Outlook 

As the twenty-first century began, Cuba's communist leader- 
ship believed that it had survived the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the European communist world. It had overcome 
increased United States sanctions on Cuba. And it had 
stemmed the economy's decline. Cuban leaders were conscious 
that popular support had dipped seriously, but they believed 
that they retained enough support, and wider tolerance, from 
their people to rebuild the political bases of the regime and to 
live through the next and perhaps most decisive crisis: Fidel 
Castro's death. Although Castro remained firmly in charge, his 
health had begun to fail and, for the first time since 1959, 
regime loyalists began to contemplate seriously a Cuba without 
Fidel. 

Much has already changed in Cuba in anticipation of that 
future. Cuba's political institutions from the mid-1960s to the 
mid-1980s had been marked by very slow rotation of personnel. 



279 



Cuba: A Country Study 

The circulation of elites accelerated dramatically in the early 
1990s and then stabilized somewhat later in the decade. Most 
members of the party's Political Bureau in place in 2000 had 
joined the bureau after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In 
effect, a much younger, more dynamic set of leaders was in 
place, ready for the regime's future battles for political survival. 
The armed forces had also changed. In particular, the forces 
were downsized, a move that reduced the political burden on 
future governments to do more downsizing. 

Cuba's political institutions, however, were weaker, more 
brittle, and enjoyed much less political support than in the 
past. The National Assembly, despite its partial revitalization in 
the 1990s, remained a toothless institution. The PCC's mem- 
bers were well regarded by their fellow citizens, but the party as 
such was not. The PCC as an institution weakened also in the 
early to mid-1990s, although an attempt was made to reinvigo- 
rate it in time for the Fifth Party Congress. The strengthening 
of the PCC in 1997 may have set the basis for a future "renewed 
communist" party, as in Poland, Lithuania, or Hungary in the 
mid-1990s. 

Ordinary Cubans were ready for change and were already 
seizing the reins of the future. They sought and found jobs on 
their own. A growing number discovered the value of religion 
to their lives. Some courageous ones joined human rights and 
opposition groups, and did not desist despite repression. Intel- 
lectuals were more willing to challenge the government and 
the party. And even Fidel Castro grudgingly and publicly con- 
fessed that he could no longer pursue the policies he preferred 
most. 

The future of Cuba lies also in part with the United States. It 
will be made easier or more difficult by United States govern- 
ment policies regarding the claims of American citizens and 
firms seeking compensation for the property expropriated in 
1959 and 1960. And it will also be greatly affected by the gener- 
osity or the revenge of returning Cuban-Americans. 

Cuba is an island archipelago, battered by hurricanes, natu- 
ral and political. There is absolute certainty that real as well as 
metaphorical hurricanes will strike it in the years to come. The 
only doubt is when and with what force. 

* * * 



280 



Government and Politics 



Much of the literature on Cuban government and politics in 
the 1990s was polemical or speculative, that is, it denounced 
the Cuban political regime and imagined a post-Castro future. 
As a result, there is less careful analytical and empirical work 
on Cuba in the 1990s than there is for previous times. Most of 
the material for this chapter had to be constructed from pri- 
mary sources. Various books do, however, ably place the early 
1990s within the broader sweep of Cuban politics since 1959. 
Among them are Irving Louis Horowitz's Cuban Communism, 
Carollee Bengelsdorf s The Problem of Democracy in Cuba, Marifeli 
Perez-Stable's The Cuban Revolution, and Susan Eckstein's Back 
from the Future. Perhaps the single most comprehensive analyti- 
cal and empirical work about Cuban politics and economics in 
the 1990s remains unpublished, however. It is Cuba in Transi- 
tion, sponsored by the Cuban Research Institute of Florida 
International University (for the series, see http:// 
www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/ asce/index.html) . The 
journal Cuban Studies continues to provide valuable articles, 
book reviews, and bibliographies. 

The good news is that significant social scientific work has 
been published in Cuba in the 1990s. Until 1996, Cuba's lead- 
ing scholarly institution for political analysis was the Center for 
American Studies (CEA). The works of then-CEA scholars, 
such as Julio Carranza, Haroldo Dilla, Rafael Hernandez, and 
Pedro Monreal, among others, contributed much to the under- 
standing of Cuba in the 1990s. So, too, did the center's journal, 
Cuadernos de Nuestra America. Important work was also pro- 
duced, although infrequently published, at the Center for Psy- 
chological and Sociological Research (CIPS) and at various 
research centers within the University of Havana. Cuba's pre- 
mier social science publication is Temas, edited by Rafael 
Hernandez. 

Indispensable primary sources remain the daily newspaper 
Granma, the weekly newsmagazine Bohemia, and the panoply of 
journals published, sometimes just occasionally, by Cuba's uni- 
versities and think tanks. The official legal gazette is the Gaceta 
Oficial de la Republica. The official Cuban government web site 
(http://www.cubaweb.cu) is also informative and useful. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



281 



Chapter 5. National Security 




The marble obelisk and statue at the Jose Marti Memorial (Monumento a Jose 
Marti) in the center of Revolution Plaza (La Plaza de la Revolucion), formerly 
Republic Plaza (La Plaza de la Republica), 1997 
Courtesy Mark P. Sullivan 



AT THE CLOSE OF THE 1990s, Cuba's Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — FAR) was a shadow 
of its former self. The decline of the Cuban military institution 
during the 1990s was in stark contrast to the FAR's position in 
the mid-1980s, when it was one of the largest and most formi- 
dable militaries in the Latin American region, if not in the 
entire developing world. 

The pre-1990 development of the military institution owed 
much to Soviet aid, a benefit from the Cuban leadership's close 
ties with the former Soviet Union that dated to the early years 
of the Revolution. These ties made possible not only the FAR's 
intensive professionalization, which was deepened in the early 
1970s, but also the extension several years later of Cuban mili- 
tary involvement to other developing world nations. By the 
time that Cuba's military "internationalism" (see Glossary) in 
Africa ended in 1991, 300,000 FAR personnel had served as 
trainers, advisers, and combatants. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, the most promising young Cuban officers were trained 
at the Soviet Union's top military schools; foreign assistance 
worth millions of dollars was channeled each year to help sup- 
port the Cuban institution; and the FAR's inventory was replete 
with many of the Soviet Union's most sophisticated, state-of- 
the-art weapons and equipment. 

By the early 1990s, the erosion of the FAR's image as one of 
the premier military institutions of the developing world was 
already underway. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the deepening of the island's economic crisis, the Cuban mili- 
tary found itself confronted with some of the most serious chal- 
lenges in the history of the institution. By 1989, with the 
demise of the East European bloc imminent, the Cuban mili- 
tary leadership was already making plans to "go it alone" with- 
out the help they had long received. As the era of Cuba's 
military "internationalism" drew to a close, the combat troops 
once deployed abroad and hailed as heroes returned home 
only to be tasked to menial agricultural labor. In the difficult 
years that followed, the size of the armed forces was halved, the 
term of military service shortened, and the defense budget 
reduced sharply. On top of these cuts, much of the FAR's 
equipment — from its supersonic jet fighters to its aging main 



285 



Cuba: A Country Study 



battle tanks — was put into storage because of the continuing 
shortages of fuel and spare parts. 

By the mid-1990s, there were signs that the FAR was success- 
fully defining a new course. The post-Cold War thaw made pos- 
sible the establishment of closer ties with fellow military 
officers in Latin America and Europe, which helped somewhat 
to mitigate the institution's isolation. Even more significant 
were the reforms introduced on the island that provided an 
opening for the FAR to assume a more prominent role in the 
economy. This provided the military the opportunity to serve 
as an exemplary model for the rest of the nation, as suggested 
by the "experiments" with the System for Managerial Improve- 
ment (Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial — SPE) that 
were first conducted within the FAR's production enterprises. 
Of no small import, this economic involvement was also moti- 
vated by the FAR's interest in economic survival, which was 
facilitated by the expansion of the military-linked Gaviota 
Tourism Group, S.A., in the burgeoning tourism industry. 
Toward the close of the decade, although a United States 
Department of Defense study affirmed that the weakened FAR 
no longer posed a serious threat, it appeared equally unlikely 
that the military institution, still professional and staunchly 
supportive of the regime, might wither away. 

The latter half of the 1990s heralded a period of new and 
different security-related concerns for the Cuban leadership. 
These concerns — stimulated, in part, by the dynamic set under- 
way by the economic reforms carried out only years before — 
led to a higher profile for the police forces of the Ministry of 
Interior. In an effort to stem the growth of common crime, the 
regular police found themselves the beneficiaries of increased 
budgets, new equipment, and training programs, occasionally 
carried out with modest assistance from European police 
authorities. At the same time, the political police — as the mem- 
bers of the Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security 
are often called — were tasked to monitor and do what was nec- 
essary to rein in the increasingly bold activities of dissidents 
and members of the nascent independent press. One serious 
crackdown, which began in earnest in late 1998, brought 
changes in the Penal Code that codified new offenses and 
established harsher sentences for many crimes already on the 
books. The crackdown included the issuance of harsher sen- 
tences for what foreign observers might recognize as offenses 



286 



National Security 



that were political in nature, as well as the more frequent appli- 
cation of the death penalty. 

Cuba's security environment of the 1990s thus appeared 
quite different from what it did in the 1980s. In some respects, 
it resembled more the difficult years of the 1960s than either of 
the two succeeding decades. With the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc, the Cuban government's focus was redirected from ambi- 
tious military efforts to bolster socialist allies abroad to efforts 
simply to maintain domestic order and the regime's own social- 
ist foundation. Despite continuing economic problems in the 
final years of the decade, the FAR appeared to be adapting to 
its new position and economic role. As well, the deterrent mea- 
sures aimed at halting the surge in common crime appeared to 
be achieving some success. At the same time, however, there 
were few indications that the regime's harsher treatment for 
political offenders had led dissidents and independent journal- 
ists to cease efforts to press for changes. 

At the close of the twentieth century, various aspects of 
Cuban internal security had clearly been challenged, whether 
directly or indirectly, as a result of the crisis of the past decade. 
Yet despite the frequent forecasts of impending collapse that 
were heard throughout the 1990s, the Cuban regime main- 
tained its stability. This was made possible in part by the con- 
tinuing loyalty and support of the security forces under the 
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias — MINFAR) . Moreover, the 
regime appeared ready to take on the new security challenges 
that were sure to arise in the coming years. 

Background of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 
1959-91 

Institutional Consolidation in the 1960s 

One of the greatest challenges faced by the revolutionary 
government when it assumed power in January 1959 was that 
of organizing a new military. Fidel Castro Ruz, who initially had 
no formal role in the civilian government, was recognized as 
the commander in chief of the armed forces. In turn, the 
troops of the Rebel Army formed the core of the new military, 
and the Rebel Army's top field commanders became the new 
institution's leaders. However, the issue remained as to what to 
do with the remnants of Fulgencio Batista Zaldfvar's (presi- 
dent, 1940-44; dictator, 1952-59) old armed forces and with 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



the poorly prepared peasants who had joined the Rebel Army's 
ranks during the final phases of the struggle in 1958. 

Batista had left behind a 40,000-man military consisting of 
35,000 members of the army and 5,000 members of the naval 
and air forces, including several thousand new recruits. The 
armed forces also had received new equipment from the 
United States shortly before the cutoff of aid to the regime. 
With Batista gone, the armed forces fell into complete disarray. 
Many officers quickly fled the island upon learning of Batista's 
departure, and members of army units throughout the country 
refused to continue fighting, with some abandoning their 
posts. Although the victorious rebels initially professed plans to 
unite the two armies into a single large force, the difficulties in 
building a new military organization composed of both guerril- 
las and their former enemies may have been recognized. In the 
months that followed the rebels' arrival in Havana, very few of 
the old military's officers who remained in Cuba were kept on 
active duty, and thousands were dismissed peremptorily. Hun- 
dreds of others were accused of war crimes, court martialed, 
and publicly executed in fulfillment of what Fidel Castro 
termed "revolutionary justice." 

The MINFAR was created on October 16, 1959, to replace 
the Batista-era Ministry of Defense. Headed by Raul Castro, the 
MINFAR quickly became the dominant organization in the 
new government. At first, the new MINFAR's leaders planned 
to have a military of 15,000 to 25,000 well-trained troops, whose 
hierarchy would be built around the few hundred individuals 
who had been the Rebel Army's leaders, were hardened com- 
batants, and were known for their loyalty to Fidel and Raul Cas- 
tro. This aim was never fully realized, however, because, despite 
their low level of professionalism, it was seen as politically 
unwise to dismiss the many who had joined the rebels in the 
latter days of the revolutionary struggle. Organized in October 
1959, the FAR numbered 40,000 troops and officers by early 
1961, making it comparable in size to Batista's old military. The 
FAR was supported by the National Revolutionary Militias 
(Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias — MNR) , a civilian organi- 
zation formed in October 1959. 

Although maintaining a large force posed a problem, the 
FAR proved useful in helping the regime counter two threats 
that developed in the early 1960s. The first was the internal 
security problem posed by the activities of the counterrevolu- 
tionaries, who opposed the new government and Fidel Castro 



288 



Cuban soldiers wearing Soviet helmets and armed with Czech-made 
automatic rifles stand guard outside the U.S. Naval Base at 

Guantdnamo in September 1 962. 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

and were roaming the countryside in central Cuba. The Castro 
government's campaign against the counterrevolutionaries, 
known as the "fight against bandits" (lucha contra bandidos), 
began in 1960 and continued until victory was declared five 
years later. Working together in coordinated operations to 
defeat the antigovernment rebels were members of at least four 
organizations — the military, the Ministry of Interior's Depart- 
ment of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del 
Estado — DSE) , the MNR, and the Committee for the Defense 
of the Revolution (Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion — 
CDR). By the end of 1964, 500 soldiers had died in the cam- 
paign, and a total of 3,500 counterrevolutionaries had been 
killed or captured. 

The United States Government's efforts to bring about the 
regime's overthrow perhaps posed a more serious threat. On 
April 17, 1961, the first major United States-sponsored military 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

action against the Castro government was carried out with the 
landing of an army of Cuban exiles organized by the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on Playa Giron in the 
Bay of Pigs on the south-central Cuban coast. This ostensibly 
covert invasion, which came only fourteen weeks after Wash- 
ington had broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba, pre- 
sented the first real test of the ability of the regime's security 
forces, including the militia and the FAR's newly organized air 
force, to repel external aggression. About 300 of the invaders 
were killed outright, and 1,179 others were captured and held 
for twenty-two months. The exile force's ready defeat turned 
into a propaganda victory for the FAR and the regime. The fol- 
lowing year, initiation of the United States-sponsored Opera- 
tion Mongoose, which was aimed at sparking a popular revolt, 
obliged the FAR to continue to maintain a high state of readi- 
ness. This readiness continued until the declarations of victory 
in 1965, at which time the Cuban leadership turned its atten- 
tion to developing the armed forces' professional capabilities 
(see Revolutionary Adventurism and Institutionalization, ch. 

i). 

This effort began with steps taken in early 1963, when the 
MNR was disbanded. Also at that time, the armed forces' ranks 
were trimmed, and several professional military schools were 
opened to improve the training and competency of the senior 
officer corps as well as of the various service arms. In addition, 
the universal conscription system known as Obligatory Military 
Service (Servicio Militar Obligatorio — SMO) was instituted so 
that draftees completing their three-year term of service might 
help fill the scaled-down military's manpower requirements. In 
1965 the military budget, which had been reduced along with 
the manpower cuts, was increased. But the truly capping 
achievement during this period was the delivery of state-of-the- 
art MiG-21 supersonic fighters, which lent the FAR the pres- 
tige of being the first military in Latin America to have such 
advanced aircraft. 

Despite the Soviet contributions to the Cuban arsenal dur- 
ing the first half of the 1960s, tensions in Soviet-Cuban rela- 
tions persisted over Cuban efforts to "export the Revolution" to 
other developing countries (at a time when the Soviets were 
pursuing "peaceful coexistence" with the West) . After the cap- 
ture and execution by Bolivian army troops of Ernesto "Che" 
Guevara in October 1967, the regime's radical ardor was tem- 
pered. One of the Revolution's heroes, Guevara had left Cuba 



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in a vain attempt to fulfill his revolutionary theory by sparking 
a peasant-led insurgency in that distant nation. 

With Cuba's decision to return to the Soviet fold, the FAR's 
professional development was intensified, a move that set the 
course that the institution would follow for the next two 
decades. In mid-1969, in one of the first outward signs that the 
rapprochement would likely extend to the FAR, a Soviet naval 
squadron entered Caribbean waters on a flag-showing visit to 
Cuba. Such visits by the Soviet Navy continued on at least an 
annual basis well into the 1980s. 

The Era of "Internationalism/' 1970-91 

Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the FAR enjoyed a 
reputation as one of the developing world's preeminent mili- 
tary institutions, and its troops participated in various interna- 
tional combat missions. This reputation and foreign 
involvement were made possible in part as a result of the exten- 
sive Soviet military assistance that the FAR began receiving dur- 
ing the early 1970s. By the end of that decade, "internationalist 
service," as the foreign military duty was known, had become 
an important part of the institution's professional identity and 
was counted among the FAR's official missions. 

The Soviet role in Cuba during the first half of the 1970s was 
aimed at developing the FAR's professional training and capa- 
bilities as well as Cuban military installations that the Soviets 
could use. The latter included Soviet construction of a deep- 
water submarine support facility at Cienfuegos on Cuba's 
southern coast. The construction of this militarily significant 
facility prompted a minor crisis in United States-Soviet rela- 
tions in 1970. According to a former Soviet diplomat, the 
Cubans had agreed to the facility's construction in exchange 
for the promise of modern Soviet fighter aircraft. There were 
also efforts to model the FAR's development on that of the 
Soviet military, an aim that included routinely sending FAR 
officers for training at Soviet military schools. In keeping with 
this emphasis on training, the Youth Labor Army (Ejercito 
Juvenil de Trabajo — EJT) was created in 1973. As a result, thou- 
sands of enlisted troops and officers were relieved of their duty 
to work in agriculture and construction in order that they 
might dedicate themselves to their professional development. 
During this period, military ranks and insignia were also 
revised to resemble more closely the Soviet style. In addition, 
the size of the FAR was cut by half between 1970 and 1974, 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

bringing it to 100,000. An attempt was made to improve the 
combat readiness of these forces through constant training and 
exercises. 

This professionalization helped to prepare the FAR for its 
extensive international involvement in Africa, which began 
with the surreptitious dispatch of Cuba's elite Special Troops 
(Tropas Especiales) to the newly independent nation of Angola 
in 1975 (see Special Troops, this ch.). Although made possible 
by Soviet aid, this extension of the FAR's international role was 
principally a reflection of the Cuban regime's abiding interest 
in providing political and military support to allies abroad. 
During the early 1960s, Che Guevara had traveled throughout 
Africa in hopes of building a support network between African 
nationalists and Cuban revolutionaries. In October 1963, in the 
first international action in which FAR troops took part, 686 
soldiers, including a battalion of 400 tank troops ( tanquistas) , 
were deployed to Algeria to aid in its border war with Morocco 
and remained there for six months. Elsewhere in Africa during 
the 1960s, small numbers of Cuban military personnel were 
reportedly involved in guerrilla fighting in territory encom- 
passing Congo (present-day Zaire), Tanzania, and Guinea-Bis- 
sau. Within the Western Hemisphere as well, the regime also 
sought to provide aid and military training to members of left- 
ist guerrilla movements and to organize insurgencies where 
such groups were lacking. In early 1973, Cuban advisers, even- 
tually numbering 600 and 700 personnel, were sent to South 
Yemen to train its military and their guerrilla allies who were 
fighting in the Dhofari rebellion. In October and November 
1973, with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Cuba's deploy- 
ment of an 800-man tank brigade to fight for Syria against 
Israel heralded the more prominent foreign role that the FAR 
would shortly assume. 

On the heels of the Special Troops' arrival in Angola, the 
first large-scale commitment of Cuban combat personnel 
abroad came in late 1975 when tens of thousands of forces 
arrived to fight in the civil war on the side of the ruling Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular 
de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) , then under the leadership 
of Agostinho Neto. For the next sixteen years, Cuban troop 
strength in Angola varied according to the ebbs and flows in 
the prolonged conflict. The FAR's air and ground forces, 
equipped by the Soviets, were pitted at different times against 
personnel of the South African Defence Force; the rebels fight- 



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National Security 



ing for the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (Uniao Nacional para la Independencia Total de 
Angola — UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi; and members of a 
lesser known rebel group, the National Front for the Libera- 
tion of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola — 
FNLA), which, despite United States covert funding, soon fell 
apart. In mid-1976, 33,000 to 36,000 FAR combat troops began 
to be deployed in Angola during one of the early peaks in the 
fighting; as many as 80 percent were thought to be activated 
reserve troops. 

When fighting intensified again in the late 1980s, the Cuban 
deployment in Angola grew to 50,000 personnel. The Battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale in early 1988 was the final major clash in 
which Cuban forces participated. It was hailed by the Cuban 
leadership as the great victory that paved the way for negotia- 
tions to end the war and Cuba's withdrawal from the conflict. 
These negotiations led to the signing of the United States- 
mediated Tripartite Agreement by representatives of Angola, 
South Africa, and Cuba in December 1988. In addition, to pro- 
viding for an end to the Angolan war and Namibian indepen- 
dence, the agreement set a timetable for the phased withdrawal 
of Cuban forces over a thirty-month period. In May 1991, the 
last combat troops returned home to Cuba, two months ahead 
of schedule. 

The second major theater to which Cuban troops were 
deployed was in eastern Africa, where several thousand combat 
personnel were sent in early 1978 to aid Ethiopia in its war with 
Somalia. During the peak of the fighting that year, 12,000 FAR 
troops were involved in the conflict. Following Somalia's deci- 
sion to end hostilities, the number of Cuban combatants in 
Ethiopia was reduced to 5,000 personnel, and this number 
remained relatively constant for most of the next decade. At 
the time of the decision to withdraw Cuban forces from Ethio- 
pia in 1989, the Cuban contingent numbered 3,000 personnel. 

Toward the end of the 1980s, because of economic difficul- 
ties at home as well as the shifting international environment, 
Soviet support for the Cubans' continuing involvement abroad 
was beginning to wane. Nevertheless, the FAR clearly had bene- 
fitted greatly from the considerable Soviet aid it had received 
over the past years. At the conclusion of the 1980s, the Cuban 
military was one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, 
with an estimated 180,500 personnel, of whom more than 
three-fourths were ground troops. The FAR was also one of the 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



best-equipped armed forces in the Latin American region, if 
not the entire developing world, counting in its inventory 
more than 100 MiG fighter jets (including new MiG-29s, which 
were then being delivered) , several submarines, more than 
1,000 main battle tanks, and an array of missiles and other 
armaments. FAR personnel also remained beneficiaries of the 
extensive Soviet training program, with the most upwardly 
mobile officers sent either to Moscow's M.V. Frunze Military 
Academy or the K.E. Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Others 
received technical training, often in Eastern Europe, to oper- 
ate and maintain the sophisticated equipment that the FAR 
had received. 

The United States military's intervention in Grenada in late 
October 1983 ended Cuban activities on that island nation. 
After the takeover of Grenada's government by the Marxist- 
Leninist New Jewel Movement in 1979, Cuban military advisers 
and labor brigades were brought in to help build an interna- 
tional airport capable of landing large military transports. 
After only brief skirmishes with the Cubans, the 13,000 United 
States troops accepted the surrender of the fifty Cuban military 
advisers to Grenada's then-collapsing regime and of the 
approximately 600 armed construction workers. 

The Grenada intervention was the last incident in the twenti- 
eth century in which armed United States and Cuban person- 
nel directly confronted each other. In 1990, following the elec- 
toral defeat of Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the Cuban 
military advisers who had been active there since 1979 and who 
had once numbered several thousand were sent home. FAR 
advisers who were involved in training missions in various other 
developing world nations also returned home, including the 
1,500 personnel who were withdrawn from Congo in 1991. 

As of the end of 1991, with all Cuban troops at home, the 
FAR's "internationalist" mission was effectively over. The mem- 
bers of the military who served abroad had gained valuable 
combat experience. In addition, the institution's inventory of 
materiel was expanded by the equipment and weapons that the 
troops brought back with them. Overall, the FAR's prestige was 
enhanced as a result of its "internationalist" role, in which the 
Cuban forces were generally considered to have acquitted 
themselves well. Both this "internationalist" experience and the 
ethos of professionalism instilled over the past two decades 
were important in the FAR's development as an institution, one 
that might be capable of managing the changes that it would 



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have to embrace during the course of the 1990s (see Chal- 
lenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s, this ch.). 

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

Organizational Changes of 1989 

Toward the end of the 1980s, the political and economic 
changes already taking place at home and abroad had begun to 
place strains on the Cuban military institution. The withdrawal 
of troops from Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere marked the 
beginning of the end for the FAR's "internationalist" mission 
and obliged the institution's leadership to seriously consider 
what the future might hold for the armed forces. At the same 
time, the military's domestic economic role and interest in eco- 
nomic involvement were also beginning to change, largely as a 
result of decisions implemented following the 1986 Third Party 
Congress, when several select FAR enterprises were authorized 
to initiate experiments in allowing plant managers greater 
autonomy in decision-making as a means to spur efficiency and 
productivity. Only two years later, with the collapse of the east- 
ern bloc regimes already imminent, the leadership announced 
its decision, with seeming abruptness, to commit Cuban mili- 
tary troops, including many returning combat veterans, to agri- 
cultural production in order to help ensure the country's 
continuing food supply during the difficult times it saw ahead. 

By mid-1989, the changes then taking place on the island 
and abroad had already likely resulted in a shared sense among 
the Cuban leadership that a crisis might be at hand. The shake- 
up of Cuba's security apparatus later that same year, together 
with the events that preceded it, seemed to confirm this. As a 
result of the shake-up, the prestige of the Ministry of Interior 
was diminished and its capabilities weakened as many career 
intelligence officers were forced out of the institution and 
replaced by military personnel. The events surrounding this 
shake-up, in which Army Corps General Abelardo Colome 
Ibarra, the FAR's ranking officer under Raul Castro, was 
installed as minister of interior, has continued to be debated 
among scholars who follow Cuban security issues. Because of 
the secrecy related to these changes in the security apparatus, it 
remains one of the least understood actions undertaken by the 
regime (see Ministry of Interior, this ch.). 

The most important reason for this lack of understanding is 
linked to what has become popularly known as the Ochoa 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



affair, named after Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa 
Sanchez. Although it involved the detention and trial of a num- 
ber of ranking officers of the country's security forces, nearly 
all of them Ministry of Interior personnel, it was named the 
Ochoa affair because it began with the court martial and exe- 
cution of Ochoa, along with three other officers. Ochoa was a 
widely respected FAR officer who was not only popular among 
his men but, as the recipient of the MINFAR's highest decora- 
tion, a Hero of the Republic. At the time, the Ochoa affair 
raised widespread speculation about support within the mili- 
tary for the regime, given Fidel Castro's resistance to imple- 
menting any political or economic reforms similar to those 
then being carried out in the Soviet Union under President 
Mikhail Gorbachev and recurring rumors that Ochoa was 
somehow involved in plotting against the leadership. It also 
raised questions yet to be answered concerning the regime's 
underlying motives in singling out Ochoa for punishment and 
in joining his case with that made against the Ministry of Inte- 
rior officials implicated. 

In June 1989, six months after his return from a tour of duty 
as the commander of Cuba's "internationalist" forces in 
Angola, General Ochoa was slated to take over as the chief of 
the Western Army, the most important of the FAR's three terri- 
torial commands (see The Revolutionary Armed Forces, this 
ch.). Instead, on June 13, the well-regarded general was 
arrested and charged with "serious acts of corruption and ille- 
gal use of economic resources." Within weeks, a Military Honor 
Tribunal, composed of forty-seven fellow general officers, was 
convened. The Honor Tribunal stripped Ochoa of his rank 
and honors, recommended that he be tried for high treason, 
and expressed its support for the application of the "full 
weight" of the law against him, if convicted, by a Special Mili- 
tary Tribunal. 

The court martial by the Special Tribunal began on June 30, 
1989. In addition to Ochoa, the government identified three 
other officers, each also stripped of rank, as the key players in a 
wide conspiracy of self-enrichment that included trafficking in 
drugs, diamonds, and other contraband, and money launder- 
ing. Another ten individuals, who had backgrounds in either 
the Ministry of Interior or the MINFAR, were tried on related 
charges at the court martial, but were convicted of lesser 
crimes. Many foreign observers at the time described the hast- 
ily convened Special Tribunal, the proceedings of which were 



296 




The Ministry of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces 
building at Revolution Plaza 
(Plaza de la Revolucion), 
October 1991 
Courtesy National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency, Washington 



broadcast on state television, as a "show trial" that was reminis- 
cent of the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. In July, following 
the Council of State's review and approval of the sentences 
handed down, the four former officers were executed by firing 
squad. 

Well beyond the proceedings that were known formally as 
Case Number 1 of 1989, the Ochoa affair continued to have 
repercussions within the state's security apparatus. Only shortly 
before the court martial began, the government announced 
that the minister of interior, Division General Jose Abrantes 
Fernandez, a man who had long been responsible for Fidel 
Castro's personal guard and was counted among his most 
trusted aides, had been removed from office for failing to dis- 
cover the illegal activities that were carried out by the soon-to- 
be convicted officials under his charge. Abrantes was immedi- 
ately replaced as minister by General Colome Ibarra. 

Through the ensuing month, a succession of MINFAR offi- 
cers were appointed to fill the vacated posts of the top Ministry 
of Interior officials who resigned. Then, on July 30, Abrantes 
and a number of those who had worked closely under him 
were arrested. The crimes with which they were charged 
included negligence, illegal use of government resources, cor- 
ruption and/or toleration of corruption by others, and the 
manipulation and concealment of information of interest to 
the government. On August 24, a second Special Military Tri- 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



bunal was convened for Case Number 2 of 1989, to consider 
the charges against Abrantes and six other former Ministry of 
Interior officials. At the conclusion of this secret court martial, 
Abrantes, who was then in his late fifties, was sentenced to 
twenty years in prison, where he died of a heart attack in Janu- 
ary 1991. The other former officials were given prison terms 
ranging from five to fifteen years. 

By the end of 1989, with Abrantes gone and a trusted career 
FAR officer in his place, hundreds of Ministry of Interior offi- 
cials, including many who had spent their entire careers in the 
organization, had been retired, dismissed, or otherwise 
replaced by FAR officers. These new Ministry of Interior per- 
sonnel, according to some analysts, often had little training or 
background in intelligence matters, and as a result, the institu- 
tion's effectiveness was thought to have suffered during the 
1990s. In 2001 Colome Ibarra remained head of the Ministry of 
Interior. 

Challenges Faced by the Institution in the 1990s 

The decade of the 1990s brought important political and 
economic changes for the FAR that were associated with the 
end of the armed forces' "internationalist" mission and the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc. These 
changes presented formidable challenges for the Cuban mili- 
tary, perhaps the most critical of which was simply continuing 
to maintain the FAR as a professional military institution 
despite a serious lack of resources. During the course of the 
decade, the FAR leadership's responses to the continuing chal- 
lenges led the military to become more involved in national 
life and to assume a more prominent role as a domestic eco- 
nomic actor. This shift appeared to be driven both by the FAR's 
financial need, given the institution's efforts to become "self- 
financing" as its share of the national budget was pared, and by 
the regime's prevailing concern about being able to maintain 
domestic order should a security crisis develop. 

Well before Fidel Castro's September 1990 declaration of 
the "special period in peacetime" (periodo especial en tiempo de 
paz; hereafter Special Period — see Glossary), the FAR had 
already begun efforts to cut spending and otherwise help mini- 
mize the impact of what it saw as an impending crisis. Troops 
returning from "internationalist" service were sent to work in 
agriculture in order to help boost the national food supply; still 
others were discharged from active duty, often placed on inac- 



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National Security 



tive reserve and left to fend for themselves, despite the promise 
that they would have jobs to return to after completing their 
foreign military duty. Within the FAR, meetings were routinely 
convened among service personnel in order to brainstorm on 
ways to conserve fuel and make do with fewer expenditures. 
Paramount among the military leadership's planning efforts at 
that time was the formulation of contingency plans for what 
was known as the "zero option," which was to be implemented 
if all foreign aid and supplies were cut off. 

Changing Ties with the Former Soviet Union 

By mid-1991, less than a year after Cuba's formal declaration 
of its economic crisis, the Soviet commitment to the island 
under President Mikhail Gorbachev had already clearly weak- 
ened. However, even in the face of the Castro regime's ada- 
mant refusal to implement any Soviet-style reforms, the long- 
standing ties between the FAR and the conservative-leaning 
Soviet Armed Forces might have suggested some slight hope 
for continuing close military-to-military relations, despite ten- 
sions between the two countries' political leaders. There 
appeared some basis for this hope: United States Department 
of State estimates of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, 
although said by some scholars to be inflated amounts, had 
reached US$1.5 billion in 1990, which turned out to be the 
final year of Soviet aid to the island. In addition, in early 1990, 
the first six of what was expected to be a squadron of thirty-six 
state-of-the art MiG-29 jet fighters had arrived on the island. 

The failed coup attempt against President Mikhail Gor- 
bachev in August 1991 and Cuba's resounding silence after the 
fact marked an irreversible shift in relations between the two 
countries. In September Gorbachev announced plans to with- 
draw the Soviet military's "special training brigade," which had 
been based on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
According to Fidel Castro, this decision was announced with- 
out the courtesy of informing him beforehand. The Soviet 
training brigade, more formally known as an independent 
motorized infantry brigade, numbered only 2,800 troops in 
1991, but it had once had an estimated 20,000 troops. Despite a 
drawdown in personnel that had already taken place, the bri- 
gade was considered in Cuba, as well as abroad, as one of the 
enduring symbols of the Soviet Union's commitment to the 
regime. The announcement of its formal withdrawal appeared 
to confirm that it would not be possible for the FAR's ties with 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

their Soviet counterparts to remain close. In September 1992, 
months after the formation of the new Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), the Cubans reluctantly agreed to 
the Russians' schedule for the departure of the brigade's last 
troops. In 1993, as the Cuban economy bottomed out, the final 
brigade members departed the island. 

The Military 's Economic Role 

Since the beginning of the economic crisis in the early 
1990s, the military has become increasingly involved in the 
nation's economy. Such involvement was officially denoted as a 
new responsibility for the MINFAR in early 1991, when Fidel 
Castro declared, "[0]ne of the Armed Forces' missions at this 
time is to help the economy." The military's interest in this eco- 
nomic involvement has been spurred as much by concerns 
over the loss of the military aid and training once provided by 
the Soviet Union as by the weakness of the civilian economy, 
which has forced reduced government spending on the armed 
forces and the inception of the MINFAR's efforts to "self- 
finance" a portion of its budget. In addition, this involvement 
has helped the military avoid further reductions in personnel 
that might otherwise have been necessary. Toward the end of 
the 1990s, some reports estimated that the MINFAR had man- 
aged to provide for as much as 80 percent of its spending needs 
through self-financing. 

The MINFAR's efforts to achieve heightened efficiency and 
productivity through management innovations in its enter- 
prises, known as the SPE (System for Managerial Improve- 
ment) , can be traced to policies embraced as early as 1987. The 
severity of the economic crisis, however, spurred the military to 
become more extensively involved in agricultural production. 
During the most difficult years of the economic crisis in the 
early 1990s, the military's troops, often having just returned 
from "internationalist" duty, were routinely deployed in the 
fields in intensive efforts to boost crop yields, and its trucks 
were used to help farmers transport their goods to the newly 
opened farmers' markets. The participation of MINFAR troops 
in the annual sugar harvest (zafra) and in planting or picking 
other crops was not unprecedented; however, it did mark the 
first time in twenty years that regular troops had been assigned 
to such tasks. During this period, the military is generally con- 
sidered to have achieved self-sufficiency in terms of its ability to 



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feed its troops, and surplus produce from the military farms 
(granjas) was sold to bring in additional revenue. 

Perhaps the most important facet of the military's economic 
involvement came about after the government's 1990 decision 
to legalize joint investment ventures, when the military became 
a dominant partner in the state tourism company known as the 
Gaviota Tourism Group, S.A. Gaviota was originally formed in 
1988 in order to provide support for vacations by Cuban and 
Soviet military personnel on the island. In its new incarnation, 
Gaviota has teamed with such foreign partners as Spain's Sol 
Melia and Tryp hotel chains and France's Club Med in order to 
bring in significant hard-currency earnings for the MINFAR. 
Gaviota has been active in both the management and the 
administration of the tourism projects funded by foreign capi- 
tal, which include four- and five-star hotels and resorts located 
in prime tourism spots, such as Varadero. It has also established 
subsidiary operations, such as AeroGaviota, which operates 
domestically to fly tourists to their vacation destinations. 

Although the exact connection between Gaviota and the 
armed forces hierarchy has not yet been publicly clarified, it is 
widely acknowledged that, since the early 1990s, the firm has 
been routinely used as a source of employment for loyal offi- 
cers who are formally retired from active duty. Some direction 
is provided through the MINFAR's Vice Ministry for Economic 
Affairs, which in the late 1990s was headed by a Politburo mem- 
ber, Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, the former com- 
mander of the Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 
Force (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — 
DAAFAR). 

The Military in the Government and Party 

From almost the beginning of the Revolution, the Cuban 
military has played a prominent role in both the government 
of the nation and, since its founding in 1965, the Communist 
Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba — PCC) . The most 
notable aspects of this role are the key leadership duties of 
Fidel and Raul Castro, who exercise overlapping national 
authority as heads of the government, the military, and the 
PCC. Other senior military officials may also be found in posi- 
tions of authority and influence elsewhere within the regime, 
particularly within the cabinet and in the top councils of the 
PCC. Their most significant single unifying trait continues to 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

be their record of loyalty to the Castros, often dating back to 
the era of the guerrilla struggle. 

The military's influence within the national government can 
be most clearly seen in the composition of the Council of Min- 
isters (Consejo de Ministros) . In addition to Fidel and Raul 
Castro, five other men with military backgrounds were mem- 
bers of the Council of Ministers in the late 1990s. These 
included General Colome Ibarra, the minister of interior; Divi- 
sion General Ulises Rosales del Toro, the FAR's former Chief of 
General Staff, who was appointed minister of the sugar indus- 
try in late 1997; Brigade General Silvano Colas Sanchez, the 
minister of communications; Captain (Capitan de Navio) 
Orlando Felipe Rodriguez Romay, the minister of the fishing 
industry; and Colonel Alvaro Perez Morales, the minister of 
transportation. In addition, another prominent military offi- 
cial in the government is retired Brigade General Juan Esca- 
lona Reguera, the Attorney General of the Republic (Fiscal 
General de la Republica). Although not a member of the 
Council of Ministers, Escalona, as attorney general, serves as 
the country's top law enforcement official and sits on the Gov- 
erning Council of the Supreme People's Tribunal, the Cuban 
state's top judicial body. 

The MINFAR has been under Raul Castro's leadership since 
its organization in 1959. By the time of the shake-up in 1989, 
however, the Ministry of Interior had been led by three differ- 
ent individuals, who, although members of the guerrillas' 
Rebel Army, did not necessarily build careers within the FAR. 
Since 1989 the Ministry of Interior has been led by a FAR 
officer (see Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.). In addi- 
tion to the other ministerial posts now held by military officials, 
the ministries of communications and transportation have pre- 
viously been headed by military officers, a record that suggests 
not only the military's expertise in logistics but also that the 
leadership likely considers these to be important resources to 
control in the event of a security crisis. Similarly, some analysts 
believed that Rosales's appointment as minister of the sugar 
industry signaled the military's expanded influence in domes- 
tic economic affairs. It should also be noted, however, that 
Rosales's ministerial post has previously been held by a military 
man, most recently in the early 1980s. Escalona's appointment 
as attorney general, a post he has held during the 1990s, is 
somewhat unusual despite the general's legal background, as 
none of his predecessors were known to be military officials. It 



302 



SS-N2 STYX missile on parade in Havana, December 2, 1986 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



may be explained by his prominent role in 1989 as the lead 
prosecutor in the Ochoa affair. 

The military also wields considerable influence within the 
top echelons of the PCC. Yet, throughout the 1990s, a consis- 
tent decline in the number of officers elected to the PCC's 
Central Committee took place. In 1981, following the PCC's 
Second Congress, officers, all with commissioned ranks, were 
elected to just over a quarter of the Committee's 225 seats. By 
contrast, after the Fourth Congress in 1991, their representa- 
tion in the Central Committee had declined by half. 

At the same time, the FAR has retained its dominance within 
the Political Bureau (Politburo) , the PCC's top decision-mak- 
ing organ. After the 1997 Party Congress, although the overall 
size of the Politburo was cut by one member, an additional mil- 
itary officer was named, which brought to seven the number of 
officials in the twenty-four-member body. They included Com- 
mander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, General of the Army Raul Cas- 
tro, Army Corps General Colome Ibarra, and Division Generals 
Julio Casas Regueiro, Leopoldo Cintra Frias, Rosales del Toro, 
and the more recently appointed Ramon Espinosa Martin. 
Given the hierarchical nature of the Cuban regime, the mili- 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

tary's continuing domination at this top level within the Party 
suggests that its declining representation on the Central Com- 
mittee may not be a matter that greatly concerns the military 
institution and its leadership. 

Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations 

Cuba's 1976 constitution, as amended in July 1992, estab- 
lishes in Article 43 the right of all Cubans to ascend to any rank 
in the country's security forces, "according to their merits and 
capabilities." In turn, as described in Article 134, the members 
of the armed forces and of other security forces also have the 
same right to vote and to be elected to office as do other citi- 
zens. In Article 65, the "defense of the socialist homeland" is 
recognized as "the greatest honor and the supreme duty of 
every Cuban citizen." As stipulated in this article, military ser- 
vice is to be regulated by law. Treason is recognized as "the 
gravest of all crimes," with the person committing it to be "sub- 
ject to the most severe sanctions." These sanctions, although 
not specified in the constitution, might include capital punish- 
ment or life imprisonment (see Penal System, this ch.). 

The articles guaranteeing Cuban citizens the right to serve 
in the security forces and setting the primacy of defense as a cit- 
izen's duty have remained unchanged since 1976. However, the 
1992 reforms created a new Chapter 8 in the constitution, com- 
posed of a single article, that was added to address provisions 
for a state of emergency. In that chapter, Article 67 sets out the 
right of the president of the Council of State to declare a state 
of emergency in case of developments or imminent develop- 
ments — whether "natural disasters or catastrophes or other cir- 
cumstances" — which may affect "domestic order, the security of 
the country or the stability of the State." This state of emer- 
gency may be applied to all the republic or a part of it, and the 
president is authorized to mobilize the population while the 
state of emergency is in effect. Article 67 also states that the 
manner in which the state of emergency is declared, its 
enforcement, and its termination are to be regulated by law. 
Similarly, although still to be subject to law, Article 67 stipulates 
that the exercise of "the rights and fundamental duties recog- 
nized by the constitution" during normal times "must be regu- 
lated differently" while the state of emergency is in force. 

In complementing the authority granted the president of 
the Council of State to declare a state of emergency, the 
National Assembly of People's Power (Asamblea Nacional del 



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National Security 



Poder Popular — ANPP; hereafter, National Assembly), Cuba's 
national legislature, formally bears constitutional responsibility 
to "declare a state of war in case of military aggression and to 
approve peace treaties." However, as the National Assembly 
meets in regular session only briefly each year, Article 89 estab- 
lishes that the Council of State, a body elected by the National 
Assembly, has the right to represent it between sessions or, 
according to Article 90, to convene extraordinary sessions. 
Among other provisions, Article 90 further explicitly assigns 
the Council of State the right "to decree a general mobilization 
when required for national defense, to declare war in case of 
aggression, or to approve peace treaties when the Assembly is 
in recess and cannot be convened with the necessary security 
and urgency." 

According to Article 93, the president of the Council of 
State, the office held by Fidel Castro that establishes him as 
chief of the Cuban state and government, has expansive 
responsibilities in terms of the security forces and national 
defense. The Council's president serves as the supreme com- 
mander of the country's security forces, which include the 
FAR's troops as well as the forces under the immediate supervi- 
sion of the Ministry of Interior, and is authorized to determine 
their general organization. As noted above, the president also 
has the authority to declare a state of emergency in situations 
addressed by Article 67 of the constitution, and as soon as cir- 
cumstances permit, to give an accounting of that declaration to 
the National Assembly or, if the legislature cannot be con- 
vened, to the Council of State. Further, the president of the 
Council of State also presides over the National Defense Coun- 
cil (Consejo de Defensa Nacional), the body established to 
oversee the defense planning and coordination system adopted 
in the 1980s. In addition, Article 94 establishes that in case of 
"the absence, sickness, or death of the president of the Council 
of State," authority is delegated to the first vice president of the 
Council of State, an office held by Raul Castro. 

As the nation's supreme executive and administrative body, 
the Council of Ministers, whose president is also Fidel Castro, is 
also invested by the constitution with security-related responsi- 
bilities. As enumerated under Article 98, these responsibilities 
include "providing for national defense, the maintenance of 
domestic order and security, the protection of citizens' rights, 
and the protection of lives and property in the event of natural 
disaster." To support these responsibilities, among others, the 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



Council of Ministers is charged with formulating the national 
budget and, following its approval by the National Assembly, its 
oversight. All government ministers, including the heads of the 
MINFAR and of the Ministry of Interior, are members of the 
Council of Ministers. Further, because Raul Castro serves as the 
first vice president of the Council of State, he would remain a 
member of the Council of Ministers even if he no longer 
served as the MINFAR' s chief. 

Lastly, Article 101 addresses the role of the National Defense 
Council. This body is charged with the responsibility to direct 
the country during "conditions of a state of war, during the war, 
the general mobilization, and the state of emergency." It is 
required to maintain its readiness to assume responsibility for 
any of these duties at any time. As noted above, the National 
Defense Council's president is the president of the Council of 
State — again, Fidel Castro. According to Article 101, the Coun- 
cil's organization and functions are to be regulated by law. 
Related to this, Article 119 elaborates the responsibilities of the 
Provincial Defense Councils, the Municipal Defense Councils, 
and the neighborhood-based Defense Zones, which within 
their respective territories mirror those assigned to the 
National Council. In accordance with the law, the National 
Council is charged with determining these bodies' organiza- 
tion and functions. The specific execution of their duties dur- 
ing a crisis, however, is to be defined by the nation's general 
defense plan and the role and responsibility assigned each 
body by one of the country's three regional military councils, 
which cover geographic territories that correspond to the areas 
under each of the MINFAR's three regional army commands. 

In terms of Cuba's security-related treaty obligations, Fidel 
Castro's government has been reluctant to enter into multilat- 
eral and bilateral pacts that might limit the scope of its actions 
either domestically or in the international arena. This stance is 
underscored in Article 11 of the 1992 constitution, which states 
that "The Republic of Cuba repudiates and considers illegal 
and null the treaties, pacts, or concessions that were signed in 
conditions of inequality or that disregard or diminish its sover- 
eignty and territorial integrity." 

In March 1960, shortly after the victory of the Revolution, 
Cuba withdrew from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Recip- 
rocal Assistance (more commonly known as the Rio Treaty — 
see Glossary), which provides for collective hemispheric 
defense against external aggressors. In August 1960, months 



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National Security 



before diplomatic relations with the United States were broken 
off, Cuba terminated its participation in the United States 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which provided military 
aid and had been endorsed by Batista in 1952. Cuba's participa- 
tion in the Organization of American States (OAS — see Glos- 
sary) was formally suspended on January 31, 1962, after the 
member states determined that the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
of the Castro government was "incompatible with the interests 
of the hemisphere." Consequently, Cuba does not have a repre- 
sentative on the Inter-American Defense Board, nor are its mil- 
itary personnel eligible to attend the Inter-American Defense 
College, located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. 

Until recently, Cuba also resisted entering into any agree- 
ments aimed at controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. It 
remains the only country in the hemisphere that has not 
joined the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
which a former Cuban United Nations ambassador said would 
require Cuba to give up "its inalienable right to defend itself 
using weapons of any kind." Nevertheless, in March 1995, Cuba 
did finally sign the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America, more commonly known as the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco (see Glossary), which, like the NPT, estab- 
lishes a commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Cuba also 
reached an agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in May 1980 with respect to implementing safe- 
guards and allowing inspections at its nuclear power facilities 
then under construction (and now abandoned) at Juragua, 
near Cienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. 

Despite its avowals, the Castro government has shown an 
inclination to join other pacts related to the conduct of warfare 
and the treatment of its victims. In June 1966, Cuba ratified the 
1925 Geneva Protocol that prohibits the wartime use of poison- 
ous gases or bacteriological agents. It also has ratified the four 
international agreements of the 1949 Geneva Convention for 
the protection of war victims. In 1976 the Cuban government 
ratified the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weap- 
ons Convention. Cuba has refused to sign the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Produc- 
tion and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, however, largely because of the use of these 
devices throughout the Cuban side of the no-man's-land that 
separates the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay 
from the rest of the mainland. 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay 

The United States Naval Station at Guantanamo consists of a 
seventy-three-kilometer area (including land and water) , four 
kilometers wide, located east of the Sierra Maestra in Cuba's 
southeastern Guantanamo Province. United States Marines 
first landed at this site during the Spanish-American War in 
1898. The United States leased the territory in 1903 as a coal- 
ing station for United States naval vessels transiting the Carib- 
bean. 

A 1934 treaty with the United States replaced the 1901 Piatt 
Amendment (see Glossary), which had authorized United 
States military intervention in Cuba. Several of the principal 
provisions of both treaties were identical, however. For exam- 
ple, the 1934 treaty also grants a lease to the Guantanamo 
Naval Station area "in perpetuity" and free maritime access to 
the land through Guantanamo Bay. In exchange, the United 
States agreed to continue to pay the Cuban government an 
annual rent of $2,000, an amount tied to the gold standard that 
was equivalent in the late 1990s to just over US$4,000. The 
main difference was that under the 1934 treaty the United 
States agreed to forego the discretionary right to intervene in 
Cuba's domestic affairs. The United States also agreed in both 
1901 and 1934 to terminate the lease by the joint consent of 
both governments. 

In terms of its strategic role, Guantanamo serves as a supply 
and logistics base for the United States Navy's Atlantic Fleet. 
Although the base's strategic value to the United States has 
declined over the years, it would still likely be a platform for 
operations in the event of war or natural disaster in the Carib- 
bean or Latin America. For more mundane purposes, the 
United States Navy uses the base for exercises and maneuvers, 
the maintenance of United States naval vessels, and the moni- 
toring of Cuban airspace. From time to time, it has also been 
used to temporarily house refugees, including 34,000 Haitian 
refugees in 1991 and many of the 30,000 Cubans who 
attempted to leave the island during the balsero (rafter) crisis in 
the summer of 1994. During 1999, the base was briefly consid- 
ered as a possible temporary shelter for the estimated 20,000 
Kosovo refugees left homeless as a result of the war. Although it 
serves as a permanent "home" to approximately 1,080 United 
States military personnel and possibly about 2,500 American 
civilian personnel, as well as 300 foreign nationals, the base is 
believed to be capable of providing temporary housing for up 



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National Security 



to 50,000. Since the 1960s, it has been self-sufficient in terms of 
its water supply and electrical needs. In the late 1990s, approxi- 
mately 1,000 United States Navy personnel and 640 United 
States Marines were stationed at Guantanamo. The number of 
American personnel stationed there is expected to continue to 
decline over the foreseeable future as a result of ongoing 
efforts to pare military expenditures. 

The base, described by Fidel Castro as a "dagger plunged 
into the heart of Cuban soil," has remained a point of tension 
in bilateral relations. As a sign of its defiance of the United 
States' right to use the territory, Castro's government has 
refused the funds paid annually by the United States Depart- 
ment of the Navy over the past decades under the terms of the 
lease. Beginning in 1961, after President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
broke diplomatic relations with the Castro government, Cuban 
and United States military troops began patrolling opposite 
sides of a twenty-eight-kilometer barb-wire-fenced stretch of the 
perimeter that separates the base from Cuban territory, and 
watchtowers were constructed on both sides. Since then the 
base has remained separated from the rest of the island by 
barbed-wire fencing and a no-man's-land filled with antiperson- 
nel and antitank mines that are designed as much to keep 
Cubans out of the base as to keep the American personnel 
there isolated. Since the onset of Cuba's economic crisis in the 
early 1990s, tourists on the Cuban side of the perimeter have 
been able to pay for visits to some of the look-out points used 
by the FAR's Border Brigade (Brigada de la Frontera) to moni- 
tor the base's activities. 

Despite Cuba's continuing adamant demand for the depar- 
ture of American troops from Cuban territory, the tensions 
between Cuba and the United States over the base have been 
reduced in recent years, especially since the bilateral Migratory 
Accords were signed in August 1994 and May 1995 and the 
final Cuban refugees left the base. The accords establish that 
Washington grant 20,000 visas a year to Cubans who wish to 
reside in the United States and that Cubans picked up at sea be 
returned to Cuba, with no reprisals by Cuba. The last time that 
shots were fired by troops stationed on either side of the perim- 
eter was in December 1989. In 1996 the United States began 
removing antipersonnel mines from its side of the no-man's- 
land that separates the base from the rest of the island; the task 
was completed in 1999. These mines were replaced by motion 
and sound detectors to warn of any incursion onto the base. 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

The Cubans, on the other hand, have not made public any 
plans to begin de-mining their side of the 100-kilometer perim- 
eter. Rather, the Cuban government maintains that these 
mines are needed for defensive purposes, and will be removed 
only after the United States gives up its base on Cuba's national 
territory. Thirteen American soldiers and five Cubans have 
been killed by the mines since their installation. Between 
50,000 and 70,000 mines were placed in the no-man's-land 
between Cuba and the Guantanamo base beginning in 1961. 

The Revolutionary Armed Forces 

By the end of the twentieth century, the profile of the FAR 
had changed significantly from that of only a decade before. 
The change was brought about largely as a result of a change in 
the armed forces' missions: the abandonment of military 
"internationalism" and the embrace of a new domestic eco- 
nomic role; the loss of the extensive financial assistance and 
training support for the military that was once provided by the 
Soviet Union; and the continuation of the island's economic 
crisis, also a product of the loss of Soviet support. As a conse- 
quence of these changes, the FAR has had to make do with far 
fewer resources, both in terms of getting by on a reduced bud- 
get and with reduced manpower, yet all the while attempting to 
maintain itself as a professional military organization. 

In the late 1990s, the FAR was composed of three major 
armed services, as it had been for the past four decades: the 
Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario), the aforemen- 
tioned DAAFAR (Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air 
Force), and the Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolu- 
cionaria — MGR) . Of these, the army, as the historical successor 
to the guerrillas' Rebel Army, is generally recognized as the 
main force; not until 1972 were separate commands estab- 
lished for the DAAFAR and the MGR. All three services are 
under the authority of the MINFAR's General Staff. At the end 
of 2000, the chief of the MINFAR's General Staff continued to 
be Division General Alvaro Lopez Miera, also MINFAR vice 
minister. Lopez Miera assumed the General Staff post in late 
1998 on succeeding Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, 
who, at that time, had only recently been promoted from the 
rank of brigade general (see Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms, 
this ch.). As General Staff chief, Lopez Miera also serves as the 
commander of the Revolutionary Army. The DAAFAR was 



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National Security 



commanded by Division General Ruben Martinez Puentes, and 
the MGR, by Vice Admiral Pedro Miguel Perez Betancourt. 

During the course of the 1990s, the FAR's manpower was 
reduced by more than half from what had been an estimated 
180,500 active-duty troops in 1990. This reduction, with the 
most severe cuts having been carried out between 1993 and 
1995, was the result of efforts to trim expenditures as well as 
adjust to a greatly reduced need for military manpower follow- 
ing the end of the "internationalist" mission. According to the 
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), the FAR was composed of 65,000 personnel in 2000. 
This number included an estimated 45,000 members of the 
Revolutionary Army, 10,000 of the DAAFAR, and 5,000 of the 
MGR. The ratio of Cuba's army in proportion to the island's 
population dropped from twenty-nine soldiers per 1,000 inhab- 
itants in 1987 to only five soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in 
1997, based on data compiled by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute. This ratio was comparable on a per 
capita basis to that found in such countries as Colombia, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Moreover, the FAR's present 
force strength is even lower than it was prior to the adoption of 
the military's "internationalist" mission in the mid-1970s, a 
period when its manpower needs were roughly comparable yet 
its budget was subsidized by Soviet aid. At that time, the FAR 
was able to maintain an active-duty force strength of 120,000 
troops and officers. 

These regular military forces under the FAR's command, 
which include conscripts and activated reservists, are sup- 
ported by yet other organizations that are assigned duties 
related to defense and the maintenance of internal order. Of 
these, the EJT (Youth Labor Army) and the Territorial Troops 
Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales — MTT) are the most 
important. The members of the EJT are primarily engaged in 
agriculture and military construction projects. The MTT con- 
sists of civilian volunteers who are trained and led by the mem- 
bers of the regular military. A Civil Defense (Defensa Civil) 
force, also made up of civilians and led by military officers, 
rounds out the nation's defense organization (see Territorial 
Troops Militia; Civil Defense, this ch.). 

The FAR's two main missions in the late 1990s consisted of 
providing for the island's external defense and the mainte- 
nance of internal order. These have remained the FAR's princi- 
pal missions since the beginning of the Revolution. In 1976 the 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



FAR's "internationalist" mission was added, which provided a 
basis for the military's deployment of troops to foreign combat. 
However, after the return home of the last "internationalist" 
forces in 1991, the sixteen-year "internationalist" mission was 
replaced with a new charge for the military to help the ailing 
economy. During the course of the 1990s, this newest mission 
led to the FAR's expanded activities in the economic sphere 
that extend from the military's role in agricultural production, 
to manufacturing, and even to providing services for the bur- 
geoning tourism industry. 

Doctrine of the War of All the People 

The military doctrine that guides the FAR in the execution 
of its traditional defense-related missions is known as the War 
of All the People (Guerra de Todo el Pueblo — GTP) . This doc- 
trine has been in force since the early 1980s, around the time 
that the MTT was established. The GTP centers on the key role 
assigned to the Cuban population in helping defend the island 
in the event of an attack. Its objective is to deter such an attack 
by so raising the costs for an invader, in terms of the casualties 
inflicted, that the action is deemed unacceptable. The doctrine 
is built around the defense-related duties assigned to the mem- 
bers of the MTT, who would be armed in order to support the 
regular armed forces. Under this doctrine, the country's entire 
population has been organized into defense zones, which exist 
at the local and provincial level and which are presided over by 
the National Defense Council. In the event of a crisis, the local 
defense zones and the militia would be mobilized and their 
command taken over by the armed forces. In the Cubans' 
defensive strategy, the regular military is conceived of as only a 
"professional vanguard" of the mobilized citizenry, and any 
ensuing struggle would be waged by means of conventional 
warfare as well as unconventional or guerrilla warfare. The 
regime's ability to rely on an armed population for the island's 
defense, at least rhetorically, has helped to compensate slightly 
for the loss of capabilities, especially in terms of diminished 
manpower, that the FAR has suffered since the early 1990s. 

Territorial Troops Militia 

The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Terri tori- 
ales — MTT), a body composed exclusively of civilian volun- 
teers, was established on May 1, 1980, and placed under the 
command of the MINFAR. Its creation is recognized as having 



312 




Afire station in Old Havana, 1999 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 

marked the beginning of Cuba's official embrace of the mili- 
tary doctrine of the War of All the People, which has remained 
in force since then. Like the MNR (National Revolutionary 
Militia) of the early 1960s, the MTT's formation reinforced the 
notion of the popular will to defend the Revolution. 

Most members of the MTT are women, the elderly, or retir- 
ees. Male teenagers who are too young or have not yet been 
called for military service are also eligible to join the MTT, as 
are men who are not obligated to serve as reservists. The MTT 
expanded from 500,000 members in 1982 to 1.2 million by 
mid-1984. The size of the force has remained at about 1 mil- 
lion, despite the economic crisis. 

The MTT's mission during a crisis would be to fight along- 
side, and provide replacements for, the personnel of the regu- 
lar armed force; to help protect such strategic infrastructure as 
bridges, highways, and railroads; and to carry out any other 
measures that might be needed to immobilize, wear down, or 
ultimately destroy the enemy. By the beginning of the 1980s, 
MTT members were extensively involved in the construction of 
tunnels throughout the island, which would be used as shelter 
for the population in the event of an attack. As a result of 
Cuba's continuing economic difficulties during the 1990s, the 
time that MTT members have spent in training and preparing 
for their various defense-related activities has been reduced. 
The reduction includes a decrease in the time that MTT mem- 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



bers have spent in carrying out joint exercises and maneuvers 
with regular FAR troops. 

The MTT is supported through the MINFAR's budget as well 
as through "voluntary" donations made by citizens. Most of 
these donations come from workplace contributions, which are 
paid through weekly deductions from workers' salaries. Accord- 
ing to the MINFAR, between 1981 and 1995, the expenses 
incurred for the MTT's training averaged approximately 35 
million Cuban pesos (for value of peso, see Glossary) per year. 
During this same period, popular contributions toward the 
force averaged about 30 million pesos per year. Just over half of 
the training expenditures went toward the purchase of study 
supplies and other training materials; just over one-third were 
dedicated for the purchase of weapons, communication equip- 
ment, uniforms, and spare parts. Other organizations also set 
annual funding goals with respect to their own MTT contribu- 
tions. Among such organizations were the CDR (Committee 
for the Defense of the Revolution), the Federation of Cuban 
Women (Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC), the 
National Association of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de 
Agricultores Pequehos — ANAP) , and even the Organization of 
Jose Marti Pioneers (Organizacion de Pioneros Jose Marti — 
OPJM). 

According to reforms for allocating MTT funds made in the 
system in 1995, the funds collected for the MTT are no longer 
sent to a central government account but remain within each 
municipality to support local MTT activities. Despite the coun- 
try's economic hardships, the amount of funds collected 
through popular contributions to the MTT continued to 
increase after the beginning of the Special Period in the early 
1990s. As of 1995, the MINFAR was paying only 14 percent of 
the MTT's total expenditures. 

Civil Defense 

Civil Defense was organized in 1966, following the disband- 
ment of the Popular Defense Force, which was the immediate 
successor to the MNR (National Revolutionary Militias) , after 
the MNR's dissolution in 1963. The mission of the civilian- 
based Civil Defense, which falls under the command of the 
MINFAR, is, in some respects, similar to that of the MTT, as the 
militia's modern incarnation. During a national crisis or war- 
time, Civil Defense members would be responsible for helping 
provide for local defense and rear-area security. 



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National Security 



Civil Defense's more routine duties, however, are to aid the 
civilian population and help protect economic resources in the 
event of a peacetime disaster. In practice this has most often 
meant that the force has been active in helping safeguard the 
population and property, including livestock, when the island 
has been threatened or hit by hurricanes or affected by other 
natural disasters, such as droughts or earthquakes. In 1999 
Civil Defense had an estimated 50,000 members, including 
both men and women. Members are often PCC members or 
local government officials and are active in their local defense 
zones. Civil Defense units are often organized at schools as well 
as at workplaces. 

Revolutionary Army 

In 1999 the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario) 
represented approximately 70 percent of Cuba's regular mili- 
tary manpower. According to the IISS, the Army's estimated 
45,000 troops included 39,000 members of the Ready Reserves 
who were completing the forty-five days of annual active-duty 
service necessary for maintaining their status, as well as con- 
scripts who were fulfilling their military service requirement. 
These personnel were under the command of one of three ter- 
ritorial armies, which are under the authority of the FAR's Gen- 
eral Staff. These commands roughly divide the island into 
thirds, corresponding with territory under either the Western, 
Central, or Eastern Armies. Since 1993 the commands have 
been unified, with the units of the DAAFAR and MGR having 
been brought under the operational control of the territorial 
army chiefs. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Isla de lajuven- 
tud Military Region — which was established in 1962 and in the 
1980s was an independent command, with a single infantry 
division — had been brought under the authority of the West- 
ern Army. 

The Western Army, organized in 1970, is the largest of the 
three territorial commands, and is generally considered the 
most strategically important because its troops are responsible 
for the defense of the nation's capital as well as Cuba's most 
important military installations. In addition to the Isla de la 
Juventud, the territory under the Western Army includes the 
provinces of Pinar del Rio, La Habana, and Ciudad de La 
Habana, where its headquarters is shared with the MINFAR. 
The Western Army is also thought to be subdivided into three 
army corps — the Havana Eastern Corps, the Havana Western 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



Corps, and the Pinar del Rio Corps — plus the Isla de lajuven- 
tud Military Region. Since 1989 the Western Army has been led 
by Division General Leopoldo "Polo" Cintra Frias, a Politburo 
member, former commander of Cuban forces in Angola, and 
Hero of the Republic. Each of the provinces under the Western 
Army's command has its own general staff. This organizational 
pattern at the provincial level is replicated in the Central and 
Eastern Armies. 

The Central Army was established in April 1961, only thir- 
teen days before the Bay of Pigs landing at Playa Giron in the 
province of Matanzas. In addition to Matanzas, the provinces 
under the Central Army's command include Cienfuegos, Santa 
Clara, and Sancti Spiritus. Its headquarters is in Santa Clara, 
the capital of Villa Clara Province. The Central Army is further 
subdivided into three army corps, consisting of the Matanzas 
Corps, the Central Corps (which has command over troops sta- 
tioned in Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, and Sancti Spiritus prov- 
inces), and the Ciego de Avila Corps. In 1999 the chief of the 
Central Army was Division General Joaquin Quintas Sola, who 
has held that post since 1984. 

The Eastern Army, established in April 1961, held command 
over personnel stationed in the provinces of Camagiiey, Las 
Tunas, Holguin, Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo 
from its headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. In 1999 the chief of 
the Eastern Army was Division General Ramon Espinosa Mar- 
tin, who has held that command for the past fifteen years. The 
Eastern Army is also organized into three army corps, consist- 
ing of the Camagiiey, the Northern, and the Southern Army 
Corps. The Northern Army Corps had authority over troops in 
the provinces of Las Tunas and Holguin. The Southern Army 
Corps had command over units deployed in the provinces of 
Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo. Also under the 
Eastern Army's command is the elite Border Brigade (Brigada 
de la Frontera) , which maintains watch over the United States 
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay (see The United States Naval 
Station at Guantanamo Bay, this ch.). 

The IISS reported in 1999 that the army's troop formations 
consisted of four to five armored brigades; nine mechanized 
infantry brigades; an airborne brigade; fourteen reserve bri- 
gades; and the Border Brigade. In addition, there is an air 
defense artillery regiment and a surface-to-air missile brigade. 
Each of the three territorial armies is believed to be assigned at 
least one armored brigade — usually attached to the army's 



316 



A Cuban army colonel inspects an infantry squad and tank crew on 

April 17, 1993. 

A front-side view of a BMP-1 armored infantry fighting vehicle at 
Battalion 2721 in San Jose de las Laj as, January 1998 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



317 



Cuba: A Country Study 



headquarters — as well as a mechanized infantry brigade. As 
well, it is known that the Border Brigade in Guantanamo and at 
least one ground artillery regiment (attached to a mechanized 
infantry brigade) , based in Las Tunas, are under the Eastern 
Army's command. Unfortunately, there is relatively little public 
information available with respect to the organization of the 
ground forces within the three armies, let alone the equipment 
that pertains to each of these commands (see table 19, Major 
Army Equipment, 1999, Appendix). Nevertheless, the Western 
Army is known to have the greatest priority for the FAR leader- 
ship, and is also likely to be assigned the most personnel and 
the most equipment; this would be followed, according to 
defense priorities, by the Eastern Army, and, lastly, by the Cen- 
tral Army. 

Assessing the situation of Cuba's ground forces has been fur- 
ther complicated by the leadership's decision to put into stor- 
age three-fourths of the FAR's equipment. The mothballing of 
so much of the military's equipment began with the onset of 
the economic crisis in the early 1990s, and was prompted by 
the lack of spare and replacement parts for the Soviet-era mate- 
riel as well as the shortage of the hard currency needed to pay 
for the fuel for training and exercises. Much of this equipment 
is stored in tunnels and caves throughout the island, but it is 
not thought to be withstanding well the island's tropical envi- 
ronment. Especially vulnerable are the equipment and weap- 
onry that rely on more sophisticated technology. According to 
the United States Department of Defense's 1998 report enti- 
tled, "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security," the moth- 
balled materiel would not be available for defense on short 
notice. The same report also concludes that, owing to severely 
reduced training, the ground forces' overall state of readiness 
is low and notes that the FAR generally is not capable of mount- 
ing effective operations above the battalion level. 

The Cuban military has long maintained its own secret base 
for intercepting electronic communications. Operated by the 
FAR's Electronic Warfare Battalion, this smaller, relatively 
unknown base is located at El Wajay, 14.5 kilometers southwest 
of Havana, near the Russian operation at Lourdes. Although 
not as powerful as the Russian facility, the Cuban military's sig- 
nals intelligence (SIGINT) facility is thought to be capable of 
monitoring telephone and radio signals at least as far away as 
Florida. The Electronic Warfare Battalion reportedly has the 



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equipment necessary to jam United States communications, 
but is not thought to have used it for this end. 

Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force 

The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force 
(Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — DAAFAR) 
traces its origins to the single aircraft that constituted the guer- 
rillas' Rebel Air Force in April 1958. It was established as a 
branch of service separate from the Revolutionary Army, with 
its own command structure, in April 1972, a change that was 
likely influenced by the then ongoing efforts by the Soviet 
Union to help professionalize Cuba's armed forces. The DAA- 
FAR's responsibilities encompass providing for the nation's air 
defense as well as tactical and airlift support for the FAR's 
ground forces. According to the IISS, in 1999 the DAAFAR had 
10,000 personnel, including conscripts, and represented 15 
percent of total regular military manpower. 

The DAAFAR's territorial commands parallel those of the 
three territorial armies and consist of the Western, Central, 
and Eastern Air Force brigades. In addition, the DAAFAR also 
maintains Air Defense Artillery and Missile Forces. Although 
their locations are not publicly disclosed, it is reasonable to sur- 
mise that they are stationed in a position to defend the capital 
of Havana. The major air installations under the command of 
the Western Air Force Brigade include bases at San Julian in 
Pinar del Rio Province and San Antonio de los Banos, as well as 
the Baracoa Air Base and the Jose Marti International Airport 
in La Habana Province. Under the Central Brigade are air 
bases at Guines, Matanzas; Cienfuegos, Cienfuegos; Santa 
Clara, Villa Clara; and Sancti Spiritus, Sancti Spiritus. The 
Western Brigade maintains its key installations at the provincial 
capitals of Camaguey, Holguin, and Santiago de Cuba in the 
respective provinces of Camaguey, Holguin, and Santiago de 
Cuba. Of all these, the base at San Antonio de los Banos is con- 
sidered to be the military's most important airport. It is the 
only airport that, as of the early 1990s, had three airstrips, one 
of which was 4,000 meters in length. 

The operational readiness and effectiveness of the DAAFAR 
have been severely compromised by the economic crisis and 
the loss of Soviet aid. Although Cuba is formally acknowledged 
as having one of the better equipped air forces in Latin Amer- 
ica, consisting of several hundred combat aircraft and armed 
helicopters, the reality is that, by the late 1990s, a significant 



319 



Cuba: A Country Study 

part of the fleet was no longer deemed operational (see table 
20, Appendix) . To become more self-sufficient, the DAAFAR's 
Research and Development Center is also seeking to build its 
own aircraft, such as the AC-001 multi-use "Comas" planes that 
were first produced at the Yuri Gargarin Military Industrial 
Enterprise in 1992. 

The United States Department of Defense estimated in 1998 
that fewer than two dozen of the DAAFAR's MiGs remain oper- 
ational. Despite the access to spare parts established by an 
accord with the Russians as rent for the signals intelligence 
facility at Lourdes, which is located south of Havana in La 
Habana Province, the DAAFAR's state of readiness is expected 
to continue to worsen. The mothballed equipment continues 
to deteriorate, and pilot training and flight hours, which are 
essential for flying the more sophisticated MiGs in the Cuban 
inventory, remain limited because of the cost of fuel. 

Revolutionary Navy 

The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revoluciona- 
ria — MGR) , which has always been the smallest and least presti- 
gious of the FAR's three armed services since its establishment 
in August 1963, is the service that has been most severely 
affected by the economic crisis. As of late 2000, it barely man- 
aged as an independent force. The MGR's formal mission has 
traditionally been to provide for shore-based coastal defense as 
well as to conduct offshore naval operations. By the end of the 
1990s, however, the MGR had no major ships that were still sea- 
worthy and no longer was considered to be a blue-water navy. It 
remained capable only of patrolling Cuba's territorial waters, 
and even that responsibility was shared with the Ministry of 
Interior's Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — 
TGF). 

In 1999 the IISS estimated that the MGR was composed of 
5,000 personnel, which represented just over 7.5 percent of 
total regular military manpower. Of these 5,000 personnel, an 
estimated 3,000 were conscripts. Another 550 were members of 
the Naval Infantry, a battalion-size force that was created in the 
late 1970s. This force, which was assigned to coastal defense, 
gave the MGR a limited ground combat capability. Although 
the MGR has no reserve force, it would presumably be supple- 
mented by members of the Cuban Merchant Marine in the 
event of a crisis. Naval aviation is a function of the DAAFAR. 



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The MGR's headquarters is located in Havana. Its opera- 
tional commands are divided in accordance with the three ter- 
ritorial armies, each of which holds ultimate authority over the 
MGR's forces within its geographic boundaries. The MGR's 
western headquarters is believed to be at Cabanas, located 
approximately 48.4 kilometers west of Ciudad de La Habana 
Province on the coast in Pinar del Rio Province; and its eastern 
headquarters, at Holgum, an inland city in the province of the 
same name. The location of the central headquarters — or even 
if the headquarters is still maintained, given the cutbacks — is 
unclear. During the 1990s, the MGR's principal installations 
were said to include facilities at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, Cien- 
fuegos; the Bahia de Cabanas, Pinar del Rio; the Bahia de 
Mariel, Havana; the Bahia de La Habana, Ciudad de La 
Habana; the Bahia de Matanzas, Matanzas; the Bahia de Nuevi- 
tas, Camaguey; and the Bahia de Nipe, Holgum. With the 
exception of that at the Bahia de Cienfuegos, all of these bases 
were located along the northern coast. Some of the installa- 
tions may have been closed as a result of the continuing cut- 
backs that were carried out during the course of the 1990s. The 
naval academy was one of the installations closed. Located just 
west of Ciudad de La Habana Province on the northern coast 
at Punta Santa Ana, the MGR's principal training school was 
converted into a hospital in the 1990s. 

As recently as a decade ago, the MGR counted in its inven- 
tory three submarines, which had been delivered by the Soviets 
between 1979 and 1984, and two frigates, the last of which was 
also received in 1984. It was one of the few countries in the 
region to have such an ocean-going fleet (see table 21, Appen- 
dix) . But by the end of the 1990s, none of these vessels 
remained in operation, and only just over a dozen of the 
MGR's remaining surface vessels were held to be combat capa- 
ble. The fast-attack boats that are equipped with Styx (SS-N- 
2B) surface-to-surface antiship missiles provide the MGR with a 
continuing, yet weak, antisurface warfare capability. The MGR's 
shore-based naval infantry reportedly is armed with approxi- 
mately fifty Samlet (SSC-2B) and two Styx (SSC-3) surface-to- 
surface missiles. According to the United States Naval Institute, 
auxiliary ships that remained in operation as late as 1998 
included a replenishment oiler, an intelligence collector, a 
cargo ship, and several hydrographic survey vessels. 



321 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Conscription and Personnel Resources 

Until 1991, Cuban men were required to perform three 
years of compulsory military service under the SMO (Obliga- 
tory Military Service) system. The three-year obligation had 
been in force since the first Law of Military Service was promul- 
gated in November 1963. In August 1991, however, the Active 
Military Service (Servicio Militar Activo — SMA) requirement 
was reduced to two years, beginning at age sixteen, under the 
General Military Service Law (Ley de Servicio Militar Gen- 
eral — SMG), formerly the SMO. Young Cubans usually are not 
called to service until age seventeen. 

The compulsory service duty reflects the interest of the mili- 
tary and Cuban leadership in having a large proportion of the 
island's population prepared to contribute to the defense of 
the Revolution. By the end of the 1990s, 1.7 million young 
Cuban men had completed their SMA requirement as con- 
scripts. Since the onset of the economic crisis, Cuban youth 
carrying out such compulsory military service continue to play 
an important role in the military. Although now at reduced 
numbers because of overall cutbacks in military manpower, 
they have become most important in providing a source of 
cheap labor for the MINFAR's efforts to become a self-sustain- 
ing institution. 

In terms of overall personnel resources, in 1999 a total of 
6.08 million Cubans between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine 
were considered to be "available" for military service, accord- 
ing to the Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook. Of this 
total, only 3.76 million Cubans, or just under two-thirds, were 
judged to be "fit" for military service. In this latter category, 1.9 
million of the Cubans were males and 1.86 million were 
females. 

The fulfillment of SMA for conscripts entails their assign- 
ment to one of the services of the regular armed forces, to the 
65,000-member EJT (Youth Labor Army), or to the Ministry of 
Interior. Cuban males between the ages of sixteen and fifty are 
required to perform a minimum of two years' service as an 
active-duty member of one of the country's security forces, a 
member of the military reserves, or in some combination of 
both forms of service. Young men are required to register 
locally for the draft after reaching their sixteenth birthday, and 
are then issued a certificate that shows they have registered. 
According to population statistics, just under 75,000 young 
Cuban males were becoming eligible for conscription each 



322 





The barracks at Battalion 2721 in San Jose de las Lajas, 
La Habana Province, January 1998 
A view of the sleeping quarters in the Battalion 2721 barracks 
in San Jose de las Lajas, January 1998 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



323 



Cuba: A Country Study 

year during the late 1990s. Induction calls are held twice a year, 
with the youth to be inducted selected by lottery. Young men 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight who have not 
been called for Active Military Service are known as prerecruits 
(prereclutados) . During the late 1980s, new draftees received six 
to eight months of basic training before being formally 
inducted into the armed forces. It is likely that the extent and 
nature of the training given draftees in the 1990s were limited 
as a result of the economic crisis. 

Since the end of the FAR's "internationalist" mission, during 
which tens of thousands of draftees were sent to fight abroad, 
the military's need for conscripted manpower has fallen mark- 
edly. The decreased need was likely one of the considerations 
behind the 1991 decision to reduce the SMA term from three 
to two years, a move that brought the Cuban system more 
closely in line with the military service requirements main- 
tained by other Latin American countries. The official explana- 
tion for the reduction was that the overall educational level of 
draftees had so improved over the years that they now needed 
less training. This explanation does not appear to be wholly 
without merit, given that since 1987, graduates of preuniversity 
programs who are drafted are required to perform only one 
year of service. In addition, the military maintains policies that 
reflect an interest in supporting the educational accomplish- 
ments of its draftees, as reflected in a provision known as Order 
18. According to this order, youth who were initially not admit- 
ted to a university but who distinguish themselves during their 
term of service are given a second opportunity to pursue their 
higher education. By the end of 1998, 14,000 graduates of 
Cuban universities had been beneficiaries of this program. 

Cuban women are not subject to conscription. After turning 
sixteen years of age, however, they are eligible to enlist in the 
armed forces under the program known as Voluntary Female 
Military Service (Servicio Militar Voluntario Feminimo) , which 
was established in 1986. (Women served in the FAR well before 
that date, however.) Their applications for enlistment are coor- 
dinated by the FMC (Federation of Cuban Women), the mass 
organization that has long been headed by Vilma Espin, Raul 
Castro's wife. During the 1980s, new female volunteers were 
accepted twice a year and signed up for two-year tours of duty, 
in contrast to the five-year commitment that was then required 
of male enlistees. Those who did not reenlist upon completion 
of their tour of duty automatically became members of the 



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FAR's reserve forces; they were eligible to remain active in the 
reserve until reaching forty years of age. 

Women who enlist in the FAR are formally eligible to ascend 
within the ranks of the armed forces, yet they are believed to 
face limited opportunities for the advanced military education 
that might qualify them for such promotions. At the pre-univer- 
sity level, women were reported to be subject to meeting more 
restrictive entrance requirements than male applicants. At the 
more advanced levels of military education, it was believed that 
the only professional program open to women was that offered 
by the Military Technical Institute (Instituto Tecnico Militar — 
ITM). The prevalence of traditional attitudes regarding sex 
roles also appeared as an impediment to women's career 
advancement within the armed forces. Between 1986 and early 
1999, more than 18,000 young women had volunteered for mil- 
itary service. 

Men who have completed their Active Military Service auto- 
matically pass to the ranks of the reserves, where they are 
expected to continue to train annually until reaching age fifty. 
Reservists are divided into various groups, according to their 
state of readiness and training. The members of the Ready 
Reserves are assigned to army units, serve on active duty for at 
least forty-five days each year, and could reportedly be mobi- 
lized on a few hours' notice. In 1999 these reserve forces num- 
bered approximately 39,000 troops. The next tier consists of 
men who have completed at least one year of Active Military 
Service and could be mobilized on a few days' notice. The final 
group consists of those who either have not completed a year 
of active service or who were deemed unfit for duty, whether 
for reasons ascribable to their physical condition or political 
unreliability. Members of this last group appear to be "reserv- 
ists" only in name, and reportedly are not required to undergo 
regular military training. 

Professional Training and Education 

Cuba's system of military training and education has been 
developed over the decades to support the specialized needs of 
a highly professional military force. These schools and training 
centers are under the authority of a separate directorate within 
the MINFAR. This directorate is dedicated exclusively to over- 
seeing the education system and reports to the FAR General 
Staff. During the late 1970s, as a result of efforts to improve 
educational standards, the upper-level military educational 



325 



Cuba: A Country Study 



institutions were granted university status. The extent to which 
these schools, their admission standards, and their curricula 
were affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s and by the 
downsizing of the armed forces is unclear. 

The preparation of potential future members of the armed 
forces may be seen as beginning with the Camilo Cienfuegos 
Military Schools (Escuelas Militares Camilo Cienfuegos — 
EMCC), which are open to youth (both males and females) 
between the ages of eleven and seventeen. The first Camilo 
Cienfuegos school was opened in Matanzas in 1966. By the 
1980s, eleven such schools had been established and were 
located throughout the island. Each was under the authority of 
a particular branch of military service, with the army control- 
ling seven of the schools. They offered a five-year course of 
study that was considered comparable to a preuniversity educa- 
tion. Yet in addition to the general curriculum that paralleled 
that offered by civilian schools, the Camilitos — as the school's 
students are known — were also given introductory classes on 
military tactics, the handling of light weapons, topography, 
chemical defense, and engineering. The students were also 
expected to adhere to military discipline and participate in 
drills. Most students gained admission either through their 
own participation in PCC-related youth organizations — 
namely, the OPJM (Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers) or the 
Union of Young Communists (Union de Jovenes Comunistas — 
UJC) — or through their parents' membership in the FAR or 
PCC. The graduates of the EMCC were believed to be given 
preference in admission to the MINFAR's more advanced 
schools and training programs. The extent to which these 
schools and their curricula were affected by the economic crisis 
of the 1990s remained unclear at the time of writing. 

Beyond this level, each branch of the armed forces has, until 
recently, operated its own schools and service academies. The 
exception is the MGR, whose naval academy at Punta Santa 
Ana, near Havana, was closed in the 1990s and converted into a 
hospital. The DAAFAR's Aviation Pilots Military School 
(Escuela Militar de Pilotos de Aviacion — EMPA) is located at 
the San Julian airbase in western Pinar del Rio Province. Dur- 
ing the 1980s, the DAAFAR also operated its own technical 
school, the DAAFAR Technical School (Escuela Tecnica de la 
DAAFAR). The Ministry of Interior also operates separate 
schools for training its personnel. 



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National Security 



The General Antonio Maceo Joint-Service School (Escuela 
de Cadetes Interarmas General Antonio Maceo — ECAM) has 
traditionally been the Army's service academy. This school, 
located at Ceiba del Agua, a short distance southeast of the cap- 
ital, was first opened in 1963. By the 1980s, admission require- 
ments had been stiffened to stipulate that entrants must have a 
minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between the ages 
of fifteen and twenty-one. ECAM's three- and four-year pro- 
grams of study emphasize the preparation and training of tacti- 
cal and technical command officers; the curriculum is 
designed for members of armored and mechanized infantry 
units and for engineering and logistics personnel. 

The Major Camilo Cienfuegos Revolutionary Armed Forces 
Artillery School (Escuela de Artilleria de las FAR Comandante 
Camilo Cienfuegos) was founded in 1963 and is located at La 
Cabana Fortress in Havana harbor. It provides advanced train- 
ing for field and antiaircraft artillery officers, who upon com- 
pletion of their studies are awarded a degree in either science 
or engineering. Those admitted to the school's engineering 
program, which is a five-year course of study, are required to 
have graduated from a preuniversity preparatory school, tech- 
nical institute, or high school, and must be between the ages of 
seventeen and twenty-one. A four-year program, with similar 
admission requirements, is offered that focuses on preparing 
future officers who will command field and antiaircraft artil- 
lery, reconnaissance, and radio-technical units. 

The Military Technical Institute (ITM), founded in 1966 
and located in Havana, offers the most advanced technical 
training programs available to MINFAR personnel. Unlike the 
other academies, the ITM is open to women. It offers enroll- 
ment in either four- or five-year training programs. Those 
admitted to the more stringent five-year program must be grad- 
uates of a preuniversity preparatory school and be between the 
ages of seventeen and twenty-one. The five-year program pro- 
vides for instruction in field artillery, infantry, weapons, tanks, 
and transport; those graduating from the program become 
qualified mechanical engineers. The two four-year programs 
offer training for electromechanical and mechanical techni- 
cians. The admission requirements for the four-year courses of 
study are slightly less stringent than for the five-year program. 
So long as an applicant has a minimum tenth-grade education 
and is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, he or she is 
eligible for admission. As with the other schools and courses of 



327 



Cuba: A Country Study 

study already discussed, the demonstration of political loyalty 
was considered a relevant factor in determining an applicant's 
qualifications. 

The MINFAR's senior service school is the General Maximo 
Gomez Revolutionary Armed Forces Academy (Academia de 
las FAR General Maximo Gomez), which was founded in July 
1963 and is located in western La Habana Province. This 
school provides training for middle-to upper-ranking MINFAR 
officers. During the 1980s, attendance at the school became a 
requisite for those hoping to be assigned to the General Staff. 
The school's curriculum is roughly comparable to that offered 
at advanced officer training schools in the United States, such 
as the United States Army's Command and General Staff Col- 
lege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the United States Army 
War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

During the 1990s, the most advanced institution for military 
education was the National Defense College. This recently 
established college, which was modeled on Canada's senior 
officer school, offers a curriculum that is roughly comparable 
to that of the United States' National Defense University at Fort 
McNair in Washington, D.C. Its primary focus, as reflected in 
the curriculum, is on strategic security issues. Although orga- 
nized mainly for the benefit of senior military professionals, 
some civilians — most of whom are government functionaries — 
also are invited to attend the courses. The faculty of the college 
includes military officials as well as civilian professors. During 
the 1990s, a period when the military became increasingly 
involved in the national economy and was often identified as 
an advocate for further reforms in that arena, the college's fac- 
ulty members included civilian economists, some of whom also 
favored economic reforms in line with those envisioned by the 
MINFAR's leaders. 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 

Since 1976 the MINFAR's system of military ranks has been 
basically patterned after that used by most Western armed 
forces (see fig. 9; 10). Prior to that time, the system of ranks was 
far from conventional, a factor that complicated relations with 
the Soviet military, which pressed Cuba to carry out such 
changes as part of its professionalization. In about 1998, a 
minor revision to the FAR's rank insignia was made when chev- 
rons were reintroduced to replace the stars on the insignia of 
junior officers. Two decades earlier, in 1978, the stars had 



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replaced the chevrons. Another minor change, also made in 
1978, was the creation of a new rank, adding the warrant 
officer class for all three services. 

The lack of conventionality in the MINFAR's system of ranks 
may be traced to the earliest days of the Revolution, and may 
be understood as a gesture that reflected the rebels' egalitarian 
nature. Following the victory of the Revolution in 1959, this 
unconventionality continued, and the only military ranks rec- 
ognized were those inherited from the Rebel Army. They con- 
sisted of lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major 
(comandante) . At that time, three dozen men — nearly all of 
them Rebel Army veterans — held the rank of comandante, 
including Fidel Castro (even though he was clearly recognized 
as the others' superior) . 

Between 1959 and 1973, no sweeping overhauls were carried 
out, but new ranks were gradually introduced. In late 1959, the 
rank of second lieutenant was the first addition to the military 
echelons. Between 1963 and 1973, other new ranks were 
added, including brigade commander, division commander, 
corps commander, army commander, and commander-in- 
chief. First-class officers included the ranks of first commander, 
commander, and major; and junior officers, the ranks of first 
and second lieutenant and first and second captain. 

In November 1976, Law No. 1315 created the system of 
ranks that remained basically unchanged for the next twenty- 
odd years. These ranks are held by personnel assigned to the 
FAR and by personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Person- 
nel assigned to the Revolutionary Army, the DAAFAR, and the 
Ministry of Interior may have similar rank titles, differentiated 
only by their uniforms and insignia colors. Fidel Castro holds 
the rank of commander in chief; his brother, MINFAR Minister 
Raul Castro, as army general (general de ejercito), is the second- 
ranking officer in the hierarchy of the armed forces. Minister 
of Interior Abelardo Colome Ibarra, as army corps general 
(general de cuerpo de ejercito) , is the third-ranking officer. 

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commands of the FAR's general staff and of its three territorial 
armies are filled by officers having the rank of division general 
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level is that of brigade general (general de brigada). 

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order, colonel (coronel), lieutenant colonel (teniente coronel), and 
major (mayor); junior officers' ranks include captain (capitdn), 



329 



Cuba: A Country Study 



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331 



Cuba: A Country Study 

first lieutenant (primer teniente), lieutenant (teniente), and second 
lieutenant (subteniente). The noncommissioned ranks of war- 
rant officers and enlisted personnel include, in descending 
order, senior warrant officer (primer suboficial) and warrant 
officer (suboficial), master sergeant (sargento de primera), ser- 
geant first class (sargento de segunda), sergeant (sargento de ter- 
cera), private first class (soldado de primera), and private (soldado). 

Establishing comparability for the highest ranks of MGR per- 
sonnel remains somewhat difficult inasmuch as the Cuban 
rank of almirante (admiral) is the equivalent of the United 
States rank of vice admiral. The MGR rank of vice almirante 
(vice admiral) is comparable to the United States rank of rear 
admiral, upper half. A contra almirante (rear admiral), in turn, 
is comparable to the United States rank of rear admiral, lower 
half (the rank formerly known in the United States Navy as 
commodore). First-class officers include, in descending order, 
the ranks of ship captain (capitdn de navw), frigate captain 
(capitdn de fragata), and corvette captain (capitdn de corbeta), 
which correspond to the United States ranks of captain, com- 
mander, and lieutenant commander, respectively. Junior offi- 
cers include, in descending order, the ranks of ship lieutenant 
(teniente de navw), which is comparable to the rank of lieutenant 
in the United States Navy, as well as frigate lieutenant (teniente 
de fragata) and corvette lieutenant (teniente de corbeta), which are 
both considered comparable to the single rank of lieutenant 
junior grade in the United States Navy. The rank of ensign 
(alferez) is comparable for both the United States Navy and the 
MGR. 

In terms of noncommissioned personnel in the MGR, the 
most senior rank is that of first sergeant major (primer subofi- 
cial), which is comparable to a United States Navy master chief 
petty officer. Confusingly, however, an MGR sergeant major 
(suboficial) corresponds to two United States ranks, senior chief 
petty officer and chief petty officer. The ranks of sergeant are 
divided into three classes: A first sergeant (sargento de primera) 
and second sergeant (sargento de segunda) correspond directly 
to the ranks of petty officer, first and second class, respectively. 
The MGR rank of third sergeant (sargento de tercera) corre- 
sponds to the two United States Navy ranks of petty officer, 
third class, and seaman. The ranks of seaman, first class (mari- 
nero de primera) and seaman (marinero) in the MGR correspond 
to the United States Navy ranks of seaman apprentice and sea- 
man recruit, respectively. 



332 



National Security 



With respect to uniforms, the olive-drab fatigues made 
famous by Castro continue to be the standard field uniform for 
the FAR's ground and air forces. Other uniforms issued to FAR 
personnel include various styles of service, parade, and cere- 
monial parade uniforms. The parade uniforms of the Revolu- 
tionary Army are olive-drab; those of the DAAFAR are blue; 
and those of the MGR are either blue-black, for winter, or 
white, for summer. Notwithstanding changes that might be 
ordered by commanders, summer uniforms are generally worn 
from mid-March through mid-November. In addition, special 
uniforms are also issued. For the ground forces, they include 
paratrooper, chemical warfare, and tanker uniforms. For the 
DAAFAR, special pilot uniforms include an antigravity uniform 
and a pressurized uniform. 

Relations with Russia 

Following the departure of the last Russian troops in 1993, 
the SIGINT facility at Lourdes remained one of the only practi- 
cal vestiges (apart from the extensive Soviet-origin materiel in 
the FAR's inventory) of the once-close security relationship 
between Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it 
provided a reason for continuing regular interaction between 
the leaders of the two countries on issues related to security 
concerns through the remainder of the 1990s. During this 
period, the Lourdes facility was maintained and staffed by Rus- 
sian intelligence personnel of the Federal Security Service 
(Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti — FSB), a successor entity 
to the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosu- 
darstvennoi Bezopastnosti — KGB). An estimated 810 Russian 
military personnel were in Cuba in 1999. 

Under the first bilateral agreement pertaining to Lourdes 
that was reached in 1993, it was agreed that the facility would 
remain in operation and that "rent" would be paid in the form 
of spare parts for the FAR. At that time, the Russians agreed to 
pay Cuba for the next twenty years for both the Lourdes opera- 
tion and for a since-closed submarine support facility at Cien- 
fuegos on the southern Cuban coast, but the amount of the 
rent was not set. In March 1995, the agreement finalizing the 
terms for remuneration for Lourdes was signed in Moscow by 
FAR First Vice Minister Division General Julio Casas Regueiro. 
It provided for an annual rent in the range of US$200 million, 
much of which would be in the form of bartered military mate- 
rials. Although the Russians, owing to their own domestic prob- 



333 



Cuba: A Country Study 



lems, had difficulties in providing the Cubans with the 
bartered goods during the first years that followed the agree- 
ment's signing, the supply problems were thought to have been 
resolved by the end of the 1990s. 

According to the Russians, the "listening post" is used to 
monitor compliance with international arms-control agree- 
ments. Yet notwithstanding its likely utility in this regard, the 
Lourdes facility also is capable of intercepting and monitoring 
communications along the eastern coast of the United States as 
well as the circum-Caribbean region. Although the Cubans do 
not have access to the "raw" intelligence data obtained by the 
Russians, they are routinely provided intelligence summaries 
on issues that are thought to affect their interests. 

Relations with Other Armed Forces 

The onset of the economic crisis, the end of military "inter- 
nationalism," and the loss of Soviet support appeared to bring 
about a heightened awareness within the Cuban armed forces 
with respect to the institution's potential isolation. As a result, 
the Cuban military's efforts to build contacts with foreign mili- 
taries were stepped up during the 1990s. In terms of other 
countries' receptivity, the Cuban military's efforts were aided by 
the end of the Cold War and Fidel Castro's 1992 declaration 
that Cuba would no longer support revolutionary movements 
abroad. 

The Cuban military has long maintained contacts with the 
armed forces of developing world nations that are considered 
nonaligned or, at least, not ideologically hostile toward the Cas- 
tro regime. The changed situation of the 1990s, however, 
helped open the way for broader international contacts. The 
Cuban interest in reducing the FAR's ideological isolation in 
the post-Cold War era spurred its efforts to increase coopera- 
tion and regular contacts with other militaries in the Latin 
American region. By mid-decade, these efforts appeared to 
have been somewhat successful. In 1996 Cuba served as host of 
the biennial meeting of Ibero-American Military Academies, a 
gathering whose participants included military officials from 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Nicara- 
gua. In this new environment, the Cuban military has also 
sought to build ties and expand cooperation with militaries in 
Canada and Western Europe. Among the latter group of coun- 
tries with whose militaries the Cubans have been most publicly 
engaged are Britain, France, and, most significantly, Spain, 



334 



National Security 



which in 1996 announced its decision to become the first Euro- 
pean Union (EU — see Glossary) nation to assign a permanent 
military attache to Havana. The contacts with these European 
countries have included hosting visits of students from their 
military schools as well as conducting discussions on mutual 
concerns and exploring areas of possible future cooperation. 

Despite the importance of Cuba's renewed military ties with 
Latin America and Europe, perhaps the most important tie 
with a foreign military service to develop since the Soviet 
Union's demise has been the FAR's relationship with the Chi- 
nese Popular Liberation Army (PLA). On various occasions 
during the 1990s, FAR leaders have traveled to the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) to meet with military officials; and 
those officials, in turn, have reciprocated in visiting the island. 
In February 1999, the Chinese defense minister and a delega- 
tion of military officials paid a three-day visit to Cuba. The 
FAR's interest in these contacts is believed to stem from the 
desire to have a powerful ally. In addition, the MINFAR leader- 
ship's view — and, in particular, Minister Raul Castro's view — 
that elements of the Chinese model of economic reform may 
be relevant for Cuba also likely contributed to the interest in 
broadening ties with their military colleagues, who during the 
1990s had a prominent role in the Chinese economy. The PLA, 
at the same time, may be recognized to have a geostrategic 
interest with respect to its Cuban ally in the Caribbean, an 
interest that has raised some concerns in the United States. In 
late 1999, for example, Cuban officials were obliged to deny a 
report published by a Miami newspaper that the PRC had 
established a military communications facility on the island. 

Ministry of Interior 

Leadership and Organization 

The Ministry of Interior was created in June 1961 and 
charged with maintaining Cuba's internal security, with respon- 
sibilities ranging from counterintelligence to firefighting. 
Between that time and 1989, the Ministry of Interior was often 
pitted against the MINFAR in the bureaucratic competition for 
primacy in ensuring national security. In contrast to the MIN- 
FAR, which since its organization has remained under the sole 
authority of Raul Castro, the Ministry of Interior has been vari- 
ously headed by Ramiro Valdes Menendez, a Rebel Army vet- 
eran and the founder of the ministry, and by Sergio del Valle 



335 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Jimenez, also a longtime revolutionary supporter. Perhaps 
owing to his background as a physician, del Valle launched 
rehabilitation programs and efforts to curtail torture. In the 
years immediately preceding the trial involving Division Gen- 
eral Arnaldo Ochoa, the ministry's head was its former first vice 
minister, Division General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, who was a 
close associate of Valdes, a trusted aide to Fidel Castro, and 
who had also played a key role in the organization of Cuba's 
intelligence community, beginning in the early 1960s (see 
Organizational Changes of 1989, this ch.). 

Following the events of mid-1989 that were associated with 
the Ochoa affair, Abrantes was sentenced to jail. The post of 
minister of interior was then assigned to the second-ranking 
officer in the FAR, Army Corps General Abelardo Colome 
Ibarra, a close associate of Raul Castro. During the ensuing 
months, the top layers of leadership of the ministry's various 
directorates were purged and their officials replaced by men 
who had a background as loyal officers in the FAR. By the late 
1990s, a few reports suggested that some of the once-purged 
Ministry of Interior officials, mainly those who had had back- 
grounds in intelligence, were being invited back on a selective 
basis. Nevertheless, some analysts maintained that even a 
decade later the ministry had still not recovered from the 
shake-up that followed the Ochoa affair. As of 1999, Colome 
Ibarra continued to head the ministry and served as its repre- 
sentative on the Council of Ministers (see The Military in the 
Government and the Party, this ch.). 

At the time of the shake-up, the Ministry of Interior was 
organized with six vice ministries, each of which was in turn 
responsible for various directorates and departments. Despite 
some name changes, this basic structure is thought to have 
remained intact since 1989. The most important of the vice 
ministries is that of the first vice minister. The first vice minister 
has authority over a number of key directorates and depart- 
ments, including the General Directorate of Personal Security 
(Direccion General de Seguridad Personal — DGSP), which is 
responsible for safeguarding the life of the Cuban leader; the 
General Directorate of Special Troops (Direccion General de 
Tropas Especiales — DGTE); the General Directorate of Border 
Guards (Direccion General de Guardafronteras — DGG); the 
Technical Directorate; and the directorates of immigration, 
control, codes (sometimes referred to as the Eighth Director- 



336 



National Security 



ate), and weapons. The Central Laboratory of Criminology is 
also under the first vice minister's jurisdiction. 

The remaining five vice ministries have more specific 
responsibilities. They include the Vice Ministry of Counterin- 
telligence, which is responsible for the Directorate of Counter- 
intelligence (Direccion de Contra Inteligencia) ; the Vice 
Ministry of Intelligence, which oversees the Directorate of 
Intelligence (Direccion de Inteligencia — DI); and the Vice 
Ministry of Political Affairs, which reportedly is jointly subordi- 
nate to the head of the PCC Central Committee's national 
security commission, as well as to the minister of interior. The 
Vice Ministry of Internal Order has authority over the follow- 
ing directorates: National Revolutionary Police, Penitentiary 
Establishments, Prevention and Extinction of Fires, and Iden- 
tity Cards. Lastly, the Vice Ministry of the Economy is responsi- 
ble for overseeing the ministry's administrative functions, 
including planning, budgeting, and exercising inventory con- 
trol over motor vehicles and warehouses. 

Other ministry subdivisions that are organizationally inde- 
pendent of the vice ministries include the directorates of Cad- 
res, Personnel, and Instruction; Information; and 
International Relations. The ministry's Secretariat, a body 
established in the 1980s and which maintains the central 
archives, is thought to still be responsible for overseeing the 
aforementioned directorates. In addition to the personnel who 
may be stationed abroad, the ministry also maintains delega- 
tions in each provincial capital that work closely with the local 
PCC in helping to carry out the charges of the sundry director- 
ates and departments. 

Special Troops 

The Special Troops (Tropas Especiales) are considered the 
elite of Cuba's security forces. Under the nominal authority of 
the first vice minister of the Ministry of Interior, they are 
thought to receive their orders directly from Fidel Castro. 
Established in the mid-1960s, the Special Troops consist of two 
battalions made up of an estimated 1,200 highly trained and 
politically reliable personnel. Despite the economic crisis of 
the 1990s, the Special Troops are considered to remain capable 
of executing selected military and internal security missions. 

The Special Troops' mission is to serve as a highly mobile 
shock force that can provide protection for high-ranking offi- 
cials, conduct special military operations, and help support 



337 



Cuba: A Country Study 



other special security requirements that the leadership might 
have. During the 1980s, several foreign advisers, all of whom 
were from Vietnam, were brought in to aid with the Special 
Troops' training, especially in survival techniques; in turn the 
Special Troops are also known to have provided training to 
selected foreign forces. Roughly comparable to the United 
States Green Berets or the spetznaz of the former Soviet Union, 
the Special Troops are trained to operate as commando-style 
units. Most members of the force are both parachute- and 
scuba-qualified and trained in the martial arts for hand-to-hand 
combat. In terms of their publicly known operations, members 
of the Special Troops were the surreptitious "advance" forces 
sent by Fidel Castro to Angola in 1975, whose arrival there 
prior to Angolan independence preceded the formal begin- 
ning of Cuba's military involvement in that African conflict. 
Few details are available with respect to the deployment of 
these forces throughout the island. Most personnel belonging 
to the Special Troops are believed to be stationed in or near 
Havana, although at least one unit was reportedly stationed 
near the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo. 

Border Guard Troops 

The Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guardafronteras — TGF) 
are under the authority of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate 
of Border Guards, an entity that falls under the jurisdiction of 
the first vice minister. In 1999 the TGF had an estimated 6,500 
personnel, as compared with an estimated 3,500 in the late 
1980s. The TGF was originally established under the Ministry 
of Interior in March 1963 as the Department of Coastal and 
Port Vigilance. During the counterrevolutionary campaign of 
the 1960s known as the "fight against bandits," the members of 
this force engaged in the maritime-oriented "fight against 
pirates." Their principal mission remains coastal surveillance. 
Correspondingly, they are charged with helping ensure the 
security of the country's borders, both in preventing unautho- 
rized incursions into Cuban territory and in preventing unau- 
thorized departures by Cubans attempting to leave the island. 
Although responsible primarily for patrolling Cuba's inland 
waterways, shores, and coastal waters, their members would be 
the first line of defense against any external invading force. Up 
until the significant weakening of Cuba's naval forces during 
the 1990s, it was expected that the TGF's forces would fall 
under the operational command of the MGR during a national 



338 



A Soviet-built Cuban Foxtrot-class patrol submarine, August 1, 1986 
Neiu Cuban patrol boats at the Boqueron port facility, August 1992 
Courtesy National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Washington 



339 



Cuba: A Country Study 



security crisis. According to a 1996 report, the TGF is thought 
to have at least one antisubmarine unit. The TGF is equipped 
with twenty Soviet-era Zhuk patrol craft as well as various fast 
launches and utility boats. TGF forces also regularly use motor- 
cycles for helping patrol the shoreline as well as canines for 
tracking. 

At the time of the 1994 balsero crisis, the TGF was widely con- 
demned for its role in the sinking of the tugboat 13 de marzo, 
which was carrying Cubans seeking to leave the island illegally. 
As a result of the TGF's ramming and fire-hosing of the vessel, 
forty-one of the boat's seventy-two passengers drowned, deaths 
that included women and twenty-three children. Because of 
the international outcry that the incident provoked, the leader- 
ship instructed the TGF to no longer use force in preventing 
such departures. 

During the late 1990s, by contrast, no reports emerged that 
cited significant brutality on the part of the TGF. Rather, in 
helping Cuba comply with the terms of the May 1995 immigra- 
tion accord signed with the United States, members of the TGF 
are routinely in contact with their counterparts in the United 
States Coast Guard. Their main role is to cooperate in the repa- 
triation of Cuban emigres who are intercepted at sea by United 
States Coast Guard personnel. 

National Revolutionary Police 

The National Revolutionary Police (Policia Nacional Revolu- 
cionaria — PNR) fall under the authority of the Vice Ministry of 
Internal Order. As Cuba's primary uniformed law enforcement 
body, they are responsible for handling routine criminal and 
law enforcement matters and are also occasionally called on by 
other security forces to help with what are deemed to be politi- 
cal matters. The force was established on January 5, 1959, only 
days after the victory of the Revolution, and in the mid-1980s 
numbered 10,000. It is unclear how the size of the force may 
have been affected by the economic crisis of the 1990s. 

The regime's increased concern over the growing crime 
problem on the island prompted greater attention to the PNR's 
professional development during the late 1990s. As a result, the 
PNR received improved training, was assigned new French Cit- 
roen cruisers to replace the old Soviet-era Ladas, and also was 
provided new, more modern communications equipment. Dur- 
ing this period, the presence of the uniformed PNR officers on 
the street was also increased, especially with respect to the 



340 



National Security 



patrols, often accompanied by canines, assigned to areas fre- 
quented by foreign tourists. According to Cuban officials, the 
increases in security-related government expenditures in 1999 
were largely attributable to the attention dedicated to beefing 
up the country's police forces. 

During the late 1990s, numerous reports by human rights 
groups also stated that PNR officers routinely assisted the non- 
uniformed personnel of the DSE in matters related to the activ- 
ities of Cuban dissidents. On occasion, political detainees have 
been taken to PNR precinct stations, where they have been 
held briefly before being released or transferred to other facili- 
ties associated with the DSE. The PNR's forces have also been 
criticized for failing to act to break up the so-called spontane- 
ous demonstrations that often erupted outside the home of dis- 
sidents and others considered to be antagonistic toward the 
regime, such as members of the small yet vocal independent 
press. The participants in these demonstrations, which are 
known as acts of repudiation (actos de repudio), are usually mem- 
bers of the officially sanctioned Rapid Response Brigades 
(Brigadas de Respuesta Rapida — BRR) or of the local CDRs. 
The BRR, composed of civilian volunteers, were initially orga- 
nized in mid-1991 to deal with possible problems that could 
develop in relation to Cuba's hosting of the Pan-American 
Games in the midst of the then new economic crisis (see 
Human Rights and Political Prisoners, this ch.). 

In addition, to assist the regular police in their increased 
responsibilities in light of Cuba's tourism boom of the 1990s, a 
new black-bereted force known as the Special Brigade (Brigada 
Especial) was created in 1998. The main role of the Special Bri- 
gade has been preventive, often in helping identify and arrest 
the hustlers and pimps who prey on foreign tourists. The force 
members have also worked closely with the PNR in coordinat- 
ing the neighborhood-based, anticrime groups under the Uni- 
fied Prevention and Vigilance System (Sistema Unificado de 
Prevencion y Vigilancia — SUPV). The SUPV was conceived 
during the early 1990s and placed under the PNR's supervision 
as part of the effort to stem the surge in economic-related 
crime that accompanied the onset of the crisis and at the same 
time improve vigilance in relation to "antisocial" behavior. 

Intelligence Directorate 

The key organization responsible for Cuba's foreign intelli- 
gence is the Intelligence Directorate (Direccion de Inteligen- 



341 



Cuba: A Country Study 



cia). Before its name was changed in 1989, this body was long 
known as the General Intelligence Directorate (Direccion 
General de Inteligencia — DGI). Prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the DGI was closely aligned with and organized 
along the lines of the former Soviet Union's KGB, from which 
it also received training. During the Soviet era, foreign intelli- 
gence gained by either organization was occasionally shared. 

The United States and the resident Cuban exile community 
in this country have been the two principal foci of the Intelli- 
gence Directorate's collection and analytical efforts. The col- 
lection activities include the infiltration of exile organizations, 
an effort that is relatively easy given the common language and 
culture and the large numbers of exiles resident in the United 
States. Following the February 1996 downing of two aircraft 
piloted by members of the exile organization Brothers to the 
Rescue, it became known that one of the group's pilots who did 
not fly that day, Juan Pablo Roque, had infiltrated the organiza- 
tion on behalf of the Cuban government. Shortly after the air- 
craft were shot down, Roque disappeared from his home in 
Florida and resurfaced in Havana. Other United States-based 
groups and paramilitary organizations reportedly targeted by 
the Intelligence Directorate include the Democracy Move- 
ment, the Alpha 66, the Democratic National Unity Party 
(Partido de Unidad Nacional Democratico — PUND), and even 
the Latin American Chamber of Commerce. 

Cuban intelligence operatives are believed to have been 
somewhat less successful in other United States penetration 
efforts. On various occasions, members of the Cuban Interests 
Section in Washington, D.C., have been identified as intelli- 
gence agents, declared persona non grata, and sent home. In 
September 1998, an extensive effort to penetrate the United 
States government was revealed, when ten Cubans residing in 
Florida were arrested for espionage. Related to these arrests, in 
December 1998, three Cuban diplomats from Cuba's United 
Nations mission were ordered to leave the United States 
because of their ties to the ten individuals. The Miami spy ring 
was the largest single group of Cubans charged with spying by 
the United States since the Castro government came to power. 
According to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the ten arrested were tasked with spying on military 
installations in Florida, including the Boca Chica Naval Air Sta- 
tion, the United States Southern Command, and MacDill Air 
Force Base. 



342 



National Security 



With respect to the Intelligence Directorate's interests, this 
shift to military targets was deemed by some observers to 
reflect a new Cuban intelligence concern, namely its interest in 
regaining access to the kind of strategic information on the 
United States military that had once been provided by the 
Soviet Union. However, the directorate is also active elsewhere 
in the world, where its operatives are often tasked to collect 
intelligence related to investments in the island or other busi- 
ness-related endeavors. Still, even beyond North America, the 
Cubans have demonstrated a continuing interest in military- 
related targets, as was suggested by the revelation in early 1999 
that the directorate had infiltrated Spanish military intelli- 
gence. At the time, Intelligence Directorate agents were 
thought to be seeking details regarding Spain's participation in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as 
information pertaining to investments in Cuba's tourism indus- 
try. Spain's capital, Madrid, is believed to serve as the "home 
base" for the directorate's agents assigned to Europe. 

By the end of the 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate 
appeared to be stepping up its overseas activities, apparently 
having recovered from the shake-up in 1989, when, as occurred 
in the other bureaucratic entities under the Ministry of Inte- 
rior's authority, a large number of the directorate's long-time 
personnel were fired or retired, and were replaced with mili- 
tary personnel. This extensive changeover in personnel was 
believed to have negatively affected Cuban intelligence during 
most of the 1990s, given that scores of operatives with many 
years of experience were peremptorily dismissed. During the 
mid-1990s, in an effort to recoup its capabilities, the director- 
ate was reported to have asked some of these career intelli- 
gence officers to return to active service. The directorate 
remained dominated by military personnel, however. 

In the late 1990s, the Intelligence Directorate reportedly 
had six divisions, or bureaus, which were divided into two cate- 
gories of roughly equal size, consisting of operational divisions 
and support divisions. The operational divisions include the 
Political-Economic Intelligence Division, which is subdivided 
into regional sections, including a separate one for North 
America; the Military Intelligence Division, and the External 
Counterintelligence Division, which is tasked with penetrating 
foreign intelligence services and the surveillance of exiles. The 
support divisions include the Technical Division, the Informa- 
tion Division, and the Preparation Division. The first is respon- 



343 



Cuba: A Country Study 

sible for the production of false documents, maintenance of 
the communications systems that support clandestine opera- 
tions, and the development of clandestine message capabilities. 
The Ministry of Interior's Intelligence Directorate maintains a 
radio listening and transmitting post on the island that is used 
primarily to maintain contact with its operatives abroad. The 
information and preparation divisions assist in matters related 
to intelligence analysis. During the 1970s and 1980s, the opera- 
tives of the America Department (Departamento America — 
DA), an entity formally under the PCC's jurisdiction, worked 
closely with the DGI (as the Intelligence Directorate was then 
known) in managing covert activities and support for national 
liberation movements throughout the world. 

Crime and Punishment 

General Crime Trends 

By the end of the 1990s, the growing national crime problem 
had become a focal point for the regime. During the early 
1990s, economic crimes — often committed by average citizens 
trying to resolver, or make do, during the most difficult years of 
the crisis — became the focus of official attention. By the end of 
the 1990s, however, the types of crimes being committed, as 
well as those committing them, had changed, prompting 
heightened concerns. These concerns stemmed from what was 
recognized as a sudden, alarming increase in violent crime, 
including armed robbery and murder, that occurred in 1998. 
In late 1998, a special section in one of the nation's leading 
weekly newspapers, Juventud Rebelde, identified crime as "one of 
the great new challenges" facing the regime and said that it 
even was emerging as a threat to the socialist system. In a major 
speech made in January 1999 to the country's National Revolu- 
tionary Police (PNR) , Fidel Castro called for urgent measures 
to preserve law and order. These measures included changes to 
the country's Penal Code, with the addition of new crimes as 
well as increasing sentences for a number of offenses. 

Throughout most of the Revolution, Cuba has traditionally 
had low rates of violence and juvenile delinquency, and has 
been counted among the nations in Latin America that could 
boast of having "safe streets." During the 1990s, however, this 
situation appeared to be changing. Many Cuban citizens 
responded to the increasing incidence of crime by installing 
bars on the windows and balconies of their homes in order to 



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keep intruders out; others reportedly turned to attack dogs 
and alarm systems. The government maintains that the 
increase in crime is "temporary" and blames it on the difficul- 
ties caused by the longstanding United States embargo. The 
cause, however, is generally acknowledged to be linked with the 
long economic crisis, the dollarization of the economy, and the 
many changes associated with the growth of the tourism indus- 
try on the island during the 1990s. Apart from the incidence of 
violent crime, the general trends in crime reflected a rise in all 
kinds of theft during the late 1990s, whether break-ins, car 
theft, or livestock theft. Lastly, the theft, usually by employees, 
of goods and manufacturing materials from state-run indus- 
tries for sale in dollars on the black market remained a prob- 
lem that interfered with the government's efforts to achieve 
greater productivity. 

In addition to theft, prostitution has increased since the 
legalization of dollars in 1992 and the growth of the tourism 
industry on the island during the decade, as Cubans have 
turned to this profession as a way to earn hard currency. 
Although prostitution itself is not recognized as a criminal 
offense, it is viewed as morally reprehensible, and Cuban 
authorities have instituted periodic campaigns against it. Those 
who profit from prostitution, whether pimps or those who rent 
rooms used by the prostitutes, are subject to prosecution and 
several years' imprisonment. During the 1998 campaign, police 
patrols in areas frequented by foreigners, such as Varadero 
Beach and the Cuban Keys, were stepped up in efforts to dis- 
courage the prostitutes' open solicitation of tourists; yet some 
reports indicated that the prostitutes were often able to bribe 
the officers to look the other way. 

The government has been anxious to keep the increase in 
crime from negatively affecting the tourism industry, one of 
the primary sources of the nation's hard currency earnings. 
(One of the incidents that may have contributed to the sud- 
denly heightened official concern in late 1998 was the fatal 
shooting of two Italian tourists during a robbery.) As a result, 
the government has attempted to increase police training, 
patrols, and manpower, and to put other resources at the dis- 
posal of the police (see National Revolutionary Police, this 
ch.). In this last regard, a special new police force, the afore- 
mentioned Special Brigade, was created in 1998 to deter crime 
in tourist areas. Cuban authorities have also called on the pop- 
ulation for assistance in the anticrime campaign. At the Fifth 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

Congress of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 
(CDRs) in September 1998, CDR members — whose political 
fervor was generally thought to have diminished as the daily 
difficulties of economic life increased in the 1990s — were 
assigned a new role in helping improve anticriminal vigilance 
in their neighborhoods. As part of this vigilance program, 
which is coordinated by the PNR, joint patrols by neighbor- 
hood residents and police were increased in Cuba's urban 
areas. 

Drug Trafficking and Narcotics-Related Problems 

During the late 1990s, the issue of drug trafficking became a 
heightened concern for Cuban officials. During this period, 
the island had become an important transshipment point for 
illicit drugs destined for sale either in Europe or, most often, 
the United States. With increasing frequency, Cuba was being 
used for airdrops of South American-produced drugs, usually 
cocaine, bundles of which were then retrieved and carried by 
fast launches to the United States. Cuba's ability to prevent the 
traffickers' operations is limited by its own strategic inability to 
fully monitor national airspace, particularly the skies over cen- 
tral Cuba, the air corridor most often favored by the traffickers. 
Similarly, severe resource shortages have hampered the ability 
of the Ministry of Interior's Border Guard Troops, which are 
assigned to patrol the island's coastal waters, to interdict ship- 
ments, and to apprehend traffickers at sea. 

Cuban authorities appear to have had mixed success in their 
interdiction efforts. By the end of 1999, the use of Cuban air- 
space by traffickers was believed to be on the decline, the rea- 
son for which may have been their relatively easier access to the 
skies over the neighboring island of Hispaniola. Still, Cuban 
officials reported that in 1999 they seized two tons of cocaine 
that had washed up on the country's north shore. This cocaine, 
part of failed airdrops at sea, was intended to be picked up by 
the small speedboats, known colloquially as "go-fasts," that 
ferry the drugs to the United States. Some analysts maintain 
that the unconfiscated drugs that have washed ashore have 
been the source of the island's nascent domestic drug problem. 
Cuban authorities also have achieved some success in appre- 
hending individuals who tried to smuggle drugs through one 
of the island's eleven international airports. Foreigners appre- 
hended for attempted drug smuggling have included Cana- 
dian, Jamaican, and British nationals, among others. During 



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1998 alone, a Ministry of Interior report stated that arrests and 
seizures had doubled over the previous year. Cuban authorities 
arrested 1,216 individuals for possession and trafficking and 
seized a total of 106 kilos of cocaine and eighty kilos of mari- 
juana. 

Despite Cuba's efforts, a notable drug seizure made in 
Colombia in December 1998 suggested a possible new aspect to 
the island's strategic role in the international narcotics trade. 
That seizure was of 7.2 tons of cocaine found packed in ship- 
ping containers aboard a vessel bound for Cuba that had an 
ultimate destination in Spain. It raised the possibility that the 
maritime transit of containerized cargo was a new tactic in traf- 
ficking via Cuba because, as one police official observed, it was 
unlikely that so large a shipment would have been sent along 
an untested route. Following the broad negative publicity that 
the incident generated, President Fidel Castro announced in 
January 1999 that international traffickers apprehended and 
convicted by Cuban authorities would be subject to the death 
penalty. 

Within the Cuban government, the Ministry of Interior and 
the Ministry of Justice are the two principal entities charged 
with antinarcotics responsibilities. As a reflection of Cuba's 
concern over what is perceived as a growing problem, the min- 
ister of justice, Roberto Diaz Sotolongo, also served as the head 
of the country's National Drug Commission (Comision Nacio- 
nal de Drogas) . Within the Ministry of Interior, the National 
Antidrug Division, which in 1999 was led by Colonel Oliverio 
Montalvo, is responsible for coordinating the antinarcotics 
efforts of its personnel, which include the police, the Border 
Guard Troops, and Customs authorities. Also, in recognition of 
this relatively new national problem and its extension well 
beyond national borders, Cuba has signed pacts with twenty- 
five foreign governments in an effort to combat international 
narcotics trafficking and the associated money laundering that 
often accompanies it. Included are pacts with Spain, Britain, 
and even Colombia. Training assistance provided by European 
governments includes helping the Cubans improve their inves- 
tigative and ship-searching techniques as well as their airport 
control measures. 

Cuban officials have also sought to increase cooperation on 
antinarcotics issues with the United States, in particular with 
the United States Coast Guard. These have included efforts to 
establish and maintain routine communications and contacts 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



between the Coast Guard and their counterparts in the Border 
Guard Troops, particularly among lower-ranking officials and 
on a "case-by-case" basis (see Border Guard Troops, this ch.). In 
one of the most notable cases involving successful cooperation 
between Cuba and the United States to deter drug trafficking, 
the United States informed the Cuban government in late 1996 
of a suspicious disabled freighter, the Limerick, which had 
drifted into Cuban waters. The Cubans searched the vessel and 
found six tons of cocaine. Cuban officials later testified at the 
United States trial in which the traffickers were convicted. 

Despite official concern with narcotics trafficking, Cuban 
government authorities officially maintained that the domestic 
consumption of drugs had not become a broad social problem 
by the end of the 1990s, but they did acknowledge a trend 
toward growing use. It was also recognized that drug use had 
increased, in particular in areas frequented by foreign tourists, 
suggesting that the tourists themselves either were bringing 
illicit drugs to the island or were a target market for Cubans 
selling the drugs. 

The use of illegal drugs has been discouraged in Cuba since 
the very beginning of the Revolution, when under Order 6, 
which was issued by Fidel Castro while still a guerrilla in the 
Sierra Maestra, the use and consumption of marijuana was pro- 
hibited. Despite the paucity of statistical data on the subject, 
drug consumption within the Cuban population, especially by 
youth, is believed to have increased markedly during the late 
1990s. Frequently, unretrieved drug shipments that acciden- 
tally wash ashore are recovered by Cubans, who often choose to 
sell the drugs and may save some for their own use. The 
Cubans have favored a community-based, educational 
approach in addressing this potential problem, as spelled out 
in their Integrated Drug Prevention Plan. According to a fine 
line drawn by the Penal Code, drug consumption itself is not a 
crime, but possession is. An individual with a record of illegal 
drug consumption or identified as exhibiting behavior that 
suggests drug use may be subject to "preventive detention." 

Despite the Cuban government's belief that the country is 
not a target market for such common illegal narcotics as 
cocaine, marijuana, or heroin, it does acknowledge that Cuba 
is one of the largest illegal markets in the hemisphere for the 
pharmaceutical tranquilizer known as meprobamate, which is 
medically prescribed to relieve anxiety, tension, and muscle 
spasms. In terms of the classification of illicit drugs, Cuba 



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adheres to the schedule elaborated by the U.N.'s Vienna Com- 
mission. The government officially supports international 
efforts to fight narcotics trafficking. For example, Cuba's minis- 
ter of justice represented Cuba at the mid-1998 U.N. Anti-Drug 
Summit in New York. 

Yet notwithstanding present efforts to build cooperation in 
this area, the issue of illicit narcotics remains a somewhat sensi- 
tive subject for the Cuban government, a number of whose offi- 
cials have in the past been accused of engaging in international 
drug trafficking. During the 1989 trial of Division General 
Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the key charges that government prose- 
cutors highlighted as having threatened the Revolution was the 
defendants' involvement and contacts with Carlos Lehder 
Rivas, the one-time head of Colombia's Medellm Cartel, with 
whom the defendants were said to have discussed collabora- 
tion. Some critics of the Castro government maintain that the 
regime's own concern over being exposed for participating in 
the international drug trade prompted it at that time to convict 
and "sacrifice" several of its leading security officers in order to 
save itself. 

Allegedly, Cuba's interest in facilitating international drug 
trafficking can be dated to the late 1970s, when the govern- 
ment first realized that it could gain by providing safe haven 
and other support for the major drug cartels and independent 
traffickers that operated in and around the Caribbean. In addi- 
tion, in supporting the introduction of illicit drugs into the 
United States, the regime enjoyed an insidious side benefit: the 
ability to "corrupt" the country from within by promoting drug 
use. Some of the money obtained was thought to have been 
used to finance revolutionary activities in Central and South 
America as well as to help support the sending of Cuban troops 
to Africa. According to one former Cuban intelligence officer, 
these operations were initially managed through what was 
known as Department "Z" of the Ministry of Interior's Special 
Troops Directorate. They were later transferred to Department 
"MC," which was under the Ministry of Interior's Vice Ministry 
of Information. (The initials "MC" are said to stand for moneda 
convertible (convertible currency), and the generation of 
moneda convertible was the main purpose of that department.) 

The heyday of Cuba's covert role in the international drug 
trade was presumably between 1979 and 1989. At this point, 
only six weeks before Ochoa's arrest in June 1989, it became 
known that two traffickers who were in the custody of United 



349 



Cuba: A Country Study 

States authorities in Miami were preparing to provide details 
on Cuba's role in narcotics trafficking and to testify against 
regime authorities for their involvement. Earlier, in November 
1982, four Cuban government officials, including Admiral 
Aldo Santamana Cuadrado, then the chief of the Revolution- 
ary Navy, were indicted by a United States grand jury for allow- 
ing Cuba to be used as a drug transshipment point by foreign 
traffickers. United States prosecutors' plans in 1993 to indict 
MINFAR chief Raul Castro along with several top Ministry of 
Interior officials for their role in facilitating the transit of 
Colombian cocaine to the United States market over a ten-year 
period were never carried out. Many of the critics who have 
cited the Cuban government's role in narcotics trafficking 
argue that the leadership continues to be deeply involved in 
trafficking and money laundering. Despite the successful lim- 
ited cooperation involved in the 1996 Limerick case and the fact 
that no Cuban authorities have ever been detained based on 
the indictments handed down, this alleged record of long-time 
involvement in international narcotics trafficking left some 
United States officials reluctant in the late 1990s to engage in 
more extensive cooperation with the Cubans in this area. As of 
the late 1990s, however, United States intelligence had never 
publicly revealed any evidence that high-level Cuban govern- 
ment officials are engaged in drug trafficking. 

The Problem of Illegal Emigration and Refugee Smuggling 

By the end of the 1990s, illegal emigration and alien smug- 
gling had become a growing problem for the regime. Given 
that Cubans are not free to leave the country without govern- 
ment-provided exit visas, illegal emigration has long plagued 
the regime, yet it has also provided a political "relief valve" in 
that those most dissatisfied with their situation on the island 
have left. Nevertheless, the incidence of alien smuggling — in 
which professional smugglers are paid to help Cubans surrepti- 
tiously leave the country — is a relatively new and growing phe- 
nomenon. By 1999 United States authorities believed that the 
majority of the Cubans arriving illegally had been brought in 
by smugglers. This developing problem was in part spurred by 
the terms of the 1995 immigration accord, which provides that 
most Cuban refugees who make it to United States soil are not 
turned away from this country but that those intercepted at sea 
by the United States Coast Guard are picked up and repatri- 
ated to Cuba. This accord reflected a change in United States 



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policy inasmuch as for decades the United States had wel- 
comed all Cubans. In turn, under the accords, the Cuban 
regime agreed that it would attempt to stem the uncontrolled 
flow of Cubans illegally departing the island, as had occurred 
on various occasions in the past. Two such incidents were the 
Mariel Boatlift of 1980, in which 125,000 Cubans left the island, 
and the 1994 balsero crisis, when 30,000 Cubans attempted to 
leave the island on rafts. 

Since 1994, thousands of Cubans have attempted to leave 
the island, often on their own, setting off on makeshift rafts or 
other unseaworthy vessels. During good weather, the number 
of Cubans attempting to make the trip across the shark-infested 
Straits of Florida to United States soil generally increases. From 
January to July 1999 alone, the United States Coast Guard 
reported that it had apprehended at sea 1,039 Cubans, who — 
with the Coast Guard working in coordination with Cuba's Bor- 
der Guard Troops — were returned to the island. This figure 
reflects a significant increase over prior years, given that from 
May 1995 to July 1999, a total of 2,195 Cubans were reported to 
have been intercepted at sea and repatriated. By contrast, the 
United States Border Patrol, which assumes jurisdiction once 
the Cubans reach United States soil, reported that between 
October 1998 and July 1999, 1,943 Cubans had made it to Flor- 
ida, thus enabling them to seek permanent resident status in 
the United States. Based on the physical condition of those 
arriving and the absence of vessels or other likely means of 
transport, the Border Patrol estimated that 80 percent had 
been ferried to the United States by smugglers. The number of 
those who have perished at sea in attempting to make the 145- 
kilometer trip to the shores of Florida, however, is unknown 
and perhaps incalculable. In one of the more noted cases to 
come to public attention in the late 1990s, a six-year-old boy, 
Elian Gonzalez, was found clinging to a tire's inner tube and 
rescued by fishermen in November 1999; he was the sole survi- 
vor of a raft sinking in which his mother perished. 

There is little debate that the 1994 balsero crisis, which came 
as Cuba's economic decline was near its worst, so raised con- 
cerns on the part of both the United States and Cuban govern- 
ments that it paved the way for the new agreement on 
immigration. Yet the unintended consequence appears to have 
been that the agreement, which also set up a lottery system for 
the granting to Cubans of only 20,000 United States visas annu- 
ally, raised the stakes for leaving the island to the point that 



351 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Cubans became more willing to pay a smuggler for assistance. 
In most cases, the smugglers are paid by the Cubans' relatives 
who reside in the United States and wish to help their family 
members join them. Occasionally, Cubans are not transported 
directly from the island, but must first travel to the Bahamas 
where they are picked up by the smugglers whose networks 
operate from there. During the late 1990s, the professional 
smugglers' fees reportedly ranged from a low of US$1,000 to as 
much as US$8,000 or US$10,000 per person; they often make 
their trips using fast boats that can outrun the United States 
Coast Guard's vessels. According to one estimate, a single boat- 
load that might carry two dozen Cubans could bring the smug- 
glers more than US$200,000 per trip. 

Alien smuggling stands as a criminal offense in both the 
United States and Cuba. Although smugglers apprehended by 
United States authorities have long been subject to prosecu- 
tion, not until the late 1990s did Cuba begin instituting laws 
that were specifically targeted against the smuggling of its citi- 
zens. According to United States regulations aimed at deter- 
ring these smugglers' activities, the United States Coast Guard 
requires that boats up to 45.5 meters in length obtain a United 
States permit to travel to Cuba from a Florida port. If it is 
found that a boat intercepted by the Coast Guard has made a 
trip without permission, the Coast Guard can seize the vessel 
and subject those aboard to prosecution. For those convicted 
of smuggling by United States courts, sentences might range 
from five to ten years' imprisonment. 

In early 1999, in light of this growing problem, Cuba 
announced its intent to crack down on those involved in smug- 
gling. In a widely publicized anticrime speech to the PNR in 
January, Fidel Castro urged that smugglers who are appre- 
hended and convicted be "at least" imprisoned for life ( cadena 
perpetua) (see Penal System, this ch.). In July 1999, in a more 
direct attempt to deter Cubans from leaving, Decree-Law 194 
also established a 500 to 10,000 peso fine (payable in hard cur- 
rency for foreigners) for those who buy, transport, or repair 
vessels without first gaining official approval. Despite Cuba's 
efforts to crack down on this crime, alien smuggling remains 
very lucrative; its continuation suggests the smugglers may 
deem their possible apprehension and prosecution by Cuban 
authorities to be unlikely and worth the risk. As of July 1999, 
Cuba was holding thirty United States residents arrested for 



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alien smuggling, twenty-six of whom it had offered to send 
back to the United States for trial. 

Human Rights and Political Prisoners 

Cuba is widely recognized as being among the nations of the 
world whose governments have a poor human rights record. 
This general assessment is offered by entities as diverse as the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United 
States Department of State, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and Freedom House. The Cuban leadership 
does not accept this assessment; rather, it maintains that any 
definition of "human rights" should consider a government's 
efforts to provide for such basic needs of its citizens as food, 
health care, and education. In this respect, the regime deems it 
has fared well. Notwithstanding this view of its own perfor- 
mance, Cuban authorities routinely interfere with the citizens' 
exercise of political and civil rights to the extent that Canada 
and member states of the EU have sought to use their diplo- 
matic and economic ties, most often in vain, to sway the regime 
toward improving its human rights record. 

The nature of Cuba's political system, which follows a totali- 
tarian model according to which the PCC remains the sole 
legal political party, appears at the core of the issue. Unlike the 
situation in many countries identified as having poor human 
rights records, the incidence of politically related "disappear- 
ances" of individuals has not been reported as problematic in 
Cuba. However, since almost the beginning of the Revolution, 
the government has not tolerated active opposition, albeit non- 
violent, by any who challenge its leadership and political pro- 
gram. In recognizing such activity as counterrevolutionary, the 
leadership has developed a sophisticated system to deal with 
such opposition, often using the Ministry of Interior for sup- 
port. As a result, those recognized as challenging the regime 
have for decades been subject to harassment, loss of employ- 
ment, or even imprisonment, and many have sought exile in 
the United States or other countries, rather than continue to 
face oppressive political conditions (see Human Rights and 
Opposition Groups, ch. 4) . 

According to the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and 
National Reconcilation (Comite Cubano Pro Derechos 
Humanos y Reconciliacion Nacional — CCDRN), Cuban jails 
held 344 political prisoners in July 1999. This Cuba-based orga- 
nization — headed by Elizardo Sanchez, himself a former politi- 



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Cuba: A Country Study 

cal prisoner — is generally recognized by those abroad as being 
a reliable source of information about both the number of 
political prisoners and internal political conditions. Because 
the government refuses to release statistics relating to how 
many Cubans are imprisoned for political crimes, the CCDRN's 
estimates are based largely on information confirmed through 
interviews with the detainees' families. Reports by some human 
rights advocates in Cuba suggest that many of these detainees 
are young men who have been imprisoned for their refusal to 
carry out their obligatory military service. According to the 
CCDRN, the number of individuals arrested and imprisoned 
for political offenses began to increase after 1997. This trend 
continued through the balance of the decade, in contrast to 
the decline in arrests and detentions that occurred for several 
years in a row during the early years of the economic crisis. 

The watershed event that marked this minor shift in the 
regime's tolerance of political activism and dissent was the 
detention of four prominent citizens, leaders of what was 
known as the Internal Dissidents' Working Group (Grupo de 
Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna), in what became one of the 
most noted human rights-related cases of the 1990s. These 
individuals were arrested in mid-July 1997, only weeks after 
signing and circulating a document entitled "The Homeland Is 
for All" ("La Patria es de todos") just prior to the convening of 
the PCC's Fifth Congress in October 1997. This document 
offered an analysis of the Cuban economic crisis that discour- 
aged foreign investment, discussed the problem of human 
rights, and proposed reforms to the constitution that would 
end the PCC's monopoly on power. They were accused of incit- 
ing sedition and "other acts against the security of the state." 
Despite the international concern provoked by the detention 
of these four respected professionals and the request for their 
release by many foreign dignitaries, including Pope John Paul 
II, the regime ignored the pleas and held the four without trial 
for nearly two years. They were not formally charged with any 
crimes until September 1998, after they had spent more than a 
year in prison. In March 1999, they were finally tried behind 
closed doors, convicted, and given prison sentences ranging 
from three-and-one-half to five years. However, only one 
remained in prison as of early 2001. 

Individuals who have been considered by human rights 
groups to be political prisoners have occasionally been released 
in response to requests by foreign officials. The Cuban govern- 



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ment has done this as a means to generate goodwill and, in 
demonstrating its presumed responsiveness to foreign con- 
cerns, has used the occasional releases as a tactic to gain politi- 
cal advantages in its foreign relations. The largest group 
released during the 1990s consisted of approximately 300 
detainees, about half of whom were considered to be political 
prisoners, who were freed in response to the clemency appeal 
made by Pope John Paul II during his January 1998 visit to the 
island. According to human rights monitors, many of those 
released in response to the papal request were at or nearing 
the end of their sentences. Shortly thereafter, in late November 
1998, in response to a request made to Fidel Castro by the 
Spanish foreign minister, who had traveled to the island in 
preparation for King Juan Carlos' upcoming trip, two more 
prisoners were released. The men, one of whom had already 
served nearly half of his fourteen-year term, had been con- 
victed of disseminating "enemy propaganda." According to 
Cuban officials, they were pardoned for "humanitarian rea- 
sons," and released to foreign exile in Spain. Frequently, politi- 
cal prisoners who are released from detention before 
completion of their sentences are required to accept exile 
abroad as a condition for their release. 

These recent instances of the detention of dissidents and 
occasional prisoner releases in response to outsiders' requests 
also reflect the regime's methods during the decades preced- 
ing the 1990s. In 1979, for example, 3,600 political prisoners 
were released from detention as a result of negotiations 
between the Cuban and United States governments. Many of 
those released in 1979 remained on the island for a number of 
years because of migration-related problems that arose after 
the 1980 Mariel exodus. In mid-1984, twenty-seven political 
detainees, along with twenty-two United States citizens who 
were serving prison sentences in Cuba, were released and 
granted entry to this country following the intervention of the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson. In late 1984, under an immigration 
accord reached between Cuba and the United States, the 
United States agreed to accept during the following year up to 
20,000 Cuban emigres, a figure that included former political 
detainees still residing on the island. 

In dealing with its imprisoned dissidents, the Cuban govern- 
ment routinely seeks to obtain the prisoners' participation in 
reeducation and rehabilitation efforts as part of the terms of 
their confinement. Those convicted of politically related 



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Cuba: A Country Study 



offenses are required to perform wage labor and participate in 
other prison-sponsored activities. Frequently, however, political 
prisoners are known to refuse to join in, an act of disobedience 
that may be interpreted as a sign of continuing defiance. These 
prisoners, who usually also refuse to wear prison uniforms (as 
they maintain they are not common criminals) , are known as 
plantados (literally, the planted ones) . Human rights monitors 
report that plantados are often accorded the harshest treatment 
by prison officials. This treatment may include the denial of 
contact with visitors or fellow prisoners and of basic privileges 
and needs, such as medical treatment, or the restriction of 
already meager food rations. Further, depending on the situa- 
tion, political prisoners are reported to often be intentionally 
placed in cells with prisoners convicted of violent crimes or 
held for long periods in solitary confinement, or sealed cells 
(celdas tapiadas). A 1985 report issued by the American Associa- 
tion for the Advancement of Science noted that such tactics are 
generally recognized to be methods of physical and psychologi- 
cal torture. In May 1995, Cuba ratified the United Nations Con- 
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but by the end of the 
decade it had not yet established criminal penalties for acts of 
torture. 

Penal System 

The revisions in the Penal Code carried out during the 
1990s suggested the regime's intent to toughen its stance on 
crime and tighten political control by recognizing as criminal 
some offenses that could be deemed to be basically political in 
nature. These revisions stood in contrast to the trend evident 
during the preceding decade, when changes in the code car- 
ried out between roughly 1979 and 1988 deleted some acts pre- 
viously considered criminal and reduced the length of 
sentence for a number of common crimes. The revisions of the 
1990s appeared to be prompted by a variety of new pressures 
generated in relation to the economic crisis, including those 
associated with the dollarization of the economy, the legaliza- 
tion of foreign investment, and the growth of tourism. They 
may also be seen as the regime's response to security-related 
concerns spurred by the efforts of dissidents and the nascent 
independent press to expand and deepen their contacts with 
foreign sympathizers, especially those in the United States. 



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As a result, during the latter half of the 1990s, a number of 
existing code provisions were being enforced more vigorously 
while new provisions were established in what the regime rec- 
ognized an the ongoing effort to "adequately respond to the 
present situation." Specifically, in early 1999, three new crimes 
were recognized and incorporated in the code. They were the 
crimes of money laundering ( lavado de dinero) , of trafficking in 
humans ( trdfico de personas) , and of the sale and trafficking of 
minors (ventay trdfico de menores). Crimes in Cuba are broadly 
categorized as either felonies or misdemeanors, for which any- 
one aged sixteen or above may be convicted. Felony crimes 
may carry either a potential sentence of greater than one year's 
imprisonment or a fine above a threshold of 300 cuotas, a vari- 
able unit that is loosely linked with the Cuban peso. Misde- 
meanor crimes carry either a potential sentence of less than 
one year or a fine under or at the 300- cuota threshold. Crimes 
categorized as felony offenses consist of murder, rape, and rob- 
bery. Other crimes, including assault, death or injury by vehi- 
cle, burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, arson, and drug trafficking, 
may variously be classified as felonies or misdemeanors 
depending on the severity of the offense. 

According to the Penal Code, acts that are recognized to be 
offenses against socialist organization are also subject to crimi- 
nal prosecution. These crimes have become the focus of 
heightened state scrutiny during the 1990s, especially in light 
of the exigencies related to the economic crisis. They include 
the misuse of employment in a state enterprise for illegal per- 
sonal gain ( malversation) , obtaining money or property illegally 
channeled from a state economic venture ( receptacion) , trading 
in foreign currency (trdfico de divisas), slaughter and distribu- 
tion of livestock outside the socialist distribution system ( sacrifi- 
cio He gal) , and attempting to leave the country without 
complying with formal emigration requirements ( salida ilegal) . 

Of the existing code provisions that were more vigorously 
enforced during the late 1990s, many were targeted against 
individuals who were deemed hostile to the regime. Among 
these offenses are included contempt for authority (desacato), 
dangerousness (peligrosidad) , defamation, resisting authority, 
association to commit criminal acts ( asociacion para delinquir) , 
and a vaguely defined, catch-all category of other acts against 
state security ( otros actos contra la seguridad del estado) . 

Under some of these provisions, it was recognized that the 
commission of what might normally be considered a criminal 



357 



Cuba: A Country Study 

act was not necessarily a prerequisite for arrest. The offense of 
dangerousness, for example, is recognized under the code as 
the "special inclination of a person to commit crimes, demon- 
strated by his conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist 
norms." Thus, as defined, the code allows for arrests to be 
made on a preventive basis. According to critics of the current 
human rights situation on the island, such arrests — which may 
call for up to several years' imprisonment if an individual is 
convicted — have reportedly resulted in the detention of thou- 
sands of Cubans. Lastly, the new Law for the Protection of the 
National Independence and Economy of Cuba, enacted in Feb- 
ruary 1999 and sometimes referred to simply as Law 88, 
appeared specifically directed against dissidents and indepen- 
dent journalists. Law 88 identifies a broad range of activities as 
undermining state security, with sanctions of up to twenty years' 
imprisonment established for contacts or collaboration with 
the United States or other foreign media aimed at destabilizing 
the country or destroying the socialist state. 

According to Cuba's Law of Penal Procedures, once an 
arrest is made police are required to file formal charges within 
the next ninety-six hours and to provide those detained with 
access to a lawyer within seven days. Between the arrest and the 
filing of formal charges, in what is known as the preparatory 
phase {fase preparatoria) , the police, possibly in conjunction 
with the government prosecutor {fiscal) , gather the witnesses 
and evidence considered necessary to demonstrate that a 
crime has been committed. Police and other security officers 
are permitted to exercise their discretion in stopping, detain- 
ing, and interrogating probable offenders, who during such a 
period are often not provided access to counsel. The individu- 
als detained may then be released without charges. According 
to the Law of Penal Procedures, those suspected of having com- 
mitted an offense may be held no more than twenty-four hours 
before their case must be submitted to an investigator. Human 
rights monitors report that such methods are frequently used 
to intimidate political dissidents. In addition, as occurred with 
the members of the aforementioned Working Group, individu- 
als may sometimes be held for long periods without formal 
charges being filed. 

According to the Cuban constitution, the state reserves the 
right to deny the civil rights of anyone who actively opposes the 
"decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." The state 
invokes this right to justify its detention of some individuals, 



358 



National Security 



even though doing so stands in violation of the penal proce- 
dures law. Once a determination is made that a crime has been 
committed, the prosecutor issues a bill of indictment (conclu- 
siones provisionales) that details the charges and circumstances 
surrounding the crime. The case is then sent to trial, with a 
copy of the criminal indictment being provided to the defense 
attorney, if one has been identified. Lawyer collectives ( bufetes 
colectivos), whose members charge fees set by the state, exist to 
provide the accused with legal counsel. All criminal cases are 
required to be adjudicated; no provisions exist for plea bar- 
gaining. Pretrial incarceration (prision provisional) is permitted 
for those charged with serious felony offenses, those charged 
with multiple crimes, or those who are deemed likely to flee 
prosecution. The determination regarding the need for such 
incarceration in relation to any specific case is made by the 
court of first instance. 

Penal Code 

The Penal Code delineates the range of sentences that 
might be handed down. They include probation, public chas- 
tisement (amonestacwn) , fines, correctional labor without con- 
finement, correctional labor with confinement to the worksite, 
incarceration, and execution. A conviction for first-degree 
murder, for example, might warrant a sentence in the range of 
fifteen to twenty years' imprisonment. The maximum prison 
term is twenty to thirty years. During the crackdown on crime 
initiated at the end of the 1990s, Cuban leader Fidel Castro 
called for harsher sentences for a number of other crimes, 
including drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and robbery; life 
sentences were also to be recommended for repeat offenders. 

Unlike many countries in the region, Cuba does carry out 
capital punishment, as it has since the beginning of the Revolu- 
tion. From the 1980s to the early 1990s, death sentences were 
not handed down as frequently as during the first twenty years 
of the Revolution. However, by the end of the 1990s, this trend 
appeared to be reversing. Under the Penal Code, the death 
penalty has traditionally been reserved for particularly heinous 
offenses, or exceptional cases ( casos excepcionales) , whether rep- 
resented by crimes against individuals or against state security. 
In 1999 the Penal Code recognized 112 different types of 
offenses for which capital punishment could potentially be 
applied, two-thirds of which involved crimes against state secu- 
rity. As a result of revisions in the Penal Code that became 



359 



Cuba: A Country Study 



effective in March 1999, the death penalty was established as a 
possible punishment for convictions of drug-trafficking, cor- 
ruption of minors, and armed robbery. The mode of execution 
in Cuba is by firing squad. Persons either under twenty years of 
age or pregnant at the time of the crime or at sentencing can- 
not be condemned to death. Cuban law stipulates that all death 
sentences are automatically appealed to the Supreme Court 
and subject to review by the Council of State, which has the 
authority to commute the sentences to life imprisonment. 
Although on occasion executions have been carried out within 
weeks after a judgment is rendered, the appeal and review pro- 
cess can sometimes continue for months. 

It is believed that eleven individuals were executed in Cuba 
between 1989 and the end of 1997. Included in this group were 
the four MINFAR and Ministry of Interior officers who were 
put to death in 1989. A trend toward more frequent applica- 
tion of the death penalty was apparent during the final years of 
the 1990s. Based on data released by Amnesty International, 
although no executions were carried out during 1997, "at least" 
five individuals were executed during 1998. Then, during 1999 
alone, "at least" thirteen Cubans were executed, and nine oth- 
ers were under sentence. Among the individuals sentenced to 
death in 1999 were two Cubans convicted for the murder of 
four foreign tourists. In addition, two Salvadoran nationals, 
tried in entirely separate cases, were convicted of terrorism and 
sentenced to death for a string of hotel bombings carried out 
in 1997, in one of which a foreign tourist was killed. According 
to the prosecutors, both Salvadorans were acting on behalf of 
anti-Castro exiles in an effort to sabotage Cuba's tourism indus- 
try. As of the close of 1999, the sentences had not been carried 
out. 

Penal Institutions 

Cuba's prison system falls under the authority of the Ministry 
of Interior's Directorate of Penitentiary Establishments. In 
1998 there were 294 prisons and correctional work camps 
located throughout the island. These prisons included forty 
maximum security facilities, thirty minimum security prisons, 
and more than 200 work camps or farms (granjas) where those 
convicted of less serious offenses might complete their sen- 
tences. Of the prisons, nineteen were reported to be "closed," 
meaning that the detainees are not allowed contact with outsid- 
ers. In addition to these facilities, police stations, offices of the 



360 



National Security 



Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security, and even 
the headquarters of the Ministry of Interior at Villa Marista are 
often used as prisons. The Ministry of Interior supervises the 
administration of these various places of confinement, and pro- 
vides guards, work camp and farm overseers, and other staff for 
the facilities. 

Cuba in the late 1990s was believed to have one of the high- 
est per capita confinement ratios in all of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. In 1996 one estimate placed the island's prison 
population at between 100,000 and 200,000 prisoners of all cat- 
egories. This number stood in marked contrast to a 1990 esti- 
mate that indicated a prison population of only 19,000. 
Although the Cuban government reportedly maintains a com- 
puterized database to keep track of its prison population, it 
does not release or allow any public access to statistics regard- 
ing it. In addition to those serving time for their convictions, 
large numbers of pretrial detainees are also held in the prisons, 
many of whom, according to human rights critics, may be con- 
fined six to nine months or longer before being brought to 
trial. Darker-skinned Cubans are reportedly overrepresented in 
Cuba's prisons. Separate penal establishments are maintained 
for women; delinquent youth under sixteen years of age might 
be sent to school-like facilities. Conjugal visits with spouses are 
formally permitted once every two months, yet might occur 
more or less frequently, based on a prisoner's conduct. 

In the late 1990s, the conditions for prisoners at many of the 
island's facilities were generally considered to be substandard, 
unhealthy, and not in compliance with the United Nations' 
Standard Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Prob- 
lems frequently noted by those knowledgeable of prison condi- 
tions included inadequate food, overcrowding, inadequate or 
denied medical attention, and forced participation in "re-edu- 
cation" programs for all detainees. In tacit recognition of these 
oft-cited problems, the Cuban government made some efforts 
during the late 1990s to improve the state of confinement. In 
May 1997, the Ministry of Interior promulgated several new 
regulations designed to achieve this end. Further revisions in 
the Penal Code in early 1999 explicitly prohibited the use of 
corporal punishment by guards and other security officials 
against detainees. However, the code set no penalties for violat- 
ing that provision. 



361 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Outlook 

The Cuban military in 2001 is a very different institution 
from what it was when the regime first came to power. At least 
three distinct generations have been through the institution 
since the Revolution, from the veterans of the guerrilla war to 
the young professional technicians of the present generation. 
Recognizing the different formative experiences of these indi- 
viduals is as important as considering how their varied back- 
grounds may relate to the effectiveness of political control. The 
officers who are now prepared to move into positions of leader- 
ship in the institution have spent their careers as military pro- 
fessionals. Their perspective on the future of the Cuban 
military institution is likely to be quite different from that of 
the guerrilla leaders who led the Revolution in the late 1950s. 
And the mechanisms necessary to ensure their continuing sub- 
ordination to political authority may be quite different as well. 

* * * 

The study of the Cuban military and national security is seri- 
ously hampered by the lack of publicly available information. 
The Cuban government rarely makes public any details regard- 
ing the status of its security forces and related security con- 
cerns; rather, it tends to view efforts to obtain and relate such 
information, whether by private Cuban or foreign citizens, as 
inimical to the interests of the Revolution. Consequently, of the 
information garnered, most is gathered by United States or for- 
eign government authorities and obtained in such a manner 
that leads it to be classified. Despite these difficulties, the care- 
ful monitoring of the press and other open-source documents 
and reports can often yield fragmentary details that help fill 
out the picture. Defectors are also an often valuable source, 
particularly when the details they provide help to corroborate 
other information. 

The PCC's official daily newspaper, Granma, is the single best 
source to consult. Within the United States, the Miami Herald 
and its Spanish-language counterpart, EINuevo Herald, have the 
most regular coverage of Cuban affairs, and offer the best 
chance for finding information related to Cuban military and 
security affairs. Digital versions of these newspapers can be 
found on the Internet (Miami Herald at http://www.her- 
ald.com; El Nuevo Herald at http://www.elherald.com). The 



362 



National Security 



Cuban Armed Forces Review (http://www.cubapolidata.com/ 
cafr/cafr.html) is a private website containing military-related 
details and photographs compiled from other public sources. 
Lastly, an excellent resource for general information is the 
Cuba Today e-mail list operated by political scientist Nelson 
Valdes at the University of New Mexico. This list tracks daily 
media coverage related to Cuba and often includes reporting 
on security-related concerns. 

Studies by academics also have contributed to an improved 
understanding of the FAR and its role in national life. Among 
the important authors of such studies are Domingo Amu- 
chastegui, Jorge I. Dommguez, Edward Gonzalez, and Jaime 
Suchlicki. Rafael Fermoselle's comprehensive study, The Evolu- 
tion of the Cuban Military, and the biographies of the officers 
provided in his Cuban Leadership after Castro should also be 
noted. The text, Cuban Communism, now in its ninth edition 
and whose primary editor throughout the years has been Irv- 
ing Louis Horowitz, has regularly included a section on the mil- 
itary composed of previously published articles. Lastly, 
mention must be made of the important 1996 volume that pro- 
files the prominent members of the FAR. Cuban journalist Luis 
Baez's Secretos de generales: Desclasificado, a collection of his inter- 
views with the officers, provides not only insights into the lives 
and career paths of the military's top officials but also the orga- 
nization of the institution. 

Unfortunately, finding information on the forces under the 
Ministry of Interior is even more difficult than locating infor- 
mation on the FAR. The little to be found is often based on 
defectors' recollections that date to the period preceding the 
economic crisis and the ministry's 1989 shake-up. Nevertheless, 
two good starting points to be noted are Jose Luis Llovio- 
Menendez's Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba 
and Juan Antonio Rodnguez-Menier's Inside the Cuban Interior 
Ministry. 

For information related to human rights, penal procedures, 
and prison conditions, the best sources are the annual human 
rights reports published by the United States Department of 
State and those of the widely recognized nongovernmental 
organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch. On the Internet, the daily reports by independent 
Cuban journalists available on the Website maintained by 
CubaNet (http:/ /www.cubanet.org) offer unusual perspectives 



363 




Cuba: A Country Study 

on the difficulties that life on the island may pose for those 
who fail to go along with the regime. 



364 



Appendix 



1 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

12 Demographic Trends in Cuba, Selected Years, 1950-2000 

13 Trends in Urban and Rural Population Change, Selected 

Years, 1970-95 

14 Enumerated Population Classified by Race, Selected Years, 

1899-1981 

15 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Economic Activity, 

1989- 98 

16 Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade, 1989-98 

17 Selected Categories of the State Budget, 1989-98 

18 Selected Indicators of Production: Agriculture, 1989, 

1993-97 

19 Selected Indicators of Production: Manufacturing, 1989, 

1993-98 

20 Tourism Industry Indicators, 1990-97 

21 Employed and Unemployed Economically Active Popula- 

tion, 1989-96 

22 State Civilian Employment, by Economic Sector, 1990-97 

23 Foreign Debt in Convertible Currency, 1993-98 

24 Balance of Payments, 1993-98 

25 Foreign Joint Ventures in Cuba, by Country of Origin, 1988, 

1990- 95 

26 Foreign Joint Ventures in Cuba, by Economic Sector, 1988, 

1990-95 

27 Voters in National Assembly Elections, 1993 

28 Percentage of Null and Blank Votes Cast in Elections, 1993, 

1997, and 2000 

29 Major Army Equipment, 1999 

30 Major Air Force Equipment, 1999 

31 Major Naval Equipment, 1999 



365 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 




0.39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m?) 2 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 3 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 




And add 32 





Cuba uses the metric system, but old Spanish units are also used. 

2 For area measurement, one Cuban cabalkria equals 13.4 hectares or 33.16 acres. 

3 Sugar is often measured in Spanish tons of 2,271 pounds, and there is a Cuban quintal of 101.4 pounds made up of 
four arrobas. 



367 



Cuba: A Country Study 



"I 



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73 bp 



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ffi (N it) « 6 ffi 
m to to to j> 



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kfl O OS 00 I> 



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368 



Appendix 



Table 3. Trends in Urban and Rural Population Change, Selected 
Years, 1970-95 



Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 



Population size (in thousands) 

TOTAL 8,520 9,306 9,710 10,102 10,598 11,041 

Urban 5,122 5,962 6,605 7,237 7,927 8,560 

Rural 3,398 3,343 3,105 2,865 2,671 2,481 

Percent urban 60 64 68 72 75 78 

Quinquennial growth rates (in percent) 1 

TOTAL n.a. 2 1.8 .85 .79 .96 .82 

Urban n.a. 3.03 2.05 1.83 1.82 1.54 

Rural n.a. -.32 -1.48 -1.61 -1.40 -1.48 



Rates refer to the quinquennium preceding the reference period. 
2 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Centra Latinoamericano de Demografla, "America 
Latina: Proyecciones de poblacion urbana-rural," Boletin Demogrdfico [Santi- 
ago, Chile], 28, 1995, 31, 35. 



Table 4. Enumerated Population Classified by Race, Selected Years, 

1899-1981 
(in percentages) 



Census Year White Black Mulatto or Mestizo Asian 



1899 66.9 14.9 17.2 1.0 

1907 69.7 13.4 16.3 0.6 

1919 72.3 11.2 16.0 0.5 

1931 72.1 11.0 16.2 0.7 

1943 74.3 9.7 15.6 0.4 

1953 72.8 12.4 14.5 0.3 

1981 66.0 12.0 21.9 0.1 



Source: Based on information from Cuban censuses provided by Sergio Diaz-Briquets. 



369 



Cuba: A Country Study 





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370 



Appendix 



Table 6. Cuban Foreign Merchandise Trade, 1989-98 
(in millions of pesos) 



Year 


Exports 


Imports 


Turnover 


Balance 


1989 


5,399.9 


8,139.8 


13,539.7 


-2,739.9 


1990 . . . . 


5,414.9 


7,416.5 


12,831.4 


-2,001.6 


1991 


2,979.5 


4,233.8 


7,213.3 


-1,254.3 


1992 


1,779.4 


2,314.9 


4,094.3 


-535.5 


1993 


1,156.7 


2,008.2 


3,164.9 


-851.5 


1994 


1,330.8 


2,016.8 


3,347.6 


-686.0 


1995 


1,491.6 


2,882.5 


4,374.1 


-1,390.9 


1996 


1,865.5 


3,569.0 


5,434.5 


-1,703.5 


1997 


1,819.1 


3,996.0 


5,815.1 


-2,176.9 


1998 


1,443.7 


4,181.2 


5,624.9 


-2,737.5 



Source: Based on information from Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic Report, 1994, 
Havana, August 1995, 11; Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario estadistico, 

1997, Havana, 1999, 119; and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Cuba en cifras, 

1998, Havana, 1999, 38. 



371 



Cuba: A Country Study 



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Appendix 



Table 18. Percentage of Null and Blank Votes Cast in Elections, 1993, 

1997, and 2000 



1993 National 1997 Municipal 2000 Municipal 
Elections Elections Elections 



Pinar del Rio 6.6 8.3 6.7 

Ciudad de La Habana 14.7 9.9 7.9 

LaHabana 12.6 11.2 8.8 

Matanzas 7.0 8.5 6.6 

Cienfuegos 5.0 7.9 6.4 

Villa Clara 6.9 8.0 7.1 

Sancti Spfritus 4.0 6.3 4.9 

Ciego de Avila 4.3 5.3 4.4 

Camagiiey 5.0 6.2 4.8 

Las Tunas 1.9 4.4 4.0 

Holgum 4.5 6.2 5.3 

Granma 1.4 4.0 3.4 

Santiago de Cuba 2.7 4.4 3.5 

Guantanamo 2.0 3.9 3.4 

Isla de la Juventud 5.9 5.9 5.3 

Countrywide 7.0 7.2 5.9 



Source: Based on information computed by Jorge I. Dommguez from Granma 
[Havana], March 11, 1993, and April 25, 2000. 



385 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Table 1 9. Major Army Equipment, 1 999 1 



Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 
Medium battle tanks 

T-34, T-54/-55, T-62 Soviet Union 1 ,500 (including 400 T-34, 

600 T-54/-55, 400 T-62) 

Light tanks 

PT-76 n.a.^ A relatively small number. 

Reconnaissance 

BRDM-1/-2 n.a. 250 

Armored infantry fighting vehicle 

BMP-1 n.a. 400 

Armored personnel carrier 

BTR-40/-50/-60/-152 n.a. 700 

Towed artillery n.a. 700 

76mm ZIS-3 

122mm M-1938, D-30 

130mm M-46 

152mm M-l 937, D-l 

Self-propelled artillery n.a. 40 

122mm 2S1 

152mm 2S3 

Multiple rocket launcher n.a. 300 

122mm BM-21 

140mm BM-14 

Mortars n.a. 1,000 

82mm M-41/-43 

120mm M-38/-43 

Static defense artillery n.a. n.a. 

122mmJS-2 heavy tank 

85mm T-34 

Antitank guided weapon n.a. n.a. 

AT-1 Snapper 

AT-3 Sagger 

Artillery guns n.a. n.a. 

85mm D-44 

100mm SU-100 self- 
propelled, T-l 2 100 SU-100 

Air defense guns n.a. 400 ZU-23, 36 ZSU-23-4 

23mm ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 

self-propelled 

30mm M-53 (twin)/BTR-60P 

self-propelled 100 

37mm M-l 939 300 



386 



Appendix 



Table 19. ( Continued) Major Army Equipment, 1 999 1 

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 

57mm S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 self- 
propelled 200 S-60, 25 ZSU-57-2 

85mmKS-12 100 

100mm KS-1 9 75 

Surface-to-air missile n.a. n.a. 

SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13/-14/-16 

1 Most equipment in storage and not available on short notice. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999-2000, London, 1999, 
228-29; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 
[Bonn], 24, No. 1,2000, 51. 



387 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Table 20. Major Air Force Equipment, 1 999 1 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin In Inventory 



Air Force 

Fighter ground attack (two squadrons) 

MiG-23 BN Soviet Union 

Fighters 2 (four squadrons) 

MiG—21F Soviet Union 

MiG-21bis Soviet Union 

MiG— 23MF Soviet Union 

MiG-29 Soviet Union 

Attack helicopters 

Mi-8 and Mi-17 Soviet Union 

Mi-24 Soviet Union 

Mi-25 Soviet Union 

Antisubmarine warfare 

Mi-14 helicopters Soviet Union 

Transport (four squadrons) 

An-2 Soviet Union 

An-24 Soviet Union 

An-26 Soviet Union 

An-30 Soviet Union 

An-32 Soviet Union 

Yak-40 Soviet Union 

11-76 (Air Force aircraft in civilian 

markings) Soviet Union 

Helicopters 

Mi-8/-l 7 Soviet Union 

Training 

L-39C Albatros Soviet Union 

MiG—15 Soviet Union 

MiG-21U Soviet Union 

MiG-23U Soviet Union 

MiG-29UB Soviet Union 

Z-326 Soviet Union 

Missiles 

Antisubmarine missiles AS-7 Soviet Union 

Antiaircraft missiles AA-2, AA-7, AA-8, 

AA-10, AA-1 1 Soviet Union 

Surface-to-air missiles Active SA-2, SA-3 

sites Soviet Union 

Civil Airline 

Aircraft used as troop transports 

11-62 Soviet Union 



1 

15 
1 
2 
4 

2 

40 

25 
30 
8 
4 
2 
20 



13 



10 



388 




Table 20. (Continued) Major Air Force Equipment, 1999 



Type and Description 


Country of Origin 


In Inventory 


Tu-154 


Soviet Union 


7 


Yak-42 


Soviet Union 


12 


An-30 


Soviet Union 


1 



Most aircraft are in storage for lack of spare parts and as a cost-saving measure. 

2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that probably only about three MiG- 29, ten MiG-23, 
and five MiG-21bis are in operation. 

3 n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1999-2000, London, 1999, 
229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 
[Bonn], 24, No. 1, 2000, 51. 



389 



Cuba: A Country Study 



Table 21. Major Naval Equipment, 1999 1 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin In Inventory 



Navy 

Submarines 

Foxtrot with 533mm and 406mm torpedo 

tube (nonoperational) Soviet Union 1 

Frigates 

-Koni-class with two antisubmarine warfare 

rocket launchers (nonoperational) Soviet Union 2 

Patrol and coastal combatants missile craft 

Osa I/II with four SSN-2 Styx surface-to- 
surface missiles Soviet Union 4 

Pauk II fast patrol craft with two anti- 
submarine warfare rocket launchers and 

four anti-submarine torpedo tubes Soviet Union 1 

Mine countermeasures 

Sonya coastal minesweeper Soviet Union 2 

Yevgenya inshore minesweeper Soviet Union 4 

Support and miscellaneous intelligence collection 

vessel n.a. 2 1 

survey n.a. 1 

Naval Infantry 
Artillery 

122mm M-1931/37 n.a. n.a. 

130mm M-46 n.a. n.a. 

152mm M-1937 n.a. n.a. 

Surface-to-surface missiles 

SS-C-3 systems n.a. n.a. 

Mobile Bandera IV n.a. n.a. 

Naval Aviation 

Ka-28s Soviet Union 4 

Mi-4s Soviet Union 4 

MiG-29 Soviet Union 6 

1 The Cuban Navy is no longer an operational force. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance. 1999-2000, London, 1999, 
229; and "The 1999-2000 World Defence Almanac," Military Technology 
[Bonn], 24, No. 1,2000, 50. 



390 



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Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institu- 
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Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, and June S. Belkin. Cuba in Africa. Pitts- 
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Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed. Cuba after the Cold War. Pittsburgh: 
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424 



Glossary 



acopio — Compulsory system of state agricultural procurement 
established in 1962. Nonstate agricultural producers are 
required to sell a certain percentage of their output to the 
state at fixed prices. Fulfillment of these quotas is a condi- 
tion for private farmers to continue to receive access to 
agricultural services, fertilizer, and other inputs from the 
state. Output in excess of acopio quotas is used by nonstate 
producers for self-consumption, for barter or black market 
sales, or for sale in government-authorized markets (which 
were allowed during the period 1980-86 and again since 
1993). 

agros — Short for agromercados, or agricultural markets. A net- 
work of farm-produce markets opened across the island in 
1994. These markets allow vendors, rather than the state, 
to set prices for their products. The agros have helped to 
ease chronic food shortages. 

Association of Caribbean States — An association of twenty-five 
Caribbean Basin countries formed in 1994 under the 
sponsorship of the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (Caricom — q.v.) for the purpose of promoting 
regional integration, economic cooperation, and a com- 
mon approach to regional political problems. In addition 
to the fifteen members of Caricom, it includes Belize, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela. Its 
creation was seen largely as a reaction to the North Ameri- 
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico, although its far smaller mar- 
ket raised doubts about its viability. 

audiencia — A high court of justice, exercising some administra- 
tive and executive functions in the colonial period. 

balance of payments — An annual statistical summary of the 
monetary value of all economic transactions between one 
country and the rest of the world, including goods, ser- 
vices, income on investments, and other financial matters, 
such as credits or loans. 

black market — Illegal activities related to trade in goods, ser- 
vices, and currencies. 

Bourbon Reforms — Throughout the eighteenth century, the 



425 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Bourbons reorganized the government structure, the eco- 
nomic system, and church-state relations in Latin America. 
The reforms introduced centralized government, in which 
ministries and a Council of State replaced the council sys- 
tem. 

cabildo — Presided over by the governor or his lieutenant and 
composed of alcaldes (judges), regidores (councilmen), and 
other minor officials, the cabildo was the political, judicial, 
and administrative unit of each new settlement. It imposed 
local taxes, provided for local police, and maintained pub- 
lic buildings, jails, and roads. 

capital-intensive — A high ratio of capital to labor and other 
resources used in the production process. 

Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) — The 
successor to the British West Indies Federation that was 
formed in 1958 and ended in 1962, Caricom officially 
came into effect on August 1, 1973, and by mid-1995 had 
fourteen member states. From its inception, Caricom has 
focused on promoting economic integration and foreign 
policy coordination among the independent member 
states. 

Casa de Contratacion (House of Trade) — A colonial-era institu- 
tion located in Seville, Spain, and devoted to finance, taxa- 
tion, and maritime operations between Spain and 
America. 

caudillista — Dictatorial. Derived from the term caudillo (q.v.). 

caudillo — A Spanish or Latin American dictator. An adaptation 
of an Arab word meaning leader. 

central bank — Usually a government institution that is 
entrusted with control of the commercial banking system 
and with the issuance of the currency. Responsible for set- 
ting the level of credit and money supply in an economy 
and serving as the banker of last resort for other banks. 
Also has a major impact on interest rates. 

centrally planned economy — An economy where crucial eco- 
nomic processes are determined not by market forces but 
by an economic planning board. In a planned economy 
such as Cuba's, production and consumption goals are set 
largely in specific quantities, without regard to factors such 
as profitability and efficiency; production successes sup- 
posedly reflect the superiority of socialism, and therefore 
have high ideological and political values; and much 
importance is placed on achieving high output targets 



426 



Glossary 



within a short deadline. 
Comecon (CMEA) — See Council for Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance. 

consumer durables — Consumer items used for several years, 
such as automobiles, appliances, or furniture. 

Contadora Support Group — A diplomatic initiative launched 
by a January 1983 meeting on Contadora Island off the 
Pacific coast of Panama, by which the "Core Four" media- 
tor countries of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Pan- 
ama sought to prevent through negotiations a regional 
conflagration among the Central American states of Gua- 
temala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
The governments of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay 
formed the Contadora Support Group in 1985 in an effort 
to revitalize the faltering talks. 

convertible currency — Currencies that are freely exchanged in 
international markets and are generally acceptable as a 
medium of payment in international transactions. Exam- 
ples of convertible currencies are the United States dollar, 
the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, and the 
French franc. Currencies of the socialist countries (includ- 
ing the peso — q.v.) were not convertible. Because their 
currencies were not convertible, transactions among the 
socialist countries relied heavily on commodity bartering. 

convertible peso — The official term for a new currency intro- 
duced in 1995. It denotes a kind of money that has no 
value outside of Cuba, but which circulates on the island as 
a parallel hard currency alongside the domestic peso. The 
value of the convertible peso is fixed at one per United 
States dollar. 

Cortes — The Spanish parliament to which Cuba was allowed to 
send representatives beginning in 1820. After the Ten 
Years' War (1868-78), Cubans were again represented in 
the Cortes, although with a very restrictive franchise. 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Come- 
con) — An intergovernmental council headquartered in 
Moscow and established on January 25, 1949, to promote 
the development of socialist countries and to further eco- 
nomic cooperation among member countries. Member- 
ship included the centrally planned economies of Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania), the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's 
Republic, Vietnam, and Cuba. Cuba joined Comecon in 



427 



Cuba: A Country Study 

1972. The organization was abolished on January 1, 1991. 

Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) — Sponsored by Congressman 
Robert G. Torricelli (D-New Jersey) . Signed into law on 
October 23, 1992, reversing the 1975 decision to allow 
third-country companies owned or controlled by United 
States firms to engage in licensed trade with Cuba. An 
exception allowed special licenses to be granted for the 
sale of medicines or medical equipment by these firms or 
their parent companies. 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Bur- 
ton) — Enacted on March 12, 1996, mandates full enforce- 
ment of criminal penalties for those who knowingly violate 
the embargo, enables claimants on properties expropri- 
ated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, to 
sue for compensation in United States Federal Court those 
international investors employing those properties for 
their profit, mandates the denial of United States visas to 
executives of business firms trafficking with Cuba, and pre- 
scribes United States policy during post-Castro transition. 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC; more commonly known in Latin America as the 
Comision Economica para la America Latina y el Caribe — 
CEPAL) — A United Nations regional economic commis- 
sion established on February 25, 1948, as the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In 1984 ECLA 
expanded its operations and title to include the Carib- 
bean. Main functions are to initiate and coordinate poli- 
cies aimed at promoting economic development. In 
addition to the countries of Latin America and the Carib- 
bean, ECLAC's forty-one members include Britain, Can- 
ada, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United States. There are an additional five Caribbean asso- 
ciate members. 

encomenderos — Colonial grantees, usually large landowners, who 
were given rights over Native American labor and tribute 
in exchange for assuming responsibility to protect and 
Christianize these indigenous subjects. 

encomienda — A system or legal arrangement that entailed 
assigning Indian families or other inhabitants of a town to 
a Spaniard, who would extract labor and tribute from 
them while providing for their Christianization. The grant- 
ing of an encomienda did not carry with it title to the land 
on which the Indians lived and labored or ownership of 



428 



Glossary 



the Indians. The crown took the position that the natives 
were "free" subjects, although they could be compelled to 
pay tribute and to work like other such subjects. Many 
encomenderos (q.v.), however, interested only in exploiting 
the resources of the island, disregarded their moral, reli- 
gious, and legal obligations to the Indians, as did others 
elsewhere in the New World. 

Enlightenment — An eighteenth-century European philosophi- 
cal movement influenced by the seventeenth-century Sci- 
entific Revolution and the ideas of John Locke and Issac 
Newton. Its basic belief was the superiority of reason as a 
guide to all knowledge and human concerns. From this 
flowed the idea of progress and a challenging of tradi- 
tional Christianity. 

European Commission (EC) — The twenty-member executive 
body of the European Union (q.v.) responsible for imple- 
menting and managing EU policies and the EU's annual 
budget, among other responsibilities. 

European Parliament — The directly elected (since 1979) 
assembly of the European Union (q.v.), with limited legis- 
lative and juridical competence. It has the right of scrutiny 
and supervision of EC executives and participates in the 
legislative and budgetary processes, advising the EC and 
reviewing all legislative proposals. 

European Union (EU) — Successor organization to the Euro- 
pean Community, the EU was officially established on 
November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union 
went into effect. The goal of the EU is a closer economic 
union of its member states and the European Monetary 
Union, a greater unity in matters of justice and domestic 
affairs, and the development of a common foreign and 
security policy. To the members of the EC, the EU added 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, effective January 1, 1995. 

fiscal year (FY) — Coincides with Cuban calendar year. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — A 123- 
member international organization created on October 
30, 1947, to provide a continuing basis for nations to nego- 
tiate and regulate commercial policies and promote inter- 
national trade on a nondiscriminatory basis. Its principal 
activity is multinational negotiation for tariff reductions. 
Its seventh and final round of negotiations, held on April 
15, 1994, was the Uruguay Round (q.v.), which had the 
aim of liberalizing the world market and promoting intel- 



429 



Cuba: A Country Study 

lectual property. GATT was subsumed by the World Trade 
Organization (q.v.) on January 1, 1995. 

global social product (GSP) — The broadest measure of an 
economy's output under the Material Product System 
(q.v.). The GSP accumulates the value of goods and "mate- 
rial" services produced by the economy in a given time 
frame, typically a year. The GSP differs from the gross 
domestic product (q.v.) in two main respects. First, the 
GSP tends to inflate value because it is based on gross 
value. For example, GSP includes the value of output of a 
furniture factory as well as the value of wood and other 
inputs that were used to produce the furniture. Thus, the 
GSP is subject to double-counting because the cost of 
inputs is not deducted from final output at each stage of 
the production process. Second, whereas the GDP 
includes nonproductive services, the GSP does not. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The most commonly used 
broad measure of an economy's output under the System 
of National Accounts (q.v). The GDP aggregates the value 
added at each stage of the production process for goods 
and services and therefore avoids double counting. In the 
1990s, Cuba reported economic performance on the basis 
of GDP growth rates, while earlier it did so on the basis of 
global social product (q.v.) growth rates. 

gross national product (GNP) — Total market value of all final 
goods (those sold to the final user) and services produced 
by an economy during a year, plus the value of any net 
changes in inventories. Measured by adding the gross 
domestic product (GDP — q.v), net changes in inventories, 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is the 
value of GNP when inflation has been taken into account. 

Group of Eight — A permanent mechanism for consultation 
and political coordination that succeeded the Contadora 
Support Group in December 1986. It consisted of Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. It advocated democracy and a negotiated 
solution to the Central American insurgencies. Its name 
was changed in 1990 to the Rio Group (q.v). 

Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77) — Established on June 15, 
1964, by seventy-seven developing countries that signed 
the "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries" 
issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations 



430 



Glossary 

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
Geneva. Although the membership of the G-77 has 
increased to 133 countries, the original name has been 
retained because of its historic significance. As the largest 
developing-world coalition in the UN, the G-77 provides 
the means for the developing world to articulate and pro- 
mote its collective economic interests and enhance its 
joint negotiating capacity on all major international eco- 
nomic issues in the UN system and promote economic and 
technical cooperation among developing countries. 
Helms-Burton Act — See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidar- 
ity Act. 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 — See 
Rio Treaty. 

internationalism — Starting in 1959, Cuba actively engaged in 
dispatching overseas missions involving support for insur- 
gencies, combat troops, or members of construction and 
medical brigades to support developing countries in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America for diplomatic, military, 
political, ideological, or other reasons. In the 1990s, Cuba 
continued to send nonmilitary internationalists abroad. In 
May 1998, Cuba had 2,759 internationalist technical work- 
ers, professionals, and specialists in eighty-six countries. 

latifundio — A large landed estate. A legacy of the Spanish 
Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, latifundia pro- 
vided the foundation for the small upper class and huge 
peasant class in the New World colonies. 

Latin American Economic System (Sistema Economico Lati- 
noamericano — SELA) — A regional intergovernmental 
organization, headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, that 
groups twenty-seven Latin American and Caribbean coun- 
tries. SELA was established on October 17, 1975, by the 
Panama Convention, and currently consists of the follow- 
ing member countries: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Domin- 
ican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. SELA provides a consultation 
and coordination system for consensus on joint positions 
and common strategies for the Latin American and Carib- 
bean regions on economic issues vis-a-vis countries, groups 
of countries, and international organizations. 



431 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) — A regional 
group founded by the Montevideo Treaty of 1960 to 
increase trade and foster development. LAFTA was 
replaced in 1980 by the Latin American Integration Associ- 
ation (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion — 
ALADI — q.u). 

Latin American Integration Association (Asociacion Lati- 
noamericana de Integracion — ALADI) — An organization 
that was established by the Treaty of Montevideo (August 
1980) and became operational in March 1981. ALADI 
replaced the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA — q.v.), which had been established in 1960 with 
the aim of developing a common market in Latin America. 
LAFTA made little progress, and ALADI was created with a 
more flexible and more limited role of encouraging free 
trade but with no timetable for the institution of a com- 
mon market. Members approved the Regional Tariff Pref- 
erence Program in 1984 and expanded upon it in 1987 
and 1990. ALADI seeks economic cooperation among its 
eleven members — Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom- 
bia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene- 
zuela. 

liberation theology — An activist movement led by Roman Cath- 
olic clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II 
(1965), when some church procedures were liberalized, 
and the Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellin, 
Colombia (1968), which endorsed greater direct efforts to 
improve the lot of the poor. 

Material Product System (MPS) — A national income account- 
ing methodology used by the centrally planned econo- 
mies. Cuba adopted the MPS in the early 1960s and used it 
through about 1992 to produce national product statistics. 
The MPS covers the value of output of goods and of so- 
called material services, which include freight transport, 
communications, and trade. In Cuban statistics, the MPS 
indicator most commonly available is the global social 
product {q.v.). 

mestizaje — According to this ideology, the fusion of various cul- 
tural traditions (including language, religion, food, music, 
and so forth) in the Americas created a new and better 
mestizo race. This idea gained strength after the Mexican 
Revolution, and Jose Vasconcelos popularized it in his 
1925 essay "La raza cosmica" (The Cosmic Race). Also 



432 



Glossary 

refers to a process of racial amalgamation. 

microbrigade — Started in 1971, microbrigades consist of "vol- 
untary" workers from a given workplace — such as factories, 
ministries, commerce, education — who labor full time, 
typically in construction projects, while the rest of the 
workers at the original workplace cover the tasks aban- 
doned by their comrades. These efforts are supplemented 
on weekends, when all workers can join in "voluntary 
work" in order to increase the pace of construction. 

Nonaligned Movement (NAM) — Established on September 1, 
1961, in Belgrade, with the aim of promoting political and 
military cooperation apart from the traditional East and 
West blocs. By 1999 NAM included 112 members plus the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), nineteen 
observer nations and organizations, and twenty-one 
"guest" nations. NAM experienced considerable difficulty 
in establishing a unified policy on many issues in interna- 
tional affairs. With the end of the Cold War and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), neutralism lost much 
of its usefulness as a guiding principle in many nations' 
foreign relations. 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) — A multilat- 
eral agreement negotiated by the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico setting forth agreements to lower and/or 
eliminate unfair trade barriers that affect the trade of 
goods and services among the three countries. NAFTA 
entered into force on January 1, 1994. 

oficiales reales — The royal budget officers, of whom there were 
four in each Spanish colony. The oficiales reales worked very 
closely, discussing ways to increase royal revenue, with 
both the governor and the Casa de Contratacion (q.v.). 

Organization of American States (OAS) — Established by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States held 
in Bogota on April 30, 1948, and effective since December 
13, 1951. Has served as a major inter-American organiza- 
tion to promote regional peace and security as well as eco- 
nomic and social development in Latin America. 
Composed of thirty-five members, including most Latin 
American states and the United States and Canada. Deter- 
mines common political, defense, economic, and social 
policies and provides for coordination of various inter- 
American agencies. Responsible for implementing the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 



433 



Cuba: A Country Study 

Treaty — q.v.), when any threat to the security of the region 
arises. 

Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OCES) — A 
regional body founded on June 18, 1981, by the seven 
former members of the West Indies Association (WISA) , 
which had been created in 1966. Original members were 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Christo- 
pher and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grena- 
dines. The British Virgin Islands later became an associate 
member. Administered by a Central Secretariat located on 
the Morne, near Castries, St. Lucia, the OCES is designed 
to coordinate economic, foreign policy, and defense mat- 
ters among its members and to facilitate their relations 
with various international organizations. The OCES is an 
associate institution of the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market {q.v.). 

Ostend Manifesto — A confidential dispatch in October 1854 to 
the United States Department of State from United States 
ambassadors in Europe. It suggested that if Spain refused 
to sell Cuba to the United States, the United States would 
be justified in seizing the island. Northerners claimed it 
was a plot to expand slavery, and the Manifesto was dis- 
avowed. 

paladares (singular, paladar) — The popular name given to 
home restaurants that sprang up in Cuba as a result of the 
legislation legalizing self-employment. The name origi- 
nates from a chain of restaurants in a popular Brazilian 
soap opera shown on Cuban television in the late 1980s. 

peninsulares — A term widely used throughout the Spanish 
Empire to refer to individuals born in Spain who were 
residing, usually temporarily, in one of the overseas colo- 
nies. Peninsulares were usually associated with important 
officials in the colonial bureaucracy, the military, or the 
Roman Catholic Church. 

peso — The national currency, consisting of 100 centavos. 
Between 1914 and 1971, the peso was exchanged at parity 
with the United States dollar. Since the early 1960s, the 
peso has not been exchanged freely in the international 
market. The official exchange rate during the 1972-86 
period averaged 1.23 (in pesos per United States dollar) 
and since 1987 has been reported by the Cuban National 
Bank to be 1.00. Since the 1960s, there has been an active 
black market for dollars in Cuba, with the black-market 




434 



Glossary 



exchange rate fluctuating between six and fifteen pesos 
per United States dollar. In the 1990s, the value of the 
peso in the black market fell drastically. The unofficial 
exchange of the peso for the U.S. dollar has been esti- 
mated (in pesos per United States dollar) as follows: 1991, 
twenty; 1992, thirty-five; 1993, sixty; June 1994, 100; August 
1994, 150; December 1994, forty-five; July 1995, thirty; Sep- 
tember 1995, twenty-five; July 1996, twenty-one; December 
1996, twenty. In the late 1990s, the exchange rate in gov- 
ernment-operated Casas de Cambio was twenty to twenty- 
two pesos for one United States dollar. 
Piatt Amendment — In 1901, shortly after cessations of hostili- 
ties in the Spanish-American War, Washington Senator 
Orville Piatt introduced legislation allowing the United 
States to intervene whenever it wished in order to protect 
life and property and "assure Cuban independence." The 
amendment was included in the Cuban constitution of 
1901. On May 29, 1934, it was abrogated under the Treaty 
of Relations with Cuba, which continued to permit the 
United States to lease the site of its naval base at 
Guantanamo. 

Rio Group — A permanent mechanism for consultation and 
political coordination that succeeded the Group of Eight 
(q.v.), formerly the Contadora Support Group, in 1990. 
The Group of Eight's predecessors had been involved in 
Central American peacekeeping negotiations. In 1993 the 
Rio Group (or Group of Rio) had twelve members: Argen- 
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 

Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) — 
A regional alliance, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, that 
established a mutual security system to safeguard the West- 
ern Hemisphere from aggression from within or outside 
the zone. Signatories include the United States and twenty 
Latin American republics. In 1975 a special conference 
approved, over United States objections, a Protocol of 
Amendment to the Rio Treaty that, once ratified, would 
establish the principle of "ideological pluralism" and 
would simplify the rescinding of sanctions imposed on an 
aggressor party. 

santena — A syncretic cult, widely practiced in Cuba, in which 
Roman Catholic saints are equated with African deities. Its 
main practitioners are among the poorer strata of Cuban 



435 



Cuba: A Country Study 

society, both black and white, but practitioners even 
include some of the white middle class. 

special period in peacetime (periodo especial en tiempo de paz; 
hereafter Special Period) — A government euphemism for 
an emergency "wartime" economic program launched by 
President Castro in 1990 to deal with the onset of the eco- 
nomic crisis. The name reflects the Cuban leadership's 
view of the escalating recession as a kind of siege economy 
without outright war. The emphasis of Special Period poli- 
cies has been on austerity measures. 

sustainable development — A concept that emerged in the 
1990s, based on the premise that development must meet 
the need of the present generation without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 

System of National Accounts (SNA) — The national income 
accounting methodology used by all nations other than 
the centrally planned economies. The SNA covers the 
value of output of goods and services, including "nonmate- 
rial" services that are excluded under the Material Product 
System (q.v.), such as education, health services, culture 
and art, housing, government administration, and 
national defense. The most commonly available SNA indi- 
cator is the gross domestic product (q.v.). Cuba began to 
publish national product statistics based on the SNA in the 
1990s. 

tariff — A tax levied by a government in accordance with its tar- 
iff schedule, usually on imported products, but sometimes 
also on exported goods. May be imposed to protect 
domestic industries from competitive imported goods 
and/or to generate revenue. Types include ad valorem, 
variable, or some combination. 

terms of trade — The ratio of a country's index of average 
export prices and average import prices. In international 
economics, the concept of "terms of trade" plays an impor- 
tant role in evaluating exchange relationships between 
nations. The terms of trade shift whenever a country's 
exports will buy more or fewer imports. An improvement 
in the terms of trade occurs when export prices rise rela- 
tive to import prices. The terms of trade turn unfavorable 
in the event of a slump in export prices relative to import 
prices. 

Treaty of Tlatelolco — On being ratified by Cuba in April 1995, 
the treaty took effect, binding the thirty-three Latin Amer- 



436 



Glossary 

ican and Caribbean signatory nations to the peaceful use 
of nuclear power. Under the treaty, Latin America became 
the world's first region to prohibit nuclear weapons. The 
treaty covers all of Latin America, including the Carib- 
bean, from the Mexican border with the United States to 
Antarctica. It bans the testing, use, manufacture, produc- 
tion, or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Each participating 
country must negotiate accords with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate verification. 

underemployment — According to the dual-labor market 
hypothesis, there are many workers in the secondary labor 
market who either already possess skills that would enable 
them to function satisfactorily within the primary market 
or who could be trained for skilled jobs at no more than 
the usual costs. Given the obstacles to entering the pri- 
mary labor market, however, they are required to take up 
unskilled secondary-sector jobs and are in this sense 
underemployed. 

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) — 
Primary responsibility for the promotion of human rights 
under the UN Charter rests in the General Assembly and, 
under its authority, in the Economic and Social Council 
and its subsidiary body, the UNCHR, an intergovernmen- 
tal body that serves as the UN's central policy organ in the 
human rights field. The UNCHR annually establishes a 
working group to consider and make recommendations 
concerning alleged "gross violations" of human rights. The 
UNCHR and its subcommission meet annually in Geneva 
to consider a wide range of human rights issues. 

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — A thirty- 
six-member organization, established on November 22, 
1965, to provide technical assistance to stimulate eco- 
nomic and social development. 

United States-Cuba Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) — 
A United States-based organization that has collaborative 
relations with the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic 
of Cuba, Cuba's ministries of Foreign Trade, Foreign 
Investment and Economic Cooperation, Tourism, Public 
Health, Metallurgy Industry, and Foreign Relations, as well 
as with the National Assembly. 

Uruguay Round — Refers to multilateral trade negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (q.u) 
that began at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 



437 



Cuba: A Country Study 



and concluded in Geneva in December 1993 with an 
agreement signed by ministers in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 
April 1994. The Uruguay Round led to the World Trade 
Organization (q.u). 
World Trade Organization (WTO) — An international agency 
overseeing the rules of international trade of member 
countries. It was established on January 1, 1995, as a result 
of the Uruguay Round (q.v.) to replace the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (q.v.) dealing with trade in 
goods. The latter agreement is now part of the WTO 
agreements. The WTO has more than 130 members. 



438 



Index 



ABC, 42, 48 

abortion, 114, 129 

Abrantes Fernandez, Jose, 297, 336 

acidification (of soil), 104 

Acosta Cordero, Armando, 257 

acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 143 
Africa: Cuban military involvement in, 5, 

292-94, 295; withdrawal from, lvii 
Afro-Cuban religions, 131-32, 134-35, 

137, 262 
Afro-Cubans, 236 
age structure, 115-16 
agrarian reform, 46, 65-66, 68, 102-103, 

122, 182-83, 256 
agricultural development, 52, 100-101, 

102-103 

agricultural markets, 159, 160, 171-72, 
175, 206 

agriculture (see also cooperatives, agricul- 
tural), 67, 92, 103-105, 165, 169, 174- 
75, 180-85, 204-205 

air force. See Antiaircraft Defense and 
Revolutionary Air Force 

airports, 195 

Alarcon de Quesada, Ricardo, lxxii, 233, 

269, 270 
Aldana Escalante, Carlos, 247 
Allende Gossens, Salvador, 74 
Almeida Bosque, Juan, 236, 249, 251 
Almendares River, 98 
Angola: Cuban military involvement in, 

li, 75, 292-93 
Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary 

Air Force ( Defensa Antiaerea y 

Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria — DAA- 

FAR), 301, 310, 315, 319-20 
Antilla, 193 
Arawak, 6 

Archipielago de Camagiiey, 93 
Archipielago de los Canarreos, 93 
Archipielago de los Colorados, 93 
Archipielago de los Jardines de la Reina, 
93 

Archipielago de Sabana, 93 



Ariguanabo (lake), 98 
armed forces. See Revolutionary Armed 
Forces 

army. See Revolutionary Army 
artisan markets, 159, 160, 172, 206 
Association of Caribbean States, 277 
audiencia, 11, 12 

austerity measures, 79, 109, 150, 159, 168 
Authentic Organization, 59-60 
Authentic Party, 4, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 

60, 63 
autonomismo, 28 
Autonomous Liberal Party, 28 

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic 
Weapons Convention (1972), 307 

Bahia de Cabanas, 94, 321 

Bahia de Cienfuegos, 321 

Bahia de La Habana (Havana Bay), 94, 
109, 321 

Bahia del Mariel, 94, 321 

Bahia de Matanzas, 94, 321 

Bahia de Nipe, 94, 321 

Bahia de Nuevitas, 94, 321 

Bahia de Puerto Padre, 94 

Bahia de Santiago, 94 

Bahia Honda, 94 

Balaguer Cabrera, Jose Ramon, 264 

balance of payments, 215, 216-18 

Banco de los Jardines, 93 

banking system, 160, 177-78 

Baracoa, 10, 319 

Barnet y Vinageras, Jose, 50 

Basic Secondary Schools in the Country- 
side, 146-47 

Basic Units of Cooperative Production 
(Unidades Basicas de Produccion 
Cooperativa— UBPC) , 103, 128, 171, 
175, 180, 183, 185, 204, 206, 248 

Batabano, 107 

Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, xlvii, 4, 44, 
45-46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55-64, 65, 
125, 287-88, 307 

Bay of Pigs invasion, xlix, 1, lvi, 70, 71, 



439 



Cuba: A Country Study 



133, 290, 316 
Bayamo, 10 
Bayamo River, 98 
bays, 94, 193-95 
Berroa, 221 

biological weapons capability, lxxix-lxxx 
biotechnology industry, lxxx, 138, 143- 
44, 180 

birth rate, 91, 113-14, 120, 146, 150 
black market, 80, 159, 165, 167, 228, 248 
blacks, 16, 34, 38, 117, 118-19 
Bonsai, Phillip, 68 

Border Guard Troops (Tropas Guarda- 
fronteras— TGF) , 320, 338-40, 346, 
347-48, 351 

Bourbon reforms, 21 

Brooke, John, 33 

Brothers to the Rescue, lix, lxxiv, 278 
Buchanan, James, 20 
Buddhism, 136 

budget, government, 164-65, 168 
budget deficits, 164-65, 167, 168 
Bush, George, lvii 
Bush, George W., lxxix, lxxxi 

Cabanas, 321 
cabildo, 12 

Caffrey, Jefferson, 48, 49 
Camaguey, 112, 138, 195 
Camagiiey Province, 38, 94, 137, 240, 

316, 319, 321 
Canada: Cuban relations with, lxii, 277- 

78 

Carbo, Sergio, 42 
Cardenas, Lazaro, 50 
Caribbean Tourism Organization, 277 
Carter, Jimmy, 1, lxxx-lxxxi, lxxxii, 130 
Casas Regueiro, Julio, lxxiv, 301, 303, 
333 

cash crops, 183-84 

Castro Ruz, Fidel, xlvii, liii, liv, lxxi, lxxii, 
lxxviii, 5, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 78, 80, 
81, 86, 91, 94, 115, 122, 130, 133, 139, 
140, 141, 149-50, 162, 167, 202, 227, 
228, 229, 231, 235-36, 237, 238, 247- 
48, 249, 251, 252, 258, 268, 270, 272, 
279, 287-89, 299, 301, 302, 303, 305, 
306, 308, 329, 336, 337, 352 

Castro Ruz, Raul, lxxi, lxxii, 5, 60, 61, 68, 
69, 126, 167, 236, 238, 249, 251, 252, 



258, 264, 268, 270, 271, 288, 295, 301, 
302, 303, 306, 324, 329, 335, 336, 350 

Catholic Relief Services (Caritas), 150 

Cautillo (river), 98 

Cauto (river and basin), 97-98, 104-105 
Ceiba del Agua, 327 
censorship, 57 

census: in 1931, 118-19; in 1943, 118-19; 

in 1953, 118-19, 121, 144; in 1970, 

118, 201; in 1981, 117, 118-19, 120, 

200, 201 
census, agricultural, 103-104 
Center for American Studies (Centra de 

Estudios sobre America — CEA) , 263- 

65, 272 

Central America: Cuban involvement in, 
82 

Central Committee, 78, 235, 252-54, 

256, 258, 264, 271, 303-304 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 70, 

290 

centrally planned economy, 5, 66-67, 
79-80, 122, 159, 162-63, 179, 205 

Central Planning Board (Junta Central 
de Planificacion — Juceplan), 66, 179 

Cespedes, Carlos Manuel de, 43, 44-45, 
47, 48 

Cespedes y Quesada, Carlos Manuel de, 
25, 26 

Chamber of Deputies, 33 
Charles III, 14, 21 
Chavez Frias, Hugo, 139 
Chibas, Eduardo (Eddie), 48, 54, 55, 56, 
58, 67 

Children's Clubs, 127, 146 

China: Cuban relations with, lv, 72-74, 

82, 276, 335 
church-state relations, 66, 132-34, 136- 

38, 259-63 
Ciboney, 6, 7, 8 
Ciego de Avila, 195 

Ciego de Avila Province, 110, 120, 240, 
243 

Cienfuegos, 94, 193-95, 275, 291, 319, 
333 

Cienfuegos, Camilo, 61 
Cienfuegos Province, 94, 250, 316, 319, 
321 

cimarrones, 16 

Cintra Frias, Leopoldo, 303, 316 

citrus production, 104, 105, 180, 183-84 

Ciudad de La Habana Province, 120, 



440 



Index 



236, 240, 243, 244, 251, 315, 321 
civic-action programs, 50 
Civic-Military Institute, 50 
Civic Resistance Movement (Movimiento 

Civico Revolucionario — MCR) , 63 
civil defense, 311, 314-15 
civil liberties, 52, 134, 231, 245, 353 
civil-military relations, lxxii 
civil service, 36 
climate, 98-100 

Clinton, William Jefferson, lix, lxi, 276 
coffee production, 18, 19, 21, 121, 180, 

183-84 
Colas Sanchez, Silvano, 302 
collective farms, 103, 128 
Colome Ibarra, Abelardo, lxxii, 236, 251, 

252, 269, 271, 295, 297, 302, 304, 329, 

336 

colonial economy, 3, 12-14, 17-20 
colonial government, 10-12, 21-23 
colonial society, 3, 14-16, 21 
colonization, by Spain, xlvii, 9-16 
Columbus, Christopher, xlvii, 3, 6, 9 
Columbus, Diego, 9 

Commercial Treaty of Reciprocity 
(1903), 34 

Committee for the Defense of the Revo- 
lution (Comite de Defensa de la Rev- 
olucion— CDR), 79, 124, 125-26, 234, 
257, 258, 259, 289, 314, 345 

Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), 300 

communism, in Cuba, lxxxi, 5, 41-42, 
48, 50, 52, 58, 67, 70 

communism, international: collapse of, 
5, 85, 147, 162, 227, 245, 274, 279, 285 

Communist Party of Cuba (Partido 
Comunista de Cuba — PCC), lxvii, 41, 
43, 67, 76, 77-79, 123, 136, 137, 160, 
203, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235, 239, 
242, 243, 245-56, 257, 258, 259, 263, 
264, 265, 270, 271, 280, 301, 303 

Communist Revolutionary Union 
(Union Revolucionaria Comunista — 
URC), 52-53 

compulsory military service, 128-29, 
290, 322-25 

conquest, by Spain, 9-10 

Conservative Party, 40, 43 

constitution (1901), 33-34, 35, 43, 44, 
46-47 

constitution (1940), 52, 58 



constitution (1976), 101, 124, 134, 231 
constitution, revised (1992), 172, 230- 

31,306, 358-59 
constitution, socialist, 79 
constitutional convention, 33-34, 51 
constitutional development, 51-52, 101 
construction industry, 165, 204—205 
consumer goods, 164 
Contino, Juan, 257 
Contracting House, 13 
Contramestre River, 98 
cooperatives, agricultural, 102, 103, 128, 

160, 171, 180, 183, 257 
Cordillera de Guaniguanico, 97 
corruption, 35, 39, 49, 53, 55, 80 
Cortes, 22 

Cortes, Hernan, 9, 14 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA or Comecon), liv, 76-77, 85, 
104, 161, 180, 189, 207, 208, 209, 210, 
211,214 

Council of Ministers, lxxi, 168, 231, 235, 

237-38, 302, 305, 306, 336 
Council of State, lxxi, 5, 171, 178, 231, 

233, 234, 235-37, 238, 239, 297, 304, 

305, 306, 360 
counternarcotics, 346-50 
counterterrorism, lxxvi, lxxix 
coup d'etat: by Batista (1952), 4, 55-56 
Creoles, 12, 21, 22, 23-24, 25, 28 
crime, 154, 248, 344-53 
criollos. See Creoles 
Crowder, Enoch, 39 

Cuban-American community (in the 
United States), 1, lix, lxiv, lxvi, lxvii, 
lxviii, lxxi, 129, 130-31, 147, 152, 278- 
79, 280, 342 

Cuban Central Bank (Banco Central de 
Cuba— BCC), lxvii, 163, 216 

Cuban Democracy Act, lvii-lviii, lxviii, 
276, 277 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidar- 
ity Act. See Helms-Burton Act 

Cuban Missile Crisis, xlix, 71-73, 275, 
299 

Cuban National Bank (Banco Nacional 
de Cuba— BNC), 163, 175, 177, 178, 
216 

Cuban People's Party (Partido del 
Pueblo Cubano— PPC), Orthodox 
branch. See Orthodox Party 

Cuban Revolution (1959), lxxi, 64-86, 



441 



Cuba: A Country Study 



117, 118, 122, 129, 131, 133, 136, 140, 
148, 154, 159, 229, 301, 311, 344 
Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Cubano — PRC) , 4, 29, 
34, 50 

Cuban Workers Federation (Central de 
Trabajadores de Cuba — CTC), 50, 
124-25, 127-28, 151, 234, 258, 259 

Cuchillas de Toa, 94, 107 

currency, 152, 160, 161, 175, 210-11, 212 

dams, 106, 107 
death: causes of, 142-43 
death penalty, 286-87, 359-60 
"Declaration of Havana," 69 
deforestation, 92, 107 
del Valle Jimenez, Sergio, 335-36 
demographic indicators, 110-17, 119, 
121, 151 

demographic transition, 112, 113-16 
Department of State Security (Departa- 

mento de Seguridad del Estado — 

DSE), 289 
desertification, 104 
Diaz Sotolongo, Roberto, 347 
Directorio. See University Students 

Directorate 
discrimination, 123-24 
divorce, 129 
dollar (US), 92, 152 
dollarization, lxix, lxx, 152-53, 178 
Dorticos Torrado, Oswaldo, 64-65, 69 
drainage, 97-98 

drug trafficking, 86, 346-50, 360 
drug use, 154, 348-49 
Dulce, Domingo, 24 



Echeverria, Jose A., 62 

Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 163, 
201, 218 

economic dependence, xlvii, 39, 42, 56, 

66, 75-76, 79-80,81,83, 85 
economic development, 56, 66, 214 
economic diversification, 56, 66, 76, 79- 

80, 179 

economic growth, 162, 163-64, 174, 221 
economic performance, lxxxii, 163-66 
economic planning, 79 
economic recovery, 174 



economic reforms, lxix, 159-60, 166-79, 

222, 228, 246, 248, 258, 270 
education, 123, 144-49; adult, 145; 

enrollment, 146, 151; higher, 146; 

ideological content, 147-48, 149; 

medical, 148-49; military, 325-28; 

nationalization of, 145; preprimary, 

145-46; primary, 145-46; secondary, 

145- 46; vocational, 145; work-study, 

146- 47 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 68, 309 
elections, 36, 38, 55, 58, 63, 233-35, 243- 
45 

electoral fraud, 35, 36, 38, 40, 63 

electoral laws, 36, 234, 244-45 

elites: economic, 24-25, 28, 121; politi- 
cal, lxxii, 4, 55, 251, 253, 268-70, 271- 
72 

embargo, economic: by United States 
against Cuba, xlviii, 1, lvi, lvii, lviii, lix, 
lxi, lxiii, lxiv, lxv, lxvi, lxvii, lxviii, lxix, 
lxx-lxxi, lxxiii, lxxvii, lxxxi, 63, 69-70, 
134, 136-37, 276-78 

emigration, 66, 79, 84, 112, 115, 119-20, 
122, 130, 131, 152, 278, 350-53 

employment, 122, 151-52, 201-205 

encomenderos, 10 

encomienda system, 10, 13 

energy, 190-92 

Enlightenment, 21 

environmental regulations, 101-102 

environmental trends, 92, 100-110 

erosion, 104 

Escalona Reguera, Juan, 302 
espanolismo, 36 

Espin Guillois, Vilma, 126, 257, 324 

Espinosa Martin, Ramon, 303 

espiritismo, 132, 135 

Estrada Palma, Tomas, 34, 36, 40 

Ethiopia: Cuban military involvement in, 
75, 293 

ethnicity, 117-20 

European Commission, 277 

European Parliament, 277 

European Union (EU), lviii, lx, 276-77, 
334-35 

executions, 65, 68 

export-processing zones, 177, 221 

exports, 159, 161-62, 164, 212-14 

expropriations of properties and enter- 
prises, 65-66, 68, 69, 122, 228 



442 



Index 



Falklands War, li, lii, 82 

family life, 66, 129-31, 152 

family planning, 114, 129 

Federation of Cuban Women (Fede- 
racion de Mujeres Cubanas — FMC), 
79, 124-25, 126-27, 234, 256, 258, 
259, 314 

Federation of Secondary School Stu- 
dents (Federacion de Estudiantes de 
la Ensenanza Media— FEEM), 124-25, 
127, 234 

Federation of University Students (Fede- 
racion Estudiantil Universitaria — 
FEU), 39, 40, 59, 124-25 

fertility rate, 91, 113-14, 119, 120, 127 

Fillmore, Millard, 20 

financial sector, 177-78 

Finlay, Carlos J., 33 

Five-Year Plan, 79 

food crops, 105 

food rationing, 67, 79, 105, 165 

food self-sufficiency, 105 

food shortages, 150, 184 

food subsidies, 105 

foreign aid, 161, 214 

foreign debt, 76, 161, 215-16 

foreign exchange, 175-76 

foreign investment, lvii, lxix, 5, 159, 160- 

61, 175-79, 189, 198, 218-21, 228, 

233, 246-47, 248, 271-72 
foreign relations, xlviii, li, lxxv, 80-85, 

274-79 

foreign trade, lxvi, 159, 161-62, 164, 169, 

172-74, 177, 207-18, 227 
forestry, 102, 107-108 
Fox, Vicente, lxxviii-lxxix 
free-trade zones, 160, 177 

Garcia, Calixto, 27 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT), 276 
"generation of 1930," 41, 43, 44, 46, 49, 

52,53 

Geneva Convention (1949), 307 
Geneva Protocol (1924), 307 
geography, xlvii, 93-98 
glasnost, lvi, 85 

Global Social Product (GSP), 161, 162, 
206 

Golden Century (Cuba's), 21 
Golfo de Batabano, 93 



Golfo de Guacanayabo, 93 
Gomez, Jose Miguel, 36-38 
Gomez, Maximo, 26, 29, 30 
Gomez y Arias, Miguel Mariano, 50 
Gonzalez, Elian, lxvii, 129, 147, 278-79, 
351 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, liii-liv, lvi, 85, 162, 
299 

government system, 229—45; provincial 

and local, 240-43 
Granma, lxxx, 60 

Granma Province, 94, 120, 240, 243, 244, 
316 

Grau San Martin, Ramon, 4, 46-49, 50, 

51-52, 53-54, 57 
Great Depression, 113 
Greater Antilles, 93 

Grenada: Cuban activities in, li, lii, 294; 

United States military intervention in, 

lii, 80, 294 
"Grito de Yara," 25 

gross domestic product (GDP), 163-64, 

165, 166 
Guanahatabey, 6, 8 
Guantanamo, 112 
Guantanamo Bay, 34, 308 
Guantanamo Province, 94, 100, 120, 240, 

243, 244, 308, 316, 318 
guerrilla warfare, 60-64 
Guevara, Ernesto "Che," 1, 60, 68, 69, 

290-91, 292 
Giiines, 319 
Guiteras, Antonio, 48 



harbors, 94 
Hatuey, 8, 9 

Havana, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 98, 112, 117, 
121, 138, 193-95, 197, 221, 319, 321 

health care, 138-44, 149-50 

Helms-Burton Act, lix, lx, lxxi, 160-61, 
220, 276, 277, 278 

Hevia, Carlos, 42 

Hispaniola, 6, 7, 9 

Holgmn, 112, 321 

Holgmn Province, 94, 186, 240, 316, 319, 
321 

housing, 66, 117, 242 

human rights, lv-lvi, lx, lxi-lxii, lxv, lxix, 

lxxix, lxxx, 228, 249, 265-67, 272, 

353-56 

hurricanes, lxiii, lxxvii, 100, 148 



443 



Cuba: A Country Study 



hydroelectric power, 190 

immigration, 112, 113, 119 

imports, 159, 164, 212-14 

income distribution, 121, 122-24, 152, 

153, 154-55 
indentured workers, 112 
independence: struggle for, xlvii, 22, 23- 

34, 132 

Independent Colored Association 
(Agrupacion Independiente de 
Color— AIC), 38 

indigenous peoples, 3, 6-9, 15, 112 

indoctrination of society, by the party, 
77-78, 80, 85, 130, 146-47, 148, 154 

industrialization, 66, 67, 76, 79-80, 179 

infectious diseases, 113, 142 

inflation, 167 

informal sector, 151, 205-207 
Information Board, 23 
information technology, lxxii-lxiii 
Intelligence Directorate, 341-44 
intelligence threat, lxxiv-lxxv 
Inter-American Defense Board, 307 
Inter-American Defense College, 307 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 

Assistance (the Rio Treaty), 306-307 
internal security, 270-71, 287, 342-44, 

353-56 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA), 307 
"internationalism," xlviii, 1, liii, lxii, lxiii, 

5, 81-82, 86, 123, 138-39, 227-28, 

245, 246, 285, 290-91, 291-96, 310, 

334 

Internet, lxxii-lxxiii 

intervention in Cuba: by the United 

States, xlvii, 30-44 
invasion of Czechoslovakia: by the Soviet 

Union, 76 
irrigation, 106 

Isla de lajuventud (Isle of Youth), 93, 

148, 240, 244, 316 
Isla de Pinos (Isle of Pines), 39 
Islam, 136 



Jackson, Jesse, 355 
Jardinillos keys, 93 

John Paul II (Pope), lx, lxxx, 92-93, 
137-38, 239, 260-62, 272, 273, 354, 



355 

joint ventures, lix, 159, 160, 168, 176-77, 
178, 189, 196, 198-200, 204, 206, 219- 
21, 301 

Jordan Morales, Alfredo, 252 
Jose Marti International Airport, 195, 
319 

Juan Carlos (King) , 355 
Judaism, 131, 136, 262-63 
judiciary, 238-39 



Kennedy, John E, 70, 71-72 
Khrushchev, Nikita, 71, 72 



labor force, 122, 127-28, 160, 200-205, 
258 

labor, forced, 129 

labor unions, 258 

La Cabana Fortress, 327 

Lage Davila, Carlos, lxxii, 236, 238, 248, 

251-52, 270 
lagoons, 98 

Laguna de Barbacoa, 98 

Laguna de la Leche, 98 

Laguna del Tesoro, 98, 107 

La Habana. See Havana 

La Habana Province, 30, 94, 107, 120, 

121, 140, 240, 244, 251, 315, 319, 320, 

328 
lakes, 98 

landholding, 50-51, 103, 122, 185, 256- 

57 

land reform, 65-66, 122, 182-83, 256 
land tenure, 103 

land use, 97, 102-103, 104, 180, 182, 184 

Laredo Bru, Federico, 50 

Las Camariocas, 108 

Las Casas, Bartolome de, 7, 10 

Las Tunas Province, 94, 240, 243, 244, 

316, 318 
latifundios, 16, 103 

Latin America: Cuban relations with, li, 
lii, liii, liv, lv, lvii, lviii, lix, lx, lxii, lxv, 
box, lxxviii-lxxix, 276-77 
Latin American Medical University, 148 
Lazo Hernandez, Esteban, 236, 251, 
269-70 

Lease Agreement (1903), 34 
legislative branch. See National Assembly 
of People's Power 



444 



Index 



Lersundi, Francisco, 23, 24 
Liberal Party, 36, 38, 40 
liberation theology, 134 
life expectancy, 113 
Lincoln, Abraham, 20-21 
literacy, 66, 121, 126, 144, 145 
Little August War, 36 
Little War, 27 
livestock, 13, 105, 180, 184 
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 32 
Lopez Miera, Alvaro, 310 
Lopez, Narciso, 20 

Lourdes, lxxv, lxxvii, 275, 316, 320, 333- 
34 

Lugo Fonte, Orlando, 257 



Maceo, Antonio, 26, 27, 29, 30 
Machado Ventura, Jose Ramon, 236, 
251,269 

Machado y Morales, Gerardo, 4, 39-40, 
41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 58, 60 

Magoon, Charles E., 36 

Mahan, Alfred T., 32 

Majana, 107 

malnutrition, 121, 150 

mambises, 26, 28 

manifest destiny, 32 

manufacturing, 165, 174, 185-86, 204 

Mao Tse-tung, 72 

Mariel, port of, 94, 193, 221 

Mariel Boatlift, li, lxiv, 84, 115, 130 

Marti, Jose, 29, 31, 34, 35, 43, 58, 67, 79, 
230 

Martinez, Oswaldo, 263 
Martinez Campos, Arsenio, 27, 30 
Martinez Puentes, Ruben, 310-11 
Martinez Villena, Ruben, 41 
Marxism-Leninism, liv-lv, 5, 67, 79, 84- 

85, 86, 130, 147-48, 154, 167, 230, 

231, 246, 307 
mass media, 198, 267-68 
mass organizations, 79, 92, 124-28, 154, 

256-59 
Matanzas, 193-95, 326 
Matanzas Province, 59-60, 94, 240, 243, 

244, 251, 316, 319, 321 
McKinley, William, 32 
McKinley Tariff (1890), 31 
Mendieta, Carlos, 41-42, 48, 50 
Menocal, Mario Garcia, 38, 42, 43, 51-52 
mercantilist economic policy, 14, 21, 24- 



25 

Merchant Marine, 320 

Mexico: Cuban relations with, lxv, 

lxxviii-lxxix, 277 
migration, internal, 117 
Mikoyan, Anastas, 68-69 
militarization of society, lviii-lix, 40-41, 

45, 76, 80, 122, 128-29 
military assistance, 71, 293-94, 299-300, 

310 

military intervention in politics, 45, 48, 
50, 76 

military ranks, uniforms, and insignia, 
328-33 

Military Units in Support of Production 
(Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Pro- 
duction— UMAPS) , 129 
mining, 108, 176, 186-89 
Ministry of Basic Industries, 191 
Ministry of Education, 145, 146 
Ministry of Foodstuffs Industry, 186 
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 172 
Ministry of Health and Social Assistance, 
140 

Ministry of Higher Education, 146 

Ministry of Interior, liv, 86, 235, 286, 289, 
295, 298, 302, 306, 335-40; Border 
Guard Troops of, 338-40; Intelligence 
Directorate under, 341-44; leader- 
ship and organization of, 335-37; Spe- 
cial Troops of, 337-38 

Ministry of Justice, 238, 239 

Ministry of Labor, 170 

Ministry of Light Industry, 202-203 

Ministry of Public Health, 138-39, 141 

Ministry of Science, Technology, and the 
Environment, 101-102 

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias — MIN- 
FAR),lxxi, 287, 295-307 

Ministry of Tourism, 217 

Miro Cardona, Jose, 64 

Moa, 186 

MoaBay, 108, 110, 186 

Moncada military barracks: attack on, 

58, 60, 251 
Monroe Doctrine, 24 
Montecristi conspiracy, 59 
mortality rate, 91, 113-14, 119, 120, 150; 

infant, 113-14, 119; maternal, 114 
mountain ranges, 94-97 



445 



Cuba: A Country Study 



mulattos, 117, 119, 120, 122 
Municipal Commission for Candidacies, 
240 

municipalities, 240-43, 256 



National Assembly of People's Power 
(Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popu- 
lar— ANPP), lxxii, lxxx, 160, 167, 168, 
176, 230, 231-35, 237, 238, 239, 243- 
45, 255, 280, 304-305 

National Association of Small Farmers 
(Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores 
Pequenos — ANAP) , 124-25, 128, 234, 
256, 257, 258, 259, 314 

National Commission for Candidacies, 
234, 240 

National Commission for Environmental 
Protection and Conservation of Natu- 
ral Resources (Comision Nacional 
para la Proteccion del Medio Ambi- 
ente y la Conservacion de los Recursos 
Naturales — Comarna), 101 

National Defense Council, 305, 306, 312 

National Drug Commission, 347 

national identity, 8-9, 16-17, 25, 28, 35- 
36, 39, 42 

nationalism, 39, 231 

Nationalist Union, 41 

nationalization (economic), xlix, 46, 47, 
65-66, 68, 69, 122 

national parks, 107 

National Revolutionary Militias (Mili- 

cias Nacionales Revolucionarias — 

MNR), 288, 289, 290 
National Revolutionary Police (Policia 

Nacional Revolucionaria — PNR), 125, 

340-41 

National Statistical Office (Oficina 
Nacional de Estadisticas — ONE), 163 

National Trade Union of Agricultural 
and Forestry Workers (Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y 
Forestales — SNTAF) , 128 

natural gas, 190 

naval blockade, 71-72 

navy. See Revolutionary Navy 

Nicaragua: Cuban activities in, lv, 82, 294 

Nicaro, 108 

nickel production, lxxxii, 108, 165, 185, 

186-89, 217 
Nonaligned Movement, li, 76, 81 



nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), 125, 263-65 

North American Free Trade Agree- 
ment, 220 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT), 307 
nuclear power, 190, 275 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), 72 
Nuevitas, 193-95 
nutrition, 105, 121, 150 

Ocampo, Sebastian de, 9 

occupation, of Cuba: by Britain, xlvii, liv, 

17-18; by the United States, 21, 32-34 
Ochoa affair, liv, 295-98, 302-303, 336, 

349-50 

Ochoa Sanchez, Arnaldo, 86, 296, 336, 
349-50 

Office of the State Prosecutor, 239 
offshore drilling, 110 
oil exploration, 110, 191 
oil imports, lxxxii, 110, 191-92, 208-209, 
213-14 

oil production, 110, 165, 190-92 
Organization of American States (OAS), 

xlix, 1, liii, liv, lv, lvii, lviii, lx, lxii, 71, 

307 

Organization of Jose Marti Pioneers 
(Organizacion de Pioneros Jose 
Marti— OPJM), 127, 314, 326 
organized labor, 49, 50, 127-28 
Oriente Province, 25, 33, 38, 42, 57, 60, 
121 

Ortega, Jaime, 261 

Orthodox Party, 54, 55, 56, 57 

Ostend Manifesto, 20 

Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction (1997), 307 

Ovando, Nicolas de, 9 



Pact of Zanjon, 27 

Panama Canal, 30 

Pan de Guajaibon, 97 

party congresses, 78, 203, 230, 245-51, 

252-56, 257, 303 
party control of society, 78-80, 228-29, 

271-74 
party structure, 78, 249-56 



446 



Index 



Paya, Oswaldo, lxxx 

Penal Code, 286-87, 348, 356, 357, 359- 
60 

penal system, 356-62 

peninsulares. See Peninsulars 

Peninsulars, 12, 22, 23-24, 28 

Pentecostal churches, 137 

People's Councils, 243 

People's Socialist Party (Partido Socia- 

lista Popular— PSP), 52-53, 58, 67 
perestroika, 85, 162 
Perez Betancourt, Pedro Miguel, 311 
Perez Morales, Alvaro, 302 
Perez Roque, Felipe, lxxvi 
Permanent Reciprocity Treaty (1903), 

34 

personalismo, 35, 78 

peso, convertible, 176, 211-12 

Pico La Cuca, 97 

Pico Real del Turquino, 94 

Pico San Juan, 97 

Pierce, Franklin, 20 

Pinar del Rio Province, 30, 42, 93, 94, 97, 
103, 104, 121, 240, 243, 244, 315, 319, 
321, 326 

Pizarro, Francisco, 9 

plantation economy, 20 

plantation system, 16 

"plantocracy," 19-20 

Piatt, Orville H., 33 

Piatt Amendment, xlvii, lxvii, 33, 34-44, 

46, 47, 308 
"Piatt Amendment complex," 42-43 
police. See National Revolutionary 

Police 

Political Bureau, 78, 137, 228, 235, 247, 
249-52, 253, 254, 257, 258, 264, 271, 
280, 303 

political dynamics, 229, 268-74, 279-80 
political opposition, lxxx, lxxxi, 239, 

265-67, 272 
political participation, 245 
political parties, 67, 245 
political prisoners, lxi, 239, 353-56 
political repression, xlix, lv, lx, lxii, 57, 

67, 70, 239, 245, 353 
political violence, 36, 38, 45, 53, 57 
Polk, James K., 20 
pollution, 108-109, 110 
Popular Party, 40 

population, 110-17; density of, 111; size 
and growth of, xlvii, 110-11 



Portal Leon, Marcos, 252, 270 
ports, 94, 193-95 
precipitation, 98-100 
priests, 15, 132, 133 
Prieto Jimenez, Abel, 252, 270 
Prio Socarras, Carlos, 4, 53 54, 59, 60 
prison system, 360-61 
private property, 122, 160, 176, 231 
privatization, 231 
prostitution, 149, 153-54, 345 
Protestants, 132, 135-36, 262 
"Protest of Baragua," 27 
provinces, 79, 240, 243, 256 
Provincial Commission for Candidacies, 
240 

public health, 139-40, 141, 144 

public works, 36, 40, 50, 52 

Puerto Gibara, 94 

Puerto Principe, 10 

PuntaGorda, 108 

Punta Santa Ana, 326 

Putin, Vladimir, lxxiii-lxxiv, lxxv 



Quintas Sola, Joaquin, 316 

racial composition, 117-20 
racial conflict, 38 
railroads, 192, 193 
Ramirez Cruz, Jose, 257 
reforestation, 102, 107 
Reform Commission, 23 
reformism, 22, 28, 49-55 
Reformist Party, 22 

religion, 92, 131-38, 228, 259-63; free- 
dom of, lxix-lxx, lxxxii, 134, 230, 231, 
259 

remittances, cash, lxi, lxvi, lxix, lxx, lxx- 
vii, 92, 131, 149, 152, 153, 161, 175, 
178 

reservoirs, 98 

revolution (1933), 4, 44-49 

revolution (1959). See Cuban Revolution 

revolution, export of, xlix, 1, 68, 69, 74- 
75, 81-82; 290-91 

Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias — FAR) , lvii, 
lxxi, 127, 235, 269, 270-71, 285-307, 
310-35; agricultural production by, 
295, 298, 300; air forces, 319-20; 
armed services of, 310; army, 315-19; 



447 



Cuba: A Country Study 



background, 287-95; economic role, 
300-301, 310; "internationalist" mis- 
sions, 291-95, 310, 311-12, 324; 
involvement in the government and 
party, 301-304; manpower, 311, 322- 
25; military doctrine, 312; missions, 
311-12; navy, 320-21; ranks, insignia, 
and uniforms, 328-33; relations with 
other armed forces, 334-35; relations 
with Russia, 333-34; role in public life, 
271; Soviet military assistance to, 299- 
300, 310; training and education, 325- 
28; women in, 324-25 
Revolutionary Army, 310, 315-19 
Revolutionary Directorate, 59, 60-62, 63 
Revolutionary Junta of Cuba, 25 
Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra 
Revolucionaria— MGR), 310, 315, 
320-21, 350 
rice production, 104, 105, 180, 184-85 
Rivero Agiiero, Andres, 63-64 
rivers, 97-98 
roads, 192-93 

Robaina Gonzalez, Roberto, 252 
Rodriguez Garcia, Jose Luis, 258, 263, 
270 

Rodriguez Romay, Orlando Felipe, 302 
Roman Catholic Church, 15, 131, 132- 

34, 138, 144, 150, 259-62, 268 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 45, 47, 52 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 32 
Rosales del Toro, Ulises, 252, 270, 302, 

303, 310 
Ross Leal, Pedro, 257 
Rural Guard, 62 

Russia: Cuban relations with, lxxiii-lxxiv, 
275-76, 333-34 



Sagua la Grande River, 97, 98 

Saldo River, 98 

salinization, 97, 104, 107 

San Antonio de los Bahos, 319 

Sancti Spiritus, 10, 319 

Sancti Spiritus Province, 94-97, 120, 

240, 243, 316, 319 
Sandinistas, 5, 75, 81-82, 294 
Sanguily, Manuel, 32 
sanitation, 106, 109, 121 
San Julian, 319 

Santa Clara, 112, 138, 316, 319 
Santamaria Cuadrado, Aldo, 350 



santeria, 132, 135, 262 

Santiago de Cuba, 10, 11-12, 112, 138, 

193-95, 316 
Santiago de Cuba Province, 94, 120, 240, 

243, 244, 251, 316, 319 
Schools in the Countryside, 146-47 
second economy, 151, 205-207 
self-employment, 160, 169-71, 246, 258 
Senate, 32, 38 
Serrano, Francisco, 24 
Seven Years War, 17 
sewerage systems, 106, 109 
Sierra de Cristal, 94, 107 
Sierra de Cubitas, 107 
Sierra de Escambray, 94-97, 103, 107 
Sierra de los Organos, 97, 107 
Sierra del Rosario, 97 
Sierra de Nicaro, 94 
Sierra de Nipe, 94, 108 
Sierra de Trinidad, 97 
Sierra Maestra mountain range, 60, 61, 

62, 94, 107, 308 
slave rebellions, 16, 20 
slavery: abolition of, in Cuba, 22, 28: 

legacy of, 121 
slaves, 15-16, 18, 26-27, 112, 118, 134 
slave trade, 18, 19, 21, 22 
social change, 153, 154-55 
social engineering, 154 
socialism, in Cuba, lvi, lxxxi, 65-66, 76, 

78-79, 85-86, 122, 154, 167, 228, 231, 

274 

socialization, 124-31 

social mobility, 122-24 

social security, 122, 151 

social services, 242 

social structure, 118, 120-24 

social welfare, 50, 52, 91, 122, 151, 154 

soil compaction, 104 

soil conservation, 104 

soil contamination, 104 

soil degradation, 104, 180 

Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 5, 75, 82 

Soviet military involvement in Cuba, 71, 

293-94, 299-300 
Soviet Union: Cuban relations with, liii- 

liv, 67, 68-69, 71, 72, 74, 75-77, 80, 81, 

82-85, 227-28, 290, 293-94, 299-300 
Spanish-American War, xlvii, 3, 21, 24, 

32, 113, 132, 308 
Spanish heritage, 9 

Special Period, 91, 92, 103, 106, 109- 



448 



Index 



110, 128, 131, 136-37, 149, 150, 159, 

162, 221, 298 
Special Troops, 292, 337-38 
standard of living, 76, 121, 159, 160, 222, 

228 

State Committee for Technical and 
Material Supply (Comite Estatal de 
Abastecimiento Tecnico-Material — 
CEATM), 172 

State Committee on Labor and Social 
Security (Comite Estatal de Trabajo y 
Seguridad Social— CETSS) , 203 

state farms, 102-103, 160, 171, 183, 185 

Straits of Florida, 278, 351 

Student Left Wing (Ala Izquierda Estu- 
diantil— ATE), 41 

subsidies, Soviet, lvii, lxxv, 80, 91, 100, 
105, 109, 144, 149, 208, 209, 210, 227, 
247, 251 

subsistence agriculture, 122, 183—85 

Sugar Coordination Law, 50 

sugar production, lxxxii, 3, 13, 18-19, 

21, 56, 104, 105, 121, 159, 165, 180- 

84, 217 
sugar slavocracy, 24-25, 28 
Supreme Court, 233, 238, 360 
sustainable development, 101, 102 
System for Managerial Improvement 

(Sistema de Perfeccionamiento 

Empresarial— SPE), 286, 300 

Tacon, Miguel, 24 
Taino, 6, 7, 8, 9-10 
tariffs, 177 

tax code, 168, 170-71 

Taylor, Zachary, 20 

teachers, 150 

technology transfers, 221 

telecommunications, 195-98 

Teller, Henry M., 32 

Teller Resolution, 32 

Ten Years' War, 23-29 

Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de 

Tropas Territoriales — MTT), 311, 

312-14 

terrorism threat, lxxv-lxxvi, lxxix 
tobacco production, 3, 13-14, 19, 180, 

183, 184 
topography, 94-97 
Torricelli, Robert G., 276 
tourism, xlix, lv, lvii, lxix, lxx, lxxvii, 



lxxxii, 110, 152-53, 159, 165, 167, 180, 

198-200, 217, 286 
trade deficits, 209-210 
transportation, 165, 192-95 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 

Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 

Tlatelolco),307 
Treaty of Paris (1763), 17 
Treaty of Paris (1898), 32 
Treaty of Relations (1903), 34 
Trejo, Rafael, 41 
tribunals, revolutionary, 65, 68 
Trinidad, 10 

tropical fruit production, 183-84 
Twenty-Sixth of July Movement, 60, 61, 
62, 63, 64, 67, 70 



Unconditional Spanish Party, 22 
underemployment, 80, 151 
unemployment, 76, 122, 151-52, 201- 
203 

Union of Young Communists (Union de 
Jovenes Comunistas — UJC), 124-25, 
126, 127, 134, 253, 254-55, 326 

United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme (UNDP) , lxxviii, 109 

United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 151, 152 

United Nations General Assembly, lviii, 
lix, lx, lxi, lxii, lxiii-lxiv, lxvi, lxix, 
lxxvi, lxxvii, 277 

United Nations Security Council, hi 

United States: Cuban relations with, 
lxvii, lxxiii, lxxvi, lxxix, lxxxi, 67-70, 
83-84, 86, 227-28, 276-79, 306-307, 
308-10 

United States Border Patrol, 351 
United States Coast Guard, 115, 347-48, 
350, 352 

United States-Cuba Trade and Economic 

Council, 219 
United States Marines, 36, 38, 308, 309 
United States Naval Station at Guan- 

tanamo Bay, lxvii, 33, 34-35, 278, 307, 

308-310, 316 
United States Navy, 308, 309 
University Council, 41 
University of Havana, 47, 52, 54, 55, 59, 

67 

University Reform Commission, 39, 40 



449 



Cuba: A Country Study 



University Students Directorate (Direc- 
torio Estudiantil Universitario — 
DEU), 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 53 

urbanization, 112, 121, 122 

Urrutia, Manuel, 64 



Valdes Menendez, Ramiro, 335-36 

Varadero, 110, 195, 228 

Varela, Felix, lxxx 

Varela Project, lxxx, lxxxi, lxxxii 

Veiga Menendez, Roberto, 257 

Velazquez de Cuellar, Diego, 9, 10, 11 

Villa Clara Province, 120, 240, 243, 244, 

316, 319 
Villanueva University, 132 



wages, 201 

War of All the People (Guerra de Todo 

el Pueblo— GTP), 312, 313 
Watergate scandal, 74 



water resources, 105-107 
water use, 105-107 

Welles, Benjamin Sumner, 42, 43, 47, 

48-49 
Weyler, Valeriano, 30 
women's organizations, 126-27 
women's rights, 66, 123-24 
Wood, Leonard, 33, 34 
work-study programs, 146-47 
World Trade Agreement, 220 
World War II, 52 

yellow fever, 33 

Youth Labor Army (Ejercito Juvenil de 
Trabajo— EJT), 124-25, 129, 291, 311 
youth organizations, 126-27 
Yucatan Peninsula, xlvii, 93 



Zayas y Alonso, Alfredo, 39 
Zaza River, 97, 98 



450 



Contributors 



Sergio Diaz-Briquets is Senior Division Director, Casals and 
Associates, Arlington, Virginia. He has written extensively 
on Cuban social and environmental issues. 

Jorge I. Dominguez is Director, Weatherhead Center for Inter- 
national Affairs, and Clarence Dillon Professor of Interna- 
tional Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. He has written extensively on Cuban politi- 
cal affairs and foreign relations. 

Rex A. Hudson is Senior Research Specialist in Latin American 
Affairs with the Federal Research Division of the Library 
of Congress. His earlier research on Cuba focused on 
Cuban support for insurgency in Latin America and 
Cuban diplomatic relations in the region. 

Enrique J. Lopez is an international information technology 
consultant and President, AKL Group, Inc., Coral Cables, 
Florida. 

Jorge Perez-Lopez is Director, Office of International Eco- 
nomic Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 
United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. He 
has written extensively on the Cuban economy. 

Jaime Suchlicki is Professor of History, Graduate School of 
International Studies, and Director, Institute for Cuban 
and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS), University of 
Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. He has written extensively 
on Cuban history. 

Phyllis Greene Walker is a Washington-area political scientist 
who has written extensively on Cuban military and secu- 
rity affairs. 



451 



Published Country Studies 
(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


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550-^4 


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Senegal 
Sierra Leone 

Singapore 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Soviet Union 
Spain 

Sri Lanka 

Sudan 

Syria 

Tanzania 

Thailand 

Tunisia 

Turkey 

Uganda 

Uruguay 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 
Yemens, The 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 

Zimbabwe 



454 



PIN:006950-000 



